Cases from cite.case.law:

G. STRICKLAND, v. PINELLAS COUNTY,, 261 So. 3d 700 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 125.15, Fla. . . .

UNITED STATES v. CASTILLO,, 891 F.3d 417 (2nd Cir. 2018)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15(1) ("recklessly"); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-16-02 ("recklessly"); Okla. . . . Penal Law § 125.15(1). People v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. CASTILLO,, 896 F.3d 141 (2nd Cir. 2018)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15(1) ("recklessly"); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-16-02 ("recklessly"); Okla. . . . Penal Law § 125.15(1). People v. . . .

PESTANA, v. MIAMI- DADE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,, 282 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (S.D. Fla. 2017)

. . . . § 125.15. . . . Stat. § 125.15, the suit was brought against the wrong party). b. . . .

WILLIAMSON, v. BREVARD COUNTY,, 276 F. Supp. 3d 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2017)

. . . . ¶ 9; § 125.15, Fla. Stat.). « B. . . .

WAITERS, v. LEE,, 857 F.3d 466 (2d Cir. 2017)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15. . . . .

WASHINGTON ALLIANCE OF TECHNOLOGY WORKERS, v. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,, 249 F. Supp. 3d 524 (D.D.C. 2017)

. . . See 8 C.F;R; § 125.15(b) (1947). . . .

RODRIGUEZ, v. HEATH,, 648 F. App'x 136 (2d Cir. 2016)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15. . . . Penal Law §§ 125.20, 125.25, while second-degree manslaughter requires only recklessness, see id. § 125.15 . . .

BENTON, v. NELSON,, 143 F. Supp. 3d 31 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)

. . . four to twelve years imprisonment for Manslaughter in the Second Degree under New York Penal Law § 125.15 . . . Penal Law § 125.15(1), two counts of Assault in the Second Degree under N.Y. . . . Penal Law § 125.15(1), which states, “A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when .. . . . Penal Law § 125.15(1). . . .

PRECISE SYSTEMS, INC. v. UNITED STATES, LLC, LLC,, 122 Fed. Cl. 263 (Fed. Cl. 2015)

. . . . § 125.15(a)(1) (2013). At the time, Mr. . . .

PARKS, v. SHEAHAN,, 104 F. Supp. 3d 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15(1), (3), two counts of Robbery in the First Degree in violation of N.Y. . . .

PRECISE SYSTEMS, INC. v. UNITED STATES, LLC, LLC,, 120 Fed. Cl. 586 (Fed. Cl. 2015)

. . . . § 125.15(a)(1) (2013). . . .

WASHINGTON ALLIANCE OF TECHNOLOGY WORKERS, v. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,, 74 F. Supp. 3d 247 (D.D.C. 2014)

. . . . § 125.15(b) (1947)). . . .

GARGUILIO, v. HEATH,, 293 F.R.D. 146 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15(1). . . .

M. SEDA, v. CONWAY,, 774 F. Supp. 2d 534 (W.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . . § 125.15(1)), and three counts of depraved indifference assault (P.L. § 120.10(3)). . . .

DENIS, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF UNITED STATES,, 633 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2011)

. . . jury found Denis guilty of second degree manslaughter, in violation of New York Penal Law (“NYPL”) § 125.15 . . . Section 125.15(1) provides in pertinent part that “[a] person is guilty of manslaughter in the second . . . Penal Law § 125.15 (McKinney 2009). . . . .

MANNIX, v. PHILLIPS, v., 619 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2010)

. . . . § 125.15(1), were indiscernible or nonexistent. . . . Penal Law § 125.25(2), and the lesser included offense of reckless manslaughter, id. § 125.15(1). . . . id. § 125.20(1), and manslaughter in the second degree, also known as reckless manslaughter, id. § 125.15 . . .

McMILLON, v. CULLEY,, 380 F. App'x 63 (2d Cir. 2010)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15(1); People v. McMillon, 31 A.D.3d 136, 816 N.Y.S.2d 167 (2d Dep’t 2006). . . . Penal Law § 125.15(1), but only of the intentional killing required for second-degree murder, see id. . . .

CHARRIEZ, v. GREINER,, 265 F.R.D. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . . § 125.15[1]. A first trial resulted in a hung jury and mistrial. . . .

GIBBS, v. DONNELLY,, 673 F. Supp. 2d 121 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)

. . . second degree manslaughter, based on recklessly causing the death of another, New York Penal Law § 125.15 . . . Penal Law § 125.15). . . .

PROGRAMMERS GUILD, INC. L. G. II E. M. v. CHERTOFF, In, 338 F. App'x 239 (3d Cir. 2009)

. . . . § 125.15(b) (1947). . . .

CONGELOSI, v. MILLER,, 611 F. Supp. 2d 274 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15(1). . . .

UNITED STATES v. BONILLA,, 524 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2008)

. . . level upward based upon his prior conviction for attempted manslaughter under New York Penal Law § 125.15 . . . Bonilla’s attempted manslaughter conviction arose from his 1998 violation of § 125.15. . . . Section 125.15 provides that: A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when: 1. . . . Penal Law § 125.15 (McKinney 2008). . . . Because no particular subdivision could be identified, Bonilla argued that § 125.15 must be analyzed . . .

In EXTRADITION OF EXOO, 522 F. Supp. 2d 766 (S.D.W. Va. 2007)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15-A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when: * * * (3) He intentionally . . .

IRONCLAD EEI, A v. UNITED STATES, MGC R. L., 78 Fed. Cl. 351 (Fed. Cl. 2007)

. . . . § 125.15(b) (2007) provides that a service disabled veteran owned small business concern, like Ironclad . . .

RUSTICI, v. PHILIPS,, 497 F. Supp. 2d 452 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15(1). . . .

MALLET, v. MILLER,, 432 F. Supp. 2d 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)

. . . apply to a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of an offense defined in sections 125.10, 125.15 . . .

CANADA, v. R. GONZALES,, 448 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 2006)

. . . Similarly, we have held that second degree manslaughter under New York Penal Law § 125.15(1), which merely . . . Penal Law § 125.15(1)), is not a crime of violence because it includes “passive conduct or omissions” . . .

VARGAS- SARMIENTO v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,, 448 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2006)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15(1), and criminally negligent homicide, id. § 125.10, crimes that require proof, respectively . . . Penal Law § 125.15(1), was not a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and, thus, not an “aggravated . . . Penal Law § 125.15(1), did not qualify as a crime of violence under § 16(b). 326 F.3d at 372. . . .

PRATT, v. UPSTATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,, 413 F. Supp. 2d 228 (W.D.N.Y. 2006)

. . . Penal Law §§ 125.15, 125.20. . . .

MANNIX, v. PHILLIPS,, 390 F. Supp. 2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)

. . . . § 125.15(1). . . .

LEE, v. RICKS,, 388 F. Supp. 2d 141 (W.D.N.Y. 2005)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15(1)) and, insofar as they applied to defendant, differed only in that they were each . . .

BENJAMIN v. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, 383 F. Supp. 2d 344 (D. Conn. 2005)

. . . . § 125.15(1), for “recklessly causing] the death of another person,” was not a crime of violence under . . .

BROWN, v. GREINER, v. L. v., 409 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 2005)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15(1); assault in the second degree, in violation of N.Y. . . . Penal Law §§ 70.00(2)(c), 125.15. Ramos, however, was charged as a persistent felony offender. . . .

JACKSON, v. EDWARDS,, 404 F.3d 612 (2d Cir. 2005)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15, and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree, N.Y. . . . Penal Law § 125.15. . . .

BROWN, v. McKINNEY, Mt., 358 F. Supp. 2d 161 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15, and one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, N.Y. . . .

ST. HELEN, v. A. SENKOWSKI,, 374 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2004)

. . . murder, under New York Penal Law § 125.25(2), and reckless manslaughter, under New York Penal Law § 125.15 . . .

SWEET, v. BENNETT,, 353 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2003)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15[1] (“recklessly causing] the death of another person”). 516 N.Y.S.2d 174, 508 N.E.2d . . . The intentional murder and reckless manslaughter counts, under § 125.25[1] and § 125.15[1] respectively . . . 125.25[1] an “intentional homicide” count that is inconsistent with the reckless homicide count, § 125.15 . . .

CHERY, v. ASHCROFT,, 347 F.3d 404 (2d Cir. 2003)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15 (requiring only recklessness) was not a crime of violence, this Court rejected the . . . Jobson, 326 F.3d at 374 (examining N.Y.P.L. § 125.15(1)). . . .

VIERLING, v. CELEBRITY CRUISES, INC. v. Co. f. k. a. Co., 339 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2003)

. . . Stat. ch. 125.15. . . .

JONES, v. KEANE,, 329 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2003)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15(1). . . .

JOBSON, v. ASHCROFT,, 326 F.3d 367 (2d Cir. 2003)

. . . .) § 125.15(1), is a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (section 16(b)), and therefore . . . Jobson, then 19 years old, pled guilty to manslaughter in the second degree pursuant to N.Y.P.L. § 125.15 . . . The predicate criminal statute, N.Y.P.L. § 125.15(1), to which Jobson pled guilty, provides that [a] . . . Accordingly, this alone would justify holding that N.Y.P.L. § 125.15(1) is not categorically a crime . . . Neither is an element of the crime defined by N.Y.P.L. § 125.15(1). . . .

SELLAN, v. KUHLMAN,, 261 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2001)

. . . . § 125.15[1], a lesser included offense of depraved mind murder). . . .

DAVIS, v. STRACK,, 211 F. Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15) and sentenced to seven to twenty-one years imprisonment for fatally shooting Eddie . . .

GIL, v. MAZZUCA,, 91 F. Supp. 2d 586 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)

. . . Murder in the Second Degree and the lesser included offenses of Manslaughter in the Second Degree, § 125.15 . . . Penal Law § 125.15(1) provides that a "person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when [he . . .

M. LYDON, Jr. v. KUHLMAN,, 62 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15(1) (reckless manslaughter), which was based on the theory of depraved indifference . . .

SUTTON, v. HERBERT,, 39 F. Supp. 2d 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)

. . . J.), convicting him, after a jury trial, of Manslaughter in the Second Degree (New York Penal Law § 125.15 . . .

VACCO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK, v. QUILL, 521 U.S. 793 (U.S. 1997)

. . . New York Penal Law § 125.15 (McKinney 1987) (“Manslaughter in the second degree”) provides: “A person . . .

WASHINGTON v. GLUCKSBERG, 521 U.S. 702 (U.S. 1997)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15(3) (McKinney 1975)). . . .

GARCIA, v. P. KEANE,, 973 F. Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)

. . . Penal Law § 125.20(1) (McKinney 1987). .New York Penal Law § 125.15 provides, in pertinent part: A person . . . Penal Law § 125.15(1) (McKinney 1987). . . . .

POMPEY v. BROWARD COUNTY a C. L., 95 F.3d 1543 (11th Cir. 1996)

. . . . § 125.15 (West 1988 & Supp.1996); Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210 (11th Cir.1992). . . .

In EXTRADITION OF MARZOOK. In Dr. MARZOOK, v. CHRISTOPHER, D. R., 924 F. Supp. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)

. . . Penal Law §§ 125.25 (murder 2°), 125.15 (manslaughter 2°), 125.20 (manslaughter 1°), 120.05 (assault . . .

E. QUILL, M. D. C. M. D. A. M. D. v. C. VACCO, E. M., 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996)

. . . they were unable to receive the requested drugs, because of the prohibitions contained in sections 125.15 . . . Section 125.15 of the New York Penal Law provides in pertinent part: A person is guilty of manslaughter . . . all persons acting in concert and participation with him from enforcing New York Penal Law sections 125.15 . . . [h]e intentionally causes or aids another person to commit suicide,” § 125.15(3), and, “[a] person is . . .

COMPASSION IN DYING, a M. D. v. STATE OF WASHINGTON, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996)

. . . . § 30-2-4 (Michie 1984); N.Y.PENAL LAW §§ 120.30, 120.35, 125.15(3), 125.25(1)(b) (McKinney 1987); N.D.CENT.CODE . . .

MEACHEM, v. P. KEANE,, 899 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15(1)) and robbery in the first degree (N.Y. . . . New York Penal Law, § 125.15(1) provides that a person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree . . .

PAWLOWSKI, v. R. KELLY,, 932 F. Supp. 475 (W.D.N.Y. 1995)

. . . N.Y.Penal Law § 125.15(1). . . .

A. KNAPP, v. LEONARDO,, 46 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 1995)

. . . overturn his state court conviction for second degree manslaughter in violation of N.Y.Penal Law § 125.15 . . . convicted him of the lesser included offense of second degree manslaughter in violation of N.Y.Penal Law § 125.15 . . . See N.Y.Penal Law § 125.15(1) (manslaughter in second degree occurs when actor “recklessly causes the . . .

E. QUILL, M. D. C. M. D. A. M. D. v. G. KOPPELL, M. M., 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)

. . . Plaintiffs move for a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the relevant statutes, §§ 125.15 . . . The Statutes Section 125.15(3) of the New York Penal Law provides in relevant part: A person is guilty . . . defendants agree that, if a physician renders the type of assistance described here, he will violate § 125.15 . . .

JONES, v. J. SPECKARD,, 827 F. Supp. 139 (W.D.N.Y. 1993)

. . . Compare N.Y.Penal Law § 125.20(1), note 5, infra, with § 125.15(1), note 6, infra. . . . N.Y.Penal Law § 125.15 provides, in relevant part: A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree . . .

GREEN, v. ABRAMS,, 798 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15, and one count of criminally negligent homicide, Id. § 125.10. . . .

THEBNER, v. L. MILLER,, 788 F. Supp. 714 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)

. . . (“petitioner”) was convicted of Manslaughter in the Second Degree pursuant to New York Penal Law § 125.15 . . . Petitioner was indicted under § 125.15[1], in that he “recklessly caused the death of Christine Iwan-icki . . .

J. SOLOMON, v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES,, 786 F. Supp. 218 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)

. . . . § 125.15[1], reckless manslaughter. See People v. . . .

PANUCCIO, v. KELLY,, 927 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1991)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15, and that the maximum sentence for that crime is five to 15 years, id. § 70.00. . . .

GRADY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF DUTCHESS COUNTY v. CORBIN, 495 U.S. 508 (U.S. 1990)

. . . Penal Law § 125.15 (McKinney 1987), negligently causing the death of another person, §125.10, and recklessly . . .

CAMPANERIA, v. REID,, 891 F.2d 1014 (2d Cir. 1989)

. . . New York law, second-degree manslaughter— recklessly causing the death of another, N.Y.Penal Law § 125.15 . . .

COLON, v. J. SMITH,, 723 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)

. . . manslaughter in the second degree based on recklessly causing the death of another, New York Penal Law § 125.15 . . .

WRIGHT, v. MANATEE COUNTY,, 717 F. Supp. 1493 (M.D. Fla. 1989)

. . . the County Commissioners (Defendants Glass, Chance, Chetlain, Snell, and Hooper) is based on Section 125.15 . . . The commission defendants assert that Section 125.15 mandates that only the county may be sued in its . . . Section 125.15, Florida Statutes, states that the county commissioners shall: ... sue and be sued in . . . Even if it were incomplete, incorporation of Section 125.15, Florida Statutes, would be inconsistent . . . Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on Section 125.15, Florida Statutes is without merit. . . .

RICE, v. HOKE,, 846 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1988)

. . . N.Y.Penal Law § 125.15(1) (McKinney 1987). . . .

SANDERS, v. E. SULLIVAN,, 701 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)

. . . . § 125.15 (McKinney 1987)), two counts of robbery in the first degree (N.Y.Penal L. § 160.15 (McKinney . . .

In LEWIS a k a, 80 B.R. 39 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)

. . . 176.00 84.42 91.58 362.71 6/82 368.60 164.61 203.99 566.70 7/82 176.00 75.57 100.43 667.13 8/82 176.00 125.15 . . .

FURST, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY,, 631 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)

. . . N.Y.Penal Law § 125.15 (McKinney 1975) provides in part: A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second . . .

HARRIS, v. SCULLY,, 779 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1985)

. . . See N.Y.Penal Law § 125.15(1) (McKinney 1975). . . . McKinney 1975), while the latter concerns merely causing the death of another recklessly, see id. § 125.15 . . .

DAVIS, v. R. BARA,, 542 F. Supp. 743 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)

. . . . § 125.15). Prior to trial, on June 12, 1980, a joint Huntley and Mapp hearing was held before Mr. . . .

INTERAIR SERVICES, INC. v. INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, 375 So. 2d 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)

. . . Section 125.15, Fla.Stat. provides that “the county commissioners shall sue and be sued in the name of . . . In Spangler the supreme court held with reference to § 125.15 that: Despite this general language in . . . regard Span-gler as narrowly circumscribed, we point out that, in any event, we do not rely upon § 125.15 . . . We certainly agree that § 125.15 alone does not constitute a general waiver of sovereign immunity. . . .

H. C. EDWARDS, E. C. T. M. D. M. D. v. LINDSLEY, 349 So. 2d 817 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)

. . . The Lindsleys respond that Section 125.15, Florida Statutes (1975), which states that “The county commissioners . . . Section 125.15 should be read in pari materia with Section 125.01(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1975). . . .

MILDWOFF, v. CUNNINGHAM, s, 432 F. Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)

. . . . § 125.15. People v. . . .

CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY, INC. v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,, 537 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1976)

. . . . § 125.15(b) entitled “Duration of Permits”, which provides, inter alia, that: “Permits of less than . . .

MUZQUIZ v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, 520 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1975)

. . . . §§ 125.15, 165.08. . . .

H. ADKINS, v. DUVAL COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD WILLMON, Jr. v. NASSAU COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, B. WILSON, v. DUVAL COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,, 511 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975)

. . . . §§ 125.15, 165.08. . . .

A. ERICKSON, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SARASOTA COUNTY,, 212 So. 2d 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968)

. . . Florida Statute Section 125.15, F.S.A., provides “The county commissioners shall sue and be sued in the . . . However, we believe this distinction is without import, and under the authority of Section 125.15 and . . .

GIDEON, E. J. M. H. W. F. v. TUSCBAY PROPERTIES, INC., 314 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1963)

. . . . § 125.15; 8 Fla.Jur. 262, Counties § 119. . . .

BENITEZ, v. DADE COUNTY, 21 Fla. Supp. 82 (Dade Cty. Cir. Ct. 1962)

. . . (See paragraph 2 of the answer of Dade County and Florida Statutes 1959 §125.15). . . .

ALIANELL, v. A. FOSSEY, N. F. L. B., 114 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)

. . . Section 125.15, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. . See Note [1], supra. . . .

CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, a v. G. EARLE, 109 So. 2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)

. . . Section 125.15, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides that ‘The county commissioners of the several counties . . .

A. J. SPANGLER, v. FLORIDA STATE TURNPIKE AUTHORITY, a ATKINS, v. FLORIDA STATE TURNPIKE AUTHORITY, a P. LOTT, v. FLORIDA STATE TURNPIKE AUTHORITY, a, 106 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1958)

. . . Section 125.15, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides that “The county commissioners of the several counties . . .

WANG CHIUN- MING, Y. v. J. SHAUGHNESSY,, 136 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)

. . . .) § 125.15. . 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(b) (4). . . . . .) § 125.15) which speaks of employment “during a school term” but it is assumed that it did. . . .

BROWARD COUNTY, FLA. v. WICKMAN. THE JUANITA, 195 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1952)

. . . It is not questioned that under section 125.15, Fla.Stat.1941, F.S.A., a Florida county is suable ex . . .

LEVY v. DOSSIN S FOOD PRODUCTS, 72 F. Supp. 855 (W.D. Mich. 1947)

. . . 75.90 feet; thence north 8 degrees 37 minutes west, 60.3 feet; thence north 74 degrees 33 minutes east, 125.15 . . . 75.90 feet, thence north 8 degrees 37 minutes west 60.3 feet, thence north 74 degrees 33 minutes east 125.15 . . .