The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . Hours Hours Amount Requested Awarded Attorney Work $198.15 19.95 15.85 $3,140.68 Paralegal Work $ 90.00 15.15 . . . 15.15 $1,363.50 Attorney Work $ 90.00 - 1 $ 90.00 at Paralegal Rate Attorney Work $ 99.08 - 3 $ 297.24 . . .
. . . . § 15.15[3] (3d ed.1999)) II. . . .
. . . A [15.15]; Facebook Page, Ex. B [15.15]; Groupon Offer, Ex. E [15.18]; Whitepages Listing, Ex. . . . reasonable estimate of at least 103 patrons each month, based on Defendants’ Facebook page. ([15.1]; [15.15 . . .
. . . See 3-15 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) . . .
. . . Though the lowest permissible sentence under the Criminal Punishment Code was 15.15 months in the Department . . .
. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15 (2d ed.1983). . . .
. . . Comparing that figure to the 36.8% calculation resulted in an absolute disparity of 15.15%. . . .
. . . For this period, the agency calculated a one-year inflation rate of 7.57 percent, or 15.15 percent over . . .
. . . See also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 15.15[3] (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2000) (“An amendment is futile . . .
. . . The rate on that card appears to be variable starting at 15.15% and fluctuating with 12.9% and 4.9%. . . . deposition, she agreed that the account statements for -5888 showed a variable rate that fluctuated from 15.15% . . . Moreover, the July 2005 billing statement shows a Purchase APR of 15.15% and a Cash Advance APR of 20.24% . . .
. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15[3], p. 15-194 (1984). . . .
. . . Section 15.15 of the Loan and Security Agreement states: “This Agreement and the Notes shall be construed . . .
. . . Penal Law § 15.15(1), when the term “intentionally” appears in a criminal statute, “it is presumed to . . .
. . . .”); see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) . . .
. . . United States, 405 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir.1968) (quoting 3 Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 15.15[2]). . . .
. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15[2]. . . .
. . . situation, the purpose of the statute of limitations would be defeated. 3 Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 15.15 . . .
. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15 [4.-2] (2d ed. 1982)). . . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, § 15.15 [4.-2] (2d ed.1978)); see also Goodman v. . . .
. . . In particular, the Agreement states that: 15.15 Governing Law. . . .
. . . the use of judicial resources and the impact on the judicial system.” 3 Moore’s Federal, Practice § 15.15 . . .
. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15[3], p. 15-194 (2d ed. 1984))). . . .
. . . See also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 15.15[3] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) . . .
. . . A, § 15.15.) . . .
. . . . § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000)). . . .
. . . . § 15.15[3] (3d ed.2000)); accord In re Interbank Funding Corp. Secs. . . . Prac. 3d § 15.15 (3d. ed.2000)). . . .
. . . . § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000)). . . .
. . . Mineta, 205 F.R.D. 29, 31 (D.D.C.2001) (quoting 3 Moore’s federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000)); . . .
. . . . § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 1999)). . . . .
. . . .”); see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000) (“An amendment is futile if it merely . . .
. . . contract prices increased from $14.11 to $15.55; and August 2004 contract prices increased from $14.12 to $15.15 . . .
. . . . § 15.15(1). . . .
. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed.); see also Winget v. . . .
. . . Prac. 3d § 15.15[3]); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . .
. . . Practice ¶ 15.15 [4.-1], at 15-220 (1982)); Advisory Comm. . . .
. . . Prac. 3d § 15.15[3]); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . .
. . . Prac. 3d § 15.15[3]); see also Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . .
. . . Prac. 3d § 15.15[3]); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . .
. . . Prac. 3d § 15.15[3]); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . .
. . . On September 19, 2007, counsel for the Funds sent Mark a letter invoking § 15.15(c) of the CBA and requesting . . .
. . . Specifically, Defendants contend Section 15.15 of the Operating Agreement bars Plaintiff from enforcing . . . Plaintiff responds that Section 15.15 applies to third-party beneficiaries, not secured creditors such . . . Additionally, Plaintiff argues Defendants’ interpretation of Section 15.15 conflicts with the UCC. . . . Defendants reply that Section 15.15 is a substantive provision applying to all creditors. . . . Section 15.15 of the Operating Agreement states that “[n]one of the provisions of this Agreement shall . . .
. . . .”); 3 James Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[l]-[3] (3d ed. 1997). Turkenitz v. . . .
. . . Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000 . . .
. . . .”); 3 James Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[1]-[3] (3d ed. 1997). Turkenitz v. . . .
. . . Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice-Civil § 15.15[2] (3d ed.1997), and 6 C. Wright, A. . . .
. . . Prac. 3d § 15.15[3]); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . .
. . . Prac. 3d § 15.15[3]); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . .
. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice, § 15.15[3], at 15—47 to 15-48 (3d ed. 2000). . . .
. . . PRAC. 3d § 15.15[3]); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . .
. . . Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000 . . .
. . . Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000 . . .
. . . Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000 . . .
. . . Prac. 3d § 15.15[3]); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . .
. . . PRACTICE § 15.15[3] (3d ed.2000)); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . .
. . . Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed.2000 . . .
. . . Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000 . . .
. . . Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000 . . .
. . . Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000 . . .
. . . . § 15.15[2] (3d ed.2000) (observing that “the party opposing amendment bears a burden of production . . .
. . . advertising and promotional spending increased by over 21% from 2002 to 2003, rising to a staggering $15.15 . . .
. . . Therefore, for the reasons stated, no costs are allowed while fees in the amount of $2,272.50 (15.15 . . .
. . . , Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 15.15[2], at 15-145 (2d Ed.2005). . . .
. . . Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also 3 Moore's Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2000 . . .
. . . Penal Law § 15.15, even an intoxicated person may be capable of forming the requisite intent. . . .
. . . Penal Law § 15.15, even an intoxicated person may be capable of forming the requisite intent. . . .
. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice— Civil § 15.15[2] (3d ed.1997); 6 Wright et al., supra, § 1488 . . . .2004) (same), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 420, 163 L.Ed.2d 320 (2005); 3 Moore et al., supra, § 15.15 . . .
. . . . § 15.15(e) (providing the Secretary of Transportation with discretion to share specific records or . . .
. . . The plea agreement provided that Scott would receive concurrent sentences of 15.15 months in prison with . . .
. . . amendments which correct the specific factual details will relate back. 3 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15 . . .
. . . Detroit News, Inc., 211 F.Supp.2d 101, 114 (D.D.C.2002) (quoting 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3 . . .
. . . . § 15.15(2) provides in relevant part that “[a] statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating . . . Second, even if the intent were not clear, section 15.15(2) would engraft onto section 263.05 only some . . . As is clear from section 15.15(1), while that level of “mental culpability” could encompass “intentional . . . Thus, if this Court’s analysis of the statute is correct, section 15.15(1) would mandate only that the . . . Thus, because the second half of the statute contains no scienter requirement, section 15.15(1) by its . . .
. . . granting Advanta a lien upon the Home; an interest rate of 14.25%; an annual percentage rate (“APR”) of 15.15% . . . Advanta offered Fisher the Mortgage with a 14.25% interest rate and an effective APR of 15.15%. . . .
. . . Freer, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15[4.-2] at 161 (2d ed.1993). See Skoczylas v. . . .
. . . purposes of compensation, D/COs are classified as Grade 18 positions and receive between $13.13 and $15.15 . . .
. . . . § 15.15[3] (3d ed.2000) (defining futility)); compare Compl. HH 67, 73, 80, 87, 143 with Am. . . .
. . . the use of judicial resources and the impact on the judicial system.” 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15 . . .
. . . requires tight tolerances for the size of the center hole; it may be no less than 15.0 mm and no more than 15.15 . . .
. . . sentence points, as reflected on the criminal punishment code worksheet equaled 48.2, requiring that a 15.15 . . .
. . . Detroit News, Inc., 211 F.Supp.2d 101, 114 (D.D.C.2002) (quoting 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3 . . .
. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15(2), at 1021)). “ ‘The Federal rule on the “relation back” of . . .
. . . Nevertheless, under the IRCP, they still would have been obligated to pay $15.15 based on their 2001 . . . than participating in the IRCP when they did not have the funds available to make even the modest $15.15 . . . Furthermore, based on their present circumstances, their payments would be $15.15 at the most and $0 . . .
. . . . § 15.15[3]); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. . . . Prac. § 15.15[1], . . .
. . . Detroit News, Inc., 211 F.Supp.2d 101, 114 (D.D.C.2002) (quoting 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3 . . .
. . . [or], reasserts a claim on which the court previously ruled”) (quoting 3 Moore's Federal Practice § 15.15 . . .
. . . amendments which correct the specific factual details will relate back. 3 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15 . . .
. . . Detroit News, Inc., 211 F.Supp.2d 101, 114 (D.D.C.2002) (quoting 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3 . . .
. . . immediate effect on the parties invoking the court’s jurisdiction); Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise, § 15.15 . . .
. . . insufficient and it would be futile to grant leave to amend.” 3 Moore’s Federal Practice (3d ed.1997) § 15.15 . . .
. . . (citing 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (3d. ed.2002)). . . .
. . . to state a legal theory, or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.” 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15 . . . complaint would survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion. 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15 . . .
. . . fails to state a legal theory, or could not withstand a motion to dismiss. 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15 . . .
. . . receive was 22 months where he had one prior felony conviction and a minimum recommended sentence of 15.15 . . .
. . . to state a legal theory, or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.” 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15 . . .
. . . to state a legal theory, or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.” 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15 . . . 994 F.2d at 876, and because the complaint is not clearly futile, see 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15 . . .
. . . to state a legal theory, or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.” 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15 . . .
. . . Section 15.15 states that the Agreement "shall become effective, of full force and effect and the parties . . .
. . . jurisdiction in the dispensable party’s absence); 3 James William Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15 . . .
. . . ... will relate back .... ” (footnotes omitted)); 3 James William Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15 . . .
. . . primarily in the form of overdrafts on certain of its operating accounts at BNY — -in the amount of $15.15 . . . MIBL subsequently defaulted on its obligation to repay the $15.15 million. . . . To satisfy this obligation, BNY liquidated Meridien Tanzania’s pledged account in the amount of $15.15 . . . The manager questioned the validity of the Meridien Tanzania Agreement and demanded return of the $15.15 . . . seeking, inter alia, (1) a declaratory judgment that BNY, not Meridien Tanzania, had the right to the $15.15 . . .
. . . primarily in the form of overdrafts on certain of its operating accounts at BNY — in the amount of $15.15 . . . MIBL subsequently defaulted on its obligation to repay the $15.15 million. . . . To satisfy this obligation, BNY liquidated Meridien Tanzania’s pledged account in the amount of $15.15 . . . The manager questioned the validity of the Meridien Tanzania Agreement and demanded return of the $15.15 . . . seeking, inter alia, (1) a declaratory judgment that BNY, not Meridien Tanzania, had the right to the $15.15 . . .
. . . legal theory, or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.” 3 Moore & Freer, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15 . . .