The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title VIII
LIMITATIONS

Chapter 95
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS; ADVERSE POSSESSION

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F.S. 95.031

95.031 Computation of time.—Except as provided in subsection (2) and in s. 95.051 and elsewhere in these statutes, the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues.

(1) A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs. For the purposes of this chapter, the last element constituting a cause of action on an obligation or liability founded on a negotiable or nonnegotiable note payable on demand or after date with no specific maturity date specified in the note, and the last element constituting a cause of action against any endorser, guarantor, or other person secondarily liable on any such obligation or liability founded on any such note, is the first written demand for payment, notwithstanding that the endorser, guarantor, or other person secondarily liable has executed a separate writing evidencing such liability.

(2)(a) An action founded upon fraud under s. 95.11(3), including constructive fraud, must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3), but in any event an action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered.

(b) An action for products liability under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the date that the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, rather than running from any other date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3), except as provided within this subsection. Under no circumstances may a claimant commence an action for products liability, including a wrongful death action or any other claim arising from personal injury or property damage caused by a product, to recover for harm allegedly caused by a product with an expected useful life of 10 years or less, if the harm was caused by exposure to or use of the product more than 12 years after delivery of the product to its first purchaser or lessee who was not engaged in the business of selling or leasing the product or of using the product as a component in the manufacture of another product. All products, except those included within subparagraph 1. or subparagraph 2., are conclusively presumed to have an expected useful life of 10 years or less.

1. Aircraft used in commercial or contract carrying of passengers or freight, vessels of more than 100 gross tons, railroad equipment used in commercial or contract carrying of passengers or freight, and improvements to real property, including elevators and escalators, are not subject to the statute of repose provided within this subsection.

2. Any product not listed in subparagraph 1., which the manufacturer specifically warranted, through express representation or labeling, as having an expected useful life exceeding 10 years, has an expected useful life commensurate with the time period indicated by the warranty or label. Under such circumstances, no action for products liability may be brought after the expected useful life of the product, or more than 12 years after delivery of the product to its first purchaser or lessee who was not engaged in the business of selling or leasing the product or of using the product as a component in the manufacture of another product, whichever is later.

3. With regard to those products listed in subparagraph 1., except for escalators, elevators, and improvements to real property, no action for products liability may be brought more than 20 years after delivery of the product to its first purchaser or lessor who was not engaged in the business of selling or leasing the product or of using the product as a component in the manufacture of another product. However, if the manufacturer specifically warranted, through express representation or labeling, that the product has an expected useful life exceeding 20 years, the repose period shall be the time period warranted in representations or label.

(c) The repose period prescribed in paragraph (b) does not apply if the claimant was exposed to or used the product within the repose period, but an injury caused by such exposure or use did not manifest itself until after expiration of the repose period.

(d) The repose period prescribed within paragraph (b) is tolled for any period during which the manufacturer through its officers, directors, partners, or managing agents had actual knowledge that the product was defective in the manner alleged by the claimant and took affirmative steps to conceal the defect. Any claim of concealment under this section shall be made with specificity and must be based upon substantial factual and legal support. Maintaining the confidentiality of trade secrets does not constitute concealment under this section.

History.—s. 3, ch. 74-382; s. 1, ch. 75-234; s. 2, ch. 77-54; ss. 1, 2, ch. 78-289; s. 1, ch. 78-418; s. 1, ch. 80-280; s. 44, ch. 81-259; s. 10, ch. 85-80; s. 2, ch. 86-272; s. 2, ch. 90-105; s. 11, ch. 99-225; s. 20, ch. 2003-154.

F.S. 95.031 on Google Scholar

F.S. 95.031 on Casetext

Amendments to 95.031

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 95.031

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 95.031.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

ENLOW v. E. C. SCOTT WRIGHT, P. A. P. A., 274 So. 3d 1192 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . . § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . ." § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .

CLEVELAND CLINIC FLORIDA a a v. CHILDREN S CANCER CARING CENTER, INC. a, 274 So. 3d 1102 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Generally, the limitations period begins to run "from the time the cause of action accrues," § 95.031 . . . Stat. (2013), which is "when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs," § 95.031(1), . . . See § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat.; see also Willson , 211 So.3d at 365. . . .

A. BROZ, v. R. E. REECE,, 272 So. 3d 512 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . ." § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . . suggest that any further amendment could include, any allegation supporting a tolling claim under section 95.031 . . .

TEJERA, v. LINCOLN LENDING SERVICES, LLC,, 271 So. 3d 97 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . The Florida Legislature enacted section 95.031(2)(a), which codified the delayed discovery doctrine, . . . relevant question is when that four-year period began to run , and whether Tejera is authorized by section 95.031 . . . of conspiracy to perpetrate fraud in the inducement alleged an action "founded upon fraud," section 95.031 . . .

LEE MEMORIAL HEALTH SYSTEM GULF COAST MEDICAL CENTER, v. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION,, 272 So. 3d 431 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . . § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. . . .

L. MIELKE C. v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE FOR GSAA HOME EQUITY TRUST, 264 So. 3d 249 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . ." § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. . . .

D. H. v. ADEPT COMMUNITY SERVICES, INC., 271 So. 3d 870 (Fla. 2018)

. . . ." § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . See generally §§ 95.031, 95.11, Fla. Stat. (2006) ; see also Davis v. . . . accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." 217 So.3d at 1077 (quoting § 95.031 . . .

CHAKRA INC. v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH,, 254 So. 3d 1056 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . ." § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .

A. GAROFALO, LLC, LLC LLC, v. PROSKAUER ROSE LLP,, 253 So. 3d 2 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . . § 95.031(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2017). Here, the plaintiffs argue dismissal was improper. . . .

BREXENDORF, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N. A., 319 F. Supp. 3d 1257 (M.D. Fla. 2018)

. . . . § 95.031(2)(a); see also Davis v. Monahan , 832 So.2d 708, 709 (Fla. 2002). . . . Stat. § 95.031(1). The last element of the FDUTPA Claim is actual damages. See Dolphin LLC v. . . .

WEEKS, v. TOWN OF PALM BEACH, A B., 252 So. 3d 258 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Id. at 115 ; accord § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2012). . . . See § 95.11(4)(g) ; § 95.031 ; Wagner , 629 So.2d at 114-15. . . .

NORKIN, v. THE FLORIDA BAR, a, 311 F. Supp. 3d 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2018)

. . . . § 95.031. . . .

THEOBALD, L. Co- v. PIPER AIRCRAFT, INC. c o c o S- SEC, 309 F. Supp. 3d 1253 (S.D. Fla. 2018)

. . . . § 95.031(2)(b). . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(b)(3). Thus, the repose period is either 12 years or 20 years. . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(d). . . . taken by anyone at Piper to conceal the alleged defect, their claims are barred under Florida Statute § 95.031 . . . affirmative steps to conceal it, as required for the statute of repose to be tolled under Florida Statute § 95.031 . . .

DESAI, v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY,, 240 So. 3d 729 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Stat. (2015) ; § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2015) ; Depicciotto v. Nationstar Mortg. . . .

IN RE L. VASQUEZ,, 581 B.R. 59 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2018)

. . . Stat. 95.031(1) states, “a cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action . . .

A. TRUDEL, v. SUNTRUST BANK,, 288 F. Supp. 3d 239 (D.D.C. 2018)

. . . . § 95.031(2)(a) ) (emphasis omitted). . . .

FLATIRONS BANK, v. ALAN W. STEINBERG LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,, 233 So. 3d 1207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Florida's delayed discovery doctrine is codified in section 95.031(2)(a), and reads, in relevant part . . . exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3).... § 95.031 . . . Florida’s delayed discovery doctrine, as codified in section 95.031(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), provides . . .

A. GREEN, v. SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING LLC,, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2017)

. . . . § 95.031(1); Id. § 95.11(2); Id. § 673.1181. . . .

FLANZER, v. KAPLAN, 230 So. 3d 960 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . We reverse because Flanzér’s claim may be subject to the delayed discovery provisions of section 95.031 . . . commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered. § 95.031 . . . The Trustees challenge the application of section 95.031(2)(a) by emphasizing the elements that distinguish . . . But the uses of the prepositions “founded upon fraud” and “founded on fraud” in sections 95.031(2)(a) . . . As such, we see no reason why section 95.031(2)(a) would not apply to Flanzer’s claim—provided that Flanzer . . .

LEXON INSURANCE COMPANY, v. CITY OF CAPE CORAL, LLC,, 238 So. 3d 356 (Fla. App. Ct. 2017)

. . . . §§ 95.11(2)(b), 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . .

EGHNAYEM, M. v. BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORPORATION, M. v. v. v., 873 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . . §§ 95.11(3)(e), 95.031. . . . Id. § 95.031(2)(b). . . .

BOLLETTIERI RESORT VILLAS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON,, 228 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 2017)

. . . .” § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . .” § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat.; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. . . .

LLANO FINANCING GROUP, LLC, v. F. PETIT,, 230 So. 3d 141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Monahan, 832 So.2d 708, 709 (Fla. 2002); see also § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . .

HECHT, v. R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, USA,, 710 F. App'x 794 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 95.031(2)(b), which states that products-liability actions accrue when “the facts giving rise to . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(b). . . .

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON As FOR NATIONSTAR HOME EQUITY TRUST A, v. L. PEDERSEN, J., 706 F. App'x 542 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 95.11(2)(b)-(c), § 95.031(1). . . . Stat. § 95.11(2)(b)-(c), § 95.031(1), § 95.281; Smith, 61 F.3d at 1561; Bartram, 211 So.3d at 1012, 1019 . . .

IN RE PALM AVENUE PARTNERS, LLC, M. K. O D. J. Co. LLC, v. LLC E. T. LLC LLC P. C., 576 B.R. 239 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2017)

. . . . § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. . § 95.03l(2)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . .

IN RE EDDY,, 572 B.R. 774 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2017)

. . . Florida Statute Section 95.031 provides that “the time within which an action shall be begun under any . . . Section 95.031(1) in turn provides that a “cause of action accrues when the last element constituting . . . Stat. § 95.031. . Id. . Id. See also Mosher v. Anderson, 817 So.2d 812, 814 (Fla. 2002). . . . .

GOMEZ, v. HOUSEHOLD FINANCE CORPORATION, III, a a HSBC a XVI,, 688 F. App'x 680 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 95.11(2)(b)-(c), § 95.031(1). . . .

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, v. M. J. M. A. M. R., 217 So. 3d 1148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Stat. (2012) (jurisdictional statute of nonclaim); §§ 95.031(2) (prescribing periods of both limitations . . .

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, FOR AMTRUST BANK, v. DREW MORTGAGE ASSOCIATES, INC. v. M., 251 F. Supp. 3d 280 (D. Mass. 2017)

. . . . § 95.031(2)(a). . . .

BEDTOW GROUP II, LLC, v. B. UNGERLEIDER, S. W., 684 F. App'x 839 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 95.031. . . . Id. § 95.031(a). . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(a); see also Davis v. . . .

D. H. L. H. BY AND THROUGH R. H. S. H. v. ADEPT COMMUNITY SERVICES, INC. B. E. A. R. R. B. E. A. R. R. v. D. H. L. H. R. H. S. H., 217 So. 3d 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Lee, 678 So.2d 818, 821 (Fla. 1996)); see also § 95.031. . . . differently, courts applying a statute of limitations must follow the default rule codified in section 95.031 . . . Under the plain language of section 95.031(1), as applied in Davis, the cause of action accrues when . . . If we take section 95.031(l)’s directive that a cause of action accrues when its last element occurs . . . legal remedy-should be whether that tolling statute applies in any given ease, not whether section 95.031 . . .

CUTTER, v. BIOMET, INC., 244 F. Supp. 3d 793 (N.D. Ind. 2017)

. . . . § 95.031(2)(b); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-213(d); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16); Wash. Rev. . . .

SLATER, v. BIOMET, INC., 244 F. Supp. 3d 803 (N.D. Ind. 2017)

. . . . § 95.031(2)(b); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13—213(d); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16); Wash. Rev. . . .

BROWN, v. BIOMET ORTHOPEDICS, LLC,, 244 F. Supp. 3d 810 (N.D. Ind. 2017)

. . . . § 95.031(2)(b); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13—213(d); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16); Wash. Rev. . . .

DOE NO. v. NUR- UL- ISLAM ACADEMY, INC. a Ul- a, 217 So. 3d 85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Graham, 767 So.2d 1179, 1184-85 (Fla. 2000) (quoting § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (1987)). . . .

MOSKOVITS, v. ALDRIDGE PITE, LLP, f. k. a. LLP, M. PLLC,, 677 F. App'x 510 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 95.031(1)). . . .

BEACH COMMUNITY BANK, v. CBG REAL ESTATE LLC,, 674 F. App'x 932 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 95.031(2)(a). . . .

A. TRUDEL, v. SUNTRUST BANK,, 223 F. Supp. 3d 71 (D.D.C. 2016)

. . . . § 95.031. . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(a). . . . Stat. §§ 95.031(2), 95.11(4)(a), (4)(b), (7). The state has no catch-all discovery statute. . . .

KIPNIS, v. BAYERISCHE HYPO- UND VEREINSBANK, AG,, 202 So. 3d 859 (Fla. 2016)

. . . .” § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat.; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. . . .

LATERZA, v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N. A., 221 F. Supp. 3d 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2016)

. . . Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Barred by Florida’s Statute of Limitations Under § 95.031(1), Fla. . . .

RIVERWALK AT SUNRISE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. a v. BISCAYNE PAINTING CORPORATION, a, 199 So. 3d 348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . “A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs,” § 95.031(1 . . .

IN RE HOLZENTHAL, III M., 580 B.R. 868 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2016)

. . . . § 95.031. . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(b). This is commonly referred to as the delayed discovery rule. . . .

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, f. k. a. v. C. VIZCAY, M. D. INC. f. k. a. P. V. C., 826 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 95.031(2)(a). . . .

DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS, v. BEAUVAIS, a, 188 So. 3d 938 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . . § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .

NATIONAL AUTO SERVICE CENTERS, INC. a a D. LLC LLC, v. F R LLC, a F R LLC, a, 192 So. 3d 498 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See, e.g., § 95.031(2)(a), (b), Fla. Stat. . . . See, e.g., §§ 95.031(2)(a), .11(3)(j) (actions founded on fraud), .11(4)(b) (medical malpractice). . . .

R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, v. CICCONE,, 190 So. 3d 1028 (Fla. 2016)

. . . .” §§ 95.031(2)(b), 95.11(3), Fla. Stat. . . .

A. HUMMER, v. ADAMS HOMES OF NORTHWEST FLORIDA, INC. Nu LLC,, 198 So. 3d 750 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See § 95.031, Fla. . . .

BLINN, v. WEST SHORE VILLAS OF NAPLES OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., 182 So. 3d 686 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . .” § 95.031. . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY AND STATE FARM FIRE CASUALTY COMPANY, v. B A DIAGNOSTIC, INC. n k a M. D. M. D., 145 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (S.D. Fla. 2015)

. . . . § 95.031. . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(a). . . .

REUSS, v. ORLANDO HEALTH, INC., 140 F. Supp. 3d 1299 (M.D. Fla. 2015)

. . . .” § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . Id. § 95.031(a). . . .

OGNENOVIC, v. DAVID J. GIANNONE, INC. J., 184 So. 3d 1135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . See §§ 95.031(2)(a), 772.17, Fla. Stat. (2013); Seymour v. . . .

ACCESS INSURANCE PLANNERS, INC. a LLC, a v. S. GEE, LLC, d b a, 175 So. 3d 921 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . . § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). The occurrence of a breach, or breaches, is a question of fact. . . . See §§ 95.031(2)(a) & (b), 95.11(4)(a) & (b), 95.11(7), Fla. Stat.. (2011). . . .

DOMINGUEZ, v. HAYWARD INDUSTRIES, INC. d b a M., 201 So. 3d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . We affirm because the statute of repose, section 95.031, Florida Statutes (2003), bars the product liability . . . Section 95.031(2)(b) is triggered once the product is delivered or the work completed. . . . The term “improvements to real property” in section 95.031(2)(b)1 is undefined. . . . The plain and obvious meaning of the language contained in section 95.031 supports this conclusion. . . . The products liability statute of repose, section 95.031, barred the Dominguezes’ cause of action. . . .

R. HEPP, M. D. v. PAUL REVERE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 120 F. Supp. 3d 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2015)

. . . . § 95.031(2)(a). . . .

PHILIP MORRIS USA INC. R. J. v. SKOLNICK,, 171 So. 3d 747 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . .” § 95.031(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . .

JAX UTILITIES MANAGEMENT, INC. v. HANCOCK BANK, A LLC, A, 164 So. 3d 1266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . .” § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . .” § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. . . .

KIPNIS, E. As A. As v. BAYERISCHE HYPO- UND VEREINSBANK, AG, a a. k. a. AG, HVB U. S. a. k. a. U. S., 784 F.3d 771 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 95.031. . . . Id. § 95.031(1). . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(a). . . . See id. § 95.031(1) (“A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(a); Davis, 832 So.2d at 709 (claim accrues when the plaintiff “either knows or should . . .

PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC. v. RUSSO,, 175 So. 3d 681 (Fla. 2015)

. . . The defendants requested that the trial judge instruct the jury on section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes . . . Frazier’s fraudulent concealment and conspiracy to conceal claims were barred by section 95.031(2), the . . . ANALYSIS Pursuant' to the statute of repose contained in section 95.031(2), fraud claims “must be begun . . . Apr. 2, 2015), we recently held that the statute of repose provided in section 95.031(2), did not bar . . . In other words, we find that “the date of the commission of the alleged fraud” under section 95.031(2 . . .

HESS, v. PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., 175 So. 3d 687 (Fla. 2015)

. . . Engle -progeny case, is whether plaintiffs fraudulent concealment claim is barred pursuant to section 95.031 . . . Id. at 260 (citing § 95.031(2), Fla. Stat. (1993)). . . . Stat.) and products liability actions (§ 95.031(2)(b), Fla. . . . .” § 95.031, Fla. Stat. . . . See § 95.031(2)(d), Fla. Stat. . . .

SCOTT, v. TRANSPORT AMERICA, INC. LLC,, 89 F. Supp. 3d 1275 (N.D. Ala. 2015)

. . . Stat. 95.031(1), and therefore is also time-barred. . . .

CORYA, J. M. P. P. v. SANDERS,, 155 So. 3d 1279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . See § 95.031, Fla. . . .

MUHAMMAD, v. CITIMORTGAGE, INC., 598 F. App'x 636 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 95.031(2)(a). . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(a). . . .

BYRNES v. SMALL, USA,, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (M.D. Fla. 2014)

. . . . § 95.031(2)(a) & (b); see Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 575 (holding that the “common defenses” rule applies . . .

D. HUSSEY, Jr. P. a v. COLLIER COUNTY, a, 158 So. 3d 661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . See § 95.031(1); Sarasota Welfare Home, Inc. v. . . .

ANDERSON, v. BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY, LLC,, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2014)

. . . . § 95.031(1). . . .

SMITH, v. BRUSTER,, 151 So. 3d 511 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . . § 95.031, Fla. Stat.; see Bauld v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 357 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1978). . . . . § 95.031(1); see Bauld. . . . or equitable action founded on fraud must be brought within four years; however, pursuant to section 95.031 . . .

DONOVAN, v. FLORIDA PENINSULA INSURANCE COMPANY,, 147 So. 3d 566 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument”); § 95.031 . . .

R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, v. L. SIKES, As, 141 So. 3d 262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . reversibly erred by denying Reynolds’ requested jury instruction on the statute of repose, section 95.031 . . .

TL OF FLORIDA, INC. v. TEREX CORPORATION, d b a, 54 F. Supp. 3d 320 (D. Del. 2014)

. . . . § 95.031(2)(a). . . .

LINARES, v. UNIVERSAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,, 141 So. 3d 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . .” § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .

LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC, v. B G PHILLIPS, a. k. a. LLC,, 569 F. App'x 814 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 95.031(1). The last element of a cause of action based on negligence is actual loss or damage. . . .

OLEAN MEDICAL CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. a v. A. AZIMA,, 144 So. 3d 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . See § 95.031(1) (“A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs . . .

EXPOSITO, v. PUBLIC HEALTH TRUST OF MIAMI- DADE COUNTY,, 141 So. 3d 663 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Section 95.031(1), Florida Statutes (2010), states that a “cause of action accrues when the last element . . .

MEDICAL DATA SYSTEMS, INC. v. COASTAL INSURANCE GROUP, INC. L., 139 So. 3d 394 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . .” § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .

DUTRA, v. T. KAPLAN, 137 So. 3d 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . See, § 95.031(1), Fla. . . .

J. BURR, L. v. PHILIP MORRIS USA INC., 559 F. App'x 961 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 95.031(2)(a). . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(b) does not extend the delayed discovery doctrine to wrongful death actions because . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(a), the same logic applies here, and we therefore reject Burr’s argument for tolling . . .

GROVE ISLE ASSOCIATION, INC. v. GROVE ISLE ASSOCIATES, LLLP,, 137 So. 3d 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . . § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . .” § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). 1. . . . Pursuant to section 95.031(1), Florida Statutes, the Condominium Association’s claims for declaratory . . .

K. HARRIS, v. ABERDEEN PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., 135 So. 3d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . See § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). The trial court entered summary judgment on Counts I and III. . . . “A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” 95.031(1), . . .

ARROWOOD INDEMNITY COMPANY, a v. CONROY, SIMBERG, GANON, KREVANS, ABEL, LURVEY, MORROW SCHEFER, P. A. a L. E. Jr., 134 So. 3d 1079 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . .” § 95.031(1), Fla. . . .

R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, v. HIOTT,, 129 So. 3d 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . On the issue of the statute of repose, section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes, Reynolds argued below that . . . commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered.” § 95.031 . . . that the trial court erred in denying its requested jury instruction on the statute of repose, section 95.031 . . . denying Reynolds’ requested jury instruction and verdict question on the statute of repose, section 95.031 . . .

R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, v. BUONOMO,, 138 So. 3d 1049 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . See § 95.031(2)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . commission of the alleged fraud,’ necessarily includes reliance by the plaintiff’) (quoting section 95.031 . . .

R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, v. BUONOMO,, 128 So. 3d 102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . See § 95.031(2)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . commission of the alleged fraud,’ necessarily includes reliance by the plaintiff’) (quoting section 95.031 . . .

LOPEZ, v. GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY,, 968 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (S.D. Fla. 2013)

. . . . § 95.031. . . . Stat. § 95.031(1). An action under FI. . . .

R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, v. CICCONE, N., 123 So. 3d 604 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . .” § 95.031(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011); § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .

ADAMS, LLC, G. LLC, J. LLC, v. DEUTSCHE BANK AG,, 529 F. App'x 98 (2d Cir. 2013)

. . . . §§ 95.11(3)0'), 95.11(3)(p), 95.031(2)(a). . . . Stat. § 95.031(1), 95.11(2)(b). . . .

MERLE WOOD ASSOCIATES, INC. v. TRINITY YACHTS, LLC,, 714 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 95.031(1). . . .

LANGLEY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, LLLP, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF LAKE COUNTY, FLORIDA,, 113 So. 3d 995 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . begins to run only “ ‘when a cause of action accrues[,]’” Hearndon, 767 So.2d at 1184 (quoting section 95.031 . . . accrues “ ‘when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.’ ” Id. at 1185-86 (quoting § 95.031 . . .

LESTI, E. Jr. PCO v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A. N. A., 960 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (M.D. Fla. 2013)

. . . . § 95.031). . . . Stat. § 95.031). . . . Stat. § 95.031). . . .

ALTENEL, INC. v. MILLENNIUM PARTNERS, L. L. C., 947 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (S.D. Fla. 2013)

. . . . § 95.11(3)(j); § 95.031(2)(a). . . .

MARLBOROUGH HOLDINGS GROUP, LTD. v. AZIMUT- BENETTI, SPA, PLATINUM YACHT COLLECTION NO. TWO, INC. f k a f k a, 505 F. App'x 899 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . Section 95.031(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes establishes a delayed discovery rule for actions founded . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(a). . . . Although the Florida legislature amended § 95.031(2)(a) in 2003 to replace the phrase “[a]n action for . . . Section 95.031(2)(a) uses the phrase “founded upon fraud,” which parallels the language of § 95.11(3) . . . Notably, § 95.031(2)(a) does not contain any language paralleling or referencing the language of § 95.11 . . .

MENDEZ, v. JARDEN CORPORATION, d. b. a., 503 F. App'x 930 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 95.031. . . . See Fla.Stat. § 95.031(2)(b). . . .

R. BECNEL, LLC, v. DEUTSCHE BANK, AG,, 507 F. App'x 71 (2d Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 95.031(2)(a) (2012). . . . Stat. § 95.031(1) • (2012). . . .

ROMERO, v. TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION,, 916 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2013)

. . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(b) (emphasis added). . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(d). . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(d). Id. . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(d). It is axiomatic that “[o]ne cannot conceal what one does not know.” . . . Stat. § 95.031(2)(d). . . .

AFFCO NEW ZEALAND, LTD. a v. AMERICAN FINE FOODS CORP. a U. S., 913 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2012)

. . . . § 95.031(1). . . .

PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC. v. NAUGLE,, 103 So. 3d 944 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . .” § 95.031(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .

PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC. v. KAYTON, 104 So. 3d 1145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Under Florida’s statute of repose — section 95.031, Florida Statutes (2007) — a party’s cause of action . . .

A. XAVIER B. v. LEVIEV BOYMELGREEN MARQUIS DEVELOPERS, LLC,, 117 So. 3d 773 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . .” § 95.031(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .

B. BLOOM, S. v. ALVEREZE,, 498 F. App'x 867 (11th Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 95.031(1) (2003). . . .

BEDWELL, A. H. S. F. O J. J. B. I. v. E. RUCKS, R. Co- E. D. Co- E. L. L. P., 127 So. 3d 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . . § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2010); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. . . . Stat. (2010) (emphasis added); see also § 95.031, Fla. . . .