F.S. 316.027 Florida Statutes and Case Law

The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)

Title XXIII
MOTOR VEHICLES

Chapter 316
STATE UNIFORM TRAFFIC CONTROL

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316.027 Crash involving death or personal injuries.—

(1) As used in this section, the term:

(a) “Serious bodily injury” means an injury to a person, including the driver, which consists of a physical condition that creates a substantial risk of death, serious personal disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ.

(b) “Vulnerable road user” means:

1. A pedestrian, including a person actually engaged in work upon a highway, or in work upon utility facilities along a highway, or engaged in the provision of emergency services within the right-of-way;

2. A person operating a bicycle, an electric bicycle, a motorcycle, a scooter, or a moped lawfully on the roadway;

3. A person riding an animal; or

4. A person lawfully operating on a public right-of-way, crosswalk, or shoulder of the roadway:

a. A farm tractor or similar vehicle designed primarily for farm use;

b. A skateboard, roller skates, or in-line skates;

c. A horse-drawn carriage;

d. An electric personal assistive mobility device; or

e. A wheelchair.

(2)(a) The driver of a vehicle involved in a crash occurring on public or private property which results in injury to a person other than serious bodily injury shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as close thereto as possible, and shall remain at the scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062. A person who willfully violates this paragraph commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(b) The driver of a vehicle involved in a crash occurring on public or private property which results in serious bodily injury to a person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as close thereto as possible, and shall remain at the scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062. A person who willfully violates this paragraph commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(c) The driver of a vehicle involved in a crash occurring on public or private property which results in the death of a person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as close thereto as possible, and shall remain at the scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062. A person who is arrested for a violation of this paragraph and who has previously been convicted of a violation of this section, s. 316.061, s. 316.191, or s. 316.193, or a felony violation of s. 322.34, shall be held in custody until brought before the court for admittance to bail in accordance with chapter 903. A person who willfully violates this paragraph commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, and shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 4 years. A person who willfully commits such a violation while driving under the influence as set forth in s. 316.193(1) shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 4 years.

(d) Notwithstanding s. 775.089(1)(a), if the driver of a vehicle violates paragraph (a), paragraph (b), or paragraph (c), the court shall order the driver to make restitution to the victim for any damage or loss unless the court finds clear and compelling reasons not to order the restitution. Restitution may be monetary or nonmonetary restitution. The court shall make the payment of restitution a condition of probation in accordance with s. 948.03. An order requiring the defendant to make restitution to a victim does not remove or diminish the requirement that the court order payment to the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund under chapter 960. Payment of an award by the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund creates an order of restitution to the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund unless specifically waived in accordance with s. 775.089(1)(b).

(e) A driver who violates paragraph (a), paragraph (b), or paragraph (c) shall have his or her driver license revoked for at least 3 years as provided in s. 322.28(4).

1. A person convicted of violating paragraph (a), paragraph (b), or paragraph (c) shall, before his or her driving privilege may be reinstated, present to the department proof of completion of a victim’s impact panel session in a judicial circuit if such a panel exists, or if such a panel does not exist, a department-approved driver improvement course relating to the rights of vulnerable road users relative to vehicles on the roadway as provided in s. 322.0261(2).

2. The department may reinstate an offender’s driving privilege after he or she satisfies the 3-year revocation period as provided in s. 322.28(4) and successfully completes either a victim’s impact panel session or a department-approved driver improvement course relating to the rights of vulnerable road users relative to vehicles on the roadway as provided in s. 322.0261(2).

3. For purposes of this paragraph, an offender’s driving privilege may be reinstated only after the department verifies that the offender participated in and successfully completed a victim’s impact panel session or a department-approved driver improvement course.

(f) For purposes of sentencing under chapter 921 and determining incentive gain-time eligibility under chapter 944, an offense listed in this subsection is ranked one level above the ranking specified in s. 921.0022 or s. 921.0023 for the offense committed if the victim of the offense was a vulnerable road user.

(g) The defendant may move to depart from the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment prescribed in paragraph (c) unless the violation was committed while the defendant was driving under the influence. The state may object to this departure. The court may grant the motion only if it finds that a factor, consideration, or circumstance clearly demonstrates that imposing a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment would constitute or result in an injustice. The court shall state in open court the basis for granting the motion.

(3) The stops shall be made without unnecessarily obstructing traffic, and, if a damaged vehicle is obstructing traffic, the driver of the vehicle shall make every reasonable effort to move the vehicle or have it moved so as not to obstruct the regular flow of traffic. A person who fails to comply with this subsection shall be cited for a nonmoving violation, punishable as provided in chapter 318.

(4)(a) In addition to any other civil, criminal, or administrative penalty imposed, a person whose commission of a noncriminal traffic infraction or a violation of this chapter or s. 1006.66 causes or results in the death of another person may be required by the court to serve 120 community service hours in a trauma center or hospital that regularly receives victims of vehicle accidents, under the supervision of a registered nurse, an emergency room physician, or an emergency medical technician pursuant to a voluntary community service program operated by the trauma center or hospital.

(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), in addition to any other civil, criminal, or administrative penalty imposed, a person whose commission of a violation of s. 316.172(1)(a) or (b) causes or results in serious bodily injury to or death of another person shall be required by the court to:

1. Serve 120 community service hours in a trauma center or hospital that regularly receives victims of vehicle accidents, under the supervision of a registered nurse, an emergency room physician, or an emergency medical technician pursuant to a voluntary community service program operated by the trauma center or hospital.

2. Participate in a victim’s impact panel session in a judicial circuit if such a panel exists, or if such a panel does not exist, attend a department-approved driver improvement course relating to the rights of vulnerable road users relative to vehicles on the roadway as provided in s. 322.0261(2).

(5) This section does not apply to crashes occurring during a motorsports event, as defined in s. 549.10(1), or at a closed-course motorsport facility, as defined in s. 549.09(1).

History.—s. 1, ch. 71-135; s. 1, ch. 75-72; s. 5, ch. 76-31; s. 1, ch. 82-161; s. 51, ch. 89-282; s. 1, ch. 93-140; s. 9, ch. 94-306; s. 894, ch. 95-148; s. 5, ch. 96-350; s. 82, ch. 99-248; s. 956, ch. 2002-387; s. 2, ch. 2006-225; s. 2, ch. 2007-211; s. 2, ch. 2011-80; s. 2, ch. 2014-225; s. 2, ch. 2017-189; s. 83, ch. 2019-167; s. 4, ch. 2020-69; s. 4, ch. 2022-180.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: March 07, 2023

F.S. 316.027 on Google Scholar

F.S. 316.027 on Casetext

Amendments to 316.027

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 316.027

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

316.027 1a - HIT AND RUN - FAIL TO STOP REMAIN AT CRASH INVOLVE INJURY - F: T

316.027 1b - HIT AND RUN - FAIL TO STOP REMAIN AT CRASH INVOLVE DEATH - F: F

Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S316.027

R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

S316.027 (1) CRASH - Leaving scene on public or private property without rendering aid (involving death/injury) [See 316.027(2)] (FELONY) - Points on Drivers License: 0 R

S316.027 (1)(a) CRASH - Leaving scene on public or private property without rendering aid (involving injury) (FELONY) - Points on Drivers License: 0 R

S316.027 (1)(b) CRASH - Leaving scene on public or private property without rendering aid (involving death) (FELONY) - Points on Drivers License: 0 R

S316.027 (3) CRASH- Fail to remove obstructing vehicle (involving death/injury) - Points on Drivers License: 0

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Hardy v. State
705 So. 2d 979 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) Cited 34 times
Appellant, Terry Carnell Hardy, was convicted of various offenses all relating to a traffic accident that occurred on July 16, 1995, on a dark stretch of U.S. 441. While we otherwise affirm, we reverse appellant's conviction for leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, as we hold that appellant's dual convictions for leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, see § 316.027(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995), and leaving the scene of an accident involving death, see id. § 316.027(1)(b), violated the prohibition against double jeopardy where both convictions related to the same accident.
State v. Mancuso
652 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1995) Cited 35 times
This Court has previously determined that section 316.027 creates only one crime, the felony of "willfully" leaving the scene of an accident involving injury. Stanfill v. State, 384 So.2d 141, 143 (Fla. 1980). In reaching that determination, this Court implicitly recognized that knowledge of the accident is an essential element of section 316.027, for one cannot "willfully" leave an accident without awareness that an accident has occurred. A majority of jurisdictions that have considered similarly worded "hit-and-run" statutes have also concluded that knowledge of the accident must be read into the statute. See Tennant, 319 S.E.2d at 400 and cases cited therein. See generally A. Kaufman, Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of Showing in a Criminal Prosecution Under a "Hit-and-Run" Statute Accused's Knowledge of Accident, Injury, or Damage 23 A.L.R.3d 497 (1969 Supp. 1994).
PAGE 371
Gaulden v. State
195 So. 3d 1123 (Fla. 2016) Cited 12 times
Motion to dismiss
Jacob Thomas Gaulden was charged with leaving the scene of a crash involving a death, a first-degree felony under section 316.027(1)(b). State v. Gaulden (Gaulden I), 134 So.3d 981, 982 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). In brief, the statute requires “[t]he driver of any vehicle involved in a crash ... that results in the death of any person” to “immediately stop” at the scene, comply with certain reporting requirements, and render assistance to anyone injured. § 316.027(1)(b), Fla. Stat.; see § 316.062, Fla. Stat. (containing reporting and assistance requirements). Gaulden moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that he was not “involved in a crash” within the meaning of the statute. Gaulden I, 134 So.3d at 982. The trial court agreed, concluding that “when a passenger suffers death as a result of being separated from the driver's moving vehicle[,]” there is no “crash” within the meaning of the statute. Id.
PAGE 1124
State v. Dumas
700 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 1997) Cited 22 times
In Mancuso, we determined that knowledge was an essential element of section 316.027 because (1) the statute imposes a more severe penalty for leaving an accident where personal injuries are involved than does a similar statute imposing sanctions where only property damage is involved; and (2) the statute requires a driver to take an affirmative course of action which necessarily requires that the driver be aware of the facts giving rise to the duty. 652 So.2d at 372. When this Court decided Mancuso in 1995, section 316.027 addressed only one crime, the felony of willfully leaving the scene of an accident involving injury or death. The 1993 amendment divided the offense into two felonies: leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury (which remained a third- degree felony) and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death (which became a second-degree felony). See § 316.027(1)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (1995).
PAGE 1225
Department of Revenue, v. Glass
15 OTR 117 (Or. T.C. 2000) Cited 4 times
States have jurisdiction to impose a personal income tax on individuals based on either jurisdiction over the person or jurisdiction over the source of income. Oregon's statutory scheme categorizes individuals for purposes of personal income tax as either residents or nonresidents. Residents are subject to taxation based upon the state's jurisdiction over their person. ORS 316.037 and ORS 316.027. Nonresidents are subject to taxation based on the state's jurisdiction over the source of income. ORS 316.127. In this case, the department is asserting jurisdiction over the person of taxpayer; and, therefore, relies upon ORS 316.027. ORS 316.027(1) provides in part:
PAGE 119
Hoag v. State
511 So. 2d 401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) Cited 26 times
The defendant, Daniel Lee Hoag, intoxicated and driving a motor vehicle, negligently struck a group of pedestrians, killing one and injuring four. He did not stop his vehicle at the scene of the accident. He was convicted of seven offenses, viz: manslaughter by driving while intoxicated (§ 316.1931(2), Fla. Stat.); manslaughter by culpable negligence (§ 782.07, Fla. Stat.); leaving the scene of an accident with a death (§ 316.027, Fla. Stat.); and four counts of leaving the scene of an accident with injuries (§ 316.027, Fla. Stat.). He appeals.
Hunt v. State
769 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) Cited 12 times
Both the First and Fourth Districts have held that double jeopardy bars prosecution under section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes (1991), because that section is subsumed by section 782.071(2), Florida Statutes (1991). See Pierce v. State, 744 So.2d 1193, 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Wright v. State, 573 So.2d 998, 1001 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). This analysis applies to the 1997 version of the vehicular homicide statute as well. Section 782.071 subsumes the requirement found in section 316.027 that the motorist stop and comply with the requirements of section 316.062, Florida Statutes (1997). See generally Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985) (holding the test of double jeopardy is statutory elements, not evidence produced at trial). On that basis, we reverse Hunt's conviction for leaving the scene of an accident involving injury.
PAGE 1111
Carrada v. State
919 So. 2d 592 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) Cited 3 times
Section 316.027(1)(a) provides:
PAGE 594
Motyka v. State
457 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) Cited 9 times
The last sentence of the committee note to Rule 3.701(d)(7) provides: "Victim injury is to be scored for each victim for whom the defendant is convicted of injuring and is limited to physical trauma." (emphasis supplied). A conviction under Section 316.027 does not necessarily mean the defendant is guilty of injuring anyone.
PAGE 1115
Peterson v. State
775 So. 2d 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) Cited 37 times
We first address appellant's convictions for leaving the scene of an accident with injuries and leaving the scene of an accident with property damage. Those convictions were based on one accident in which three people were injured and the car which they occupied was damaged. Section 316.061(1), Florida Statutes (1997), one of the statutes under which appellant was convicted, prohibits leaving the scene of a "crash resulting only in damage to a vehicle or other property." Section 316.027(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997) prohibits leaving the scene of a "crash resulting in injury of any person."