Cases from cite.case.law:

UNITED STATES v. WALLEN,, 874 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2017)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15 (1) (same); Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.209 (same); S.D. . . .

SILVA, v. KEYSER,, 271 F. Supp. 3d 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)

. . . . § 35.15(2)(a); see also Bonilla v. Lee, 35 F.Supp.3d 551, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). . . .

IN RE S. POWELL, v. S., 567 B.R. 429 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2017)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15— was actually litigated or otherwise placed in issue in the prior proceeding. . . . Penal Law § 35.15 (McKinney). . . .

WILLIAMS, v. DAVIS,, 192 F. Supp. 3d 732 (S.D. Tex. 2016)

. . . Pro. art 35.15(a). . . .

RODRIGUEZ, v. HEATH,, 648 F. App'x 136 (2d Cir. 2016)

. . . Under New York Penal Law § 35.15, a justification charge is warranted if “any reasonable view of the . . . Penal Law § 35.15(l)(b), (2)(a). . . .

IN RE R. SOLIMAN, v. R., 539 B.R. 692 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15; see also In re Graham, 455 B.R. 227 (Bankr.D.Colo.2011) (stating that the “[d]efendant . . . Penal Law § 35.15 (emphasis added). . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a), deadly physical force cannot be used if retreat can be made in complete safety . . . Penal Law § 35.15(1); see also People v. . . .

RODRIGUEZ, v. HEATH,, 138 F. Supp. 3d 237 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15; see also Jackson v. Edwards, 404 F.3d 612, 623 (2d Cir.2005). . . . Penal Law § 35.15(1). . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a). . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a). . . . Penal Law § 35.15(1)(b). . . .

DOAK, v. JOHNSON, U. S., 798 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2015)

. . . nearly exhausted her twelve weeks of FMLA leave and had negative balances of 233 hours of sick leave and 35.15 . . .

DOAK, v. JOHNSON, U. S., 418 U.S. App. D.C. 375 (D.C. Cir. 2015)

. . . nearly exhausted her twelve weeks of FMLA leave and had negative balances of 233 hours of sick leave and 35.15 . . .

SMITH, v. ARTUS,, 610 F. App'x 23 (2d Cir. 2015)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15(1), though “[a] person may not use deadly physical force upon another person ... unless . . . other person is using or about to use deadly physical force” or certain other conditions are met, id. § 35.15 . . .

BONILLA, v. LEE,, 35 F. Supp. 3d 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)

. . . New York Penal Law § 35.15(2) provides in relevant part that a person may not use deadly physical force . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a). . . .

DOAK, v. JOHNSON,, 19 F. Supp. 3d 259 (D.D.C. 2014)

. . . remaining, and that she currently had negative leaves balances of 233 hours of sick leave and negative 35.15 . . .

UNITED STATES v. DAVIS,, 531 F. App'x 65 (2d Cir. 2013)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15(1) (McKinney 2004). . . .

GARGUILIO, v. HEATH,, 293 F.R.D. 146 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15. . . .

LEVY, v. CITY OF NEW YORK,, 935 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15 states, “A person may ... use physical force upon another person when and to the extent . . . Penal Law § 35.15, thus negating a finding of probable cause. . . .

NORTHEASTERN RURAL ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION, v. WABASH VALLEY POWER ASSOCIATION, INC., 707 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 35.15 (requiring notice and filing with FERC to cancel or terminate a rate schedule). . . . Id.; 18 C.F.R. § 35.15. . . .

COUNCIL OF CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,, 692 F.3d 172 (D.C. Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 35.15 (“When a rate schedule, tariff or service agreement or part thereof required to be on file . . .

HUBRECHT, v. ARTUS,, 457 F. App'x 29 (2d Cir. 2012)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)). . . .

PUERTO RICO TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC. v. TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATORY BOARD OF PUERTO RICO L v. L, 665 F.3d 309 (1st Cir. 2011)

. . . Consequently, upon reconsideration, we reject the Arbitrator’s requirement to increase demand by 35.15 . . .

RODRIGUEZ, v. ERCOLE,, 421 F. App'x 118 (2d Cir. 2011)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15. . . .

M. LINNEN, v. POOLE,, 766 F. Supp. 2d 427 (W.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15, and the defense of extreme emotional disturbance, which is a partial affirmative defense . . .

CALDWELL, v. THALER,, 770 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Tex. 2011)

. . . Code Crim Proc. art. 35.15(b). . . . .

DeLEON, v. LEMPKE,, 401 F. App'x 610 (2d Cir. 2010)

. . . New York Penal Law § 35.15 provides that the use of force is justified in the following circumstances . . . Penal Law § 35.15 (McKinney 1997). . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)). . . .

PETRONIO, v. WALSH,, 736 F. Supp. 2d 640 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a). . . .

BARNEY, v. T. CONWAY,, 730 F. Supp. 2d 264 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . and use of force are not the same, and justification, by the very words of the statute (Penal Law § 35.15 . . . does not involve the use of physical force, there are no circumstances when justification (Penal Law § 35.15 . . .

SMITH, v. PEREZ,, 722 F. Supp. 2d 356 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a), and the defensive use of deadly physical force against a rape or sodomy, or . . . attempt to commit a rape or sodomy, id., § 35.15(2)(b). . . .

CUNNINGHAM, v. T. CONWAY,, 717 F. Supp. 2d 339 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a); see People v. . . .

THEME PROMOTIONS, INC. a d b a Co- Op v. NEWS AMERICA MARKETING FSI, INC. a, 731 F. Supp. 2d 937 (N.D. Cal. 2010)

. . . locality-based pay differentials between the Washington-Baltimore area (+24.22%) and the San Francisco area ( + 35.15% . . .

DINGLE, v. MANCE, M., 716 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . . § 35.15(1). . Id. § 35.15(2)(a). . Id. § 35.15(2)(a)(i). . Jackson v. . . .

M. LINNEN, v. POOLE,, 689 F. Supp. 2d 501 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15, and the defense of extreme emotional disturbance, which is a partial affirmative defense . . .

ROBINSON, v. ARTUS,, 674 F. Supp. 2d 435 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)

. . . a jury instruction on the defense of justification (self-defense) pursuant to New York Penal Law § 35.15 . . . court should have given an “initial aggressor” charge as part of its instruction pursuant to P.L. § 35.15 . . . "Penal Law § 35.15(1) provides that 'a person may ... use physical force upon another person when and . . . Penal Law §35.15(1) applies only to the use of non-deadly physical force. . . . The use of deadly physical force is governed by Penal Law § 35.15(2), which provides that ‘[a] person . . .

GIBBS, v. DONNELLY,, 673 F. Supp. 2d 121 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15; see generally, People v. . . . Specifically, New York Penal Law § 35.15(1) provides that “[a] person may, subject to the provisions . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)). . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a) reversible error. Id. (citing, inter alia, People v. . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a).” Jackson v. Edwards, 404 F.3d at 623 (other internal citations omitted). . . . .

MILLS, v. A. GIRDICH,, 614 F. Supp. 2d 365 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)

. . . 707, 563 N.E.2d 21 (citing Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d at 112, 506 N.Y.S.2d 18, 497 N.E.2d 41), and Penal Law § 35.15 . . . Penal Law § 35.15 (McKinney 1975 & Supp.1987); Johnson v. . . . Penal Law § 35.15. . . . New York Penal Law § 35.15(2) provides in pertinent part with respect to the defense of justification . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a). . . . .

SEOW, v. ARTUZ,, 320 F. App'x 46 (2d Cir. 2009)

. . . . § 35.15(1), (2). . . .

In GREENE, v., 397 B.R. 688 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15(1). A punch is considered ordinary, physical force. People v. . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a). . . . Penal Law § 35.15 defines the justification defense in relevant part as follows: 1. . . .

UNITED STATES v. TAVERAS,, 570 F. Supp. 2d 481 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15. See also Jackson v. . . . Penal Law § 35.15(l)(b) N.Y. . . . Penal Law § 35.15(1)0) (providing an exception permitting an initial aggressor to claim self defense . . . Penal Law § 35.15. . . .

UNITED STATES v. DESINOR,, 525 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2008)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15(1)(b) (providing that the justification of self-defense is not available to an initial . . . Penal Law § 35.15(l)(b) (providing an exception whereby an initial aggressor may claim self-defense “ . . .

RODRIGUEZ, v. SUPERINTENDENT, COLLINS CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,, 549 F. Supp. 2d 226 (N.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . justification charge was appropriate based on “any reasonable view of the evidence” under N.Y.Penal Law § 35.15 . . . Penal Law § 35.15(1). . . . Penal Law § 35.15(l)(a)-(e). . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)(i). This claim is dismissed. E. . . .

HORTON, v. ERCOLE,, 557 F. Supp. 2d 308 (N.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a). . . .

GARCIA, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK,, 539 F. Supp. 2d 718 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . Under New York Penal Law (hereinafter “NYPL”) § 35.15(1), an individual is permitted to use force upon . . . NYPL § 35.15(2)(a). . . . justification as follows: To determine whether a defendant’s conduct was justified under Penal Law § 35.15 . . . Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96, 114-15, 506 N.Y.S.2d 18, 497 N.E.2d 41 (1986) ] that Penal Law § 35.15 requires . . .

ROBINSON, v. GREENE,, 507 F. Supp. 2d 279 (W.D.N.Y. 2007)

. . . New York’s self-defense statute is set forth in Penal Law § 35.15. . . . Penal Law § 35.15. . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a); People v. Collice, 41 N.Y.2d at 907, 394 N.Y.S.2d 615, 363 N.E.2d 340). B. . . . Penal Law § 35.15 provides that a person is justified in using physical force in self-defense under the . . . Penal Law § 35.15. . . .

ROBERTS, v. MAHONING COUNTY, v., 495 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2007)

. . . Such program shall be administered within the facilities of the jail. 35.15 The Provider shall provide . . .

JONES, v. DONNELLY,, 487 F. Supp. 2d 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)

. . . New York Penal Law §§ 35.15(1),(2)(a). . . .

NUNEZ, v. T. CONWAY,, 473 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15(1). . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2). . . .

In HOWARD E. TUSS,, 360 B.R. 684 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2007)

. . . Lines 44 and 46 increased additional food and clothing expense from $34.55 to $35.15. . . .

SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT, v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,, 474 F.3d 797 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

. . . . § 35.15(a). . . . service provider retains the option of filing a motion to terminate its service - under 18 C.F.R. § 35.15 . . .

FOLGER, v. CONWAY,, 443 F. Supp. 2d 438 (W.D.N.Y. 2006)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15(1). . . .

WILLIAMS, v. HERBERT,, 435 F. Supp. 2d 199 (W.D.N.Y. 2006)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a) (“[T]he actor may not use deadly physical force if he knows that he can with . . . force necessary to do so, and thereby place the defendant’s conduct outside the purview of Penal Law § 35.15 . . . Penal Law § 35.15(1), (2)(a). . . .

PRATT, v. UPSTATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,, 413 F. Supp. 2d 228 (W.D.N.Y. 2006)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15(1). . . . Penal Law § 35.15(1). . . .

ABNER, v. MOBILE INFIRMARY HOSPITAL, M. D., 149 F. App'x 857 (11th Cir. 2005)

. . . . § 35.15, and Ala.Code § 22-8-1, without first granting them leave to amend pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. . . . AFFIRMED. . 42 C.F.R. § 35.15 requires that consent be obtained before performing a major operative procedure . . .

JACKSON, v. EDWARDS,, 404 F.3d 612 (2d Cir. 2005)

. . . Penal Law §§ 35.15(2)(b); 35.15(2)(c); 35.20(3)). . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2). . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a). . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(b); N.Y. . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a). . . .

PULINARIO, v. GOORD,, 118 F. App'x 554 (2d Cir. 2004)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15[2][b]. The trial court precluded Dr. . . .

UNITED STATES v. JACKSON,, 351 F. Supp. 2d 108 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15 for one statutory formulation of these complex rules, which very likely differs in . . .

DE JESUS, v. MILLER,, 323 F. Supp. 2d 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)

. . . At the trial, DeJesus presented a defense, pursuant to New York Penal Law § 35.15(2), that his use of . . .

DIGUGLIELMO, v. T. SMITH,, 366 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2004)

. . . . § 35.15 (McKinney 1975 & Supp.1987); Johnson v. Rosemeyer, 117 F.3d 104, 111 (3d Cir.1997). . . .

STEVENS, v. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, a MTA MTA, 293 F. Supp. 2d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)(ii) (McKinney 1998). . . .

PULINARIO, v. GOORD,, 291 F. Supp. 2d 154 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)

. . . Regarding the law of self-defense, New York Penal Law § 35.15(1) authorizes the use of physical force . . . Section 35.15(2)(b) authorizes the use of deadly physical force where “[h]e reasonably believes that . . . shooting Imagio because she reasonably feared that a second rape was imminent under New York Penal Law § 35.15 . . . Penal Law § 35.15). . . .

JACKSON A- v. EDWARDS,, 296 F. Supp. 2d 292 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)

. . . . § 35.15(1). . . . Penal L. § 35.15(2). . . . Penal L. § 35.15(2)(b); see also N.Y. Penal L. § 160.00 (“Robbery is forcible stealing.”). . . . Pursuant to Penal Law § 35.15, a person ‘may’ use physical force to defend himself or a third person, . . . Almodovar, supra), there are no circumstances when justification (Penal Law § 35.15) can be a defense . . .

DUREN A- v. BENNETT,, 275 F. Supp. 2d 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)

. . . Under section 35.15 of New York Penal Law, a person “may not use deadly physical force upon another person . . .

NEW YORK, v. TANELLA,, 239 F. Supp. 2d 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15(1) (McKinney 1998). . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2). . . .

JOCKS, v. TAVERNIER A., 316 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2003)

. . . Penal Law §§ 35.05, 35.15 (McKinney 1997). . . . Penal Law § 35.15 states, A person may ... use physical force upon another person when and to the extent . . .

SPERINGO, v. MCLAUGHLIN,, 202 F. Supp. 2d 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15; People v. . . .

PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT NO. OF SNOHOMISH COUNTY, WASHINGTON, v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, PJM L. L. C., 272 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

. . . . §§ 35.15, 35.26-35.29). . . .

DAVIS, v. STRACK, C., 270 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2001)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a) (McKinney 1998). . . . Penal Law § 35.15 sets out the defense of justification for the use of force: 1. . . . Penal Law § 35.15(1). . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a). . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a), In view of how close Bubblegum was to him, Davis could not have fled without . . .

POWER COMPANY OF AMERICA, L. P. v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, PG E L. P., 245 F.3d 839 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

. . . . § 35.15(a). . . . time at the discretion of the parties,” and, as such, did not have to be on file under 18 C.F.R. § 35.15 . . . The Commission’s Interpretation of its Regulation The Commission interpreted 18 C.F.R. § 35.15(a) as . . . In its Order on Rehearing, the Commission conceded that it “applied Section 35.15 to short-term power . . . In PCA’s view, the overruling of Portland General wrote the “part thereof’ language out of § 35.15(a) . . .

TRANSMISSION ACCESS POLICY STUDY GROUP, v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

. . . . § 35.15 (1995) (repealed by Order 888). . . . See 18 C.F.R. § 35.15 (repealed by Order 888). . . . See 18 C.F.R. § 35.15 (1999). . . . a showing in the context of a utility’s proposed termination of a contract pursuant to the section 35.15 . . .

DAVIS, v. STRACK,, 211 F. Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)

. . . New York Penal Law § 35.15 provides that a person is justified in using physical force under the following . . . New York Penal Law § 35.15 (emphasis added). . . . See Penal Law § 35.15. (See also Report at 413). . . . The Justification Defense Under New York Law New York Penal Law § 35.15 provides that a person is justified . . . 639 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 663 N.E.2d 313 (1996), the New York Court of Appeals explained that Penal Law § 35.15 . . .

MOSCOSO, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK,, 92 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)

. . . Penal Law §§ 35.00, 35.15, requiring the defendant to show that he reasonably believed that his force . . . Penal Law § 35.15(1). . . .

EVANS, v. ARTUZ,, 68 F. Supp. 2d 188 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)

. . . necessary to defend himself against the use of offensive physical force by his assailant. 1 CJI(N.Y) 35.15 . . .

SUTTON, v. HERBERT,, 39 F. Supp. 2d 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)

. . . N.Y.Penal Law § 35.15(1) (McKinney 1998). . . . Subdivision two of § 35.15 states, in part: A person may not use deadly physical force upon another person . . . (a) He reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to use deadly physical force. § 35.15 . . .

DAVIS, v. R. KELLY,, 2 F. Supp. 2d 362 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)

. . . the People failed to disprove his justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt (see, Penal Law § 35.15 . . .

SCHONFELD v. CITY OF CARLSBAD, 978 F. Supp. 1329 (S.D. Cal. 1997)

. . . . § 35.15 1(a), (b). . . .

BROWN, v. ARTUZ,, 124 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1997)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15(1)-(2) (McKinney 1987); see generally People v. . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)(i) (McKinney 1987). . . .

McCOLLY, v. BRUNELLE,, 980 F. Supp. 691 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)

. . . . § 35.15(2)(a)(use of deadly physical force justified only where actor reasonably believes other person . . .

DeLUCA, v. A. LORD,, 77 F.3d 578 (2d Cir. 1996)

. . . See N.Y.Penal Law § 35.15(l)(b) (aggressor may not claim self-defense); United States v. . . .

GARCIA, v. KUHLMANN,, 897 F. Supp. 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)

. . . See N.Y.Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a). . . .

GODFREY, v. IRVIN,, 871 F. Supp. 577 (W.D.N.Y. 1994)

. . . The provisions relevant to this case are as follows: § 35.15 Justification; use of physical force in . . . Penal Law § 35.15. . . . According to the lower courts, because § 35.15 uses the term “he reasonably believes,” the appropriate . . . reasonably” in a statute, and misconstrues the clear intent of the Legislature, in enacting section 35.15 . . .

LEBRON, v. F. MANN,, 40 F.3d 561 (2d Cir. 1994)

. . . Under N.Y.Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a) a person is justified in using deadly force against another person . . . This alternative theory relies on N.Y.Penal Law § 35.15(2)(b), under which a person may use deadly physical . . . N.Y.Penal Law, § 35.15(2)(b). . . .

UNITED STATES v. THOMAS, A. A., 34 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1994)

. . . Penal Law, § 35.15(l)(b) McKinney (1988). . . .

LEBRON, v. F. MANN,, 844 F. Supp. 140 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)

. . . N.Y.Penal Law § 35.15. . . . N.Y.Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a). Retreat in “his dwelling” is not required. . . . N.Y.Penal Law § 35.15(2)(b). . . .

UNITED STATES v. J. WOODS., 986 F.2d 669 (3d Cir. 1993)

. . . Rhodes, 5 Orfield's Criminal Procedure Under the Federal Rules § 35.15, at 433-34 (2d ed. 1987). . . .

TATE, v. W. WOOD,, 963 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1992)

. . . to which he was pleading guilty, as justification is a complete defense to homicide, N.Y.Penal Law § 35.15 . . .

WESCH, v. HUNT,, 785 F. Supp. 1491 (S.D. Ala. 1992)

. . . 2,828 2,422 100.00% 85.64% 385 5 13.61% 0.18% 16 0 0.57% 0.00% GLEN OAKS SCHOOL 5,129 1,803 100.00% 35.15% . . .

MERZON, v. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, 767 F. Supp. 432 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)

. . . The plaintiff contends that the defendant Emanuele violated the provisions of New York’s Penal Law § 35.15 . . . The pertinent provisions of New York Penal Law are as follows: “§ 35.15 Justification; use of physical . . . Under such circumstances, the officer is under no duty to retreat (see id. at § 35.15[2][a][ii]). . . . enunciated a hybrid subjective/objective analysis with regard to a private person under Penal Law § 35.15 . . . was justified in causing the death of the decedent, under the provisions of the New York Penal Law § 35.15 . . .

MAIORINO, v. J. SCULLY,, 746 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)

. . . Maiorino contends that Justice Torres’ refusal to instruct the jury pursuant to New York Penal Law § 35.15 . . .

RINALDI, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, 756 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15. . . .

BLAZIC, v. J. HENDERSON, M., 900 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1990)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a) (McKinney 1987). . . . Magliato, 68 N.Y.2d 24, 30, 496 N.E.2d 856, 860, 505 N.Y.S.2d 836, 840 (1986) (Huntley held that § 35.15 . . . Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a) (McKinney 1987). . . . Penal Law § 35.15(l)(b) (McKinney 1987). . . . .

GANDER, v. FMC CORPORATION,, 892 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1990)

. . . MAI 35.15 illustration (3d ed. . . . Instruction number 13, see also MAI 35.15 illustration (3d ed. Supp.1989) (emphasis added). . . . MAI 37.03 as written in the MAI 35.15 illustration clearly and correctly instructs the jury on the same . . .

COLON, v. J. SMITH,, 723 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)

. . . Second, counsel failed to request an instruction on justification under New York Penal Law § 35.15(2) . . . reasonably believes “is committing or attempting to commit a ... robbery” under New York Penal Law § 35.15 . . . counsel requested and received a justification defense instruction pursuant to New York Penal Law § 35.15 . . .

In CHURCHFIELD MANAGEMENT INVESTMENT CORPORATION,, 98 B.R. 838 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989)

. . . As stated above, 35.15 hours ($3,078.00) would be disallowed under the common fund theory. . . .

ESTATE OF JACKSON, v. CITY OF ROCHESTER, E. I., 705 F. Supp. 779 (W.D.N.Y. 1989)

. . . New York Penal Law § 35.15 provides that a police officer may use deadly force upon another person if . . . N.Y.Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)(ii) (Consol.1984). . . .

MORGAN, v. J. WARD J. R. S. G. J. O A. G. R. L. C. M. B. D. B. F. L. S. P., 699 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D.N.Y. 1988)

. . . See N.Y.Penal Law § 35.15(1) (McKinney 1987) (use of physical force in defense of self or third person . . .

WASHINGTON, v. J. SCULLY,, 640 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15 (McKinney 1975 & Supp.1986). . . .

GRIFFIN, v. N. MARTIN, III, S. C., 785 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1986)

. . . . §§ 35.00, 35.15 and Practice Commentaries by Arnold D. Hechtman to § 35.-00. . . .

HARRIS, v. SCULLY,, 779 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1985)

. . . Miller, 39 N.Y.2d 543, 548, 384 N.Y.S.2d 741, 745, 349 N.E.2d 841, 845 (1976); see also N.Y.Penal Law § 35.15 . . .

WHITTENBERG, Mr. P. NAACP, Dr. T. H. v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF GREENVILLE COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA,, 607 F. Supp. 289 (D.S.C. 1985)

. . . 14.71 33.60 38.12 29.54 34.82 25.64 15.65 18.87 34.55 22.50 20.70 30.12 21.58 17.50 36.31 40.31 26.75 35.15 . . .

KENTUCKY UTILITIES COMPANY, v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,, 689 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1982)

. . . . § 35.15(c)(1) (emphasis supplied). . . .

RAMIREZ, v. E. W. JONES,, 530 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)

. . . New York Penal Law §§ 35.10(6) and 35.15(2) further provide that a person may be justified in using physical . . .

WASHINGTON, v. HARRIS,, 650 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1981)

. . . Penal Law § 35.15, and argued that since Washington was acting in defense of his wife and himself, his . . . Penal Law § 35.15, which imposes, upon the intended victim of a murder the duty to retreat, is unconstitutional . . .

WASHINGTON, v. HARRIS,, 502 F. Supp. 1267 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)

. . . a reasonable doubt; (3) petitioner was not denied effective assistance of counsel, and (4) section 35.15 . . .

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Cases from cite.case.law:

The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)