Amendments to 296.31

1. United States v. Rutland

   CRIMINAL 2:20-cr-16-KS-MTP (S.D. Miss. Aug. 5, 2021)

   2. A portion of Asset C1-namely, all right, title, and interest in the real property located at 2278 Martin Road, Bolton, Mississippi, Hinds County, (296.31 Acres) including parcels 4967-545, 4967-545-1, 4967-546, 4967-546-3, 4967-546-4, 4967-546-5 & 4967-547-2, titled to the Rutland Family Trust (17-DCI-000086) (collectively, the "2278 Martin Road Real Property"), except for $319, 110.76 of the equity in Asset C1.

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2. United States v. Rutland

   Criminal 2:20-cr-16-KS-MTP (S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2021)

   GIA 2165688215. Cl C-001 a/k/a 17-DCI-000086 2278 Martin Road, Bolton, Mississippi, Hinds County, (296.31 Acres) including parcels 4967-545, 4967-545-1, 4967-546, 4967-546-3, 4967-546-4, 4967-546-5 &4967547-2

3. United States v. Rutland

   CRIMINAL 2:20-cr-00016-KS-MTP (S.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2021)

   GIA2165688215. CI C-001 a/k/a 17-DCI-000086 2278 Martin Road, Bolton, Mississippi, Hinds County, (296.31 Acres) including parcels 4967-545, 4967-545-1, 4967-546, 4967-546-3, 4967-546-4, 4967-546-5 & 4967-547-2

4. Justiniano v. Astrue

   07-CV-6221CJS (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2008)

   • Motion to dismiss

   Additionally, while the Commissioner relies on a February 28, 2006, examination report by Laura Kilpatrick, LMSW (Record at 199-201; Def.'s Mem. of Law at 20-21), in support of his contention that as of that date, Justiniano was not suffering from any mental limitations, this report is at odds with a subsequent report of treating psychiatrist, Eric Rennert, M.D. In his mental assessment dated October 31, 2006, Dr. Rennert diagnosed Justiniano with "296.31 major depressive disorder — recurrent" and "309.81 post traumatic stress disorder." (Record at 214.) In the category of understanding and memory, he noted only mild limitations (defined as "some mild limitation in this area, but the individual can generally function adequately"). (Record at 215.) With regard to sustained concentration and persistence, he noted moderate limitations (described above, at 5). He specifically noted, "Pt's depression increases when she is expected to perform physical functions that cause physical pain." (Record at 216.) Ms. Kilpatrick's February 2006 report does not address the areas of functioning assessed by Dr. Rennert in his October 2006 report. Further, it does not address the conflict…

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5. Adams v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

   Case No. 6:13-cv-1599-Orl-DAB (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2015)   Cited 3 times

   Presently her diagnosis is Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent; DSM-IV-TR 296.31, and she reports "not feeling happy and depressed" on and off for the past 8 years. She is currently taking Wellbutrin 300 mgm per day for her depression and Xanax .25 mgm prn for anxiety. These medications help her "not feel so devastated all the time." Ms. Adams also has chronic illnesses (diabetes and fibromyalgia) and complains of cluster migraine headaches.

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6. Conner ex rel. I.C. v. Astrue

   No. 11 C 8736 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2012)

   • Motion for summary judgment

   designated by code numbers from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM-IV") as 296.31 (code for Major Depressive Disorder, recurrent, mild) and 300.00 (code for Generalized Anxiety Disorder)

7. Munn v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.

   Civil No. 6:13-cv-00997-ST (D. Or. Aug. 25, 2014)

   The next day, Jane Silbernagel, L.C.S.W., completed a Mental Impairment Questionnaire. Tr. 437-44. She listed Munn's impairments as 300.21 (Panic disorder with agoraphobia) and 296.31 (Major Depressive Disorder). Tr. 437. Munn's reported symptoms were "panic attacks when in public, [or] in any sort of interpersonal conflict or slight confrontation." Tr. 439. Munn reportedly managed his symptoms by avoiding certain locations with a lot of people and leaves "as soon as possible." Id. At the time, he was taking Celexa. Id. Silbernagel described Munn's ability to complete an eight-hour work day as "poor" due to his fatigue from anxiety. Tr. 440. She opined that Munn would need to be absent from work more than four times a month. Tr. 441.

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8. Matson Navigation Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp.

   Civil Action No. 18-2751 (RDM) (D.D.C. May. 30, 2020)

   • Motion for summary judgment
   • Motion to dismiss

   To this, MARAD and APL respond that a regulation cannot change the meaning of a statute, and the statute defines "foreign commerce" to mean "commerce or trade between the United States, its territories or possessions, or the District of Columbia and a foreign country" and "commerce or trade between foreign countries." 46 U.S.C. § 53101(4); Dkt. 24-1 at 10, 26. They correctly note that the regulations define an "[e]ligible vessel" to mean "a vessel that meets the requirements of § 53102(b)," 46 C.F.R. § 296.2, that is, the statutory provision that lacks the express "exclusivity" requirement. Dkt. 24-1 at 26. MARAD further argues that Matson's reading of the regulations would render other regulatory text "nonsensical." Dkt. 28 at 22-25. In particular, if "eligible vessel" is read to mean a vessel operating exclusively in foreign commerce, the regulation governing MSP operating agreements would require that a "vessel operating exclusively in foreign commerce or in mixed foreign and domestic commerce under a" § 12111 registry endorsement must "[b]e operated exclusively in foreign commerce or in mixed foreign commerce and domestic trade under a" § 12111 registry endorsement. 46 C.F.R…

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9. Williams v. Colvin

   CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13CV701-RLV (W.D.N.C. Dec. 16, 2015)

   • Motion for summary judgment

   In June 2010, Dr. Carbone described Mr. Williams' depression diagnosis as "Major Depression mild to moderate without apparent Psychotic Features currently in partial remission. Rule out Chronic Dysthymia" (Axis I: 296.31). (Tr. 187).

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10. Matson Navigation Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp.

    466 F. Supp. 3d 177 (D.D.C. 2020)   Cited 2 times

    • Motion for summary judgment
    • Motion to dismiss

    To this, MARAD and APL respond that a regulation cannot change the meaning of a statute, and the statute defines "foreign commerce" to mean "commerce or trade between the United States, its territories or possessions, or the District of Columbia and a foreign country" and "commerce or trade between foreign countries." 46 U.S.C. § 53101(4) ; Dkt. 24-1 at 10, 26. They correctly note that the regulations define an "[e]ligible vessel" to mean "a vessel that meets the requirements of § 53102(b)," 46 C.F.R. § 296.2, that is, the statutory provision that lacks the express "exclusivity" requirement. Dkt. 24-1 at 26. MARAD further argues that Matson's reading of the regulations would render other regulatory text "nonsensical." Dkt. 28 at 22–25. In particular, if "eligible vessel" is read to mean a vessel operating exclusively in foreign commerce, the regulation governing MSP operating agreements would require that a "vessel operating exclusively in foreign commerce or in mixed foreign and domestic commerce under a" § 12111 registry endorsement must "[b]e operated exclusively in foreign commerce or in mixed foreign commerce and domestic trade under a" § 12111 registry endorsement. 46…

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