Cases from cite.case.law:

LEHMANN v. COCOANUT BAYOU ASSOCIATION, INC., 269 So. 3d 599 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . See § 95.361, Fla. . . . See § 95.361, Fla. Stat. (1983). . . . See, e.g., § 95.361, Fla. Stat. (2018) ; § 341.51, Fla. . . .

E. CAMPBELL D. v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 267 So. 3d 541 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . judgment quieting title of the subject property to the Florida Department of Transportation under section 95.361 . . . The Department filed a counterclaim to quiet title, arguing that section 95.361, Florida Statutes, had . . . the Trial Court's Final Judgment An appellate court reviews a trial court's application of section 95.361 . . . Section 95.361(1), Florida Statutes, provides that when a road is constructed by a governmental entity . . . Section 95.361(2), Florida Statutes, provides that when a road is constructed by a nongovernmental entity . . .

PELICAN CREEK HOMEOWNERS, LLC, H. A. L. J. v. T. PULVERENTI E., 243 So. 3d 467 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . . § 95.361, Fla. Stat. (2016). . . . Additionally, filing a map of the dedication and referring to section 95.361 serves as prima facie evidence . . . Here, the dedication on the plat map does not refer to section 95.361, and no other record evidence suggests . . . We recognize that section 95.361 references only roads and does not specifically include dedication of . . .

MATHERS v. WAKULLA COUNTY, a, 219 So. 3d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . The Matherses argue, among other things, that the trial court erred in its application of section 95.361 . . . Because acceptance is not an element of statutory-presumed dedication under section 95.361, and section . . . 95.361 may be invoked by private parties, we agree and reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect . . . Stat¡ Because it was enacted so much later than section 95.361(1), no case law construes section- 95.361 . . . section 95.361 may be invoked by private parties. . . .

J. CHACKAL, S. v. STAPLES, M. D. J. M. a, 991 So. 2d 949 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . portion of a roadway that borders their property is owned by Palm Beach County pursuant to section 95.361 . . . that it had acquired title to the land at issue by statutory presumed dedication pursuant to section 95.361 . . . (1), Florida Statutes (2001), as follows: By operation of Florida Statutes Section 95.361, Palm Beach . . . In 2001, when this lawsuit was filed, section 95.361, Florida Statutes, applied only where a road was . . . “constructed” by a governmental entity, as follows: 95.361. . . .

W. CHARITY u t d B. B. u t d L. H. v. SARASOTA COUNTY, a K., 956 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . land adjacent to the roadway by operation of Florida’s road dedication statute, as codified in section 95.361 . . .

I. PASCO v. CITY OF OLDSMAR, a, 953 So. 2d 766 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . judgment, asking the court to rule that the roadway was presumed to be dedicated to the City under section 95.361 . . . Section 95.361 creates a presumption that a road is dedicated to the public when it was both constructed . . . “maintained or repaired continuously and uninterruptedly for 4 years” by the governmental entity. § 95.361 . . . Section 95.361(1) requires more than occasional, or even periodic, maintenance or repair; it requires . . . 840, 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (reversing conclusion that road was dedicated to county under section 95.361 . . .

T. UNDERWOOD, v. COLUMBIA COUNTY,, 868 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . See § 95.361, Florida Statutes (2002). . . . Nothing in the dedication statute, section 95.361, authorizes a court to award a property owner compensation . . . See § 95.361, Fla. Stat.; Suwannee County v. Garrison, 417 So.2d 1070, 1071 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). . . . Section 95.361(1) provides, When a road, constructed by a county, a municipality, or the Department of . . . whether or not there is a record of a conveyance, dedication, or appropriation to the public use. § 95.361 . . .

R. HANCOCK T. a k a P. v. TIPTON, 732 So. 2d 369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . Section 95.361(1), Florida Statutes (1995), sets out the requirements for a statutory presumptive dedication . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. JAMES,, 681 So. 2d 886 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . response, DOT denied James’ ownership and raised the affirmative defense of ownership based on section 95.361 . . . had conveyed its interest in the 1937 tax deed and that it could not prove compliance with section 95.361 . . . James’ predecessor-in-interest pursuant to the 1937 tax deed before raising a defense based on section 95.361 . . . That property conveyance rendered DOT’s assertions of ownership pursuant to section 95.361 “completely . . . Section 95.361(l)(c) states: (1) When a road, constructed by ... the Department of Transportation, has . . .

In JACKSON,, 169 B.R. 742 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1994)

. . . Statutory dedication under § 95.361 (and its predecessor § 341.66) vests fee title to a dedicated road . . . Fla.Stat. § 95.361(l)(a). . . . Florida courts hold that the requirements of § 95.361 must be strictly met. St. Joe Paper Co. v. . . . If the Objectors cannot carry their burden of proving compliance with the statute, then § 95.361 does . . . adverse possession in this case, the County’s only claim to title is by statutory dedication under § 95.361 . . .

SOUTHEAST SEMINOLE CIVIC ASSOCIATION, INC. v. W. A. ADKINS,, 604 So. 2d 523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . The reference is to a common law dedication (as opposed to a statutory dedication, see §§ 95.361, 177.081 . . .

P. WARD, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 584 So. 2d 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . The Department asserted that under section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1989), and its predecessors, title . . . the extent in width that has been actually maintained for the prescribed [four year] period....” § 95.361 . . .

STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. AMERADA HESS CORPORATION v. AMERICAN ROYALTY PRODUCING COMPANY,, 46 Fla. Supp. 2d 97 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1991)

. . . language remains essentially the same today, and the maintenance statute appears at Florida Statutes § 95.361 . . .

DARLEY, v. MARQUEE ENTERPRISES, INC. d b a s d b a d b a, 565 So. 2d 715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . Appellant argues that under section 95.361(1), Florida Statutes (1987), the parking lot roadway became . . . The record at best contains conflicting evidence concerning the applicability of section 95.361(1). . . . Although appellant did not present sufficient evidence to apply section 95.361 as a matter of law, the . . . Section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1987) provides in pertinent part: (1) When a road, constructed bya . . .

SANTA ROSA COUNTY, v. C. WICKS, 535 So. 2d 349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . determinations that the closed portion of the road had been dedicated to the public pursuant to section 95.361 . . .

L. LEE v. CALHOUN COUNTY, a, 532 So. 2d 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . and has since maintained the road, and therefore that the road is a county road pursuant to section 95.361 . . . Section 95.361(1), entitled "Roads presumed to be dedicated,” provides: [W]hen a road, constructed by . . .

H. BOOTHE, v. MANATEE COUNTY, FLORIDA,, 812 F.2d 1372 (11th Cir. 1987)

. . . . § 95.361 (West 1982) which provides in relevant part as follows: (1) When a road, constructed by a . . . The Florida courts have held that Section 95.361 is a statute of repose, which, when its terms have been . . .

CITY OF LIVE OAK, v. ARNOLD,, 468 So. 2d 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . asserted that Long Street was a “street” under the ordinances of the city as well as under Section 95.361 . . . Street became a “street” or roadway by dedication and acceptance of a recorded plat, or under Section 95.361 . . . that Long Street became a dedicated public street either by recording of the plat or under Section 95.361 . . .

SUN PLAZA WEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, v. CITY OF HOLMES BEACH, a, 465 So. 2d 542 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . Holmes Beach claimed title through the application of section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1983), and a . . . Section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1983), reads as follows: 95.361 Roads presumed to be dedicated.— (1 . . . The filing of the map pursuant to section 95.361(2) was prima facie evidence that the state had acquired . . . In construing a forerunner of section 95.361, our supreme court held that a city “could, without the . . . Admittedly, our construction of section 95.361 would theoretically permit a city to assert ownership . . .

BONIFAY, v. E. DICKSON R., 459 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . Section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1977), which establishes a presumption of dedication when a road has . . . Although section 95.361, Florida Statutes provides for acquisition of fee title to the “dedicated” road . . .

HUDSON FARMS CITRUS CATTLE, a v. DESOTO COUNTY, a, 456 So. 2d 511 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . s summary judgment for DeSoto County on its counterclaim asserting ownership of roads under Section 95.361 . . . Subsection (1) of Section 95.361 provides that When a road, constructed by a county ... has been maintained . . . the county thereby properly employed the second of the two methods of proof spelled out in Section 95.361 . . .

L. HUGHES, v. TOWN OF MEXICO BEACH,, 455 So. 2d 566 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . evidence is not sufficient to support a claim of ownership by any governmental authority under Section 95.361 . . .

OSCEOLA COUNTY, v. D. CASTELLI,, 435 So. 2d 417 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . Section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1981), provides that a county may acquire title to a roadway under . . . Therefore, section 95.361 is inapplicable here. . . .

HODGES, v. CITY OF WINTER PARK,, 433 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . Belflower, 355 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), and section 95.361, Florida Statutes. . . . Section 95.361(1), Florida Statutes (1975), states: When a road, constructed by a county, a municipality . . . four year period, or that the county performed inspections or repairs within the meaning of section 95.361 . . .

STAR ISLAND ASSOCIATES, a a v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG BEACH,, 433 So. 2d 998 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . Although arguably those facts may not support a showing of road construction within the meaning of section 95.361 . . . 1980), we need not decide that issue because we cannot find that the legislative intent behind section 95.361 . . . We cannot construe the language of section 95.361(1)(b), which allows title to a road to vest in a municipality . . .

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION, STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. IDEAL HOLDING COMPANY, R., 427 So. 2d 392 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . alternatively of (a) common-law dedication, (b) proscriptive easement or (c) maintenance pursuant to Section 95.361 . . .

DOWDELL, v. CITY OF APOPKA, FLORIDA, H., 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983)

. . . . § 95.361. See 511 F.Supp. at 1379. . . .

SUWANNEE COUNTY, v. E. GARRISON, Jr. L. E. III,, 417 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . whether a road across appellees’ property had become vested in the County under the provisions of Section 95.361 . . . Section 95.361 makes no provision for an award of attorney’s fees in litigation to determine whether . . . of appellees’ property, and sought by means of the present suit to perfect title to it under Section 95.361 . . . fees against the County for its attempt to clarify the status of the road, in the light of Section 95.361 . . . Section 95.361 provides that when a road constructed by a county, municipality, or the state, has been . . .

C. BALBIER A. v. CITY OF DEERFIELD BEACH,, 408 So. 2d 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . adopted by the trial judge, is that the City owns the right-of-way pursuant to the authority of Section 95.361 . . . In pertinent part, Section 95.361 provides: “Roads presumed to be dedicated “(1) When a road, constructed . . .

S. GENET, v. CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, a, 400 So. 2d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . continuous public use of the beach area since the late 1920’s, or a presumed dedication under Section 95.361 . . . dispose of the City’s contention that it owns the property by presumed dedication pursuant to Section 95.361 . . . The statute provides: 95.361 Roads presumed to be dedicated.— (1) When a road, constructed by a county . . . below was inadequate to support a finding of prescriptive easement or dedication pursuant to Section 95.361 . . .

DOWDELL, L. L. v. CITY OF APOPKA, FLORIDA H. Jr., 511 F. Supp. 1375 (M.D. Fla. 1981)

. . . . § 95.361, the streets are deemed dedicated to the City of Apopka and, thus, the City has the authority . . .

A. P. WEEKLEY v. SANTA ROSA COUNTY,, 384 So. 2d 44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the County acquired, by compliance with Section 95.361 . . .

ST. JOE PAPER COMPANY, a v. ST. JOHNS COUNTY, a, 383 So. 2d 915 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . Joe had become the property of appellee under Florida Statutes, § 95.361, which is, in pertinent part . . . The County answered, claiming that the access way had been dedicated by operation of § 95.361. . . . Joe contends fthat Florida Statutes, § 95.361, to the extent that it has been construed to give rise . . . Florida Statutes, § 95.361 creates an exception to these general rules by providing a substantially shorter . . . activities were held to be a “construction” within the terms of the predecessor of Florida Statutes, § 95.361 . . .

MADDEN, v. FLORALA TELEPHONE COMPANY,, 362 So. 2d 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)

. . . Court (but had not been recorded) and which purported to show compliance with the requirements of § 95.361 . . . The trial court granted the injunction as aforesaid finding that § 95.361(2), Florida Statutes (1975) . . . (2), Florida Statutes (1975), or by complying with the provisions of § 95.361(1). . . . The map which was filed in the Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court pursuant to § 95.361(2) was an . . . Appellant further contends that if the county has acquired any rights under § 95.361, its rights are . . .

JOHNSON, v. CITY OF ARCADIA, FLORIDA, E. Sr. J. I. D. Jr., 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1978)

. . . . § 95.361 (1976) 26. . . .

CONTINENTAL INS. CO. v. J. B. BELFLOWER,, 355 So. 2d 840 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)

. . . presented as to whether the road where the accident occurred was a county road under Florida Statute § 95.361 . . . Belflower’s case rests entirely on Section 95.361, Florida Statutes (1975), which presumes dedication . . .

PREMER, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 346 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)

. . . Applicable were Section 337.31 (now section 95.361, Florida Statutes 1975) under which the State had . . . submitted to the jury for decision, without explanation, by reading to the jury Section 337.31 (now Section 95.361 . . .

CAMPANELLA, v. L. SHUFORD,, 336 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

. . . holding that the county had maintained the road for more than the four-year prescriptive period, § 95.361 . . .