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F.S. 335.18 on Google Scholar

F.S. 335.18 on Casetext

Amendments to 335.18


The 2022 Florida Statutes

Title XXVI
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
Chapter 335
STATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 335.18 Florida Statutes and Case Law
335.18 Short title.Sections 335.18-335.188 may be cited as the “State Highway System Access Management Act.”
History.s. 1, ch. 75-157; s. 59, ch. 84-309; s. 3, ch. 88-224; s. 98, ch. 92-152.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: August 29, 2022
F.S. 335.18 on Google Scholar

F.S. 335.18 on Casetext

Amendments to 335.18


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 335.18
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 335.18.


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S335.18
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 335.18.


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Although section 335.18 requires any challenge to be "presented to the court within thirty days after filing of the [board's] decision," the majority interprets the statute "to allow a challenge to the board's action by filing a petition for certiorari anytime until thirty days after filing of the board's decision." (Emphasis added.) My first disagreement with the majority is the way it characterizes its rationale. If the majority were really interpreting section 335.18 based on the meaning of the words used in the statute, one would assume the statute would have the same meaning under various factual scenarios. The statute either allows challenges "anytime until" thirty days after the board's decision has been filed or it does not. But the majority has limited its "interpretation" to cases in which the "two peculiar circumstances" present in this case exist. Consequently, the majority is really creating an exception to the statutory requirements for cases like this one. The majority apparently believes the statute means what it says under any other set of circumstances — namely, that a challenge to the board's action must be taken "within" thirty days after the…
    PAGE 322
  2. Iowa Coal then filed its second action in the District Court. Counts I-III were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that both the 19-month delay in ruling on the Star 14 application and the ultimate denial of the certificate were arbitrary and for a malicious purpose, in violation of Iowa Coal's due-process and equal-protection rights, and constituted an unconstitutional taking without just compensation. Count IV was a claim under Iowa Code § 335.18 for certiorari review of the board's decision denying the certificate. Iowa Coal's two actions were consolidated, and the County moved for summary judgment on all claims.
    PAGE 851
  3. Sear v. Clayton County Zoning Board of Adjustment

    590 N.W.2d 512 (Iowa 1999)   Cited 23 times
    Metzger points out that the Sears were present at the hearings on his petitions for certiorari and therefore their rights were protected. He maintains that if they desired to have their claims heard they should have intervened in the action. Metzger also contends that Iowa Code section 335.18 (1995) governs certiorari actions and that rule 25 does not apply to such actions. Section 335.18 provides:
    PAGE 516
  4. Paradyne Corp. v. Miller

    455 So. 2d 432 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 1 times
    We find, however, that the circuit court violated due process of law because it did not have authority to order appellant to participate with appellees in the construction of the 250-foot connector road. The permit, as issued, did not require a 250-foot connector road. The circuit court is only authorized to enforce the DOT permit under section 120.69. The authority to regulate connectors to state roads has been delegated to DOT pursuant to section 335.18, Florida Statutes (1981). Therefore, we reverse and remand to the circuit court to enforce the DOT permit pursuant to section 120.69, so both parcels will have access to the light-controlled intersection. Upon remand, DOT may intervene as a matter of right pursuant to section 120.69(1)(d), or be joined as an indispensable party based on its duties under section 335.18. It is possible that DOT will find that the intersection, as designed, does not meet the standards in section 335.18, Florida Statutes (1981). In this event, DOT should be allowed to redesign the connector road to meet the standards of section 335.18, and to have minimal impact on the property rights of appellant and appellees…
    PAGE 434
  5. Paradyne Corp. v. State, Dept, Transp

    528 So. 2d 921 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 2 times
    We conclude, based upon our review of controlling statutes and the facts presented, including the undisputed evidence that Paradyne did not construct this road connection in accordance with the 1981 permit, that DOT has the right to revoke Paradyne's permit under section 335.18(3). The evidence supports the need for a major redesign of the intersection on Ulmerton Road and Paradyne's connection with that road due to the heavy amount of traffic entering and exiting Paradyne's property during peak morning and afternoon traffic periods. As a consequence, DOT has the authority to require Paradyne to submit a redesign of its connection which will accommodate the current traffic conditions in a safe and efficient manner under section 335.18(1). Further, DOT can properly require that any revised connection designed by Paradyne must allow access to Ulmerton for both Paradyne and M B, since two separate accesses for Paradyne and M B at this light-controlled intersection cannot safely be allowed to exist.
    PAGE 926
  6. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc v. Dallas County

    675 N.W.2d 544 (Iowa 2004)   Cited 9 times
    Iowa Code § 335.18.
    PAGE 550
  7. Bombard v. State

    113 A.D.3d 954 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)   Cited 3 times
    Initially, we find no merit in petitioner's procedural contentions. Respondent Board of Trustees of the State University of New York is statutorily empowered “[t]o make and establish ... rules and regulations” (Education Law § 355[2][b] ), and thus properly enacted regulations delegating powers to chief administrative officers, including the powers to make probationary appointments and appoint classified civil service employees ( see8 NYCRR 333.2, 335.18). Further, the Board properly permitted chief administrative officers to assign powers, duties and responsibilities to college administrative officers ( see 8 NYCRR 333.9). Contrary to petitioner's further contention, respondent Arlene M. Sabo, the University Police Chief, and respondent Jerry Lottie, the Assistant Police Chief, did not violate 4 NYCRR 4.5(b)(5)(iii) by failing to deliver a written report to the University stating the reasons for the termination two weeks prior to the end of his probationary period; the record demonstrates substantial compliance with the notice requirements ( see Matter of Schuman v. Westchester County Health Care Corp., 304 A.D.2d 585, 585, 758 N.Y.S.2d 141 [2003], lv. denied100 N.Y.2d…
    PAGE 470
  8. Kay v. City of Rancho

    504 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2007)   Cited 71 times
    Ala. Code § 11-52-81 (15 days); Alaska Stat. § 29.40.060 (time to appeal set by assembly); Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 12-904 (35 days); Ark. Code Ann. § 14-56-425 (30 days); Cal. Gov't Code § 65009(c)(1) (90 days); Colo. R. Civ. P. 106(b) (30 days); Conn. Gen.Stat. § 8-8(b) (15 days); Del. Code Ann. tit. 38 § 328(a) (30 days); Fla. Stat. § 120.68 (30 days); Ga. Code § 5-3-20 (30 days); Haw.Rev.Stat. § 91-14 (30 days); Idaho Code Ann. § 65-6519(4) (28 days); 735-111. Comp. Stat. 5/3-103 (35 days); Ind. Code § 36-7-4-1003 (30 days); Iowa Code § 335.18 (30 days); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 19-223 (30 days); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 100.347 (30 days); La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 33:4727 (30 days); Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 5 § 11002 (30 days); Md. Cir. Ct. R. 7-203 (30 days); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 17 (20 days); Mich. Comp. Laws § 125.3606 (30 days); Minn.Stat. § 394.27 (30 days); Miss. Code § 11-51-75 (10 days); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 89.110 (30 days); Mont. Code Ann. § 76-2-327 (30 days); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 14-413 (30 days); Nev. Rev.Stat. § 14-413 (25 days); N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 677:4 (30 days); N.J. Ct. R. 4:69-6 (30 days); N.M. Stat. § 39-3-1.1 (30 days); N.Y. Town Law § 267-c (30 days); N.C. Gen.Stat. …
    PAGE 816
  9. Gustafson v. Bd. of Adjustment of Buena Vista Cnty.

    No. 17-1665 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 12, 2018)
    "Our review of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari is at law." Frank Hardie Advert., Inc. v. City of Dubuque Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 501 N.W.2d 521, 523 (Iowa 1993). The district court has the authority to review de novo a petition for certiorari directed to a county board of adjustment under Iowa Code sections 335.19 and 335.21 (2017). The Gustafsons had the burden to prove the Board's decision was illegal in whole or in part. Iowa Code § 335.18. "We review the record to determine whether the trial court applied the correct legal standards and whether its decision is supported by substantial evidence." City of Des Moines v. Bd. of Adjustment, 448 N.W.2d 696, 698 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989). "Evidence is substantial 'when a reasonable mind could accept it as adequate to reach the same findings.'" City of Cedar Rapids v. Mun. Fire & Police Ret. Sys., 526 N.W.2d 284, 287 (Iowa 1995) (citation omitted).
    PAGE 4
  10. Iowa Code chapter 335 relates to county zoning. It contains a number of provisions analogous to those in chapter 414 relating to city zoning. Compare Iowa Code § 335.12 ("Rules"), and id. § 335.18 ("Petition to court"), with id. § 414.9 ("Rules—meetings—general procedure"), and id. § 414.15 ("Petition for certiorari").
    PAGE 481