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F.S. 322.26 on Google Scholar

F.S. 322.26 on Casetext

Amendments to 322.26


The 2022 Florida Statutes

Title XXIII
MOTOR VEHICLES
Chapter 322
DRIVER LICENSES
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 322.26 Florida Statutes and Case Law
322.26 Mandatory revocation of license by department.The department shall forthwith revoke the license or driving privilege of any person upon receiving a record of such person’s conviction of any of the following offenses:
(1)(a) Murder resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle, DUI manslaughter where the conviction represents a subsequent DUI-related conviction, or a fourth violation of s. 316.193 or former s. 316.1931. For such cases, the revocation of the driver license or driving privilege shall be permanent.
(b) Manslaughter resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle.
(2) Driving a motor vehicle or being in actual physical control thereof, or entering a plea of nolo contendere, said plea being accepted by the court and said court entering a fine or sentence to a charge of driving, while under the influence of alcoholic beverages or a substance controlled under chapter 893, or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages or a substance controlled under chapter 893. In any case where DUI manslaughter occurs and the person has no prior convictions for DUI-related offenses, the revocation of the license or driving privilege shall be permanent, except as provided for in s. 322.271(4).
(3) Any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used.
(4) Failure to stop and render aid as required under the laws of this state in the event of a motor vehicle crash resulting in the death or personal injury of another.
(5) Perjury or the making of a false affidavit or statement under oath to the department under this law, or under any other law relating to the ownership or operation of motor vehicles.
(6) Conviction, or forfeiture of bail not vacated, upon three charges of reckless driving committed within a period of 12 months.
(7) Any violation of the law against lewdness, assignation, and prostitution where such violation has been effected through the use of a motor vehicle.
(8) Conviction in any court having jurisdiction over offenses committed under this chapter or any other law of this state regulating the operation of a motor vehicle on the highways, upon direction of the court, when the court feels that the seriousness of the offense and the circumstances surrounding the conviction warrant the revocation of the licensee’s driving privilege.
(9) Conviction in any court having jurisdiction over offenses committed under s. 817.234(8) or (9) or s. 817.505.
History.s. 38, ch. 19551, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 4151(652); s. 38, ch. 20451, 1941; s. 1, ch. 21764, 1943; s. 4, ch. 61-457; s. 2, ch. 65-124; s. 20, ch. 73-331; s. 1, ch. 77-119; s. 2, ch. 78-204; s. 46, ch. 89-282; s. 6, ch. 96-330; s. 8, ch. 98-223; s. 290, ch. 99-248; s. 3, ch. 2006-305.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: August 29, 2022
F.S. 322.26 on Google Scholar

F.S. 322.26 on Casetext

Amendments to 322.26


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 322.26
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 322.26.


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S322.26
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 322.26.


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Larcher v. Dep., Hwy. Saf. Mtr. V

    736 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 3 times
    In contrast, in Stockman, the petitioner's license therein was not suspended automatically as the result of a DUI conviction pursuant to section 322.26 (2), but rather as the result of Department administrative proceedings, for which a conviction is not necessary. Also, it was the Department administrative order itself that was being reviewed in the circuit court, so plainly the circuit court, as the direct reviewing court, had the jurisdiction, discretion and inherent power to stay the effect of an order that it was reviewing.
    PAGE 1251
  2. Webb v. State

    816 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 1 times
    Thus, a DUI manslaughter conviction sufficient to permanently revoke a license under section 322.26(1)(a) may also count as a conviction to habitualize the offender under section 322.264(1)(a). Because it requires three criminal convictions or fifteen convictions for moving traffic offenses, the habitual traffic offender statute primarily punishes recidivist bad driving. A permanent revocation of a driver's license occurs in cases involving a death or seriously dangerous conduct, such as a fourth DUI. See § 322.26(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000). Where the legislature has authorized multiple revocations of a driver's license using the same convictions under separate statutes, it follows that the legislature intended to authorize separate punishments when a defendant's conduct has triggered those revocations.
    PAGE 1193
  3. Mandile v. State

    547 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 18 times
    322.26 Mandatory revocation of license by department. — The department shall forthwith revoke the license or driving privilege of any operator or chauffeur upon receiving a record of such operator's or chauffeur's conviction of any of the following offenses:
    PAGE 1063
  4. Schottel v. State

    590 So. 2d 486 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
    There is no indication in this record that a motor vehicle was used in the commission of the grand theft and dealing in stolen property convictions. Cf. Spera v. State, 556 So.2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (referral of matter to department proper where motor vehicle was involved in the commission of grand theft). Although there were four separate convictions for burglary of a conveyance, mandatory revocation of the driver's license pursuant to section 322.26(3) is not applicable. See, e.g., Douglas v. State, 559 So.2d 732 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (burglary of automobile conviction does not support application of section 322.26(3)).
    PAGE 488
  5. Silha v. Dep't of Highway Safety

    109 So. 3d 820 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)
    Section 322.26(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), which the trial court also cited in its order, provides that “[t]he department shall forthwith revoke the license or driving privilege of any person upon receiving a record of such person's conviction of any of the following offenses: ... a fourth violation of s. 316.193 [DUI]....” A revocation under section 322.26(1)(a) is permanent. Section 322.24, Florida Statutes (1999), authorizes the Department “to suspend or revoke the license of any resident of the state, upon receiving notice of the conviction of such person in another state or foreign country of an offense therein which, if committed in this state, would be grounds for the suspension or revocation of his or her license.” Pursuant to these two statutes, the Department would have been entitled, had Appellant had a Florida license, to revoke that license based upon his fourth DUI which occurred in Georgia. It, therefore, follows that the Department was authorized under section 322.23(1) to revoke Appellant's privilege to drive in Florida as a result of his fourth DUI conviction.
    PAGE 822
  6. State v. Miller

    830 So. 2d 214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 5 times
    Ralph Earl Miller was charged with violating section 322.341, Florida Statutes (2000), which makes it unlawful to drive after one's license has been permanently revoked pursuant to sections 322.26 or 322.28. After his arraignment and receipt of discovery from the State, Miller moved to dismiss on the ground that the State's intention to introduce a certified copy of his driving record in proof of his offense was insufficient underSylvester v. State, 770 So.2d 249 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). The circuit court granted the motion. We reverse.
  7. Silha v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles

    CASE NO. 1D12-4323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2013)
    Section 322.26(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), which the trial court also cited in its order, provides that "[t]he department shall forthwith revoke the license or driving privilege of any person upon receiving a record of such person's conviction of any of the following offenses: . . . a fourth violation of s. 316.193 [DUI]. . . ." A revocation under section 322.26(1)(a) is permanent. Section 322.24, Florida Statutes (1999), authorizes the Department "to suspend or revoke the license of any resident of the state, upon receiving notice of the conviction of such person in another state or foreign country of an offense therein which, if committed in this state, would be grounds for the suspension or revocation of his or her license." Pursuant to these two statutes, the Department would have been entitled, had Appellant had a Florida license, to revoke that license based upon his fourth DUI which occurred in Georgia. It, therefore, follows that the Department was authorized under section 322.23(1) to revoke Appellant's privilege to drive in Florida as a result of his fourth DUI conviction.
    PAGE 5
  8. Crain v. State

    79 So. 3d 118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 7 times
    (b) While his or her driver's license or driving privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked pursuant to s. 316.655, s. 322.26(8), s. 322.27(2), or s. 322.28(2) or (4), and who by careless or negligence operation of the motor vehicle causes the death of or serious bodily injury to another human being is guilty of a felony of the third degree.... (Emphasis supplied.) In subsection (6), the Legislature drew a distinction between the act of driving without a valid driver's license and the act of driving after cancelation, suspension or revocation of a driver's “license or ... privilege.” Under subsection (5), however, because the state did not prove that Mr. Crain ever had a driver's license, it could not prove that he drove while his driver's license was revoked.
    PAGE 122
  9. In re Christina W.

    No. B223936 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2011)
    At the hearing, Father’s counsel asserted that “Father feels that his mental health issues are stabilized” and continues to see health care professionals on a regular basis. Father also had “a plan... not to leave the mother alone with the children.” DCFS opposed the petition, arguing that no change of circumstances had been established because, among other things, Father still lived with Mother. The court took the matter under submission and proceeded to the Section 322.26 hearing.