F.S. 316.1935 Florida Statutes and Case Law

The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)

Title XXIII
MOTOR VEHICLES

Chapter 316
STATE UNIFORM TRAFFIC CONTROL

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316.1935 Fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer; aggravated fleeing or eluding.—

(1) It is unlawful for the operator of any vehicle, having knowledge that he or she has been ordered to stop such vehicle by a duly authorized law enforcement officer, willfully to refuse or fail to stop the vehicle in compliance with such order or, having stopped in knowing compliance with such order, willfully to flee in an attempt to elude the officer, and a person who violates this subsection commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(2) Any person who willfully flees or attempts to elude a law enforcement officer in an authorized law enforcement patrol vehicle, with agency insignia and other jurisdictional markings prominently displayed on the vehicle, with siren and lights activated commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(3) Any person who willfully flees or attempts to elude a law enforcement officer in an authorized law enforcement patrol vehicle, with agency insignia and other jurisdictional markings prominently displayed on the vehicle, with siren and lights activated, and during the course of the fleeing or attempted eluding:

(a) Drives at high speed, or in any manner which demonstrates a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(b) Drives at high speed, or in any manner which demonstrates a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, and causes serious bodily injury or death to another person, including any law enforcement officer involved in pursuing or otherwise attempting to effect a stop of the person’s vehicle, commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall sentence any person convicted of committing the offense described in this paragraph to a mandatory minimum sentence of 3 years imprisonment. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law.

(4) Any person who, in the course of unlawfully leaving or attempting to leave the scene of a crash in violation of s. 316.027 or s. 316.061, having knowledge of an order to stop by a duly authorized law enforcement officer, willfully refuses or fails to stop in compliance with such an order, or having stopped in knowing compliance with such order, willfully flees in an attempt to elude such officer and, as a result of such fleeing or eluding:

(a) Causes injury to another person or causes damage to any property belonging to another person, commits aggravated fleeing or eluding, a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(b) Causes serious bodily injury or death to another person, including any law enforcement officer involved in pursuing or otherwise attempting to effect a stop of the person’s vehicle, commits aggravated fleeing or eluding with serious bodily injury or death, a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

The felony of aggravated fleeing or eluding and the felony of aggravated fleeing or eluding with serious bodily injury or death constitute separate offenses for which a person may be charged, in addition to the offenses under ss. 316.027 and 316.061, relating to unlawfully leaving the scene of a crash, which the person had been in the course of committing or attempting to commit when the order to stop was given. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall sentence any person convicted of committing aggravated fleeing or eluding with serious bodily injury or death to a mandatory minimum sentence of 3 years imprisonment. Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law.

(5) The court shall revoke, for a period not less than 1 year nor exceeding 5 years, the driver license of any operator of a motor vehicle convicted of a violation of subsection (1), subsection (2), subsection (3), or subsection (4).

(6) Notwithstanding s. 948.01, no court may suspend, defer, or withhold adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence for any violation of this section. A person convicted and sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of incarceration under paragraph (3)(b) or paragraph (4)(b) is not eligible for statutory gain-time under s. 944.275 or any form of discretionary early release, other than pardon or executive clemency or conditional medical release under s. 947.149, prior to serving the mandatory minimum sentence.

(7) Any motor vehicle involved in a violation of this section is deemed to be contraband, which may be seized by a law enforcement agency and is subject to forfeiture pursuant to ss. 932.701-932.704. Any vehicle not required to be titled under the laws of this state is presumed to be the property of the person in possession of the vehicle.

History.—s. 1, ch. 71-135; s. 1, ch. 76-31; s. 4, ch. 85-309; s. 52, ch. 89-282; s. 1, ch. 94-276; s. 896, ch. 95-148; s. 1, ch. 98-274; s. 140, ch. 99-248; s. 1, ch. 2004-388.

Note.—Former s. 316.019.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: March 07, 2023

F.S. 316.1935 on Google Scholar

F.S. 316.1935 on Casetext

Amendments to 316.1935

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 316.1935

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

316.1935 1 - FLEE/ELUDE POLICE - FAIL TO OBEY LEO ORDER TO STOP - F: T

316.1935 2 - RESIST OFFICER - FLEE ELUDE LEO WITH LIGHTS SIREN ACTIVE - F: T

316.1935 3 - FLEE/ELUDE POLICE - FLEE ELUDE LEO AT HIGH SPEED - F: S

316.1935 3a - FLEE/ELUDE POLICE - FLEE W DISREGARD OF SAFETY TO PERSONS OR PROP - F: S

316.1935 3b - FLEE/ELUDE POLICE - FLEE DISREGARD SAFETY CAUSE INJURY OR DEATH - F: F

316.1935 4a - FLEE/ELUDE POLICE - AGGRAVATED FLEEING W INJURY OR DAMAGE - F: S

316.1935 4b - FLEE/ELUDE POLICE - AGGRAV FLEEING W SERIOUS INJURY OR DEATH - F: F

Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S316.1935

R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

S316.1935 FLEEING/ATTEMPTING TO ELUDE A POLICE OFFICER [See 316.1935(5)] - Points on Drivers License: 0 R

S316.1935 (1) Fail obey police officer/flee - Points on Drivers License: 0 R

S316.1935 (2) Flee/elude officer in patrol vehicle (Revoked by court) - Points on Drivers License: 0 R

S316.1935 (3)(a) Flee/elude officer/disregard safety of others (Revoked by Court) - Points on Drivers License: 0 R

S316.1935 (3)(b) Flee/elude officer resulting in serious injury or death (Revoked indefinite/minimum incarceration of 3 years) - Points on Drivers License: 0 R

S316.1935 (4)(a) Fleeing/elude officer after crash involving property damage or injury - Points on Drivers License: 0 R

S316.1935 (4)(b) Fleeing/elude officer after crash involving serious bodily injury or death (Suspend indefinite/minimum incarceration of 3 years) - Points on Drivers License: 0 R

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

U.S. v. Harrison
558 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2009) Cited 78 times
As to subsections 1 and 3, the 2004 modifications made a violation of § 316.1935(1) a third-degree felony, not a misdemeanor, and a violation of § 316.1935(3) either a second-degree felony or a first-degree felony, depending on whether the offender "causes serious bodily injury or death to another person." See Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(1)-(3) (2004). A violation of § 316.1935(2) remains a third-degree felony. Id.
PAGE 1291
United States v. Petite
703 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2013) Cited 61 times
To be sure, we do not dispute that the ordinary commission of aggravated vehicle flight under Fla. Stat. § 316.1935( 3) presents a greater level of risk than does the ordinary commission of simple vehicle flight under Fla. Stat. § 316.1935( 2). But the question before us is not one of drawing the relative risks among different categories of vehicle flight; rather, it is whether the lesser offense of simple vehicle flight, in the ordinary case, nonetheless poses a substantial risk of physical injury to others comparable to the ACCA's enumerated crimes. See Sykes, 131 S.Ct. at 2273;James, 550 U.S. at 203–04, 127 S.Ct. 1586;see also Hudson, 673 F.3d at 268 (“While it may be true that the conduct underlying violations of §§ 316.1935( 3)(a) and 316.1935( 3)(b) presents greater risks of violence and injury than does conduct underlying a violation of the base offense in § 316.1935( 2), it does not follow that a violation of § 316.1935( 2) does not also present a substantial risk of injury to another.”). And the Supreme Court made it clear in Sykes that intentional vehicle flight from a law enforcement officer is an inherently risky…

PAGE 1301
U.S. v. Harris
586 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2009) Cited 53 times
Fla. Stat. § 316.1935. Harris pled nolo contendere to the Section 316.1935(3)(a) charge on May 27, 2007, and was convicted. On March 20, 2008, Anthony Harris was charged with and pled guilty, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI") recommended a base offense level of 20, counting Harris's earlier conviction under Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(3)(a) as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).
PAGE 1284
United States v. Adams
815 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2016) Cited 6 times
After Johnson, Adams's convictions for fleeing or attempting to elude, under Fla. Stat. § 316.1935, can serve as predicate offenses only if they qualify as violent felonies under a different ACCA provision. But Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(1) and (2) do not have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” are not “burglary, arson, or extortion,” and do not involve the “use of explosives.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). And the government concedes that after Johnson, Adams's convictions for fleeing or attempting to elude, under Fla. Stat. § 316.1935, are no longer ACCA-qualifying offenses and cannot form the basis for a sentencing enhancement under the ACCA. We agree.
PAGE 1293
United States v. Nix
628 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2010) Cited 30 times
We reject Nix's challenge to the § 843.01 conviction, holding that a such conviction constitutes a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). This is the same holding we recently reached in United States v. Hayes, 2010 WL 3489973 (September 8, 2010). Although the Hayes decision was not published, we are persuaded by its rationale regarding § 843.01 and therefore adopt its holding. Nix's challenge to the § 316.1935(3) conviction is foreclosed by United States v. Harris, 586 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2009), which we are bound to follow.
PAGE 1342
Whitehall v. State
81 So. 3d 599 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) Cited 6 times
Motion to dismiss
By its verdict of guilt for the greater offense, the jury found all elements of the necessarily-included lesser offense of fleeing to elude under section 316.1935(1). See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 28.8 (designating an offense under section 316.1935(1) as a necessarily lesser-included offense of one under section 316.1935(3)). Therefore, on remand, the trial court shall enter judgment for the originally charged offense of fleeing to elude and sentence Mr. Whitehall accordingly, with credit for all time served.
PAGE 604
State v. Maisonet-Maldonado
308 So. 3d 63 (Fla. 2020) Cited 15 times
Maisonet-Maldonado contests his dual convictions for fleeing or eluding a law enforcement officer causing serious injury or death under section 316.1935(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2010), and vehicular manslaughter under section 782.071(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2010). Section 316.1935(3)(b) makes it a first-degree felony to flee a law enforcement officer and drive in a wanton manner and cause serious bodily injury or death to another person:
PAGE 70
U.S. v. Orisnord
483 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2007) Cited 80 times
Accordingly, we hold that felony fleeing and eluding, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(3), is a "crime of violence" for purposes of the career-offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. As such, we conclude that the district court did not err in holding that Polynice qualified as a career offender under the Guidelines.
PAGE 1183
Derosa v. Rambosk
732 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (M.D. Fla. 2010) Cited 12 times
Motion for summary judgment
6 more...
James DeRosa was arrested for fleeing and eluding in violation of Florida Statute § 316.1935(1), resisting a law enforcement officer without violence in violation of Florida Statute § 843.02, and refusal to accept and sign a citation in violation of Florida Statute 318.14. (Doc. #57, p. 9.) As discussed above, the Court finds that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, Deputy George had probable cause to arrest James for a violation of Florida Statute § 316.1935.
PAGE 18
Santiago v. State
847 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) Cited 7 times
Santiago argues that fundamental error requires a reversal of his conviction for aggravated fleeing or eluding, a violation of section 316.1935(4), Florida Statutes (1999), because the State failed to prove, and could not prove, that he was leaving the scene of an accident. Santiago's argument is well taken. In count seven, the superseding indictment cited section 316.1935(4) and charged that Santiago