Cases from cite.case.law:

PIERRE, v. STATE, 264 So. 3d 206 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Fritz Gerald Pierre appeals his conviction and sentence for refusal to submit to testing under section 316.1932 . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. DAVIS,, 264 So. 3d 965 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . the case was whether the officer informed him that he could refuse a blood draw pursuant to section 316.1932 . . . other medical facility and the administration of a breath or urine test is impractical or impossible. § 316.1932 . . .

HOWITT, v. STATE, 266 So. 3d 219 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Florida's implied consent statute, section 316.1932(1)(a)1.a., Florida Statutes (2016), provides: Any . . . suspect that law enforcement conflated the provision for securing a breath or urine test under section 316.1932 . . .

STATE v. MEYERS,, 261 So. 3d 573 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . The trial court found that the officer requesting the blood draw did not comply with section 316.1932 . . . other medical facility and the administration of a breath or urine test is impractical or impossible. § 316.1932 . . .

BEDELL, v. STATE, 249 So. 3d 1329 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . According to the motion, under section 316.1932(1)(c) the State must show that administration of a urine . . . Second, it is not clear that section 316.1932(1)(c) makes the distinction that the State asserts in its . . .

BEDELL, v. STATE, 250 So. 3d 146 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Id. at 321-322 ; see § 316.1932(1)(f), Fla. . . . She relied on section 316.1932(1)(c) for her position that without a prior offer of these less-intrusive . . . Section 316.1932(1)(c) establishes the conditions under which a driver is "deemed to have given his or . . . upon which Appellant may be deemed to have consented to submit to an approved blood test under section 316.1932 . . . court's finding of fact that a urine test was "impractical" for purposes of implied consent under section 316.1932 . . .

MCGRAW, v. STATE, 245 So. 3d 760 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . certified the following question to be of great public importance: Does the following sentence in § 316.1932 . . . See§§ 316.1932, .1933, .1934, Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . Specifically at issue here is section 316.1932(1)(c) : Any person who accepts the privilege extended . . . I dissent from the majority's determination of the constitutionality of section 316.1932(1)(c). . . . However, the State contends that Defendant's consent was implied pursuant to section 316.1932(1)(c), . . .

GOODMAN, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT,, 238 So. 3d 102 (Fla. 2018)

. . . . § 316.1932(1)(f)2.a., Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . See §§ 316.1932, 316.1933, 316.1934, Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . Id. § 316.1932(1)(a) 1.a. . . . Miles, 775 So.2d at 952 ; see §§ 316.1932(1)(a) 2., (f)1., Fla. Stat.; § 316.1933(2)(b), Fla. Stat. . . . doctors, nurses, or paramedics can collect blood for the purposes of determining its alcoholic content. § 316.1932 . . .

A. MONTES- VALETON, v. STATE, 216 So. 3d 475 (Fla. 2017)

. . . Burnett, 536 So.2d 375, 377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (“Here, the first requirement [of section 316.1932(l)( . . . Accordingly, section 316.1932(l)(c) was not applicable to this situation; therefore, the implied consent . . . The implied consent law consists of sections 316.1932, 316.1933, and 316.1934, Florida Statutes (2008 . . .

B. WIGGINS, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,, 209 So. 3d 1165 (Fla. 2017)

. . . Section 322.2615 is to be read in pari materia with section 316.1932, Florida Department of Highway-Safety . . . control of the motor vehicle within this state while under the influence of alcoholic beverages.” § 316.1932 . . .

GOODMAN, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT,, 203 So. 3d 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See §§ 316.1932-34, Fla. . . . accepting drivers’ licenses in the state are deemed to consent to testing of their blood alcohol content. § 316.1932 . . .

STATE v. F. LILES, v., 191 So. 3d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Notwithstanding s. 316.1932, the testing required by this paragraph need not be incidental to,a lawful . . . Under this statutory scheme, section 316.1932 provides that any person who drives a motor vehicle is . . . blood alcohol testing if the driver is lawfully arrested on suspicion of a drunk driving offense. § 316.1932 . . .

EDGE- GOUGEN, v. STATE, 182 So. 3d 730 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Hernandez, 74 So.3d 1070, 1075 (Fla.2011) (citing to section 316.1932(l)(a)l.a., Fla.,Stat. (2011) (finding . . .

WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 167 So. 3d 483 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . to submit to a chemical or physical test of his or her breath, blood, or urine, as described in s. 316.1932 . . . placed under lawful arrest for a violation of s. 316.193 unless such test was requested pursuant to s. 316.1932 . . . test ... for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood or breath ....” § 316.1932 . . .

A. HAMMONS, v. STATE, 158 So. 3d 758 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . See § 316.1932(l)(a)(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011). Dismissed as untimely. . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. WIGGEN,, 152 So. 3d 773 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Berne, 49 So.3d 779, 782 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010); see also § 316.1932(l)(b)(2), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .

VUONG, DUI, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT,, 149 So. 3d 174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . See § 316.1932(l)(a)l.a., Fla. Stat. (2012). . . . See § 316.1932(l)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2012). . . .

LAWS, v. STATE, 145 So. 3d 937 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . argue only that his decision to refuse to comply with the request for a sobriety test under section 316.1932 . . . It is noteworthy that subsection 316.1932(1) expressly makes a refusal to submit to the statutory test . . . Nothing in sections 316.1932, .1933, or .1934 suggests that the commission of this separate misdemeanor . . . The blood test itself was not taken in compliance with subsection 316.1932(l)(f). . . .

MONTES- VALETON, v. STATE, 141 So. 3d 204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . “blood test results obtained by actual consent, independent of the implied consent statute [section 316.1932 . . .

CARRIZOSA, v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,, 124 So. 3d 1017 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Carrizosa consented to submit to a breath test under section 316.1932(l)(a). . . . That section provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 316.1932. . . . whether the suspension was incident to a lawful arrest because (1) probable cause reviewed under section 316.1932 . . . the detention,” (2) whether the driver "refused to submit to any such test” reviewed under section 316.1932 . . . The language of sections 316.1932 and 322.2615, Florida Statutes (2007), applied in Hernandez is the . . .

FERREI, v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,, 91 So. 3d 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . determination of whether the test was administered incident to a lawful arrest, as required by section 316.1932 . . .

PANKAU, v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,, 91 So. 3d 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . determination of whether the test was administered incident to a lawful arrest, as required by section 316.1932 . . .

GONZALEZ, v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,, 91 So. 3d 924 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . determination of whether the test was administered incident to a lawful arrest, as required by section 316.1932 . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. CARILLON,, 95 So. 3d 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . enforcement officer was authorized to request that respondent submit to a breath test under section 316.1932 . . . The circuit court here applied the correct law, section 316.1932(l)(a), and where the circuit court has . . .

NADER, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,, 87 So. 3d 712 (Fla. 2012)

. . . THE BREATH-ALCOHOL TEST IS THE ONLY REQUIRED TEST, VIOLATE THE IMPLIED CONSENT PROVISIONS OF SECTION 316.1932 . . . First Certified Question Statutory Scheme for Florida’s Implied Consent Law Section 316.1932, Florida . . . See § 316.1932(l)(a)l.b„ Fla. Stat. . . . See § 316.1932(l)(c), Fla. Stat. . . . Relating to the above three provisions, subsection 316.1932(l)(d) provides that when an officer arrests . . .

STATE v. HOLLAND,, 76 So. 3d 1032 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . This issue has been resolved by the Legislature’s enactment of the implied consent law under section 316.1932 . . . Section 316.1932(l)(a)l.a. provides in pertinent part that “[t]he refusal to submit to a chemical or . . . enforcement officer as provided in this section is admissible into evidence in any criminal proceeding.” § 316.1932 . . . to conclude that the segment of the videotape showing Holland’s refusal is admissible under section 316.1932 . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. CHERRY,, 91 So. 3d 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Cherry requested a blood test, she was not provided with assistance as required ' under section 316.1932 . . . that when she requested a blood test she was not provided with assistance as required under section 316.1932 . . . an approved breath-alcohol test as required under Rule 11D-8.002(13) [sic] and regulated by section 316.1932 . . . an approved breath-alcohol test as required under Rule 11D-8.002(13)(sic) and regulated by section 316.1932 . . .

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. HERNANDEZ, v., 74 So. 3d 1070 (Fla. 2011)

. . . The obligation to submit to breath-alcohol testing emanates from section 316.1932, Florida Statutes ( . . . The only location in the Florida Statutes where the definition can be found is section 316.1932(l)(a) . . . The only definition of a lawful breath test under section 322.2615 is found in section 316.1932(l)(a) . . . Section 316.1932 is what creates and defines the scope of the obligation, and its mandate is certain: . . . That is what the Legislature has expressly provided for in section 316.1932. . . .

STATE v. G. GEISS,, 70 So. 3d 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . dissent to that portion of the opinion that addresses the effect of the implied consent statute, section 316.1932 . . . also erred in finding that the search in this case violated Florida’s implied consent statute, section 316.1932 . . . Regarding blood draws, section 316.1932(l)(c) states that any person operating a motor vehicle in Florida . . . or other medical facility and the administration of a breath test is impractical or impossible.” § 316.1932 . . .

STATE v. L. MURRAY L., 51 So. 3d 593 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . provided for the use of breath and urine tests, except under the circumstances described in sections 316.1932 . . . Hence, the limitations on blood testing found in section 316.1932(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2007), and . . . The implied consent law, section 316.1932(1)(a)1.a.f Florida Statutes (2007), provides that a person . . . Further, section 316.1932(1 )(c), Florida Statutes (2007), authorizes blood withdrawals where an officer . . . While Robertson involved section 316.1933(1)(a), the provisions of section 316.1932(l)(a)l.a. and (c) . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. BERNE,, 49 So. 3d 779 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . . § 316.1932(1)(b)2., Fla. Stat. (2005); see also Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. . . .

KURECKA, v. STATE v. J., 67 So. 3d 1052 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See §§ 316.1932, 316.1933, and 316.1934, Fla. Stat.; State v. . . . privilege to drive, all drivers have already consented to taking a breath test pursuant to section 316.1932 . . .

WICKY, v. C. OXONIAN I., 24 So. 3d 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See §§ 316.1932-.1933, Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . interest in preserving her right to test the blood sample herself under the implied consent law, § 316.1932 . . .

E. FOLDEN, v. STATE, 16 So. 3d 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See §§ 322.2615, 316.1932(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). REVERSED AND REMANDED. . . .

In FORFEITURE OF CHRYSLER DOOR, IDENTIFICATION NO. v., 9 So. 3d 709 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See §§ 316.193(2)(b)(l), 316.1932, 316.1939(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. U. J. HOFER,, 5 So. 3d 766 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . also explained that the obligation to submit to a breath, blood, or urine test is imposed by section 316.1932 . . . Hofer briefly mentioned the relationship between sections 316.1932 and 322.2615. . . . review denied, 984 So.2d 519 (Fla.2008), the Fifth District addressed the interplay between sections 316.1932 . . . officer must consider the legality of the stop “ ‘in order to maintain the constitutionality of [section] 316.1932 . . .

R. LEE, v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,, 4 So. 3d 754 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . -8 of the Florida Administrative Code was promulgated pursuant to the specific authority in section 316.1932 . . .

YANKEY, v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,, 6 So. 3d 633 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . This standardized agency inspection report form was created to implement section 316.1932, Florida Statutes . . . Section 316.1932(1)(a)(2) states that the Alcohol Testing Program within the Department of Law Enforcement . . . Section 316.1932(1)(b)(1) sets forth the proper criteria for measuring blood- and breath-alcohol levels . . . Construing these provisions together, under sections 316.1932(1)(a)(2) and (b)(2), a breath test result . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. ESCOBIO,, 6 So. 3d 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Rather, he argued to the circuit court and now argues to this court that the interplay of sections 316.1932 . . . noted that Pel-ham’s “consent” to a breath-alcohol test was implied under the provisions of section 316.1932 . . . The Fifth District concluded that sections 316.1932 and 322.2615 were interdependent and had to be read . . . These cases specifically address whether the driver may be penalized under section 316.1932(1)(a)(1)( . . . Section 316.1932 is not implicated under these circumstances. . . . Because section 316.1932 is not directly implicated in this case, we do not find ourselves in direct . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. NADER, v., 4 So. 3d 705 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See §§ 316.1932(l)(a)(l)(a), 322.2615(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). Both Ms. Nader and Ms. . . . Section 316.1932(l)(a)(l)(a), which is commonly referred to as the “Implied Consent Law,” provides: Any . . . Sections 316.1932(l)(a)(l)(a) and 322.2615 plainly require the suspension of a driver’s license when . . . THE BREATH-ALCOHOL TEST IS THE ONLY REQUIRED TEST, VIOLATE THE IMPLIED CONSENT PROVISIONS OF SECTION 316.1932 . . . See § 316.1932, Fla. Stat. (2007). . . . .

KIRPALANI, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,, 997 So. 2d 502 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . . § 316.1932(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .

HERNANDEZ, v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,, 995 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Section 316.1932(l)(a)l.a, Florida Statutes (2007), provides in pertinent part that Any person who accepts . . . revision to section 322.2615 and concluded, when reading the revised statute in pari materia with section 316.1932 . . . in an administrative review of a license suspension that a lawful arrest for a violation of section 316.1932 . . . However, given the provision in section 316.1932 that a breath or blood test must be incident to a lawful . . . Section 316.1932 unambiguously provides that a driver has impliedly consented to submit to a breath or . . .

F. McLAUGHLIN, v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,, 2 So. 3d 988 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . McLaughlin argued that section 322.2615 conflicted with section 316.1932, because the latter did not . . . intent was to make the lawfulness of the arrest a relevant factor in criminal proceedings under section 316.1932 . . . The Pelham court reached this conclusion by construing section 322.2615 in pañ materia with section 316.1932 . . . Thus section 322.2615 cannot be read in pari materia with section 316.1932 to create an ambiguity that . . .

KIRPALANI, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,, 991 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . . § 316.1932(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . . The implied consent requirements of section 316.1932(l)(a) are not limitations on the admissibility of . . . Under section 316.1932, an officer’s roadside description of the effects of refusing to submit to a breath . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. SARMIENTO,, 989 So. 2d 692 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . After quoting section 316.1932(l)(a), Florida Statutes, the circuit court wrote: It is clear that the . . . Therefore, the statutory implied consent contained in Florida Statute § 316.1932(l)(a) does not apply . . . In considering section 316.1932(l)(a) and Jones v. . . . court held that because the vehicle was inoperable, the statutory implied consent contained in section 316.1932 . . .

PALAZZOTTO, v. STATE, 988 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Notwithstanding s. 316.1932, the testing required by this paragraph need not be incidental to a lawful . . .

STATE v. THOMPSON,, 987 So. 2d 163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See § 316.1932, Fla. Stat. (2007) (Florida's "Implied Consent Laws”). . See State v. . . .

STATE v. BASTOS, 985 So. 2d 37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See § 316.1932, Fla. Stat. (2005). 2. . . . See §§ 316.1932(1) & 316.1934(2), Fla. Stat. (2005); see also State v. . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. FALCONE,, 983 So. 2d 755 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . results of any test of a person’s blood or breath to determine its alcohol content, as authorized by s. 316.1932 . . .

M. JUMP, v. STATE, 983 So. 2d 726 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See § 316.1932(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. C. PELHAM,, 979 So. 2d 304 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . obligation to submit to testing for alcohol and chemical substance impairment emanates from section 316.1932 . . . determine the “alcoholic content of his or her blood or breath if the person is lawfully arrested _” § 316.1932 . . . Petitioner responds that sections 316.1932 and 322.2615 should be read in isolation because they are . . . Section 316.1932, Petitioner contends, is a criminal statute, while section 322.2615 is a statute that . . . Section 316.1932 is what creates and defines the scope of the obligation, and its mandate is certain: . . .

STATE v. BUSCIGLIO,, 976 So. 2d 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Section 316.1932(l)(a)(l)(a) provides: “Any person who accepts the privilege extended by the laws of . . . See § 316.1932. . . . Morale, the Vermont Legislature had enacted an implied consent law very similar to Florida’s section 316.1932 . . . To be guilty of violating section 316.1932, the defendant must have been "informed that, if he or she . . .

STATE v. BUTTOLPH,, 969 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . results of any test of a person’s blood or breath to determine its alcoholic content, as authorized by s. 316.1932 . . .

STATE v. R. CLEMENTS,, 968 So. 2d 59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . informed of Florida’s Implied Consent Law and the consequences of refusing blood and breath tests, see § 316.1932 . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. CLARK,, 974 So. 2d 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Section 316.1932(l)(a)l.a., Florida Statutes (2006) provides that a person who accepts the privilege . . . Other statutory provisions such as section 316.1932(l)(c) (medical condition precludes breath test) or . . .

DYER, v. LEE, J. F. III, E., 488 F.3d 876 (11th Cir. 2007)

. . . . § 316.1932. . According to the parties, this is known as "slipping.” . . .

STATE v. DUBIEL,, 958 So. 2d 486 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . failure to advise of the consequences of refusal to permit a blood test administered under section 316.1932 . . . Iaco involved the construction of section 316.1932(l)(a), which sets forth the procedure for requesting . . . Section 316.1932(l)(c) applies to blood tests. . . . The language of the statute is nearly identical to that of section 316.1932(l)(a). . . . to provide for the use of breath and urine tests, except under circumstances described in sections 316.1932 . . .

BRUCH, v. STATE, 954 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Stat. (2006) (results of any test administered in compliance with §§ 316.1932 and 316.1933 give rise . . .

STATE v. CUBIC,, 946 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . The primary issue at the hearing was whether the State could satisfy its burden under section 316.1932 . . . Section 316.1932(l)(b)2. states: An analysis of a person’s breath, in order to be considered valid under . . . actual testing procedures in any individual case do not render the test or test results invalid. § 316.1932 . . . the In-toxilyzer 5000 was an insubstantial violation of approved testing methods pursuant to section 316.1932 . . .

L. MOE, v. STATE, 944 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . suffer the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the disclosure obligation imposed upon it by section 316.1932 . . . Section 316.1932(1X04., Florida Statutes (2004), which applies to alcohol testing, requires that the . . .

DELGADO, v. STATE, 948 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 2006)

. . . See § 316.1932, Fla. . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. JONES,, 935 So. 2d 532 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . See § 316.1932(l)(a), Fla. . . .

BELVIN, v. STATE, 922 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . results of any test of a person’s blood or breath to determine its alcohol content, as authorized by s. 316.1932 . . .

SCHWARTZ, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,, 920 So. 2d 664 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . See § 316.1932(l)(a), Fla. . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. PIPKIN,, 927 So. 2d 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . At the station, Pipkin was informed of Florida’s implied consent law, § 316.1932, Fla. . . . See also § 316.1932(l)(a), Fla. . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. R. GRIFFIN,, 909 So. 2d 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . Griffin's license suspension invalid for failure to read the entire implied consent warning in section 316.1932 . . .

STATE v. IACO, 906 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . on the basis that the informed consent advisement was incomplete and not in compliance with section 316.1932 . . . It found section 316.1932(l)(a), Florida Statutes, “expressly states that a subject arrested for DUI . . . partial legal advisement represents a material modification of the plain language and intent of’ section 316.1932 . . . criminal and administrative consequences of a refusal is deemed to be in substantial compliance with F.S. 316.1932 . . .

SMALLRIDGE, v. STATE, 904 So. 2d 601 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . uninterrupted telephone access with him, he would have advised his son of his right, provided by section 316.1932 . . . Such interpretation is clearly at vari-anee with the terms of section 316.1932(1)(f)3, authorizing the . . . . § 316.1932(l)(a)l, Fla. . . .

GURRY, v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY,, 902 So. 2d 881 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . results of any test of a person’s blood or breath to determine its alcohol content, as authorized by s. 316.1932 . . .

GRZELKA, v. STATE, 881 So. 2d 633 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . suspended for a prior refusal, her refusal would constitute a misdemeanor, as is required by section 316.1932 . . . Although section 316.1932(l)(a)l.a. provides that the refusal to submit to a breath test “upon the request . . .

STATE v. SERRAGO,, 875 So. 2d 815 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Applying what it believed to be the correct statute, section 316.1932(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2000), . . . Although the trial court was convinced, as was the State, that section 316.1932(1)(c) was the correct . . . Our reading of section 316.1932(1)(c) leads us to conclude that it cannot reasonably be read to allow . . . The only reason that section 316.1932(1)(c) mentions breath or urine tests is to limit blood draws to . . . section 316.1932(1)(a), from blood tests, which are authorized by section 316.1932(1)(c). . . .

STATE v. KORTH,, 875 So. 2d 790 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . COLLECTION, PRESERVATION, AND ANALYSIS OF URINE SAMPLES OBTAINED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 316.1932 . . . April 15, 2004), which holds that section 316.1932(l)(a)(l) of the Florida Statutes does not require . . . consolidated appeals which excluded the results of urine tests procured under the aegis of section 316.1932 . . . different County Court judges: DOES AN ARRESTEE CONSENT, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE IMPLIED CONSENT LAW, § 316.1932 . . . results of a defendant's urine sample obtained by law enforcement pursuant to Florida Statute, section 316.1932 . . .

STATE v. BODDEN,, 877 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 2004)

. . . Because we conclude that section 316.1932(l)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (2002), does not require that urine . . . Bodden argued that section 316.1932, part of the implied consent law pertaining to the operation of motor . . . We begin with the actual language used by the Legislature in section 316.1932(l)(a)(l). . . . of blood and breath testing, Specifically, sections 316.1932(l)(a)(2)(n) and 316.1932(l)(b)(2) grant . . . See § 316.1932(l)(a)(l). . . .

STATE v. MONTELLO P., 867 So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . The statute at issue in this case, Bodden, and Pierre, is section 316.1932(l)(a)l., Florida Statutes . . . Section 316.1932(l)(a)l. distinguishes between urine and breath tests. . . . (1)(a)(1) in conjunction with sections 316.1932(1)(b)(2) and 316.1932(1)(f)(1)” to “conclude that an . . . See § 316.1932(l)(a)2., Fla. . . . (emphasis added); § 316.1932(l)(b)2., Fla. . . .

BERMUDEZ, v. STATE, 870 So. 2d 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . were violated when the police drew blood from him without first arresting him, as required by section 316.1932 . . . in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages.... § 316.1932 . . .

STATE v. MULDOWNY E., 871 So. 2d 911 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Only approved breath testing machines may be used to establish impairment pursuant to section 316.1932 . . . Section 316.1932(l)(f)(4), Florida Statutes (2002), requires that when a person tested with a machine . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, DIVISION OF DRIVER LICENSES, v. POSSATI,, 866 So. 2d 737 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . This case is controlled by section 316.1932, Florida Statutes (2001), which provides that anyone who . . . the driving privilege of ... a person who has refused to submit to a breath ... test authorized by s. 316.1932 . . . breath ... will result in the suspension of the person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle.... § 316.1932 . . .

SCHOFIELD, v. STATE, 867 So. 2d 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . results of any test of a person’s blood or breath to determine its alcohol content, as authorized by s. 316.1932 . . .

JENKINS, v. STATE v., 855 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . See § 316.1932(l)(f)l., Florida Statutes (1999) (requiring FDLE to establish rules for the “reliability . . . breath test instruments ... must be expressly prescribed by rule or regulation required by section 316.1932 . . . The statutory language of section 316.1932(l)(f)l., Florida Statutes (1991), very clearly requires that . . . We note that section 316.1932 was amended by chapter 2000-226, Laws of Florida, to explicitly require . . . State, 604 So.2d 783 (Fla.1992), that when there is no assurance of compliance with sections 316.1932 . . .

STATE v. PIERRE, Jr., 854 So. 2d 231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . certified to us a question of statutory interpretation involving the “Implied Consent Law,” section 316.1932 . . . urine test results of a urine sample obtained by law enforcement pursuant to Florida statute section 316.1932 . . . We restate the question as follows: Does section 316.1932, Florida Statutes (2002), require that urine . . . Our decision today turns on whether an ambiguity exists in the following portion of section 316.1932( . . . The second possible ambiguity is illustrated by Appellee’s purported quote to section 316.1932(l)(a) . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. WHITLEY,, 846 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . Incidental To A Lawful Arrest The circuit court held, pursuant to section 316.1932(l)(a)l., that the . . . Thus, based on Barrett, “incidental to a lawful arrest” as that term is used in section 316.1932(l)(a . . . Hence, the dictates of section 316.1932(l)(a)l. were met. . . . We note that section 316.1932(l)(a)l. requires that the individual be lawfully arrested. . . . However, because we have concluded that the requirements of section 316.1932(l)(a)l. were established . . .

MENNA, v. STATE, 846 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 2003)

. . . Although not expressly mentioned in our Taylor opinion, a provision of the implied consent law, section 316.1932 . . .

STATE v. SCHREIBER,, 835 So. 2d 344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . take a sample of her blood; however, he did not read her her rights under the Implied Consent Law, §§ 316.1932 . . . See § 316.1932(l)(a)(2)(e), Fla. . . . possession of his or her normal faculties, the results of any test administered in accordance with s. 316.1932 . . .

STATE v. T. BODDEN,, 872 So. 2d 916 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . See § 316.1932(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . . Pursuant to section 316.1932(l)(a), Mr. . . . The State notes that there is no such language in section 316.1932 regarding the validity of a urine . . . Thus, in this instance, in reading section 316.1932(l)(a)(l) in conjunction with sections 316.1932(l) . . . (b)(2) and 316.1932(l)(f)(l), we conclude that an “approved” urine test is one in which the method of . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. BELLO,, 813 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . level, or of a person who has refused to submit to a breath, urine, or blood test authorized by s. 316.1932 . . .

STATE v. LANGSFORD,, 816 So. 2d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . Indeed, it is the established law of this state that Florida’s implied consent statutes [§§ 316.1932, . . . This it has done through the enactment of section 322.261, Florida Statutes (1975) [now sections 316.1932 . . . "F.S. 316.1932, F.S. 316.1933, F.S. 316.1934, (2000).” . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. R. ALLISTON,, 813 So. 2d 141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . provides that an affidavit containing the results of any breath alcohol test authorized by section 316.1932 . . . See § 316.1932(l)(b)(2). . . . However, section 316.1932(l)(b)(2) also provides, “Any insubstantial differences between approved techniques . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. SILVA,, 806 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . The results of breath, urine, and blood tests administered as provided in s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 . . .

V. BASS, v. STATE, 801 So. 2d 975 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See §§ 316.1932-316.1934. . . .

S. DODGE, v. STATE, 805 So. 2d 990 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See §§ 316.1932, 316.1933, Fla. Stat. (2000)(the Implied Consent Statute). . . .

SERVIS, v. STATE, 802 So. 2d 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . . §§ 316.1932-316.1934 (1999). . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. K. DEHART,, 799 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . results of any test of a person’s blood or breath to determine its alcohol content, as authorized by s. 316.1932 . . .

TYNER, v. STATE, 805 So. 2d 862 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . results were not obtained in accordance with the core policies of the implied consent law, sections 316.1932 . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. RUSSELL,, 793 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See § 316.1932(l)(b)(2), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . . results of any test of a person’s blood or breath to determine its alcohol content, as authorized by s. 316.1932 . . .

HEMBREE, v. STATE, 790 So. 2d 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See §§ 316.1932-316.1934, Fla. Stat. . . .

G. RAFFERTY, v. STATE, 799 So. 2d 243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . The implied consent law is embodied in sections 316.1932 to 316.1934, Florida Statutes (1997), and provides . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. L. MOWRY,, 794 So. 2d 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . results of any test of a person’s blood or breath to determine its alcohol content, as authorized by s. 316.1932 . . .

STATE v. MILES,, 775 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 2000)

. . . See §§ 316.1932, 316.1933, 316.1934, Fla. Stat. (1995). . . . Id.; cf. § 316.1932(l)(b)(2), Fla. Stat. (1995) (applicable for breath analysis). . . . possession of his or her normal faculties, the results of any test administered in accordance with s. 316.1932 . . .

STATE v. KLIPHOUSE,, 771 So. 2d 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . questions of great public importance, which we rephrase as follows: WHETHER FLORIDA STATUTE SECTION 316.1932 . . . The trial judge correctly determined that- section 316.1932(l)(c) applies to^.the facts in this case. . . . Similar to section ' 316.1932(l)(c), this section requires the officer to have probable cause to believe . . . Unlike section 316.1933(1), the section applicable to the blood draw herein, section 316.1932(l)(c), . . . Although section 316.1932(l)(c) contains no express language corresponding to the statutory elements . . . See §§ 316.1932 and 316.1933, Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . Section 316.1932(l)'(c) is the statute used in this case, and it requires three elements for a valid . . . Lacking such challenges, section 316.1932(l)(c) surely cannot be said to be arbitrary. . . . See § 316.1932(l)(c), Fla. . . . No one suggests that section 316.1932(1 )(c) is ambiguous. . . . . When the statute was adopted, section 316.1932(1)(c), at issue in this case, did not contain the requirement . . . of reasonable cause although there was a reasonable cause requirement in section 316.1932(1)(a). . . . held that there was a reasonable cause requirement in subsection 1(c) “implied from reading section 316.1932 . . . (l)(c) together with section 316.1932(l)(a).” . . .

STATE v. KLINE,, 764 So. 2d 716 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . See § 316.1932, Fla. Stat. . . . 842, 849 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (refusal to submit to the breath test is “clearly admissible” under § 316.1932 . . .