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F.S. 120.68 on Google Scholar

F.S. 120.68 on Casetext

Amendments to 120.68

The 2020 Florida Statutes

Title X
Chapter 120
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 120.68 Florida Statutes and Case Law
120.68 Judicial review.
(1)(a) A party who is adversely affected by final agency action is entitled to judicial review.
(b) A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate order of the agency or of an administrative law judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings is immediately reviewable if review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy.
(2)(a) Judicial review shall be sought in the appellate district where the agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides or as otherwise provided by law. All proceedings shall be instituted by filing a notice of appeal or petition for review in accordance with the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure within 30 days after the rendition of the order being appealed. If the appeal is of an order rendered in a proceeding initiated under s. 120.56, the agency whose rule is being challenged shall transmit a copy of the notice of appeal to the committee.
(b) When proceedings under this chapter are consolidated for final hearing and the parties to the consolidated proceeding seek review of final or interlocutory orders in more than one district court of appeal, the courts of appeal are authorized to transfer and consolidate the review proceedings. The court may transfer such appellate proceedings on its own motion, upon motion of a party to one of the appellate proceedings, or by stipulation of the parties to the appellate proceedings. In determining whether to transfer a proceeding, the court may consider such factors as the interrelationship of the parties and the proceedings, the desirability of avoiding inconsistent results in related matters, judicial economy, and the burden on the parties of reproducing the record for use in multiple appellate courts.
(3) The filing of the petition does not itself stay enforcement of the agency decision, but if the agency decision has the effect of suspending or revoking a license, supersedeas shall be granted as a matter of right upon such conditions as are reasonable, unless the court, upon petition of the agency, determines that a supersedeas would constitute a probable danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the state. The agency also may grant a stay upon appropriate terms, but, whether or not the action has the effect of suspending or revoking a license, a petition to the agency for a stay is not a prerequisite to a petition to the court for supersedeas. In any event the court shall specify the conditions, if any, upon which the stay or supersedeas is granted.
(4) Judicial review of any agency action shall be confined to the record transmitted and any additions made thereto in accordance with paragraph (7)(a).
(5) The record for judicial review shall be compiled in accordance with the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(6)(a) The reviewing court’s decision may be mandatory, prohibitory, or declaratory in form, and it shall provide whatever relief is appropriate irrespective of the original form of the petition. The court may:
1. Order agency action required by law; order agency exercise of discretion when required by law; set aside agency action; remand the case for further agency proceedings; or decide the rights, privileges, obligations, requirements, or procedures at issue between the parties; and
2. Order such ancillary relief as the court finds necessary to redress the effects of official action wrongfully taken or withheld.
(b) If the court sets aside agency action or remands the case to the agency for further proceedings, it may make such interlocutory order as the court finds necessary to preserve the interests of any party and the public pending further proceedings or agency action.
(7) The court shall remand a case to the agency for further proceedings consistent with the court’s decision or set aside agency action, as appropriate, when it finds that:
(a) There has been no hearing prior to agency action and the reviewing court finds that the validity of the action depends upon disputed facts;
(b) The agency’s action depends on any finding of fact that is not supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record of a hearing conducted pursuant to ss. 120.569 and 120.57; however, the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on any disputed finding of fact;
(c) The fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action may have been impaired by a material error in procedure or a failure to follow prescribed procedure;
(d) The agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and a correct interpretation compels a particular action; or
(e) The agency’s exercise of discretion was:
1. Outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law;
2. Inconsistent with agency rule;
3. Inconsistent with officially stated agency policy or a prior agency practice, if deviation therefrom is not explained by the agency; or
4. Otherwise in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision;

but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency on an issue of discretion.

(8) Unless the court finds a ground for setting aside, modifying, remanding, or ordering agency action or ancillary relief under a specified provision of this section, it shall affirm the agency’s action.
(9) A petition challenging an agency rule as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority shall not be instituted pursuant to this section, except to review an order entered pursuant to a proceeding under s. 120.56 or s. 120.57(1)(e)1. or (2)(b) or an agency’s findings of immediate danger, necessity, and procedural fairness prerequisite to the adoption of an emergency rule pursuant to s. 120.54(4), unless the sole issue presented by the petition is the constitutionality of a rule and there are no disputed issues of fact.
(10) If an administrative law judge’s final order depends on any fact found by the administrative law judge, the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative law judge as to the weight of the evidence on any disputed finding of fact. The court shall, however, set aside the final order of the administrative law judge or remand the case to the administrative law judge, if it finds that the final order depends on any finding of fact that is not supported by competent substantial evidence in the record of the proceeding.
History.s. 1, ch. 74-310; s. 13, ch. 76-131; s. 38, ch. 77-104; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 11, ch. 78-425; s. 4, ch. 84-173; s. 7, ch. 87-385; s. 36, ch. 90-302; s. 6, ch. 91-30; s. 1, ch. 91-191; s. 10, ch. 92-166; s. 35, ch. 96-159; s. 15, ch. 97-176; s. 8, ch. 2003-94; s. 5, ch. 2016-116.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: December 31, 2020
F.S. 120.68 on Google Scholar

F.S. 120.68 on Casetext

Amendments to 120.68

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 120.68
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 120.68.

Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S120.68
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 120.68.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. The remedial choices under Section 120.68 are legion. The APA's "impressive arsenal of varied and abundant remedies for administrative error" includes the judicial power, on review of agency action, to decide "the rights, privileges, obligations, requirements or procedures at issue between the parties" and to "provide whatever relief is appropriate," whether "mandatory, prohibitory or declaratory in form." Section 120.68(13)(a). Among other things, we may, for example, remand the action to the agency with directions that it establish a presumptive parole release date at a proceeding conforming to the procedure set out under Sections 947.172 and .173, or at a proceeding conforming to a rule of practice adopted by the Commission, or, if the issue involves one only of law and not of facts, we may, as was done in Harris v. Florida Real Estate Commission, supra, n. 3, directly decide the rights litigated between the parties without remand. Section 120.68 furnishes many appellate remedies to adversely affected parties and should be liberally construed as a broad grant of power, not as a limitation of power.
    PAGE 1356
  2. Department of Business Reg., Etc. v. Hyman

    417 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1982)   Cited 36 times
    The Third District found that the 170-day post-hearing delay in rendering the agency's final order violated section 120.59(1)(a) and concluded that this violation caused the order to be unenforceable. It set aside the order and directed the agency to dismiss the proceedings. The Third District expressly disagreed with G B of Jacksonville, Inc., in which the First District held that a departure from section 120.59(1) would not cause reversal unless, pursuant to section 120.68(8), the delay resulted in an impairment of either the fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action. The Third District concluded that the issue is controlled not by section 120.68(8) but by section 120.68(9).
    PAGE 673
  3. Roberson v. Fla. Parole Probation Com'n

    444 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1984)   Cited 20 times
    Roberson is an inmate in a Florida prison in Homestead. In October 1981 he filed a timely notice of appeal in the Third District Court of Appeal pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes (1981), requesting review of the determination by the Commission of his presumptive parole release date. His grievance with the procedure concerned the use by the Commission of allegedly false information in establishing his release date. The Third District refused to hear the appeal, predicating its action on the argument that prisoners are excluded from appealing under section 120.68, because of the language in section 120.52(10)(d), Florida Statutes (1981).
    PAGE 918
  4. Hood v. Unemp. Appeals Comm.

    72 So. 3d 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 1 times
    Because the Commission acted within its jurisdiction and authority, complied with the statutes applicable to Unemployment Compensation and administrative procedures, and because the appellant has not established on appeal any of the grounds, under section 120.68(7), Florida Statutes, upon which the Commission's final order
    PAGE 276
  5. Polk v. School Bd. of Polk County

    373 So. 2d 960 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 24 times   1 Legal Analyses
    This is an appeal from a final agency action of the Polk County School Board restructuring high school attendance zones in Lakeland. Appellant represents a group known as Concerned Citizens, South Lakeland, who are adversely affected because the new attendance lines will require their children to attend a different school. By definition, the action of the school board in adopting the attendance plan constituted the making of a rule. Section 120.52(14), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978).
  6. Sierra Club v. Suwannee Amer. Cement

    802 So. 2d 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 13 times
    Section 120.68(1), Florida Statutes (2000), allows judicial review of a final order only by "a party who is adversely affected." Interpreting section 120.68(1), this court explained in Daniels v. Florida Parole and Prob. Comm'n, 401 So.2d 1351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), aff'd sub nom, Roberson v. Florida Parole and Prob. Comm'n, 444 So.2d 917 (Fla. 1983), that chapter 120, Florida Statutes, the Florida Administrative Procedures Act, defines a "party" more narrowly for the purposes of obtaining appellate review than for the purposes of obtaining an administrative proceeding.
  7. Silver Show Inc. v. Dept Buss&sProf Reg State

    23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 2 times
    . See § 120.68, Fla. Stat. (1995).
    PAGE 349
  8. Yamaha International Corp. v. Ehrman

    318 So. 2d 196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)   Cited 20 times
    The Supreme Court has not yet adopted appellate rules governing petitions for review of administrative orders and until such rules are adopted, it is our ruling that the appropriate rules for such review are those governing certiorari [Rule 4.5(c), Florida Appellate Rules], but as amplified by the requirements of § 120.68, 1974 Supplement to Florida Statutes 1973. Although the petition in this cause is properly styled, it does not contain a concise statement of the cause and the reasons relied upon for reversal of the order sought to be reviewed as is required by the aforesaid rule. It is noted that although petitioner, upon filing its petition did not at the same time file the record and its brief as is required by the aforesaid rule, the record and brief have now been filed, though not complete under the requirements of said § 120.68.
    PAGE 197
  9. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Florida Public Service Commission

    31 So. 3d 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 5 times
    The rule clearly contemplates an appeal directly from the non-final order and does not mention review after final agency action. Section 120.68(1), Florida Statutes, requires an appeal from non-final agency action to be filed within 30 days. The Commission could have released the utilities' compensation information after 30 days, had the utilities not filed these petitions and requested continued confidentiality of the information pending our review. Thus, we reject the Commission's argument that irreparable harm could not result if review of the orders were denied.
    PAGE 864
  10. White, Etc. v. State, Dept. of Transp

    368 So. 2d 411 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 5 times
    Other provisions of § 120.68, requiring remand or reversal, should be measured by and read in pari materia with § 120.68( 8). When we measure the effect of DOT's action, urged by White to be invalid, by the provisions of § 120.68, we find that the subsection most applicable is (12)(b), requiring remand if the exercise of discretion by the agency is "[i]nconsistent with . . . a prior agency practice." Reading further, however, we find that remand is mandated only "if deviation therefrom is not explained by the agency; . . . ." A § 120.57 hearing was provided White and an order complying with § 120.59 was regularly entered following the hearing. The hearing provided by § 120.57 "serves the public interest by providing a forum to expose, inform and challenge agency policy and discretion." State ex rel. Dept. of General Serv. v. Willis, 344 So.2d 580, 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). It provides a mechanism both for rule challenges and for more varied complaints concerning agency action, including those against whom the agency has instituted adjudicatory proceedings, those whose substantial interests are threatened by agency causes or by agency action which is…
    PAGE 414