Cases from cite.case.law:

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. SARNOFF,, 241 So. 3d 931 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . to chapter 337, including that chapter's statutory waiver of FDOT's home venue privilege in section 337.19 . . . Statutory Waiver; Section 337.19 Section 337.19, captioned "Suits by and against department; limitation . . . Importantly, section 337.19(1) addresses actions by and against FDOT and a "contractor:" "In any such . . . The limited waiver available to contractors under section 337.19 is inapplicable to the joint motion . . . We refer to both appellants collectively as "FDOT." § 337.19(1), Fla. Stat. (2017). . . .

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. UNITED CAPITAL FUNDING CORP., 219 So. 3d 126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . . § 337.19(1), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . . Since Pan-Am and, as applicable here, section 337.19(1) waive sovereign immunity only as to an express . . .

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, v. CONTRACTPOINT FLORIDA PARKS, LLC,, 986 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 2008)

. . . Dep't of Transp., 894 So.2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (rejecting DOT’s claim that section 337.19 . . .

GRADING AND BUSH HOG SERVICES, INC. v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 894 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . Section 337.19 of the Florida Statutes governs lawsuits filed against FDOT. . . . Subsection two of the statute provides, in relevant part, as follows: 337.19. . . . This section shall apply to all contracts entered into after June 30, 1993. § 337.19(2), Fla.' . . . The time limit in section 337.19(2) is solely a limitations period. See Hypower, [Inc. v. . . . See § 337.19, Fla. Stat. (2001). . . . .

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. CONE GRAHAM, INC., 884 So. 2d 224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . The parties agree that venue is proper where the cause of action accrued, pursuant to section 337.19( . . .

WHITE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 860 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . With respect to actions in court, section 337.19 provides, in pertinent part: (1) Suits at law and in . . . In denying arbitration, however, the Board relied upon neither section 337.185(1) nor section 337.19. . . . In addition, the Hypower court rejected DOT’S argument that section 337.19 precludes any arbitration . . . action against DOT filed after the 820-day period provided for in section 337.19(2). . . . The time limit in section 337.19(2) is solely a limitations period. See Hypower, 839 So.2d at 857. . . .

HYPOWER, INC. v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 839 So. 2d 856 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . FDOT argues that the 820-day period within which to file an arbitration request, set forth in section 337.19 . . . However, section 337.19 is not applicable to the instant case, because it relates only to lawsuits and . . .

In MID- CONTINENT ELECTRIC, INC. v. F. Jr., 278 B.R. 601 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002)

. . . Debtor also seeks declaratory relief that the Statute of Limitations imposed by Florida Statutes § 337.19 . . . 108(a)(2) did extend the applicable statute of limitations period as set forth in Florida Statutes § 337.19 . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. ANDERSON COLUMBIA, CO. INC., 656 So. 2d 609 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . Section 337.19(3), Florida Statutes (1993), provides: “Any action or suit brought against the department . . .

BROWARD COUNTY, v. FINLAYSON,, 555 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 1990)

. . . With the exception of the right to sue the state road department (section 337.19, Florida Statutes), . . .

STATE FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. L. GARY, Co., 513 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . On the other hand, section 337.19, Florida Statutes, allows for suits at law and in equity to be brought . . .

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. WHITE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. a a, 452 So. 2d 33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . sovereign immunity which permits the bringing of contract actions for work done against DOT is set out at § 337.19 . . . , Fla.Stat., which provides: 337.19 Suits by and against department; limitation of actions; forum.— ( . . .

PAN- AM TOBACCO CORPORATION, d b a Am v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,, 471 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1984)

. . . .-62(11), 163.370, 230.22(4), 337.19(1), Fla. Stat. (1981). . . .

SAN MARCO CONTRACTING COMPANY, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 386 So. 2d 615 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . Section 337.19, Florida Statutes (1977). In State Road Department v. . . . The court rejected the State Road Department’s argument, holding that Section 337.19 was enacted by the . . .

GRAHAM CONTRACTING, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SERVICES,, 363 So. 2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)

. . . Section 337.19, Florida Statutes (1967). . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. SAN MARCO CONTRACTING CO., 355 So. 2d 133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)

. . . Section 337.19(1), Florida Statutes (1975), provides that actions may be maintained against DOT “on any . . .

L. CARLILE, v. GAME FRESH WATER FISH COMMISSION, 354 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1977)

. . . general or specific waivers of sovereign immunity: Section 230.23(9)(d), Florida Statutes (1975); Section 337.19 . . . these enactments the Legislature specifically provided for modification of the venue rule: Section 337.19 . . .

ASHLAND OIL, INC. v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION L., 352 So. 2d 567 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)

. . . In Section 337.19(3), Florida Statutes (1975), the Florida Legislature waived the venue privilege in . . . We think it clear that under the facts of this case and the provisions of Section 337.19(3), the DOT’ . . .

STATE DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION, v. R. OLIFF,, 350 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)

. . . Kinnon next argues Section 337.19(1), Florida Statutes (1975), allows contract actions against the Department . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. EDWARD M. CHADBOURNE, INC. a, 333 So. 2d 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

. . . sole point on appeal is : “Whether or not an action pursuant to a contract predicated upon Section 337.19 . . . Florida Statute 337.19 is clear; suits at law upon a contract may be brought against the Department of . . . It is apparent therefore that the language of F.S. 337.19(3) that ‘All actions and suits brought against . . . Florida Statute 337.19 provides: “337.19 Suits by and against department; limitation of actions; form . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. CHOTHEN, a By, 328 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

. . . In our opinion, Negrin is inapposite to the case at bar since it treats § 337.19(1), Fla.Stat., which . . .

CHOTHEN, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 43 Fla. Supp. 46 (Dade Cty. Cir. Ct. 1975)

. . . . §337.19(3) to tort actions, and did not consider the exception to the department’s privilege which . . .

STATE v. F. NEGRIN,, 306 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)

. . . S. 337.19(3). . . . S. 337.19(1) specifically provides “That no suit sounding in tort shall be maintained against the department . . . Whether or not the quoted clause from subsection (1) of F.S. 337.19 is constitutional, it clearly reveals . . . that the Legislature did not intend for that statute, F.S. 337.19, to be applicable to tort actions. . . . It is apparent therefore that the language of F.S. 337.19(3) that “All actions and suits brought against . . .

STATE ROAD DEPARTMENT v. CONE BROTHERS CONTRACTING COMPANY, a, 207 So. 2d 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968)

. . . Section 337.19, F.S.A., quoted above. . . . F.S. § 337.19, F.S.A. . F.S. § 120.20, F.S.A. .F.S. § 120.21(1), F.S.A. . . .

PEREIRA, d b a v. STATE ROAD DEPARTMENT,, 178 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965)

. . . Section 337.19, F.S.A. . . .

STATE ROAD DEPARTMENT v. M. TAYLOR,, 167 So. 2d 748 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964)

. . . jurisdiction of the court to entertain the action on the ground of sovereign immunity; that under Section 337.19 . . . only statute giving consent of the State for suit to be brought against the Road Department is Section 337.19 . . . F.S. § 337.19'(1), F.S .A. . “Issuance of Rule. . . .

STATE ROAD DEPARTMENT v. BANKERS LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY,, 166 So. 2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964)

. . . in the last quoted portion of Justice Terrell’s opinion [which was the predecessor of the present § 337.19 . . .

SEASIDE PROPERTIES, INC. a v. STATE ROAD DEPARTMENT a, 121 So. 2d 204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960)

. . . directed to two statutes dealing with suits against the State Road Department in certain circumstances, §§ 337.19 . . . Section 337.19 clearly is not applicable here, as it authorizes suits “against the department on any . . .

STATE ROAD DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA, v. J. C. DARBY,, 109 So. 2d 591 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)

. . . State, cannot be sued without the consent of the State, and such consent has been given only in Section 337.19 . . .

FLORIDA STATE TURNPIKE AUTHORITY, v. ANHOCO CORPORATION, a a, 107 So. 2d 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)

. . . Fla.Stat., F.S.A., § 337.19; Weir v. Palm Beach County, supra. . . .

H. JONES, v. STATE ROAD DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF FLORIDA, 260 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1958)

. . . Florida Constitution, Article 3, Sec. 22, 25 F.S.A. 912; Sec. 337.19 F.S. 57, F.S.A. . . .

HANOVER FIRE INS. CO. v. NEWMAN S, 108 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1939)

. . . The policy was originally for $7,500 but payment of a previous loss of $337.19 reduced it to $7,162.81 . . .