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F.S. 292.055 on Google Scholar

F.S. 292.055 on Casetext

Amendments to 292.055


The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
Title XX
VETERANS
Chapter 292
VETERANS' AFFAIRS; SERVICE OFFICERS
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 292.055 Florida Statutes and Case Law
292.055 Direct-support organization.—
(1) SHORT TITLE; DIRECT-SUPPORT ORGANIZATION ESTABLISHED.—This section may be cited as the “Sergeant First Class Paul R. Smith Memorial Act.” The Department of Veterans’ Affairs may establish a direct-support organization to provide assistance, funding, and support for the department in carrying out its mission. This section governs the creation, use, powers, and duties of the direct-support organization.
(2) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section, the term:
(a) “Department” means the Department of Veterans’ Affairs.
(b) “Direct-support organization” means an organization that is:
1. A Florida corporation not for profit, incorporated under chapter 617, exempted from filing fees, and approved by the Department of State.
2. Organized and operated exclusively to obtain funds; request and receive grants, gifts, and bequests of moneys; acquire, receive, hold, invest, and administer in its own name securities, funds, or property; and make expenditures to or for the direct or indirect benefit of the department, the veterans of this state, and congressionally chartered veteran service organizations having subdivisions that are incorporated in this state.
3. Determined by the department to be operating in a manner consistent with the goals of the department and in the best interest of the state.
(c) “Personal services” includes full-time or part-time personnel.
(3) BOARD OF DIRECTORS.—The direct-support organization shall be governed by a board of directors.
(a) The board of directors shall consist of no fewer than five members appointed by the executive director of the department. Veteran service organizations in this state may recommend nominees to the executive director of the department.
(b) The term of office of the board members shall be 3 years, except that the terms of the initial appointees shall be for 1 year, 2 years, or 3 years in order to achieve staggered terms. A member may be reappointed when his or her term expires. The executive director of the department or his or her designee shall serve as an ex officio member of the board of directors.
(c) Members must be current residents of this state. A majority of the members must be veterans, as defined in s. 1.01(14), and highly knowledgeable about the United States military, its service personnel, its veterans, and its missions. The executive director of the department may remove any member of the board for cause and with the approval of a majority of the members of the board of directors. The executive director of the department shall appoint a replacement for any vacancy that occurs.
(4) CONTRACT.—A direct-support organization shall operate under a written contract with the department. The written contract must provide for:
(a) Certification by the department that the direct-support organization is complying with the terms of the contract and is doing so consistent with the goals and purposes of the department and in the best interests of the state. This certification must be made annually and reported in the official minutes of a meeting of the direct-support organization.
(b) The reversion of moneys and property held by the direct-support organization:
1. To the department if the direct-support organization is no longer approved to operate for the department;
2. To the department if the direct-support organization ceases to exist; or
3. To the state if the department ceases to exist.
(c) The disclosure of the material provisions of the contract, and the distinction between the department and the direct-support organization, to donors of gifts, contributions, or bequests, including such disclosure on all promotional and fundraising publications.
(5) USE OF PROPERTY.—
(a) The department may permit the use of property, facilities, and personal services of the department by the direct-support organization, subject to this section.
(b) The department may prescribe by contract any condition with which the direct-support organization must comply in order to use property, facilities, or personal services of the department.
(c) The department may not permit the use of its property, facilities, or personal services by any direct-support organization organized under this section which does not provide equal employment opportunities to all persons regardless of race, color, national origin, gender, age, or religion.
(6) ACTIVITIES; RESTRICTIONS.—Any transaction or agreement between the direct-support organization organized under this section and another direct-support organization or other entity must be approved by the executive director of the department.
(7) ANNUAL BUDGETS AND REPORTS.—
(a) The fiscal year of the direct-support organization shall begin on July 1 of each year and end on June 30 of the following year.
(b) The direct-support organization shall submit to the department its federal Internal Revenue Service Application for Recognition of Exemption form (Form 1023) and its federal Internal Revenue Service Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax form (Form 990).
(8) ANNUAL AUDIT.—The direct-support organization shall provide for an annual financial audit in accordance with s. 215.981.
(9) CONFIDENTIALITY OF DONORS.—
(a) Any information identifying a donor or prospective donor to the direct-support organization who desires to remain anonymous is confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution.
(b) Portions of meetings of the direct-support organization during which the identity of a donor or prospective donor, whose identity is confidential and exempt pursuant to paragraph (a), is discussed are exempt from s. 286.011 and s. 24(b), Art. I of the State Constitution.
History.—s. 1, ch. 2008-84; s. 1, ch. 2008-85; s. 1, ch. 2013-97; s. 16, ch. 2014-96; s. 1, ch. 2017-6.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: March 07, 2023
F.S. 292.055 on Google Scholar

F.S. 292.055 on Casetext

Amendments to 292.055


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 292.055
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 292.055.

Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S292.055
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 292.055.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Oregon Afscme Council 75, Local # 2503 v. Hood River Cnty.

    274 P.3d 186 (Or. Ct. App. 2012)
    We begin with the county's first assignment of error. As noted, under ORS 243.672(1)(f), it is an unfair labor practice for a public employer such as the county to “[r]efuse or fail to comply with any provision of ORS 243.650 to 243.782.” Furthermore, under ORS 243.776, “rights and responsibilities prescribed for state officers and employees in ORS 292.055 shall accrue to employees of all public employers.” Taken together, those statutes make a public employer's violation of ORS 292.055 an unfair labor practice under ORS 243.672(1)(f).
    PAGE 298

  2. Chambers v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps. Int'l Union

    450 F. Supp. 3d 1108 (D. Or. 2020)
    In 2019, the Oregon Legislative Assembly amended ORS § 243.666 and repealed both ORS § 243.776 and ORS § 292.055, effective January 1, 2020. See Chapter 429 Oregon Laws 2019 (HB 2016) §§ 9 and 19.
    PAGE 1116

  3. Jarrett v. Marion Cnty.

    Case No. 6:20-cv-01049-MK (D. Or. Jan. 6, 2021)   Cited 1 times
    This statute became effective January 1, 2020. The parties agree that the statutory scheme previously in place, ORS §§ 243.776 and 292.055(3), provided analogous procedures and protections. See, e.g., Def.'s Reply to Mot. Dismiss at 3, ECF No. 27; Comp. at 3. ECF No. 1.
    PAGE 2

  4. Stines v. Oregon State Employes Ass'n

    601 P.2d 799 (Or. 1979)   Cited 5 times
    One additional problem arises. Can the union enter into a collective bargaining agreement which deprives the plaintiff of her rights promised her in their contract? Under her contract with the union plaintiff could cancel her dues at the end of her first year as an employe. She attempted to exercise this right, but four days before her cancellation went into effect, the collective bargaining agreement became effective. It required that she pay dues until the termination of that agreement, which was more than a year later. However, during this entire period ORS 292.055 (3) was in effect. It provides that when the employer receives a request in writing from the employe to terminate deduction from his wages for union dues, the deduction must terminate unless "there is a contract to the contrary." We conclude that in the context in which ORS 292.055 is found the statute can only mean a contract between the union and the employer. In subsection (4) of the same statute there is a provision that no deductions for payments to any labor organization under the section shall be deemed an unfair labor practice under ORS 243.672. ORS 292.055 having been in existence…
    PAGE 652

  5. Anderson v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union

    400 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (D. Or. 2019)   Cited 10 times
    Each Defendant's maintenance and enforcement of its dues checkoff and maintenance of membership provisions and restrictive revocation policies and continued deduction and collection of union dues/fees from the wages of Plaintiffs and class members, pursuant to ORS 243.776 and ORS 292.055(3), without the affirmative authorization and knowing waiver of their First Amendment rights violates Plaintiffs' and class members' First Amendment rights to free speech and association[.]
    PAGE 1116

  6. Stines v. Oregon State Employes Ass'n

    37 Or. App. 707 (Or. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 1 times
    ORS 292.055 provides, in relevant part:
    PAGE 710

  7. Kain v. Myers

    335 Or. 228 (Or. 2003)   Cited 7 times
    Although it does not affect our disposition of the issue respecting the caption, we also take note of petitioners' third argument. Petitioners argue that the proposed measure will put an end to the right that public employees presently have to make contributions to their unions through payroll deduction with the specific authorization to those unions to use some of the money so collected for political purposes. See ORS 292.055 (authorizing payroll deduction to be paid to labor organization). We agree with petitioners that the proposed measure categorically puts an end to that practice. We do not agree, however, that the Attorney General's caption violates the statute because it does not include that information. It might be more completely accurate to do so and the Attorney General may consider doing so on referral. However, given the statutory 15-word limitation in which the caption must identify the proposed measure's subject, the failure to mention an aspect of the measure that has a particular effect on the union members' rights does not necessarily make the caption invalid.
    PAGE 233

  8. Oregon City Federation of Teachers v. Oregon City Education Ass'n

    584 P.2d 303 (Or. Ct. App. 1978)   Cited 7 times
    "(c) Take such affirmative action, including but not limited to the reinstatement of employes with or without back pay, as necessary to effectuate the purposes of ORS 240.060, 240.065, 240.080, 240.123, 243.650 to 243.782, 292.055, 341.290, 662.705, 662.715 and 662.785.
    PAGE 32

  9. Zielinski v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union Local 503

    499 F. Supp. 3d 804 (D. Or. 2020)   Cited 1 times
    Plaintiff does not contest the State's authority to deduct union dues pursuant to a membership agreement. Instead, the claimed constitutional harm stems from SEIU 503 forging Plaintiff's signature on the agreements and authorizing dues deductions without his consent. Compl. ¶¶ 1-2, 15, 18-19, 23, 25, 35, 43-45. Thus, as in Belgau , the source of the alleged constitutional harm is not a State statute or policy but the particular private agreement between the union and Plaintiff. SEIU 503's "private misuse of a state statute does not describe conduct that can be attributed to the State[.]" Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. , 457 U.S. 922, 941, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) ; see also O.R.S. § 292.055 (repealed Jan. 1, 2020) (permitting union dues deductions only when authorized by the state employee). "Where, as here, the dispute surrounds whether the agreement the plaintiff signed is valid, the allegedly wrongful conduct stems from the union's authorization of dues, an exclusively private act." See Schiewe v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union Local 503 , No. 3:20-CV-00519-JR, 2020 WL 4251801, at *5 (D. Or. July 23, 2020), report and recommendation adopted , 2020 WL 5790389 (D…
    PAGE 810

  10. CITY OF LA GRANDE v. FIREFIGHTERS

    626 P.2d 1 (Or. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 3 times
    "Any provisions of local charters and ordinances adopted pursuant thereto in existence on October 5, 1973, and not in conflict with the rights and duties established in ORS 240.060, 240.065, 240.080, 240.123, 243.650 to 243.782, 292.055, 341.290, 662.705, 662.715 and 662.785 may remain in full force and effect after the board has determined that no conflict exists."
    PAGE 405