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Florida Statute 104.31 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 104.31 Case Law from Google Scholar
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Link to State of Florida Official Statute Google Search for Amendments to 104.31

The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title IX
ELECTORS AND ELECTIONS
Chapter 104
ELECTION CODE: VIOLATIONS; PENALTIES
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 104.31
104.31 Political activities of state, county, and municipal officers and employees.
(1) No officer or employee of the state, or of any county or municipality thereof, except as hereinafter exempted from provisions hereof, shall:
(a) Use his or her official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or a nomination of office or coercing or influencing another person’s vote or affecting the result thereof.
(b) Directly or indirectly coerce or attempt to coerce, command, or advise any other officer or employee to pay, lend, or contribute any part of his or her salary, or any money, or anything else of value to any party, committee, organization, agency, or person for political purposes. Nothing in this paragraph or in any county or municipal charter or ordinance shall prohibit an employee from suggesting to another employee in a noncoercive manner that he or she may voluntarily contribute to a fund which is administered by a party, committee, organization, agency, person, labor union or other employee organization for political purposes.
(c) Directly or indirectly coerce or attempt to coerce, command, and advise any such officer or employee as to where he or she might purchase commodities or to interfere in any other way with the personal right of said officer or employee.

The provisions of this section shall not be construed so as to prevent any person from becoming a candidate for and actively campaigning for any elective office in this state. All such persons shall retain the right to vote as they may choose and to express their opinions on all political subjects and candidates. The provisions of paragraph (a) shall not be construed so as to limit the political activity in a general, special, primary, bond, referendum, or other election of any kind or nature, of elected officials or candidates for public office in the state or of any county or municipality thereof; and the provisions of paragraph (a) shall not be construed so as to limit the political activity in general or special elections of the officials appointed as the heads or directors of state administrative agencies, boards, commissions, or committees or of the members of state boards, commissions, or committees, whether they be salaried, nonsalaried, or reimbursed for expense. In the event of a dual capacity of any member of a state board, commission, or committee, any restrictive provisions applicable to either capacity shall apply. The provisions of paragraph (a) shall not be construed so as to limit the political activity in a general, special, primary, bond, referendum, or other election of any kind or nature of the Governor, the elected members of the Governor’s Cabinet, or the members of the Legislature. The provisions of paragraphs (b) and (c) shall apply to all officers and employees of the state or of any county or municipality thereof, whether elected, appointed, or otherwise employed, or whether the activity shall be in connection with a primary, general, special, bond, referendum, or other election of any kind or nature.

(2) An employee of the state or any political subdivision may not participate in any political campaign for an elective office while on duty.
(3) Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(4) Nothing contained in this section or in any county or municipal charter shall be deemed to prohibit any public employee from expressing his or her opinions on any candidate or issue or from participating in any political campaign during the employee’s off-duty hours, so long as such activities are not in conflict with the provisions of subsection (1) or s. 110.233.
History.s. 8, ch. 26870, 1951; s. 7, ch. 29615, 1955; s. 5, ch. 29936, 1955; s. 1, ch. 59-208; s. 18, ch. 65-379; s. 53, ch. 71-136; ss. 1, 2, ch. 74-13; s. 1, ch. 75-261; s. 30, ch. 79-190; s. 1, ch. 80-207; s. 628, ch. 95-147; s. 1, ch. 2006-275.

F.S. 104.31 on Google Scholar

F.S. 104.31 on Casetext

Amendments to 104.31


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 104.31
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S104.31 1a - EXTORT - USE AUTHORITY TO INFLU INTERFERE W ELECTION - M: F
S104.31 1b - EXTORT - COMMAND COERCE OTHER OFFICER EMPLOYEE - M: F
S104.31 1b - ELECTION LAWS - DUPLICATE - SEE 1c - REC#69 - M: F
S104.31 1c - EXTORT - COERCE WHERE PURCH COMMODITY INTRF PERS RIGHTS - M: F
S104.31 1c - ELECTION LAWS - ADVISE WHERE PURCH COMMODITY INTRF PERS RIGHTS - M: F



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF FLORIDA, v. L. SCOTT,, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1311 (N.D. Fla. 2018)

. . . . § 104.31(1)(a). . . .

IN RE GGI PROPERTIES, LLC, GGI LLC, v., 568 B.R. 231 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2017)

. . . N.J.S.A. 54:5-104.31. See also Borough of New Shrewsbury, 104 N.J.Super. at 366, 250 A.2d 53. . . .

SCHWARZ, v. THE VILLAGES CHARTER SCHOOL, INC. d b a, 165 F. Supp. 3d 1153 (M.D. Fla. 2016)

. . . . § 104.31; 7 C.F.R. § 15b.20. . . . receive Federal financial assistance for the operation of, such programs or activities.” 34 C.F.R. § 104.31 . . .

MICHELLE K. K. v. PENTUCKET REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT K. v. v., 79 F. Supp. 3d 361 (D. Mass. 2015)

. . . appropriate public education guaranteed by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, as set forth in 34 CFR §§ 104.31 . . .

L. WILLS, Jr. v. FLORIDA ELECTIONS COMMISSION,, 955 So. 2d 61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . or influence another person’s vote or affecting the results of an election” in violation of section 104.31 . . .

J. FUGATE, v. FLORIDA ELECTIONS COMMISSION,, 924 So. 2d 74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . Appellant was charged with “willfully” violating section 104.31(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), which . . . reasonable definition of “willful,” the ALJ found that, although appellant had technically violated section 104.31 . . . (l)(a), appellant did not intend to violate section 104.31(l)(a), and therefore the appellant’s violation . . . applying the definition of “willful” set forth in 106.37 to appellant’s alleged violation of section 104.31 . . . adopted by the Commission, the ALJ’s factual finding that appellant did not “willfully” violate section 104.31 . . .

SCHNEIDER, J. J. J. O F. E. A. A. v. R. FEINBERG,, 345 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2003)

. . . . § 104.31(b)(1). . . . See 28 C.F.R. § 104.31(b)(2). . . .

COLAIO, J. J. J. O F. N. E. A. A. U. S. C. v. R. FEINBERG, M. I. I. v. Of R. v. R., 262 F. Supp. 2d 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)

. . . . § 104.31(b)(1) (2003). . . . claimant about eligibility within 45 days, and the claimant then proceeds to a hearing. 28 C.F.R. § 104.31 . . . presumptive award methodology” in order to obtain an adjustment in the presumed award, 28 C.F.R. §§ 104.31 . . . Challenge to 28 C.F.R. §§ 104.31(h) (2) and 10183(f)(2) Plaintiffs object to 28 C.F.R. §§ 104.31(b)(2 . . . 104.43, which provides presumptive award charts for incomes up to the 98th percentile, and 28 C.F.R. §§ 104.31 . . .

G. URBAN, URBAN, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT R-, 89 F.3d 720 (10th Cir. 1996)

. . . . § 104.31 et seq., we conclude that if a disabled child is not entitled to a neighborhood placement . . .

HUDSON, By HUDSON, v. BLOOMFIELD HILLS PUBLIC SCHOOLS,, 910 F. Supp. 1291 (E.D. Mich. 1995)

. . . . § 104.31 et seq. . . .

S- S- By Ad P- P- P- P- v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF NORTH CAROLINA C. D., 6 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 1993)

. . . . § 104.31 et seq. Relying primarily on School Committee of Burlington v. . . .

E. BALL, SSN XXX- XX- XXXX v. W. SULLIVAN, M. D., 754 F. Supp. 71 (D.S.C. 1990)

. . . Adjusting the “cap” for inflation, the rate permitted by statute is $104.31 per hour. . . . is applied to the cap, plaintiff, for services of petitioner, would receive a total fee of $3476.65 [104.31 . . . As noted earlier, the court finds that a rate of $104.31 per hour would fully reflect the $75 “cap” adjusted . . . While the court could allow $104.31 per hour, the court instead limits the rate of recovery in this action . . .

SULLIVAN, By SULLIVAN, Ad v. VALLEJO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT M. W., 731 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. Cal. 1990)

. . . . §§ 104.31, et seq.; see also Timms v. Metro. School Dist. of Wabash Cty. . . .

S- S- By Ad P- P- P- P- v. C. D. SPANGLER, Jr. C. D., 832 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1987)

. . . . § 104.31 et seq. Relying primarily on Burlington School Committee v. . . .

J. ENDRES, v. J. HELMS,, 617 F. Supp. 1260 (D.D.C. 1985)

. . . incidental employee benefits plaintiff would have received but for the violation. 3 Larson, supra note 10, § 104.31 . . .

ST. LOUIS DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES TREATMENT CENTER PARENTS ASSOCIATION, v. L. MALLORY,, 591 F. Supp. 1416 (W.D. Mo. 1984)

. . . . § 104.31-39, and the Education Act and its regulations are directed toward ensuring a free appropriate . . .

STATE COMMISSION ON ETHICS, v. SULLIVAN, 430 So. 2d 928 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . This section shall not be construed to conflict with s. 104.31. . . .

METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, a v. SANTOS,, 430 So. 2d 506 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . Article VIII, § 11(5) Florida Constitution of 1885, as amended, invalidly in “conflict” with Section 104.31 . . . The propriety of the conclusion that Sec. 104.31(1) does not abrogate the Charter provision before us . . . Sec. 104.31(3) states: Nothing contained in this section or in any county or municipal charter shall . . . It is significant that the court was concerned only with Sec. 104.31(3). . . . Apparently, Sec. 104.31(1) was considered so obviously not involved that it was not even discussed. . . .

NEW MEXICO ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CITIZENS, v. STATE OF NEW MEXICO,, 678 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1982)

. . . . § 104.31. . . .

TENNEY, v. STATE COMMISSION ON ETHICS, STATE COMMISSION ON ETHICS, v. TENNEY,, 395 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . This section shall not be construed to conflict with s. 104.31. . . .

R. RESEDEAN, v. CIVIL SERVICE BOARD OF CITY OF PENSACOLA, 332 So. 2d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

. . . (1) (d) and created Section 3 of F.S. 104.31. . . . We would have no qualms about accepting appellant’s position, but for the fact that F.S. 104.31(3) (1975 . . . Settled rules of statutory construction militate against stretching the 1974 amendment of § 104.31 to . . . Not only in § 104.31(3), F.S., but also in § 99.012, the “resign to run law” which was significantly . . . F.S. 104.31(1) (d) provides, in pertinent part: “104.31 Political activities of state, county and municipal . . .

CITY OF MIAMI, v. S. R. STERBENZ,, 203 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1967)

. . . Sec. 104.31, F.S.A.; State v. Stuler, Fla.1960, 122 So.2d 1. . Jones v. . . .

JONES, v. BOARD OF CONTROL, 131 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1961)

. . . Appellantasserts that the rule in question does violence to the legislative policy suggested by Section 104.31 . . . Section 104.31, supra, condemns certain types of political activities by State officers and employees . . . We, ourselves, have sustained the validity of Section 104.31, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which places . . .

STATE v. B. STULER,, 122 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1960)

. . . judge sustaining a motion to quash an information charging appellee Stuler with a violation of Section 104.31 . . . The pertinent part of Section 104.31, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides: “Political activities of state . . . campaign fund of * * * candidates in said primary campaign in 1958, contrary to the provisions of Section 104.31 . . . Section 104.31, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., supra, like most of the statutes on this subject does not preclude . . .

VROOMAN v. PENHOLLOW, 222 F. 894 (6th Cir. 1915)

. . . this farm for the four years 1906, 1907, 1908, and 1909, covering 10,431 bushels, and paid into court $104.31 . . .

DONALDSON v. SEVERN RIVER GLASS SAND CO., 138 F. 691 (E.D. Pa. 1905)

. . . reason of the fact that the barge was out of repair and had been leaking during the voyage, and that 104.31 . . .

SEVERN RIVER GLASS SAND CO. v. DONALDSON, 138 F. 694 (E.D. Pa. 1905)

. . . The libel in this case to recover the value of 104.31 tons of sand at the rate of $1.35 per ton is dismissed . . .