The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XVIII
PUBLIC LANDS AND PROPERTY

Chapter 261
OFF-HIGHWAY VEHICLE SAFETY AND RECREATION

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F.S. 261.10

261.10 Criteria for recreation areas and trails; limitation on liability.—

(1) Publicly owned or operated off-highway vehicle recreation areas and trails shall be designated and maintained for recreational travel by off-highway vehicles. These areas and trails need not be generally suitable or maintained for normal travel by conventional two-wheel-drive vehicles and should not be designated as recreational footpaths. State off-highway vehicle recreation areas and trails must be selected and managed in accordance with this chapter.

(2) State agencies, water management districts, counties, and municipalities, and officers and employees thereof, which provide off-highway recreation areas and trails on publicly owned land are not liable for damage to personal property or personal injury or death to any person resulting from participation in the inherently dangerous risks of off-highway vehicle recreation. This subsection does not limit liability that would otherwise exist for an act of negligence by a state agency, water management district, county, or municipality, or officer or employee thereof, which is the proximate cause of the damage, injury, or death. Nothing in this subsection creates a duty of care or basis of liability for death, personal injury, or damage to personal property, nor shall anything in this subsection be deemed to be a waiver of sovereign immunity under any circumstances.

History.—s. 53, ch. 2002-295; s. 3, ch. 2006-290.

F.S. 261.10 on Google Scholar

F.S. 261.10 on Casetext

Amendments to 261.10

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 261.10

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 261.10.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

HERRERA, v. WYOMING, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (U.S. 2019)

. . . See Appropriations Act of 1899, ch. 424, 30 Stat. 1095; 36 CFR §§ 241.2, 241.3 (Supp. 1941); § 261.10 . . .

TWUM- BAAH, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,, 299 F. Supp. 3d 369 (D. P.R. 2018)

. . . violation notices against him for infringing certain National Forest System regulations listed in 36 C.F.R. 261.10 . . . of El Yunque without obtaining a special use authorization as required under 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.50(a), 261.10 . . .

UNITED STATES v. J. CRUZ,, 674 F. App'x 732 (9th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 261.10(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. . . . See 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(1); United States v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. E. GODFREY,, 659 F. App'x 928 (9th Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 261.10(a). We affirm. 1. To the degree that Defendant claims that 36 C.F.R. . . .

WESTERN RADIO SERVICES COMPANY, INC. v. ALLEN, R., 147 F. Supp. 3d 1132 (D. Or. 2015)

. . . . § 261.10(a) for constructing and maintaining a structure without authorization; and 5) the revocation . . .

UNITED STATES v. M. WASSON,, 627 F. App'x 604 (9th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 261.10(b) (unauthorized residency on Forest System lands) and 36 C.F.R. § 261.11(d) (improper removal . . . The court then concluded that the same regulation at issue in this case — 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b) — is . . . See 36 C.F.R. § 251.50 (requiring authorization for most uses of Forest System lands); id. § 261.10(b . . . The district court therefore did not err in holding that Wasson had violated 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b). . . .

UNITED STATES v. E. GODFREY,, 112 F. Supp. 3d 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2015)

. . . . § 261.10(a). Id. . . . Count k In Count 4, Defendant is alleged to have violated 36 C.F.R. § 261.10, which prohibits “constructing . . . authorization, contract, or approved operating plan when such authorization is required.” 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . , and he failed to obtain an approved plan of operations, this work was in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .

UNITED STATES v. L. OBERDORFER,, 602 F. App'x 397 (9th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 261.10. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm. . . . Oberdorfer first argues that his criminal prosecution for violating § 261.10 violates the Double Jeopardy . . .

UNITED STATES v. EVERIST,, 588 F. App'x 569 (9th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 261.10(b); using or occupying national forest lands without an approved operating plan, in violation . . . of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(p); and cutting timber without authorization, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.6 . . . correcting the amended judgment to reflect that Everist was convicted in Count Two of violating 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .

UNITED STATES v. BACKLUND,, 588 F. App'x 525 (9th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 261.10(b), contending that the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously or contrary to law . . .

UNITED STATES v. S. PARKER,, 761 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 261.10(c), and one misdemeanor count of threatening, resisting, intimidating, or interfering with . . . activities or services not authorized by federal law, regulation, or special-use authorization. 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . Section 261.10(c) prohibits, in relevant part and as charged in Count 5, (1) “conducting any kind of . . . ”; (2) on lands encompassed by the regulation; (3) without a special use authorization. 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .

UNITED STATES v. LEWTON,, 575 F. App'x 751 (9th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 261.10(c) by filming a bighorn sheep hunt for profit without a required special use permit for engaging . . . lawful authority to conduct such business activity on National Forest lands in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .

UNITED STATES v. BACKLUND, v. D., 689 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 261.10(b).”: To be clear, we do not hold that proving the correctness or even the existence of the . . . Backlund pled guilty to violating 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b), pursuant to a plea agreement. . . . After a bench trial, the district court found Everist guilty of violating § 261.10(b). . . . Section 261.10(b) therefore is not unconstitutionally vague. . . . Section 261.10(b) is not ambiguous. . . .

UNITED STATES v. BACKLUND, v. D., 677 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 261.10(b), which prohibits “[cjonstruction, reconstructing, improving, maintaining, occupying or . . . Backlund pled guilty to violating 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b), pursuant to a plea agreement. . . . After a bench trial, the district court found Everist guilty of violating § 261.10(b). . . . Section 261.10(b) therefore is not unconstitutionally vague. . . . Section 261.10(b) is not ambiguous. . . .

UNITED STATES v. AMES, v., 472 F. App'x 794 (9th Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 261.10(b). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 1. . . . Section 261.10(b) is consistent with the mining laws and not unconstitutionally vague. . . . The evidence was sufficient to convict Ames and Fournier of violating 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b). . . .

UNITED STATES v. Ed NEEDLES,, 483 F. App'x 310 (9th Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 261.10(b). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 1. . . . Needles’ conviction under § 261.10(b) did not violate his due process rights due to lack of notice that . . . Needles’ contention that § 261.10(b) is unconstitutionally vague fails for the reasons discussed in a . . . Section 261.10(b) was not applied to punish conduct predating its enactment. . . . §§ 228.1-228.15 (2003) (regulating mining operations in the national forests); 36 C.F.R. §§ 261.1b, 261.10 . . .

GEORGE, v. UNITED STATES U. S. M., 672 F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 2012)

. . . . §§ 261.10(a); 261.1(a) (1977); see also 261.12(e) (1977). . . .

W. COSTELLO, v. R. GRUNDON,, 651 F.3d 614 (7th Cir. 2011)

. . . . § 261.10(d)(4), or any other official source. . . .

W. COSTELLO, v. R. GRUNDON,, 651 F.3d 614 (7th Cir. 2011)

. . . . § 261.10(d)(4), or any other official source. . . .

UNITED STATES v. BATOR,, 421 F. App'x 710 (9th Cir. 2011)

. . . . § 261.10(a), and damaging a natural feature or property of the United States, in violation of 36 C.F.R . . .

UNITED STATES v. GANOE,, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (E.D. Cal. 2010)

. . . .;” § 261.10(a) in Counts V through VIII, “constructing, placing, or maintaining any kind of road ... . . . The court finds the defendants Ganoe and McKay guilty of violating § 261.10(a) as to Counts V and VII . . . does find that McKay and Ganoe were involved in such activity and finds them guilty of violating § 261.10 . . . The court finds defendants Ganoe and McKay guilty of violating § 261.10(a), and as to defendant McFarlin . . . (16 U.S.C. 620, et seq.), or its implementing regulations at 36 CFR 223.185-223.203. . 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .

UNITED STATES v. R. TRACY,, 401 F. App'x 232 (9th Cir. 2010)

. . . . §§ 261.10(p) and 228.4(a)(3) (forbidding mining activities without approved plan of operation). . . .

W. COSTELLO, v. R. GRUNDON,, 625 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2010)

. . . . § 261.10(d)(4), or any other official source. . . .

W. COSTELLO, v. R. GRUNDON,, 625 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2010)

. . . . § 261.10(d)(4), or any other official source. . . .

FIDELITY INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY ADVISOR A FUND, LLC, BY TAX MATTERS PARTNER, v. UNITED STATES a LLC, v., 747 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D. Mass. 2010)

. . . The 522,200 McData shares contributed on that date had a total cost basis of $261.10. {Id.). . . .

FOREST SERVICE EMPLOYEES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS v. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE,, 689 F. Supp. 2d 891 (W.D. Ky. 2010)

. . . . § 261.10(10). . . .

In D. REID, D. v., 423 B.R. 726 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010)

. . . Apparently, there was a prepetition modification agreement reducing the monthly loan payments to $261.10 . . .

UNITED STATES v. SCOTFORD,, 302 F. App'x 561 (9th Cir. 2008)

. . . . § 261.10(m). . . . The evidence supporting Scotford’s conviction for violating 36 CFR § 261.10(m) also supports his conviction . . .

UNITED STATES v. LOWRY,, 512 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 2008)

. . . . §§ 261.10(b) and (k)? . . . a special-use authorization, or as otherwise authorized by Federal law or regulation.” 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . Section 261.10(k) similarly prohibits the “[u]se or occupancy of National Forest System land or facilities . . . A Sections 261.10(b) and (k) do not explicitly allocate the burden of proof. . . . . § 261.10(b). . . .

SAUER v. UNITED STATES, 234 F. App'x 587 (9th Cir. 2007)

. . . . §§ 261.10(b), 228.4; see also United States v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. L. FREED,, 189 F. App'x 888 (11th Cir. 2006)

. . . . § 261.10(k), and construction and maintenance of improvements on National Forest Lands, 16 U.S.C. § . . . 551; 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(a). . . . See 36 C.F.R. § 261.10; 16 U.S.C. § 551. . . .

UNITED STATES v. STUBBS,, 181 F. App'x 697 (9th Cir. 2006)

. . . . § 261.10(1), and his sentence. We affirm. . . . Under 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(1), it was necessary to show that Stubbs had violated the terms of the permit . . .

UNITED STATES v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY,, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (E.D. Cal. 2006)

. . . . § 261.10(a), which prohibits Constructing, placing, or maintaining any kind of road, trail, structure . . .

UNITED STATES, v. McCLURE,, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (E.D. Cal. 2005)

. . . On September 1, 2004, the Defendant was charge with violating 36 C.F.R. 261.10(k) which prohibits use . . . which specifically does not require “special-use authorization” that he cannot be convicted under § 261.10 . . . The Government argues that the term “special-use authorization” as used in § 261.10(k) broadly includes . . . Under Part 261, a miner can be charged with violating a "Plan of Operation," [Doremus & § 261.10(1)], . . . Here, however, § 261.10(k) is not an appropriate vehicle. . . .

UNITED STATES v. WINSLOW,, 116 F. App'x 703 (6th Cir. 2004)

. . . . §§ 251.50(a), 261.10(k), and 261.1b. . . . one count of violating the rules and regulations of the National Forest, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . . § 261.10(k) as specified in the majority opinion, but raised a defense that, because he is not an official . . .

UNITED STATES v. ADAMS,, 388 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2004)

. . . . § 261.10(k). His misdemeanor conviction was affirmed by the district court. . . . or facilities “without special-use authorization when such authorization is required.” 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . Specifically, the court stated: Not one court considering the application of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b) has . . . There, the court clarified that proof of a violation of section 261.10(k) requires the government to . . . sufficient to prove that Adams engaged in prohibited use of National Forest System land under 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .

GRAND LAKE ESTATES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, a v. VENEMAN, S., 340 F. Supp. 2d 1162 (D. Colo. 2004)

. . . . § 261.10(a). . . .

CAMACHO, El d b a R. E. v. TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION,, 326 F. Supp. 2d 803 (W.D. Tex. 2004)

. . . . § 607 and 45 CFR § 261.10, a Choices individual is deemed to be engaged in work by cooperating with . . . restrictions regarding TANF core and TANF non-core activities as set forth in 45 U.S.C. § 607, 45 C.F.R. §§ 261.10 . . .

CAMACHO, El d b a R. E. v. TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION,, 326 F. Supp. 2d 794 (W.D. Tex. 2004)

UNITED STATES v. R. NENNINGER,, 351 F.3d 340 (8th Cir. 2003)

. . . . §§ 261.10(a), (k) (1997). He was fined fifty dollars for each conviction. See United States v. . . . land or facilities without special-use authorization when such authorization is required.” 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . See 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.50(c), 251.54(h)(l)(viii), 251.61, 261.10(k) (1997). We disagree. . . .

UNITED STATES v. O. LEX, 300 F. Supp. 2d 951 (E.D. Cal. 2003)

. . . without a special-use authorization, or as otherwise authorized by Federal law or regulation 36 C.F.R. 261.10 . . . See 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b), supra. The first element is not in dispute. . . . The Determination that Appellants Were Not “Otherwise Authorized” to Occupy the Land 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . Nonetheless, they could comply with section 261.10(b) if they were otherwise authorized to occupy the . . . appellants had not created a mining claim as of the time that they were cited for a violation of § 261.10 . . .

UNITED STATES v. H. GOOD,, 257 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (D. Colo. 2003)

. . . . § 261.10(a). . . . Section 261.10(a), 36 C.F.R., prohibits any person from “[cjonstructing, placing, or maintaining any . . . Good is charged with a single count of violating § 261.10(a) by constructing, placing, or maintaining . . . Consequently, I find that violations of 36 C.F.R. §§ 261.9(a) and 261.10(a) are public welfare offenses . . .

UNITED STATES v. MURPHY- ELLIS,, 47 F. App'x 488 (9th Cir. 2002)

. . . Kent, 945 F.2d 1441, 1446 & n. 9 (9th Cir.1991) (no mens rea element for § 261.10(b) (occupying National . . .

CHERRY, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE O. J., 13 F. App'x 886 (10th Cir. 2001)

. . . . § 261.10, and that if he could not remove his materials by December 12, 1997, he should contact the . . . , or to obtain a Forest Service approved operating plan will place [him] in violation of 36 C.F.R § 261.10 . . .

UNITED STATES v. LUPPI,, 6 F. App'x 826 (10th Cir. 2001)

. . . . §§ 251.50, 261.10(k), and 261.54(a). . . .

UNITED STATES v. H. KALB, v. M. v. M., 234 F.3d 827 (3d Cir. 2000)

. . . S 261.10(k): “Use or occupancy of National Forest System land or facilities without special-use authorization . . . each with use of Forest Service land without special use authorization in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . Not one court considering the application of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b) has hesitated to apply that section . . . There, the court clarified that proof of a violation of section 261.10(k) requires the government to . . . dismissed the information filed against Linick and other defendants alleging a violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .

UNITED STATES v. A. ELLISON,, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (D. Colo. 2000)

. . . . § 261.10(1) with three counts of violating the terms and conditions of a Department of Agriculture . . . term or condition of a special-use authorization, contract or approved operating plan.” 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . counts alleged violations of the special use permit in violation of 16 U.S.C. § 551 and 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .

UNITED STATES v. H. KALB, M. M., 86 F. Supp. 2d 509 (W.D. Pa. 2000)

. . . . § 261.10(k): “Use or occupancy of National Forest lands without authorization when such authorization . . . The violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(k) is the same charge which many defendants have faced in reported . . . the same language, except that the numbers and letters denoting this section are different. 36 CFR § 261.10 . . .

UNITED STATES v. K. GRIEFEN, 200 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 2000)

. . . . § 261.10(a) and 16 U.S.C. § 551 for maintaining a structure on National Forest system land without . . . IV Maintaining a Structure The district court held that the appellants violated 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(a) . . . argue that their conduct did not constitute “maintaining a structure” as required under 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . The purpose of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(a) is to prevent the impeding of Forest Service roads. . . . In Scranton, the district court held that the language of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(a) was not ambiguous. . . .

UNITED STATES v. MACK,, 200 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 2000)

. . . . § 261.10(a); and (2) impeding a USFS road in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.12(d). . . . II The district court held that appellants had violated 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(a). . . . . § 261.10(a) (emphasis added). . . . however, that their conduct did not constitute “maintaining a structure” as required under 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . The purpose of 36 C.F.R § 261.10(a) is to prevent the hindrance of traffic on Forest Service roads and . . .

UNITED STATES v. J. BROWN,, 200 F.3d 710 (10th Cir. 1999)

. . . . § 261.10(c). Brown challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on each count. . . . See 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c). . . . See 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c). There is evidence of both offer by Brown and acceptance by Barlow. . . . Receipt of payment, however, is not a required element under § 261.10(c). . . . See 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c). IV. . . .

UNITED STATES v. D. LINICK G. III,, 195 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 1999)

. . . . § 261.10(k) — namely unauthorized special use of National Forest System land. . . . AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. . 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(k) prohibits the use or occupation of “National . . . See 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.50(a) & 261.10(k). 36 C.F.R. § 251.56(a)(2) states that each "special use authorization . . .

UNITED STATES v. A. MASEL,, 54 F. Supp. 2d 903 (W.D. Wis. 1999)

. . . . § 261.10(k). . . .

UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS,, 195 F.3d 823 (6th Cir. 1999)

. . . . §§ 261.10 & 261.11. . . .

UNITED STATES v. E. JOHNSON, III V. O., 159 F.3d 892 (4th Cir. 1998)

. . . .§ 261.10 (1998) which prohibit occupancy or use of any national forest system lands by groups of 75 . . . land or facilities without special-use authorization when such authorization is required.” 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .

BLACK, v. ARTHUR,, 18 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (D. Or. 1998)

. . . . §§ 251.50, 251.51, 251.54, 251.56, 251.60, and 261.10. . . . may result in a fine of up to $500 or imprisonment of up to 6 months or both. 36 C.F.R. §§ 261.1b, 261.10 . . .

UNITED STATES v. D. A. OSGUTHORPE,, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Utah 1998)

. . . . § 261.10(b) which prohibits a person from residing on National Forest lands without authorization). . . .

UNITED STATES v. POWER ENGINEERING COMPANY, J. v. LILIENTHAL,, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (D. Colo. 1998)

. . . Code Regs. 1007-3 § 261.10. . . . Code Regs. 1007-3 § 261.10 (identical definition). . . . Code Regs. 1007-3 § 261.10. . . . Code Regs. 1007-3 § 261.10 and 40 C.F.R. § 260.10. (Stip-¶¶ 15-16.) . . . Code Regs. 1007-3 § 261.10. (Stip-¶ 14.) . . .

UNITED STATES v. E. JOHNSON, III, V. O., 988 F. Supp. 920 (W.D.N.C. 1997)

. . . . §§ 251.50, 251.51, 261.10(k). . . . At trial before the Magistrate Judge, Defendants were found guilty of violating 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(k) . . . Kent, 945 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir.1991), a Native American defendant argued that 26 C.F.R. § 261.10(b), which . . . This is further confirmed by the minor penalties imposed for violating 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(k), which can . . . As noted above, the combined effect of 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.50, 251.51 and 261.10 is to require a special . . .

UNITED STATES v. SCRANTON,, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1131 (D. Idaho 1997)

. . . . § 261.10(a), and in count two with blocking, restricting or otherwise interfering with the use of Forest . . .

DUVAL RANCHING COMPANY S D L. L. B. v. R. GLICKMAN, R. M. D., 965 F. Supp. 1427 (D. Nev. 1997)

. . . . § 261.10(a). . . .

UNITED STATES v. L. COOPER,, 950 F. Supp. 1050 (D. Colo. 1996)

. . . . § 261.10(c), by knowingly participating in a commercial operation without a permit. . . .

MARINE SHALE PROCESSORS, INC. v. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,, 81 F.3d 1371 (5th Cir. 1996)

. . . . § 261.10. . . .

UNITED STATES v. STRONG,, 79 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 1996)

. . . . § 261.10(c), which prohibits commercial activity on National Forest lands without special use authorization . . . In March, 1993, Strong was charged with violating 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(e), which prohibits the “[s]elling . . . DISCUSSION The magistrate concluded that to find Strong guilty of violating 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c), the . . . We agree that 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c) prohibits the specified activities only when they are engaged in . . . USFS Special Uses Handbook 2079.11 Section 41.53b also supports our conclusion that 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .

ELKO COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS S D L. L. B. v. R. GLICKMAN, R. M. D., 909 F. Supp. 759 (D. Nev. 1995)

. . . . § 261.10(a). . . . National Forest system land” without a permit, is a criminal offense. 36 C.F.R. §§ 261.1b, 261.9(a), 261.10 . . .

UNITED STATES v. A. PETERSON,, 897 F. Supp. 499 (D. Colo. 1995)

. . . . § 261.10(c). This regulation was promulgated pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 551. . . . The regulation in question, 36 CFR § 261.10(c) (regulation), has been examined by other courts in the . . . prosecution has established beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant is guilty of a violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a finding of guilty as to a violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c) is entered against . . .

UNITED STATES v. M. CAUDLE,, 48 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 1995)

. . . . § 261.10(a) (1993). . . .

UNITED STATES v. PATZER,, 15 F.3d 934 (10th Cir. 1993)

. . . . §§ 251.50(a) and 261.10(c) by engaging in a commercial service, outfitting and filming motion pictures . . . grazing of livestock are designated special uses and must be approved by any authorized officer. § 261.10 . . . Although Patzer was charged with violating §§ 251.50 and 261.10(c), his contention that the ten counts . . . motion pictures on NFSS lands without a special use authorization in violation of §§ 251.50(a) and 261.10 . . . service, to wit: outfitting, without a special-use authorization; In violation of 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.50(a), 261.10 . . .

UNITED STATES v. RECTICEL FOAM CORPORATION, a k a L. P. O. E., 858 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Tenn. 1993)

. . . . §§ 261.10; 261.11; 261.20-261.24. . . .

SHELL OIL COMPANY v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991)

. . . . §§ 261.10-.il). . . .

UNITED STATES v. S. HARPER,, 946 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1991)

. . . . § 261.10(a), and also with camping within the National Forest for more than thirty days, in violation . . .

UNITED STATES v. WATSON WASTE OIL COMPANY, UNITED STATES v. NARRAGANSETT IMPROVEMENT COMPANY, UNITED STATES v. K. D ALLESANDRO, UNITED STATES v. RITAROSSI, UNITED STATES v. SLADE,, 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991)

. . . Subparts B, C and D, §§ 261.10 et seq. . . .

UNITED STATES v. MATSUMOTO,, 756 F. Supp. 1361 (D. Haw. 1991)

. . . . § 261.10(a). . . .

UNITED STATES v. K. HATCH,, 919 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1990)

. . . . § 261.10(a). . . . As a miner on Forest System land he was required by 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(a) to file for and obtain a special-use . . .

UNITED STATES v. A. HALL,, 751 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Cal. 1990)

. . . Hall was cited by an employee of the Tahoe National Forest (the “Forest”) for a violation of 36 CFR § 261.10 . . . Resource Officer, Peggy Hernandez, visited the mine to tell Hall that he was not in compliance with § 261.10 . . . miner disagrees, and, if not complied with, may subject the miner to criminal liability under 36 CFR 261.10 . . . If Hall had been charged with a violation of § 261.10(k) (violating a term or condition of an approved . . .

UNITED STATES v. BURNETT,, 750 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Idaho 1990)

. . . . § 261.10(a)). The court finds this case is also controlling. . . . Instead, the government bases its authority to remove the structures on Sections 228.4 and 261.10(a) . . . Title 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(a) (1989) prohibits the "[c]onstructing, placing, or maintaining any kind of . . .

UNITED STATES v. R. KENT,, 912 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1990)

. . . . § 261.10(b) (1988). United States v. Kent, 679 F.Supp. 985 (E.D.Cal.1987). . . . within a national forest, coupled with the language of the allotment statute, shows that 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . The information charging Kent with violating 16 U.S.C. § 551 and 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b) alleged that Kent . . . In supplemental briefing, the government argues that 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b) sets forth a strict liability . . . The government bases its argument on the lack of an explicit mens rea requirement in section 261.10(b . . . . § 261.10(b). . . . decides two issues of law, upon which supplemental briefing was ordered: first, it decides that section 261.10 . . . The first issue, whether section 261.10 defines a strict liability offense, is the most difficult. . . . disagree more strongly with the majority’s ruling that Kent could not be convicted of violating section 261.10 . . .

UNITED STATES v. R. KENT,, 945 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1990)

. . . . § 261.10(b). . . . In supplemental briefing, the government argues that 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b) sets forth a strict liability . . . The government bases its argument on the lack of an explicit mens rea requirement in section 261.10(b . . . II Even if section 261.10(b) is interpreted as a strict liability offense, I believe Kent’s conviction . . . Section 261.10(b) in clear language exempts anyone “otherwise authorized under Federal law” from the . . . . § 261.10(b) (1988). United States v. Kent, 679 F.Supp. 985 (E.D.Cal.1987). . . . Whether 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b) Includes a Mens Rea Element There is one issue, however, that we address . . . We now hold that section 261.10(b) does not contain a mens rea element. . . . We do not see how section 261.10(b) can be distinguished from section 261.6(a) in regard to this issue . . . We conclude, therefore, that section 261.10 does not require violations to be “knowing” or “willful”; . . .

UNITED STATES v. DOREMUS, 888 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1989)

. . . . § 261.10(k) (1987)). . . . The references to operating plans in § 261.10 would be meaningless unless Part 261 were construed to . . . We agree with the district court that 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(k) is consistent with the mining laws. . . . A. 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(h) This regulation prohibits “[violating any term or condition of a special-use . . . We therefore hold that § 261.10(k) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied. . . .

UNITED STATES v. SMITH, UNITED STATES v. BLAIR,, 866 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1989)

. . . . § 261.10(b), (c).” . . .

HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT COUNCIL, Re- v. U. S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, HWTC I, 861 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1988)

. . . Id. at §§ 261.10-.il. . . .

HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT COUNCIL, v. U. S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, HWTC II, 861 F.2d 277 (D.C. Cir. 1988)

. . . . §§ 261.10-.il (1987) (criteria for listing); id. at §§ 261.20-.24 (characteristics of hazardous wastes . . .

UNITED STATES v. ALLEGAN METAL FINISHING COMPANY,, 696 F. Supp. 275 (W.D. Mich. 1988)

. . . . § 261.10.” Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Request to Admit ¶ 11. . . . (2) of RCRA is constrained by the regulatory definition of “disposal facility” found at 40 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . disposal facility” drawn from the regulatory definition of “disposal facility” found at 40 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . fit into the four corners of the regulatory definition of “disposal facility” found at 40 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .

G. ADAMS, D. G. D. v. UNITED STATES a, 687 F. Supp. 1479 (D. Nev. 1988)

. . . . §§ 212.8, 212.10, 251.53, 251.54, 251.57, 261.10. . . .

UNITED STATES v. R. KENT,, 679 F. Supp. 985 (E.D. Cal. 1987)

. . . . § 261.10(b). . . . Section 261.10(b) of these regulations prohibits “taking possession of, occupying, or otherwise using . . . a special-use authorization, or as otherwise authorized by Federal law or regulation.” 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . CONCLUSION The court, therefore, finds defendant GUILTY of violating 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b) and 16 U.S.C . . .

UNITED STATES v. L. NORDWICK,, 673 F. Supp. 397 (D. Mont. 1987)

. . . . § 261.10(a) (1986). . . . District, Deer Lodge National Forest, without an approved operating plan, in violation of 36 CFR § 261.10 . . . structure, enclosure, or other improvement on National Forest land without an approved operatr ing plan. § 261.10 . . . guilty of maintaining structures and failing to submit a plan of operations in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .

DICKERSON, INC. v. C. HOLLOWAY,, 685 F. Supp. 1555 (M.D. Fla. 1987)

. . . Regulations provide specific rules for the proper disposal of PCB waste. 15 U.S.C. 2605(e); 40 CFR 261.10 . . .

UNITED STATES v. DOREMUS, 658 F. Supp. 752 (D. Idaho 1987)

. . . . § 261.10(k) by exceeding the terms of an approved operating plan for a mining claim by keeping more . . . Title 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(k) (1986) prohibits “[violating any term or condition of a special-use authorization . . . Title 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(h). . . . The trial court found that 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(k) was certainly clear on its face and as applied. . . . . § 261.10(k) prohibits violating a term or condition of an operating plan. . . .

RAMOS, v. D. LAMM,, 632 F. Supp. 376 (D. Colo. 1986)

. . . Total American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Colorado (Holland & Hart) 1490.00 393.20 381.20 261.10 . . .

K. ANDERSON, v. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, B. UNITED STATES v. K. ANDERSON,, 645 F. Supp. 3 (E.D. Cal. 1985)

. . . . § 261.10(a), (b) and © (FSR 35). 9. . . . 13, 1985 decision regarding the removal order based on lack of authorization required by 36 C.F.R. 261.10 . . . obtained any authorization required to maintain the ANDERSON property on LANDS as required by 36 C.F.R. 261.10 . . . special-use authorization, contract or an approved operating plan permitting such use. 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . jurisdiction when there is no authorization for such property to be maintained thereon. 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . .

UNITED STATES v. HUSSONG,, 778 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1985)

. . . . § 261.10(c). . . . The two counts were outfitting without a permit in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c) and giving false . . .

UNITED STATES v. BROERS,, 776 F.2d 1424 (9th Cir. 1985)

. . . . § 261.10(c), a regulation promulgated pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 551 (1982) (rules protecting national . . .

UNITED STATES v. ESPOSITO,, 754 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1985)

. . . We reverse because § 261.10(c) is not applicable to a holdover tenant, who is prosecuted for conduct . . . Section 261.10(c) of 36 C.F.R. prohibits in federal forests: “Selling or offering for sale any merchandise . . . We conclude therefore that Esposito should not have been prosecuted under' 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c). . . .

PAULINA LAKE HISTORIC CABIN OWNERS ASSOCIATION, L. S. L. D. L. W. v. U. S. D. A. FOREST SERVICE, J. G., 577 F. Supp. 1188 (D. Or. 1983)

. . . See 36 C.F.R. 261.10(e) (1982). . . .

CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, By BOARD OF WATER COMMISSIONERS, v. BERGLAND, R. W. D. D., 695 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1982)

. . . . §§ 261.6(a) and 261.10(a) (1981). . . .

UNITED STATES v. R. BEAM,, 686 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1982)

. . . . § 261.10(j). . . . forty-one different prohibited acts, including verbatim the above-set out paragraph (j) of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10 . . . can be characterized as an assembly, because such activities are specially exempted from the section 261.10 . . . He had no part in drafting section 261.10, and was basically unfamiliar with it. . . . . This lack of distinction is not accidental, for section 261.10(i) specifically mentions “developed recreation . . .

UNITED STATES v. SMITH CHRISTIAN MINING ENTERPRISES, INC. J. Sr. J. Jr. R. E. L. F. G. L. A., 537 F. Supp. 57 (D. Or. 1981)

. . . and improvements of the lands without permit, the defendants are in continuing violation of 36 C.F.R. 261.10 . . . and no permit permitting construction or improvement on Forest Service land, as required by 36 C.F.R. 261.10 . . .

UNITED STATES v. HELLS CANYON GUIDE SERVICE, INC. O. Jr., 660 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1981)

. . . . § 261.10(c) prohibits conducting any business activity within a National Forest or within the boundaries . . .

DOWNSTATE STONE COMPANY, v. UNITED STATES, 651 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1981)

. . . of such a site on National Forest land without approval is a violation of the provisions of 36 CFR 261.10 . . . of this action from prosecuting either Downstate or its officers, employees or agents under 36 CFR 261.10 . . . prosecuting either Downstate Stone Company or any of its officers, employees or agents under 36 C.F.R. 261.10 . . . and statutes, the enforcement of which were enjoined, provide in pertinent part as follows: 36 C.F.R. 261.10 . . .

CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, By BOARD OF WATER COMMISSIONERS, v. BERGLAND, R. W. D. D., 517 F. Supp. 155 (D. Colo. 1981)

. . . section 261.9 prohibits generally the destroying, disturbing, and removing of any property; and section 261.10 . . .