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F.S. 335.10 on Google Scholar

F.S. 335.10 on Casetext

Amendments to 335.10


The 2022 Florida Statutes

Title XXVI
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
Chapter 335
STATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 335.10 Florida Statutes and Case Law
335.10 State Highway System; vehicle regulation; prohibited use and traffic; liability for damage.
(1) The department shall prescribe regulations for vehicles operating on the State Highway System. At least 14 days prior to implementation of such regulations, notice of such regulations shall be provided in writing by certified mail, return receipt requested, to each local governmental entity where such regulations will be applicable.
(2) The department shall prohibit any use of, and any traffic on, the State Highway System that might damage or destroy the same.
(3) Any person is civilly liable to the department for the actual damage to a road under the department’s jurisdiction by reason of his or her wrongful act; such damage may be recovered by suit and, when collected, shall be paid into the State Treasury to the credit of the State Transportation Trust Fund or other appropriate department trust fund if the damage occurred to the turnpike system.
History.s. 34, ch. 29965, 1955; s. 2, ch. 61-119; ss. 23, 35, ch. 69-106; ss. 2, 3, ch. 73-57; s. 45, ch. 84-309; s. 46, ch. 93-164; s. 491, ch. 95-148.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: August 29, 2022
F.S. 335.10 on Google Scholar

F.S. 335.10 on Casetext

Amendments to 335.10


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 335.10
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 335.10.


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S335.10
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 335.10.


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. State v. Lopez

    2010 Ohio 2462 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010)
    {¶ 32} Finally, the state contends that Officer Denney had sufficient probable cause because Lopez was cited for RRCO 335.10, and not R.C. 4503.21. The state claims that RRCO 335.10 is "more stringent than the language in R.C. 4503.21."
    PAGE 13
  2. City of Bedford Heights v. Jones

    2011 Ohio 6075 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011)
    Jones does not challenge his conviction for violating B.H.C.O. 335.10.
    PAGE 3
  3. Ackman v. Board of Adjustment

    596 N.W.2d 96 (Iowa 1999)   Cited 21 times
    As already noted, the record provides substantial evidence that the operation of a quarry may be harmonized with an agricultural district and does not conflict with the county's plan and policy statements. By statute the board of supervisors is empowered to adopt zoning ordinances and to later make changes and amendments, carrying out essentially legislative power and process. See Iowa Code §§ 335.3-.7; Boomhower v. Cerro Gordo County Bd. of Adjustment, 163 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Iowa 1968). Complementing this power, the board of adjustment concerns itself with administering the zoning ordinance and may be authorized by the board of supervisors to make special exceptions to the ordinance in accordance with Iowa Code sections 335.10 and .15. See Boomhower, 163 N.W.2d at 77.
    PAGE 104
  4. Perdomo-Padilla v. Ashcroft

    333 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2003)   Cited 75 times
    The naturalization application signed by Petitioner does not require the applicant presently to pledge permanent allegiance to the United States. Instead, the application asks only: " Are you willing to take the full Oath of Allegiance to the U.S.?" (Emphasis added.) The statement of allegiance signed by an applicant is prospective in nature and, therefore, an applicant does not owe permanent allegiance to the United States until the applicant takes the full oath of allegiance as part of a naturalization ceremony. The applicant may withdraw the application before that occurs. See 8 C.F.R. § 335.10 (allowing an applicant to request withdrawal of his or her naturalization application without prejudice to any future application).
    PAGE 969
  5. City of Mt. Vernon v. Young

    2006 Ohio 3319 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)
    {¶ 68} Appellant was further charged and convicted of violation Section 335.10(d) of the Codified Ordinances of the City of Mount Vernon, Ohio, which states:
  6. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc v. Dallas County

    675 N.W.2d 544 (Iowa 2004)   Cited 9 times
    On September 19, 2001, the Board of Supervisors amended the zoning ordinance to require that conditional uses be approved by the Board of Adjustment in accordance with sections 335.10 and 335.15(2). The amendment provided that applications that had been reviewed by the Planning and Zoning Commission and had received a positive recommendation from that body could be submitted directly to the Board of Adjustment for approval.
    PAGE 548
  7. Malkan v. Mutua

    No. 1:12-CV-00236 (MAT) (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2016)
    The Court has reviewed the record in this case as well as the parties' arguments on summary judgment. Upon due consideration of the first R&R, the Court finds no clear error. The Court agrees with Judge Schroeder's conclusion that plaintiff had no property interest in his position as clinical professor at the law school, because the rules governing term appointments in SUNY schools provide that a term appointment can last no longer than three years and that an individual so appointed has no "legal right, interest, or expectancy" in a renewed appointment. 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 338.2; see 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 335.10. The Court therefore adopts the first R&R in its entirety and grants defendant's motion for summary judgment.
    PAGE 4
  8. Malkan v. Mutua

    No. 1:12-CV-00236 (MAT) (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2016)
    The Court has reviewed the record in this case as well as the parties' arguments on summary judgment. Upon due consideration of the first R&R, the Court finds no clear error. The Court agrees with Judge Schroeder's conclusion that plaintiff had no property interest in his position as clinical professor at the law school, because the rules governing term appointments in SUNY schools provide that a term appointment can last no longer than three years and that an individual so appointed has no "legal right, interest, or expectancy" in a renewed appointment. 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 338.2; see 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 335.10. The Court therefore adopts the first R&R in its entirety and grants defendant's motion for summary judgment.
    PAGE 6
  9. Malkan v. Am. Bar Ass'n

    No. 19-1958 (7th Cir. Dec. 10, 2019)   Cited 1 times
    Malkan sued Mutua in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York, alleging that Mutua violated Malkan's due process rights by unilaterally declining to renew his contract. See Malkan v. Mutua, No. 1:12-CV-00236 (MAT), 2016 WL 7335574 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2016). The district judge, adopting a magistrate judge's recommendation, entered summary judgment for Mutua. Malkan, 2016 WL 7335574, at *2. As the court explained, state regulations governing appointments in SUNY schools limit a term appointment to no longer than three years, so Malkan had no "legal right, interest, or expectancy" in a renewed appointment. Id.; 8 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 338.2, 335.10. The Second Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the state regulations prevented the law school from providing presumptively renewable contracts and, therefore, Malkan was not entitled to have his contract renewed. Malkan v. Mutua, 699 Fed. Appx. 81, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2017). Those state regulations, the appeals court concluded, could not be overridden by the "[law school's] by-laws, customs, accreditation reports, the [ABA's] standards, [or] his contract." Id. at 83.
    PAGE 3