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Florida Statute 316.002 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 316.002 Case Law from Google Scholar
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Link to State of Florida Official Statute Google Search for Amendments to 316.002

The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XXIII
MOTOR VEHICLES
Chapter 316
STATE UNIFORM TRAFFIC CONTROL
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 316.002
316.002 Purpose.It is the legislative intent in the adoption of this chapter to make uniform traffic laws to apply throughout the state and its several counties and uniform traffic ordinances to apply in all municipalities. The Legislature recognizes that there are conditions which require municipalities to pass certain other traffic ordinances in regulation of municipal traffic that are not required to regulate the movement of traffic outside of such municipalities. Section 316.008 enumerates the area within which municipalities may control certain traffic movement or parking in their respective jurisdictions. This section shall be supplemental to the other laws or ordinances of this chapter and not in conflict therewith. It is unlawful for any local authority to pass or to attempt to enforce any ordinance in conflict with the provisions of this chapter.
History.s. 1, ch. 71-135.

F.S. 316.002 on Google Scholar

F.S. 316.002 on Casetext

Amendments to 316.002


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 316.002
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 316.002.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

JIMENEZ, v. STATE, 246 So. 3d 219 (Fla. 2018)

. . . . § 316.002. . . . Section 316.002 makes it unlawful "for any local authority to pass or to attempt to enforce any ordinance . . . See § 316.002, .007, Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .

CITY OF OLDSMAR Jo v. Vo TRINH,, 210 So. 3d 191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . authorized under section 316.008(l)(w), Florida Statutes (2008), and were expressly preempted by sections 316.002 . . . authorized under section 316.008(l)(w), Florida Statutes (2008), and were expressly preempted by sections 316.002 . . .

CLASSY CYCLES, INC. v. BAY COUNTY, a a, 201 So. 3d 779 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . In discussing implied preemption in Sarasota Alliance, the Florida Supreme Court stated: Sections 316.002 . . . Section 316.002 preempts local regulation of traffic laws, except as expressly permitted, and states: . . . The express preemption established by sections 316.002 and 316.007 has been interpreted by the Florida . . . Thus, we find Phantom of Brevard to be distinguishable because the broad preemptions in sections 316.002 . . . Section 316.002 does allow municipalities to control certain traffic movement or parking as provided . . .

CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, a v. AREM,, 154 So. 3d 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . First, in section 316.002 the legislature identified the purpose of chapter 316 as being “to make uniform . . . Section 316.002 expressly limits the power of municipalities to legislate over traffic matters, as follows . . . Finally, section 316.002 makes it “unlawful for any local authority to pass or to attempt to enforce . . . Consistent with section 316.002, section 316.007, like a constitutional provision over traffic matters . . . The section 316.007 prohibition is even broader than that of 316.002; while section 316.002 precludes . . .

MASONE, v. CITY OF AVENTURA, v., 147 So. 3d 492 (Fla. 2014)

. . . In fact, as recognized by the majority,' section 316.002, Florida Statutes, explicitly states that [t . . . shall be supplemental to the other laws or ordinances of this chapter and not in conflict therewith. § 316.002 . . . with the statutory scheme, the majority reads this authorizing section too narrowly- When sections 316.002 . . . City of Aventura, 89 So.3d at 236; see § 316.002, Fla. Stat. . . . control certain traffic movement or parking in their respective jurisdictions,” is found in section 316.002 . . . As indicated in section 316.002, section 316.008 contains an enumeration of specific powers that local . . . As broadly described in section 316.002, the powers granted to municipalities by section 316.008 are . . .

STATE v. T. CATALANO,, 104 So. 3d 1069 (Fla. 2012)

. . . produced must be located upon (stopped, standing or moving) any street or highway as defined by Section 316.002 . . .

Jo BOWEN v. TAYLOR- CHRISTENSEN,, 98 So. 3d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . .” § 316.002, Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .

CITY OF ORLANDO v. UDOWYCHENKO,, 98 So. 3d 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Section 316.002, entitled “Purpose,” provides in pertinent part that: It is the legislative intent in . . . The language in section 316.002 and section 316.007, where it specifically states the intent of the Legislature . . . Section 316.002 further states: “Section 316.008 enumerates the area within which municipalities may . . . This is the type of conduct that is expressly prohibited in the language of section 316.002 and section . . .

CITY OF AVENTURA, v. MASONE,, 89 So. 3d 233 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . .” § 316.002, Fla. Stat. (2008). . . . Section 316.002 also makes it “unlawful for any local authority to pass or to attempt to enforce any . . . Despite the proscriptions of sections 316.002 and 316.007, the City of Aventura (“the City”) enacted . . . Section 316.002 of the Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law specifies: It is the legislative intent in . . . Section 316.002 specifies the legislative intent for uniform statewide traffic laws. . . . . §§ 316.001, 316.002, Fla. Stat. (2008). . . . See §§ 316.002, 316.008(l)(w), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . . As set forth in section 316.002, “[t]he Legislature recognizes that there are conditions which require . . . More specifically, the dissent highlights the language in section 316.002, which makes it “unlawful for . . . Neither the language in section 316.002 nor section 316.007 demonstrates express preemption by the state . . .

MONTGOMERY, v. STATE, 69 So. 3d 1023 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . produced must be located upon (stopped, standing or moving) any street or highway as defined by Section 316.002 . . .

E. MADDOX, v. STATE, 923 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2006)

. . . The stated purpose of this chapter of the Florida Statutes was outlined by the Legislature in section 316.002 . . . the state and its several counties and uniform traffic ordinances to apply in all municipalities. § 316.002 . . . expresses a “legislative intent ... to make uniform traffic laws to apply throughout the state,” § 316.002 . . .

BISCHOFF, v. FLORIDA, C., 242 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (M.D. Fla. 2003)

. . . . § 316.002 (purpose); accord, Fla. . . .

GULLEY, v. PIERCE, a a, 625 So. 2d 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . .” § 316.002, Fla.Stat. (1971). . . .

L. THOMAS, v. STATE, 614 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1993)

. . . .” § 316.002, Fla.Stat. . . . from passing or attempting to enforce any ordinance in conflict with the provisions of chapter 316. § 316.002 . . .

STATE v. SMITH,, 584 So. 2d 145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . See § 316.002, Fla.Stat. (1989). . . .

THOMAS, v. STATE, 583 So. 2d 336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . Section 316.002 provides: It is the legislative intent in the adoption of this chapter to make uniform . . .

CITY OF MARGATE v. WOOTEN, 45 Fla. Supp. 2d 12 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1990)

. . . F.S. 316.002 provides as follows: “Purpose. . . .

STATE OF FLORIDA v. BERKSHIRE, 42 Fla. Supp. 2d 83 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1990)

. . . Section 316.002 provides that the legislative intent in the adoption of this chapter is to make uniform . . .

McCRIMMON, v. STATE, 505 So. 2d 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . See §§ 316.002 and 316.008(l)(h), Fla.Stat. . . .