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Florida Statute 95.051 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 95.051 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title VIII
LIMITATIONS
Chapter 95
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS; ADVERSE POSSESSION
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 95.051
95.051 When limitations tolled.
(1) The running of the time under any statute of limitations except ss. 95.281, 95.35, and 95.36 is tolled by:
(a) Absence from the state of the person to be sued.
(b) Use by the person to be sued of a false name that is unknown to the person entitled to sue so that process cannot be served on the person to be sued.
(c) Concealment in the state of the person to be sued so that process cannot be served on him or her.
(d) The adjudicated incapacity, before the cause of action accrued, of the person entitled to sue. In any event, the action must be begun within 7 years after the act, event, or occurrence giving rise to the cause of action.
(e) Voluntary payments by the alleged father of the child in paternity actions during the time of the payments.
(f) The payment of any part of the principal or interest of any obligation or liability founded on a written instrument.
(g) The pendency of any arbitral proceeding pertaining to a dispute that is the subject of the action.
(h) The period of an intervening bankruptcy tolls the expiration period of a tax certificate under s. 197.482 and any proceeding or process under chapter 197.
(i) The minority or previously adjudicated incapacity of the person entitled to sue during any period of time in which a parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem does not exist, has an interest adverse to the minor or incapacitated person, or is adjudicated to be incapacitated to sue; except with respect to the statute of limitations for a claim for medical malpractice as provided in s. 95.11. In any event, the action must be begun within 7 years after the act, event, or occurrence giving rise to the cause of action.

Paragraphs (a)-(c) shall not apply if service of process or service by publication can be made in a manner sufficient to confer jurisdiction to grant the relief sought. This section shall not be construed to limit the ability of any person to initiate an action within 30 days after the lifting of an automatic stay issued in a bankruptcy action as is provided in 11 U.S.C. s. 108(c).

(2) A disability or other reason does not toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section, s. 95.091, the Florida Probate Code, or the Florida Guardianship Law.
History.s. 16, Nov. 10, 1828; ss. 14, 17, ch. 1869, 1872; RS 1284, 1285; GS 1715, 1716; RGS 2928, 2929; CGL 4648, 4649; s. 4, ch. 74-382; s. 2, ch. 75-234; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 3, ch. 86-266; s. 1, ch. 89-26; s. 1, ch. 90-105; s. 519, ch. 95-147; s. 1, ch. 2011-151.
Note.Former ss. 95.05, 95.07.

F.S. 95.051 on Google Scholar

F.S. 95.051 on Casetext

Amendments to 95.051


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 95.051
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 95.051.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

SOUTHERN SPECIALTIES, INC. a v. FARMHOUSE TOMATOES, INC. a, 259 So. 3d 869 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Farmhouse had made partial payments on its debt which tolled the statute of limitations pursuant to section 95.051 . . . Although Southern contended that the statute was tolled pursuant to section 95.051(1)(f), Florida Statutes . . .

D. H. v. ADEPT COMMUNITY SERVICES, INC., 271 So. 3d 870 (Fla. 2018)

. . . . § 95.051(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . Interpreting § 95.051(1)(h), Fla. . . . ." § 95.051(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . Cf. § 95.051(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . See § 95.051(1)(i), Fla. Stat. (2018). . . . ." § 95.051(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . Twins' "awareness" argument as "irrelevant" to the issue of whether the tolling provisions in section 95.051 . . . (1)(h), and the Second District ruled on the merits that section 95.051(1)(h) did not apply, in part . . . In other words, because the Twins presented some argument for the applicability of section 95.051(1)( . . . Indeed, according to the majority: "The Second District held section 95.051(1)(h) did not toll the Twins . . . the majority's decision today, which holds that the Twins' negligence action was tolled by section 95.051 . . . This subsection is now codified in section 95.051(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2017). . . .

WEATHERLY, v. PERSHING, LLC,, 322 F. Supp. 3d 746 (N.D. Tex. 2018)

. . . In particular, section 95.051 "delineates an exclusive list of conditions" that can toll the running . . . STAT. § 95.051 (1991) (emphasis added). . . . STAT. § 95.051(1) (1991). . . . STAT. § 95.051(2) (1991) (emphasis added). . . . STAT. § 95.051(2) (1991) ) ); Senger Bros. Nursery v. . . .

R. R. S. B. v. NEW LIFE COMMUNITY CHURCH OF CMA, INC., 248 So. 3d 232 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . We note that even if we were to adopt Appellants' argument as to section 95.051(1)(i), Florida Statutes . . .

WILCHFORT v. M. KNIGHT, REIT REIT LLC, REIT, BRE W. W. B. S. M., 307 F. Supp. 3d 64 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)

. . . As an initial matter, Florida Statutes § 95.051, the Florida state statute on tolling, "appears to preclude . . . Florida Statutes § 95.051"delineates an exclusive list of conditions that can 'toll' the running of the . . . "The commencement of a class is not included among the tolling conditions listed in [ section] 95.051 . . . Indeed, citing to section 95.051, the Second Circuit has held that "Florida does not allow tolling during . . . Despite the language of Florida Statutes § 95.051, the Florida Supreme Court has allowed putative class . . .

J. JACOBS, Jr. v. ESTEFAN,, 705 F. App'x 829 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 95.051. So it is clear that Jacobs’s claims were filed after the applicable limitations period. . . .

GOMEZ, a v. CALIFORNIA, No., 702 F. App'x 872 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 95.051. . . .

D. H. L. H. BY AND THROUGH R. H. S. H. v. ADEPT COMMUNITY SERVICES, INC. B. E. A. R. R. B. E. A. R. R. v. D. H. L. H. R. H. S. H., 217 So. 3d 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . more than four years before they filed suit, and the tolling for minors’ claims provided by section 95.051 . . . See Hearndon, 767 So.2d at 1185; see also § 95.051. . . . The twins argue that the limitations period was tolled under section 95.051(l)(h) continuously from the . . . The twins’ reliance on section 95.051(l)(h) is therefore misplaced. III. . . . Nor does the tolling afforded by section 95.051(l)(h) apply here under the undisputed facts. . . . As the majority recognizes, section 95.051(l)(h) tolls the statute of limitations during “[t]he minority . . .

DOE NO. v. NUR- UL- ISLAM ACADEMY, INC. a Ul- a, 217 So. 3d 85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . As the first sentence of section 95.051(1) makes clear, the legislature is delineating a rule of tolling . . . To the extent that the appellees argue the last sentence of section 95.051(l)(i) (formerly section 95.051 . . . we deem the argument to lack merit because after enacting the statute of repose provision in section 95.051 . . . the time of abuse, the legislature clearly did not intend for the statute of repose bar in section 95.051 . . . Thus, we conclude the statute of repose in section 95.051(l)(i) does not bar her action on our review . . .

A. TRUDEL, v. SUNTRUST BANK,, 223 F. Supp. 3d 71 (D.D.C. 2016)

. . . . § 95.051. . . .

DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS, v. BEAUVAIS, a, 188 So. 3d 938 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Section ,95.051(2) limits statute of limitations tolling to the reasons specified in section ,95.051( . . . , 906 So.2d 1094, 1100-01 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (providing that the legislature’s enactment of section 95.051 . . .

A. HUMMER, v. ADAMS HOMES OF NORTHWEST FLORIDA, INC. Nu LLC,, 198 So. 3d 750 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Stat. (2009) ("Except as provided in subsection (2) and in s. 95.051 and elsewhere in these statutes, . . .

JAX UTILITIES MANAGEMENT, INC. v. HANCOCK BANK, A LLC, A, 164 So. 3d 1266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . “Except as provided in subsection (2) [fraud and products liability] and in s. 95.051 [tolling] and elsewhere . . .

HESS, v. PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., 175 So. 3d 687 (Fla. 2015)

. . . .); tolling exceptions provided in section 95.051(l)(a)-(i), Florida Statutes (2013); and “elsewhere . . .

W. WIAND, L. P. v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A., 86 F. Supp. 3d 1316 (M.D. Fla. 2015)

. . . . § 95.051. Neither delayed discovery nor equitable tolling applies. In re Wiand, 2008 U.S. Dist. . . .

In ENGLE CASES, 45 F. Supp. 3d 1351 (M.D. Fla. 2014)

. . . These cases base their reasoning on Florida Statutes section 95.051, which provides that “[t]he running . . . Stat. § 95.051(1). . . . Id. § 95.051(2). . . .

IN RE CATHODE RAY TUBE CRT ANTITRUST LITIGATION. v. No. v. No. v., 27 F. Supp. 3d 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2014)

. . . case, which the Court addresses (and dismisses) below, but regardless of that, Florida Statute section 95.051 . . . Defendants respond that a different Florida statute, Section 95.051(1), provides an exclusive list of . . . Defendants are right that Section 95.051(1) provides an exclusive list of Floridian tolling doctrines . . . S.A.P., 835 So.2d 1091, 1095-96 & n. 7 (Fla.2002) (affirming that Section 95.051 is exclusive, but distinguishing . . .

AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY, a v. WEAVER AGGREGATE TRANSPORT, INC. a a a v. a a v. d b a S M, 990 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (M.D. Fla. 2013)

. . . . § 95.051 lists the bases for tolling statutes of limitations in Florida, including the limitations . . . Stat. § 95.051; however the court subsequently withdrew that opinion. See Fulton County Admin. v. . . . Stat. § 95.051). . . . .

A. JACOBS, Jr. v. ESTEFAN, Ar, De, 531 F. App'x 1004 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 95.051. . . . Ann. § 95.051. AFFIRMED. . . .

LOPEZ, v. GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY,, 968 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (S.D. Fla. 2013)

. . . The legislative intent expressed in Section 95.051 lent further support to that conclusion, as 95.051 . . . Furthermore 95.051(2) expressly precludes use of any tolling provision not listed. See id. . . .

ADAMS, LLC, G. LLC, J. LLC, v. DEUTSCHE BANK AG,, 529 F. App'x 98 (2d Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 95.051(2) (“A disability or other reason does not toll the running of any statute of limitations . . .

RUBIO, v. ARCHDIOCESE OF MIAMI, INC., 114 So. 3d 279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . . § 95.051, Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .

LANGLEY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, LLLP, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF LAKE COUNTY, FLORIDA,, 113 So. 3d 995 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . See § 95.051(2), Fla. . . . the Second District, the rule in Dupont was superseded by the Legislature’s 1974 adoption of section 95.051 . . .

R. BECNEL, LLC, v. DEUTSCHE BANK, AG,, 507 F. App'x 71 (2d Cir. 2013)

. . . Stat: § 95.051(2) (2012) (“A disability or other reason does not toll the running of any statute of limitations . . .

AFFCO NEW ZEALAND, LTD. a v. AMERICAN FINE FOODS CORP. a U. S., 913 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2012)

. . . . § 95.051. The statutory tolling list is exhaustive, see Fla. . . . . § 95.051(2); Major League Baseball v. . . .

M. J. O. HOLDING CORPORATION, a v. HELLER, A., 97 So. 3d 864 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Section 95.051(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), provides that the “running of the time under any statute . . . The phrase “that is unknown to the person entitled to sue” modifies the word “use” in section 95.051( . . . tortfeasor’s fraudulent concealment of his identity will not toll the statute of limitations under section 95.051 . . .

WOODBURN v. STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 854 F. Supp. 2d 1184 (S.D. Fla. 2011)

. . . . § 95.051(l)(d), (h) (2011). . . . Stat. § 95.051(l)(d), (h) (2011). . . . Stat. § 95.051(l)(d), (h) (2011). . . .

STARLING, v. R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY,, 845 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (M.D. Fla. 2011)

. . . . § 95.051, but that list is exhaustive, id. § 95.051(2); Hearndon v. . . . Stat. § 95.051).) Mrs. . . . 790 So.2d 1071, 1075 (Fla.2001) and explained: The [Florida Supreme Court] held that although section 95.051 . . . statute of limitations, it must be included in the exclusive list of conditions set forth in section 95.051 . . . Stat. § 95.051, but that list is exhaustive, id. § 95.051(2); Hearndon v. . . .

E. CLARK, v. ESTATE OF ELROD H., 61 So. 3d 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Further, we fail to find any exception under section 95.051 that would toll the statute of limitations . . .

D. COHEN, v. WORLD OMNI FINANCIAL CORP., 751 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (S.D. Fla. 2010)

. . . . § 95.051 sets forth eight situations sufficient to toll a limitations period, none of which are applicable . . .

LEWIS, Jr. v. BARNICK,, 385 F. App'x 930 (11th Cir. 2010)

. . . Lewis argues that the district court erred in finding that Florida’s tolling statute, Florida Statute § 95.051 . . . Stat. § 95.051 tolled the limitations period. . . .

RAMIREZ, v. H. McCRAVY,, 37 So. 3d 240 (Fla. 2010)

. . . Supreme Court itself in Hearndon specifically declaring that by enumerating eight grounds in section 95.051 . . .

I. McCOLE, v. CITY OF MARATHON, 36 So. 3d 750 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Section 95.051, Florida Statutes, enumerates eight specific grounds for tolling limitations periods. . . .

SNEED, v. PAN AMERICAN HOSPITAL, Dr., 370 F. App'x 47 (11th Cir. 2010)

. . . . § 95.051. . . .

B. BROWN, J. L. v. NATIONSCREDIT FINANCIAL SERVICES CORPORATION, N. A., 32 So. 3d 661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Appellants concede on appeal that them claims are time-barred unless tolled by section 95.051(l)(f). . . . Appellants counter that section 95.051(l)(f) refers to the tolling of “any statute of limitation” and . . . First, if, as Appellants argue, making payments was sufficient under section 95.051(1)(f) to toll the . . . To the contrary, the cases construing section 95.051(1)(f) hold that the statute merely codified the . . . This is a complete misapplication of the part-payment tolling provision in section 95.051(l)(f). . . . In 1974, however, the legislature enacted section 95.051, Florida Statutes, which provided for a set . . . “In 1975, the legislature added section 95.051(l)(f), which provided that the running of time was tolled . . . Under the provisions of § 95.051(l)(f), the only act which would toll the time for the running of the . . . the payment of any part of the principal or interest, since any contrary case law was superseded by § 95.051 . . . respect to claims brought by creditors, the eases giving rise to this concept were superseded by section 95.051 . . .

In CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC. ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION. To ATA v., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (S.D. Fla. 2010)

. . . . § 95.051. . . .

MEYER, v. MEYER,, 25 So. 3d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Citing the tolling statute, section 95.051, Florida Statutes (2005), the trial court dismissed those . . .

LARSON LARSON, P. A. v. TSE INDUSTRIES, INC., 22 So. 3d 36 (Fla. 2009)

. . . statute of limitations founders not only on our decision in Kelley but also on the text of section 95.051 . . . Section 95.051(1) contains a list of specific circumstances in which the running of the time under statutes . . . Section 95.051(2) provides that “[n]o disability or other reason shall toll the running of any statute . . .

DRIESSEN, B. O. d o b B. O. d o b v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, BAL, 351 F. App'x 355 (11th Cir. 2009)

. . . . § 95.051; see also Chappell, 340 F.3d at 1283; Justice v. . . .

MILLER, v. ANHEUSER BUSCH, INC. a, 348 F. App'x 547 (11th Cir. 2009)

. . . . § 95.051. Id. at 535-36. . . .

ARUANNO, v. MARTIN COUNTY SHERIFF,, 343 F. App'x 535 (11th Cir. 2009)

. . . . § 95.051, but that list is exhaustive, id. § 95.051(2); Hearndon v. . . .

ARVELO, v. PARK FINANCE OF BROWARD, INC., 15 So. 3d 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . limitations was tolled by “the sale of the collateral and resulting partial payment,” under section 95.051 . . .

RODRIGUEZ, v. C. FAVALORA,, 11 So. 3d 393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . of the statutorily authorized grounds for tolling a limitation period. 767 So.2d at 1185; see also § 95.051 . . .

PALMER, v. CORPORATION,, 7 So. 3d 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . statutory tolling exceptions to the statutes of limitations applicable to civil actions found in section 95.051 . . . Having held that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving tolling exceptions contained in section 95.051 . . .

RAMIREZ, v. H. McCRAVY,, 4 So. 3d 692 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Section 95.051, Florida Statutes (2006), enumerated eight different, specific grounds for tolling limitation . . . Lobo De Gonzalez, 841 So.2d 510 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), the court held that section 95.051, did not abrogate . . . Supreme Court itself in Heamdon specifically declaring that by enumerating eight grounds in section 95.051 . . .

LANOUE, v. M. RIZK,, 987 So. 2d 724 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See § 95.051(f), Fla. Stat. (2003). On that analysis, the lawsuit was timely filed. . . .

BURGEST, v. McAFEE,, 264 F. App'x 850 (11th Cir. 2008)

. . . . § 95.051 (West 1990). . . .

W. SHIVERS, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS LOCAL UNION IBEW J. J. W. D., 262 F. App'x 121 (11th Cir. 2008)

. . . . § 95.051. . . .

ABC LIQUORS, INC. v. CENTIMARK CORPORATION,, 967 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . when ABC’s causes of actions accrued nor does Centimark take into account the provision of section 95.051 . . .

COMMERCEBANK, N. A. v. E. TAYLOR,, 964 So. 2d 817 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . See § 95.051(a), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .

NEW LENOX INDUSTRIES, INC. a v. H. FENTON, LLC., 510 F. Supp. 2d 893 (M.D. Fla. 2007)

. . . . § 95.051 (l)(a) or for tolling of the statute of limitations under equitable principles is not appropriate . . .

SOUTH MOTOR COMPANY OF DADE COUNTY, a d b a v. DOKTORCZYK,, 957 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . a statutory cause of action, but held that the part payment tolling exception contained in section 95.051 . . . Section 95.051, entitled “[w]hen limitations tolled,” provides in pertinent part: (1) The running of . . . necessarily based on a “written instrument,” i.e. the RSIC, and, consequently, the tolling provision of § 95.051 . . . finance agreement thus did not operate to toll the statute of limitation period pursuant to section 95.051 . . . This is a complete misapplication of the part-payment tolling provision in section 95.051(1)(f). . . .

GOMEZ, v. DOE,, 213 F. App'x 877 (11th Cir. 2007)

. . . . § 95.051(1)(d) & (h). . . .

HUNT A. J. D. D. v. ENZO BIOCHEM, INC., 471 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)

. . . . § 95.051(1)(a)(2003); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260 § 9; S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-30. . . . . Ann. § 95.051(l)(h) (stating that the tolling provisions "shall not apply if service of process ... can . . .

In VITAMINS ANTITRUST LITIGATION, 183 F. App'x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

. . . . § 95.051(1). . . . Stat. § 95.051(2) (emphasis added). . . . statute of limitations, it must be included in the exclusive list of conditions set forth in section 95.051 . . .

CADLE COMPANY, v. McCARTHA,, 920 So. 2d 144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . Cadle argued that the five-year period set forth in section 95.11(2)(b) had been tolled by section 95.051 . . . Prior to the 1974 enactment of section 95.051, Florida Statutes, Florida law had long recognized that . . . This exception was apparently eliminated in 1974, when the legislature enacted section 95.051, which . . . Section 95.051(l)(f), the tolling provision involved in this case, was added by the legislature in 1975 . . . with this viewpoint, the cases that have considered this issue to date indicate that under section 95.051 . . .

RYAN, IV, v. LOBO DE GONZALEZ,, 921 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2005)

. . . We held that section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1993), which delineates the circumstances that can “toll . . .

In HILL, P. v. MTLC a, 332 B.R. 835 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005)

. . . . § 95.051, Fla. . . .

SAN PEDRO, v. SAN PEDRO,, 910 So. 2d 426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . In the present case, not only does the plain language of section 95.051 not expressly change the common . . . This is true even subsequent to the 1975 enactment of subsection (2) of section 95.051, which states . . .

FOXWORTH, ESTATE OF DURDEN, v. KIA MOTORS CORPORATION v., 377 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (N.D. Fla. 2005)

. . . . § 95.051. See Hearndon v. . . . , 767 So.2d 1179 (Fla.2000) (declining to create additional tolling exceptions to those listed in § 95.051 . . . Section 95.051 does not provide for tolling in the instant wrongful death causes of action. . . .

HASKINS, v. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE,, 898 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . Section 95.051(l)(g), Florida Statutes (2004), provides that the statute of limitations is tolled by . . . Based upon the plain meaning of section 95.051(l)(g), there was no tolling of the statute of limitations . . . Therefore, section 95.051(l)(g) does not operate to toll the applicable statute of limitations, and Plaintiffs . . .

CHILDERS, v. CAPE CANAVERAL HOSPITAL, INC., 898 So. 2d 973 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . HB 43 contained a proposal to amend section 95.051, Florida Statutes to toll the' statute of limitations . . .

HOUCK CORPORATION, v. NEW RIVER, LTD. PASCO,, 900 So. 2d 601 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . Section 95.051, Florida Statutes (2002), sets forth the times when the limitations period under section . . .

HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF FLORIDA, INC. d b a v. HILLMAN,, 906 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Section 95.051(1) enumerates eight circumstances under which the running of the time under any statute . . . The court also noted that section 95.051(2) specifically precludes application of any tolling provision . . . Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071, 1075 (Fla.2001), the supreme court once again addressed section 95.051 when . . . The court held that although section 95.051(1) “delineates an exclusive list of conditions that can ‘ . . . Section 95.051(1) contains exceptions to these tolling provisions that are not relevant here. . . . .

LEE, v. SIMON, D. O. d b a D. O. M. D. a k a D. O. P. A. L. M. D. A M. D. G. M. D. L. M. D. M. D. N. D. O. J. D. O. J. M. D. M. D. M. D. P. A. M. D. Y. M. D., 885 So. 2d 939 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Section 95.051(1), Florida Statutes (1998), provides when the running of the statute of limitations may . . . Even in the provisions of F.S. s 95.051, enacted after the events involved in this case, the Legislature . . . that fraudulent concealment of the identity of a wrongdoer did not toll the statute because section 95.051 . . . did not contain such a provision, and section 95.051(2) specifically provides that “ ‘No disability . . . While acknowledging that the reasons for tolling the statute set forth in section 95.051 were a legislatively . . .

ROSS, v. JIM ADAMS FORD, INC., 871 So. 2d 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . See § 95.051(2), Fla. . . .

GONZALEZ, v. CATHOLIC CEMETERIES OF ARCHDIOCESE OF MIAMI, INC., 870 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . See and compare §§ 95.051, 95.11(3), Fla. Stat. (2001); Davis v. . . .

RYAN, IV, E. v. LOBO DE GONZALEZ, 841 So. 2d 510 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . , the trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of Major League Baseball holding that section 95.051 . . . second district certified to our supreme court as a question of great public importance whether section 95.051 . . . reason shall toll the running of any statute of limitation except those specified in this section....” § 95.051 . . .

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, v. S. A. P., 835 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 2002)

. . . acting on her behalf, no friend or guardian, who could have filed suit on her behalf’; and (3) section 95.051 . . . specified in this section, s. 95.091, the Florida Probate Code, or the Florida Guardianship Law. § 95.051 . . . Because fraudulent concealment is not one of the exceptions listed in section 95.051(2), this provision . . . the district court’s decision on this issue must be quashed because it is in conflict with sections 95.051 . . . First, section 95.051(2) specifically prohibits tolling for any statute of limitations except as specified . . . Morsani 790 So.2d 1071 (Fla.2001), addressed the question of whether the tolling proscription in section 95.051 . . . estoppel “are as different as apples and oranges,” and held that the tolling proscription in section 95.051 . . . Section 95.051 sets forth an exclusive list of conditions that can "toll” the running of the statute . . . See § 95.051, Fla. Stat. (1995). . See § 95.11, Fla. Stat (1995). . . . . This is true even subsequent to the 1975 enactment of subsection (2) of section 95.051 which states that . . . bar to a statute of limitations defense both prior to the passage of the tolling provision in section 95.051 . . .

L. DAVIS, v. K. MONAHAN,, 832 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 2002)

. . . . — Except as provided in subsection (2) and in s. 95.051 and elsewhere in these statutes, the time within . . .

NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION, v. J. PATAFIO, JR., 829 So. 2d 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . the general rule in Florida, which we apply in this case, is that the tolling provisions of section 95.051 . . . Section 95.051 provides: (1) The running of the time under any statute of limitations except ss. 95.281 . . . ’s statute of limitations for Florida judgments because Florida’s statute is also twenty years. . § 95.051 . . .

S. CUILLO, v. McCOY, E., 810 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . Appellees argue that under section 95.051(l)(f), Florida Statutes, the statute of limitation was tolled . . . Section 95.051(l)(f) provides: (1) The running of the time under any statute of limitations except ss . . . Estate of Cooke, 432 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the court stated: In 1975 the legislature added § 95.051 . . . Under the provisions of § 95.051(l)(f), the only act which would toll the time for the running of the . . . the payment of any part of the principal or interest, since any contrary case law was superseded by § 95.051 . . .

M. BENFIELD, v. EVEREST VENTURE GROUP, INC. f k a d b a S. I. C. A. f k a S. I. C. A., 801 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . Benfield contends the action on the promissory note was timely because of the tolling provision in section 95.051 . . . The applicable portions of section 95.051(1) state: “The running of the time under any statute of limitations . . . We conclude that section 95.051(1)® is applicable and that partial payments tolled the limitations period . . . Section 95.051(1)® applies equally to promissory notes, with or without acceleration clauses. . . .

MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, v. L. MORSANI,, 790 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 2001)

. . . .2d 610 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), wherein the district court certified the following question: Does section 95.051 . . . The trial court found that section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1993), which enumerates the eight specific . . . Section 95.051 delineates an exclusive list of conditions that can “toll” the running of the statute . . . The Court recently explained that use of the term “toll” in section 95.051 is synonymous with “suspend . . . Moseley, 2 Fla. 171 (1848). . § 95.051(2), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added). . See State v. . . .

K. MONAHAN, v. L. DAVIS, Jo B L a, 781 So. 2d 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . The court observed that in section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1987), the legislature limited the circumstances . . .

HEARNDON, v. L. GRAHAM,, 767 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 2000)

. . . See § 95.051, Fla. Stat. (1987). . . . See § 95.051(1), Fla. Stat. (1987). . . . See § 95.051(2), Fla. Stat. (1987). . . .

HANKEY, v. YARIAN, M. D., 755 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 2000)

. . . For example, section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1997), provides generally for the tolling of statutory . . . defendant had accepted a demand for arbitration thereby suspending the statute of limitations under section 95.051 . . .

TOTURA COMPANY, INC. v. E. WILLIAMS, v., 754 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 2000)

. . . Permenter does not suggest that any of the tolling provisions in section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1991 . . . attention to a concept of “tolling” rather than when an action is “commenced” and, therefore, found section 95.051 . . .

HOSPITAL CONSTRUCTORS LTD. a By LIFEMARK HOSPITALS OF FLORIDA, INC. d b a v. L. LEFOR, 749 So. 2d 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . See § 95.051(l)(f), Fla. Stat. (1990). See Chaplin v. . . . See § 95.051(l)(f). Therefore, based on the allegations, the cause of action against Mrs. . . .

ALLAPATTAH SERVICES, INC. v. EXXON CORPORATION,, 188 F.R.D. 667 (S.D. Fla. 1999)

. . . courts are constrained to hon- or the statutory bar except for those circumstances enumerated in § 95.051 . . .

In HILLARD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, In d b a In d b a d b a LTD. v., 238 B.R. 857 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999)

. . . . § 95.051(1)©) (statute of limitations for action on written instrument is tolled by the “payment of . . .

PUTNAM BERKLEY GROUP, INC. a a v. DININ, 734 So. 2d 532 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . See § 95.051(1)(b)-(c), Fla. Stat. (1975). . . . Moreover, in section 95.051(2), the legislature stated, ‘No disability or other reason shall toll the . . . See § 95.051(2), Fla. Stat. (1985). . . . See § 95.051(2), Fla. Stat. (1985). . . . Section 95.051, Fla. . . .

L. MORSANI, a v. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL V. M. T. Jr. S. D. S. Jr. W. M. D. a d b a d b a d b a a d b a d b a d b a O d b a L. P. d b a d b a d b a D. F. St. d b a St. L. d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a M. Co. d b a d b a d b a d b a H. d b a MTI Co. d b a R. P. A. d b a M. d b a d b a d b a d b a, 739 So. 2d 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . The trial court found that section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1993), which enumerates the eight specific . . . In Sullivan, the district court of appeal held that section 95.051 precludes the tolling of the statute . . . The supreme court agreed and reasoned that the legislative intent of section 95.051 sought to exclude . . . That court concluded that the two concepts are different and that section 95.051 has ho bearing on the . . . In Heamdon, the court held that the defense of delayed discovery was precluded by section 95.051. . . .

MUSCULOSKELETAL INSTITUTE CHARTERED, d b a E. III, M. D. E. III, M. D. P. A. A. M. D. v. S. PARHAM,, 745 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1999)

. . . For example, section 95.051 is titled "[wjhen limitations tolled.” . . . .” § 95.051(1)(d),(h), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .

NORTHCUTT, v. BALKANY,, 727 So. 2d 382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . Balkany’s argument that Florida’s general statute of limitation tolling provisions, set forth in section 95.051 . . . prevent a person from exercising a legal remedy, including bankruptcy proceedings _ Further, section 95.051 . . . However, in relying so heavily on section 95.051 and the Swartzman decision, Balkany fails to recognize . . .

SENGER BROTHERS NURSERY, INC. f k a a v. E. I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS COMPANY,, 184 F.R.D. 674 (M.D. Fla. 1999)

. . . See Fla.Stat. § 95.051. . . . Florida Statute § 95.051 addresses the issue of tolling statutes of limitation, while federal judge-made . . . Florida Statute § 95.051 does not permit tolling of statutes of limitation for any reason, other than . . . See Fla.Stat. § 95.051; Sullivan, 22 Fla.L. Weekly S578, — So.2d -. . . . Plaintiffs claims are not tolled under Florida Statute § 95.051. . . .

BARNES v. CLARK SAND COMPANY, INC., 721 So. 2d 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . . — Except as provided in subsection 95.051(2) and elsewhere in these statutes, the time within which . . .

PERMENTER, v. GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,, 712 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . Permenter does not suggest that any of the tolling provisions in section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1991 . . .

HEARNDON, v. L. GRAHAM,, 710 So. 2d 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . The Sullivan court ruled that, because section 95.051(2), Florida Statutes (1985) “specifically precludes . . . the accrual of the cause of action, then the legislative preclusion on tolling set forth in section 95.051 . . . Although Sullivan holds that section 95.051(2) precludes the judicial recognition of a “tolling provision . . .

W. Ed HERDER, v. FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK OF FLORIDA f k a, 708 So. 2d 997 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . the appellee’s argument that any change in this rule has been effected by the enactment of section 95.051 . . .

In STEWART,, 215 B.R. 633 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997)

. . . statute of limitations by any statement, writing, or part payment by the Debtor pursuant to Fla.Stat. ch. 95.051 . . .

P. GREENE, Jr. v. SEMINOLE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., 701 So. 2d 646 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . the only acts or circumstances that will toll a limitations period are those enumerated in section 95.051 . . .

S. A. P. v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES,, 704 So. 2d 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . Section 95.051(l)(h) Not Applicable Finally, we cannot agree with the trial court that, on the facts . . . alleged in this complaint, section 95.051(l)(h), Florida Statutes (1993), mandates that S.AP. must have . . . In section 95.051(l)(h), the legislature also established a seven-year period of repose for actions to . . . The 1990 law which added subsection (1)(h) to section 95.051, however, expressly applies only “to causes . . . 1095 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), the trial court erred in dismissing the instant action based upon the section 95.051 . . .

In BLACKBURN. STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, AS RECEIVER OF GUARANTEE SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. BLACKBURN, STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, AS RECEIVER OF ATLANTIC GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. BLACKBURN,, 209 B.R. 4 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997)

. . . First, the court reasoned that, because Florida’s tolling statute, Section 95.051, Florida Statutes, . . .

DOE, v. DORSEY,, 683 So. 2d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . Section 95.051(l)(h). . . .

SCHRANK, v. PEARLMAN, 683 So. 2d 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . See § 95.051, Fla. Stat (1989). . The bus ticket was designated “Contract.” 369 So.2d at 419. . . .

GRANTHAM, v. BLOUNT, INC. a, 683 So. 2d 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . .” § 95.051(2), Fla. Stat. (1993). . . . Section 95.051, Florida Statutes (1993), provides circumstances that toll the statute of limitations, . . . See § 95.051(l)(b), (c), Fla. Stat. (1993). Mr. . . .

W. ABBOTT, v. L. KISER,, 654 So. 2d 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . . § 95.051(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1993). . . .

CHARLEY TOPPINO SONS, INC. v. SEAWATCH AT MARATHON CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. EPIC METALS CORP. v. SEAWATCH AT MARATHON CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., 658 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1994)

. . . See § 95.051, Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .

In C. WHITTAKER A., 177 B.R. 360 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1994)

. . . . § 95.051(f). . . .