The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XIV
TAXATION AND FINANCE

Chapter 206
MOTOR AND OTHER FUEL TAXES

View Entire Chapter

F.S. 206.27

206.27 Records and files as public records.—

(1) The records and files in the office of the department appertaining to parts I and II of this chapter shall be available in Tallahassee to the public at any time during business hours. The department shall prepare and make available a list each month of all current licensed terminal suppliers, importers, exporters, and wholesalers which also shall include all new licenses issued and all licenses canceled during the past 12 months. Such list shall be used to verify license numbers of purchasers issuing exemption certificates or affidavits.

(2) Nothing herein shall be construed as requiring the department to provide as a public record any information concerning audits in progress or those records and files of the department described in this section which are currently the subject of pending investigation by the Department of Revenue or the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. It is specifically provided that the foregoing information shall be exempt from the provisions of s. 119.07(1) and shall be considered confidential pursuant to s. 213.053; however, the department may make available to the executive director of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles or his or her designee, exclusively for official purposes in administering chapter 207, any information concerning any audit in progress, and the provisions of s. 213.053(8) requiring a written agreement and maintenance of confidentiality by the recipient, and the penalty for breach of confidentiality, shall apply if the department makes such information available. Any officer, employee, or former officer or employee of the department who divulges any such information in any manner except for such official purposes or under s. 213.053 is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

History.—s. 21, ch. 16082, 1933; CGL 1936 Supp. 1167(81); s. 7, ch. 63-253; s. 5, ch. 65-371; s. 2, ch. 65-420; ss. 21, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 1, ch. 70-995; s. 98, ch. 85-342; s. 28, ch. 86-152; s. 76, ch. 87-99; s. 27, ch. 88-119; s. 44, ch. 90-360; s. 236, ch. 91-224; s. 37, ch. 95-417; s. 58, ch. 96-406; s. 3, ch. 97-54; s. 2, ch. 2005-140; s. 10, ch. 2005-280; s. 3, ch. 2006-85.

Note.—Former s. 207.36.

F.S. 206.27 on Google Scholar

F.S. 206.27 on Casetext

Amendments to 206.27

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 206.27

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S206.27 2 - INVADE PRIVACY - DOR EMPLOYEE REVEAL CONFID FUEL TAX INFO - M: F

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

REVERSE MORTGAGE SOLUTIONS, INC. v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, v., 365 F. Supp. 3d 931 (N.D. Ill. 2019)

. . . . § 206.27(b)(7). Lenders generally pass the MIP costs directly on to the borrowers. . . . See 24 C.F.R. §§ 206.27(c), 206.55 (effective September 19, 2017). . . . See 24 CFR § 206.27(c)(3) (effective September 19, 2017). . . . Judicial reviewability of § 206.27(c) was not at issue in Plunkett . . . . Wilson is challenging only the prior version of § 206.27(c). But Ms. . . .

FINANCE OF AMERICA REVERSE, LLC, v. A. CARMONA- VARGAS,, 288 F. Supp. 3d 500 (D. P.R. 2018)

. . . . § 206.27(c)(2). . . . The reverse mortgage in this case includes language similar to that required by § 206.27(c)(2). . . .

SMITH, v. REVERSE MORTGAGE SOLUTIONS, INC., 200 So. 3d 221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . . § 206.27(c)(1) (adopted August 16, 1995). . . .

BENNETT, v. n CASTRO,, 74 F. Supp. 3d 382 (D.D.C. 2014)

. . . . § 206.27(c)(1). . . . in fee simple, as a leasehold interest as set forth in § 206.45(a), or as a life estate. 24 C.F.R, § 206.27 . . . In Bennett II, this Court made clear that “HUD’s regulation [24 C.F.R. § 206.27(c)(1) ] as applied to . . . This Court invalidated 24 C.F.R. § 206.27(c)(1) as applied to plaintiffs, and as a result, HUD determined . . . Defendant alternatively argued that HUD was empowered to promulgate 24 C.F.R. § 206.27(c)(1) in light . . .

PLUNKETT, v. n CASTRO,, 307 F.R.D. 47 (D.D.C. 2014)

. . . . § 206.27(c), those HECM loans became due and payable upon the death of the spouse mortgagors. Id. . . . In Bennet, plaintiffs filed suit claiming that 24 C.F.R. § 206.27(c)(1) violated federal law by failing . . . concluded that 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-20(j) unambiguously foreclosed HUD’s interpretation in 24 C.F.R. § 206.27 . . . and a purported class of similarly situated individuals, mounting the same challenge to 24 C.F.R. § 206.27 . . . After a mortgage comes due and payable for any of the reasons listed in 24 C.F.R. § 206.27(c)(1) or ( . . .

KOSTOPOULOS, v. ONEWEST BANK, FSB, LLC f k a, 60 F. Supp. 3d 804 (E.D. Mich. 2014)

. . . . § 206.27(c)(1). . . . . § 206.27(c) was unlawful because insuring loans payable on the death of the last surviving borrower . . .

PLUNKETT, v. CASTRO,, 67 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2014)

. . . . § 206.27(c)(1). . . . Bennett I, 797 F.Supp.2d at 73 This language is consistent with 24 C.F.R. § 206.27(c)(1), a regulation . . . In their Complaint, they made the identical challenge made by the Bennett plaintiffs that section 206.27 . . . A (“Bene E-mail”) (the lender “may elect to hold the HECM loan” because 24 C.F.R. 206.27(c)(1) “does . . . (See Opp. at 23 (“The Court has previously held that 24 C.F.R. § 206.27(c)(1) is invalid as to Mr. . . .

BENNETT, v. DONOVAN,, 4 F. Supp. 3d 5 (D.D.C. 2013)

. . . . § 206.27, a regulation promulgated by HUD, which states that “[t]he mortgage shall state that the mortgage . . .

BENNETT, v. DONOVAN,, 703 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 206.27(c)(1). . . . They asserted that HUD’s promulgation of 24 C.F.R.. § 206.27(c) was unlawful because insuring loans payable . . .

BENNETT, v. DONOVAN, 797 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D.D.C. 2011)

. . . . § 206.27(c) (emphasis added). . . . the contract language in the HECMs that had been signed by plaintiffs’ spouses, and per 24 C.F.R. § 206.27 . . . Specifically, they argue that 24 C.F.R. § 206.27(c) illegally allows the Secretary to insure mortgages . . .