The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XXVI
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION

Chapter 342
WATERWAY AND WATERFRONT IMPROVEMENT

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CHAPTER 342

WATERWAY AND WATERFRONT IMPROVEMENT

342.03 Beautification and improvement of waterways by counties and municipalities; tax.

342.04 Time warrants.

342.05 Precautions as to use of poisons.

342.06 Contracts and bond of contractor.

342.07 Recreational and commercial working waterfronts; legislative findings; definitions.

342.201 Waterfronts Florida Program.

342.03 Beautification and improvement of waterways by counties and municipalities; tax.—It is declared to be a legitimate county or municipal purpose for any county or incorporated city or town in the state to improve and beautify waterways, including lakes, rivers, streams, ditches and canals, within such county or municipality, by opening such waterways and by clearing them of logs and other obstructions, including water hyacinths and other disagreeable and obnoxious vegetation, and, for all or any part of such purpose, any county or incorporated city or town in the state may levy a tax not to exceed 1 mill on the dollar of the assessed valuation of all property assessed for taxes in such county or incorporated city or town.

History.—s. 1, ch. 14651, 1931; CGL 1936 Supp. 2011(4).

342.04 Time warrants.—Any county or incorporated city or town in the state desiring to carry on all or any part of the work mentioned in s. 342.03 may issue and sell time warrants not to exceed in amount the sum of $15,000 for any county or the sum of $5,000 for any incorporated city or town, except that time warrants shall not exceed 50 percent of the estimated revenue to be derived from the tax to be levied by virtue of s. 342.03. Such time warrants shall not be sold for less than their par value and shall not draw a rate of interest in excess of 6 percent per year. When such time warrants shall come within the purview of s. 12, Art. VII of the State Constitution, the said time warrants shall be issued only after the same shall have been approved by the majority of the votes cast in an election in which a majority of the owners of freeholds not wholly exempt from taxation who are qualified electors residing in such county or city or town shall participate, which said election shall be called and held, and the result thereof declared and recorded, in the manner prescribed by ss. 100.201-100.221, 100.241, 100.261-100.341, 100.351, and said election shall be subject to all the provisions of said chapter.

History.—s. 2, ch. 14651, 1931; CGL 1936 Supp. 2011(5); s. 24, ch. 57-1; s. 15, ch. 69-216; s. 64, ch. 77-175.

342.05 Precautions as to use of poisons.—Any county or incorporated city or town in the state, its agents, servants, employees, and contractors, may use any poisonous substance, chemical, or spray in killing water hyacinths and other disagreeable or obnoxious vegetation in the waterways mentioned in s. 342.03, provided no such poisonous substance, chemical, or spray shall be used which might injure or destroy fish life or human or other animal life without first taking sufficient precaution to prevent the same.

History.—s. 3, ch. 14651, 1931; CGL 1936 Supp. 2011(6).

342.06 Contracts and bond of contractor.—Any county or incorporated city or town in the state may contract to have carried on all or any part of the work mentioned in s. 342.03, provided such contract shall be let in the manner prescribed by law for other work of a public nature. No such contractor shall use any poisonous substance, chemical or spray in any of the waterways mentioned in s. 342.03 without first entering into a good and sufficient bond to be fixed and approved by the county or municipal authorities conditioned to indemnify any and all persons against any loss or damage for injury to livestock resulting from the use of such poisonous substance, chemical or spray.

History.—s. 4, ch. 14651, 1931; CGL 1936 Supp. 2011(7); s. 23, ch. 29615, 1955.

342.07 Recreational and commercial working waterfronts; legislative findings; definitions.—

(1) The Legislature recognizes that there is an important state interest in facilitating boating and other recreational access to the state’s navigable waters. This access is vital to tourists and recreational users and the marine industry in the state, to maintaining or enhancing the $57 billion economic impact of tourism and the $14 billion economic impact of boating in the state annually, and to ensuring continued access to all residents and visitors to the navigable waters of the state. The Legislature recognizes that there is an important state interest in maintaining viable water-dependent support facilities, such as public lodging establishments and boat hauling and repairing and commercial fishing facilities, and in maintaining the availability of public access to the navigable waters of the state. The Legislature further recognizes that the waterways of the state are important for engaging in commerce and the transportation of goods and people upon such waterways and that such commerce and transportation is not feasible unless there is access to and from the navigable waters of the state through recreational and commercial working waterfronts.

(2) As used in this section, the term “recreational and commercial working waterfront” means a parcel or parcels of real property which provide access for water-dependent commercial activities, including hotels and motels as defined in s. 509.242(1), or provide access for the public to the navigable waters of the state. Recreational and commercial working waterfronts require direct access to or a location on, over, or adjacent to a navigable body of water. The term includes water-dependent facilities that are open to the public and offer public access by vessels to the waters of the state or that are support facilities for recreational, commercial, research, or governmental vessels. These facilities include public lodging establishments, docks, wharfs, lifts, wet and dry marinas, boat ramps, boat hauling and repair facilities, commercial fishing facilities, boat construction facilities, and other support structures over the water. As used in this section, the term “vessel” has the same meaning as in s. 327.02. Seaports are excluded from the definition.

History.—s. 13, ch. 2005-157; s. 8, ch. 2006-172; s. 6, ch. 2006-220; s. 8, ch. 2014-70.

342.201 Waterfronts Florida Program.—

(1) There is established within the Department of Economic Opportunity the Waterfronts Florida Program to provide technical assistance and support to communities in revitalizing waterfront areas in this state.

(2) As used in this section, the term:

(a) “Waterfront community” means a municipality or county that is required to prepare a coastal element for its local government comprehensive plan.

(b) “Recreational and commercial working waterfront” means a parcel or parcels of real property that provide access for water-dependent commercial activities or provide access for the public to the navigable waters of the state. Recreational and commercial working waterfronts require direct access to or a location on, over, or adjacent to a navigable body of water. The term includes water-dependent facilities that are open to the public and offer public access by vessels to the waters of the state or that are support facilities for recreational, commercial, research, or governmental vessels. These facilities include docks, wharfs, lifts, wet and dry marinas, boat ramps, boat hauling and repair facilities, commercial fishing facilities, boat construction facilities, and other support structures over the water.

(3) The purpose of this program is to provide technical assistance, support, training, and financial assistance to waterfront communities in their efforts to revitalize waterfront areas. The program shall direct its efforts on the following priority concerns:

(a) Protecting environmental and cultural resources;

(b) Providing public access;

(d) Enhancing the viable traditional economy.

(4) The program is responsible for:

(a) Implementing the Waterfronts Florida Partnership Program. The department, in coordination with the Department of Environmental Protection, shall develop procedures and requirements governing program eligibility, application procedures, and application review. The department may provide financial assistance to eligible local governments to develop local plans to further the purpose of the program. In recognition of limited funding, the department may limit the number of local governments assisted by the program based on the amount of funding appropriated to the department for the purpose of the program.

(b) Serving as a source for information and technical assistance for Florida’s waterfront communities in preserving traditional recreational and commercial working waterfronts.

History.—s. 9, ch. 2005-157; s. 241, ch. 2011-142; s. 56, ch. 2012-96.

F.S. 342 on Google Scholar

F.S. 342 on Casetext

Amendments to 342

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 342

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 342.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

P. BARR, v. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, INC., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Corrigan , 257 U.S. 312, 342, 42 S.Ct. 124, 66 L.Ed. 254 (1921). For example, in Eberle v. . . . the underlying 1901 law authorizing Arizona courts to issue injunctions generally. 257 U.S., at 341-342 . . .

ESPINOZA, v. MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Bd. of Ed. , 342 F.3d 271, 280 (CA3 2003) (student's decision to distribute small gifts with religious . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, v. THURAISSIGIAM, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (U.S. 2020)

. . . . ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 1945, 1953, 201 L.Ed.2d 342 (2018). . . . Shaughnessy , 342 U.S. 580, 588, n. 15, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) ("An open door to the immigrant . . . Shaughnessy , 342 U.S. 580, 588, n. 15, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) ; see also St. . . .

BOSTOCK, v. CLAYTON COUNTY, GEORGIA v. Jr. Co- R. G. G. R. v., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Johnson , 491 U.S. 397, 420-421, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). . . . Immigration and Customs Enforcement , 543 U.S. 335, 341-342, 125 S.Ct. 694, 160 L.Ed.2d 708 (2005) ; . . . Essentia Health , 342 F.Supp.3d 947, 952-954 (D Minn. 2018) (allowing ACA claim). . . .

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, LLC, III v. LLC, v. LLC, n De De La El Y v., 140 S. Ct. 1649 (U.S. 2020)

. . . United States , 411 U.S. 389, 398, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973). . . . United States , 411 U.S. 389, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342, provides a rough analogy. . . . United States , 411 U.S. 389, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973), "provides a rough analogy." . . .

BANISTER, v. DAVIS,, 140 S. Ct. 1698 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Johnston , 313 U.S. 342, 61 S.Ct. 1015, 85 L.Ed. 1392 (1941), the petitioner sought habeas relief from . . .

NEW YORK STATE RIFLE PISTOL ASSOCIATION, INC. v. CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK,, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Id ., at 342. In Watseka v. . . .

BARTON, v. P. BARR,, 140 S. Ct. 1442 (U.S. 2020)

. . . United States , 342 U.S. 246, 263, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952) )). . . .

COUNTY OF MAUI, HAWAII, v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND,, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Id. , at 140, 342. . . . Id. , at 342. . . .

ROMAG FASTENERS, INC. v. FOSSIL, INC., 140 S. Ct. 1492 (U.S. 2020)

. . . United States , 342 U.S. 246, 250-263, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952) (criminal law); Wooden-Ware . . .

GUERRERO- LASPRILLA, v. P. BARR, v. P., 140 S. Ct. 1062 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Ashcroft , 342 F.3d 207, 222 (CA3 2003) (same); Mu-Xing Wang v. . . .

C. HERNANDEZ, v. MESA, Jr., 140 S. Ct. 735 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Shaughnessy , 342 U.S. 580, 589, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) ). . . .

C. ROTKISKE, v. KLEMM,, 140 S. Ct. 355 (U.S. 2019)

. . . Glover , 21 Wall. 342, 22 L.Ed. 636 (1875) ; Sherwood v. . . . Glover , 21 Wall. 342, 347, 22 L.Ed. 636 (1875) ("[W]hen the object of the suit is to obtain relief against . . . Glover , 21 Wall. 342, 22 L.Ed. 636 (1875), and Holmberg v. . . . Glover , 21 Wall. 342, 22 L.Ed. 636 (1875). . . .

F. MCCAFFREY, v. L. CHAPMAN,, 140 S. Ct. 535 (U.S. 2019)

. . . No. 19-342 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .

V. CASSIDY, v. HALYARD HEALTH, INC., 391 F. Supp. 3d 474 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . ARMDS Inc. , 342 F. App'x 848, 850 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Goosby v. . . .

TIMS, v. LGE COMMUNITY CREDIT UNION,, 935 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Coleman , 294 Ga. 170, 751 S.E.2d 337, 342 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Key v. . . .

L. SMITH, v. SHARP,, 935 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States, 568 U.S. 342, 348, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013). . . .

BIRD, v. i DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES DHS, R., 935 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Express Agency, Inc. , 321 U.S. 342, 348-49, 64 S.Ct. 582, 88 L.Ed. 788 (1944) ). . . .

HUEBNER, v. BRADSHAW,, 935 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. 1945, 201 L.Ed.2d 342 (2018). . . .

R. PESCI, v. BUDZ, LLC, LLC,, 935 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Estate of Shabazz , 482 U.S. 342, 353, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987) ; Turner , 482 U.S. at 85 . . .

SCRIMO, v. LEE,, 935 F.3d 103 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 342. . . . Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 113, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) ). Here, the State's case was thin. . . .

WOLFINGTON, v. RECONSTRUCTIVE ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATES II PC, a k a, 935 F.3d 187 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Rose , 871 F.2d at 342. . . .

BOWLES, v. DESANTIS,, 934 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . 920 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2019) (some alterations in original) (quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. at 342 . . .

UNITED STATES v. F GARO- BENJAM N, 392 F. Supp. 3d 280 (D. P.R. 2019)

. . . (Docket No. 342 at p. 2; Docket No. 14.) . . . (Docket No. 342 at p. 2.) . . .

S. BLEDSOE, v. VANDERBILT,, 934 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009). . . . Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) ). . . . Coffey, 221 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2000). . . .

ANZA TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. MUSHKIN, INC., 934 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Clark , 93 F.3d 339, 342 (7th Cir. 1996) ; Slade v. U.S. . . .

NALPROPION PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. v. ACTAVIS LABORATORIES FL, INC., 934 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Yellow Cab Co. , 338 U.S. 338, 342, 70 S.Ct. 177, 94 L.Ed. 150 (1949) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. FELICIANOSOTO,, 934 F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . See id. at 342-44. . . .

UNITED STATES v. NORMAN,, 935 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Maxwell , 285 F.3d 336, 342 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .

MCMICHAEL, v. TRANSOCEAN OFFSHORE DEEPWATER DRILLING, INCORPORATED RIGP DCL, L. L. C. USA,, 934 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Haggar Clothing Co. , 342 F.3d 569, 578 (5th Cir. 2003). . . . See, e.g. , Palasota , 342 F.3d at 577-78 (finding sufficient evidence to sustain a jury verdict where . . . Palasota , 342 F.3d at 578. . . .

LAFFERTY, v. BENZON,, 933 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 380 (Utah 2001). . . .

ADAM AND EVE JONESBORO, LLC, v. PERRIN, In, 933 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Johnson , 491 U.S. 397, 404, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989). . . .

UNITED STATES v. IN U. S. CURRENCY, 933 F.3d 971 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Currency , 872 F.3d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 2017). . . .

UNITED STATES EX REL. CHARTE v. AMERICAN TUTOR, INC. Jr. Sr., 934 F.3d 346 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . City & Cty. of San Francisco , 545 U.S. 323, 342, 125 S.Ct. 2491, 162 L.Ed.2d 315 (2005). . . . Express Agency , 321 U.S. 342, 348-49, 64 S.Ct. 582, 88 L.Ed. 788 (1944). . . . Phillips & Cohen, LLP , 443 N.J.Super. 447, 129 A.3d 342, 350 (Ct. App. . . .

MARTINEAU, v. WIER, 934 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Corp. , 717 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 2013). . . . See Wilson , 717 F.3d at 342-43 (treating question of whether debtor or bankruptcy trustee is entitled . . . See Wilson , 717 F.3d at 342-43 (collecting cases). . . .

IN RE MIAMI METALS I, INC., 603 B.R. 727 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . De Luca , 300 A.D.2d 342, 342, 751 N.Y.S.2d 766 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2002). . . .

UNITED STATES v. NG LAP SENG, Ng, Ng W. C., 934 F.3d 110 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Esperdy , 285 F.2d 341, 342 (2d Cir. 1961) ("Bribery in essence is an attempt to influence another to . . .

UNITED STATES v. M. SWARTZ,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 199 (N.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Supp. 2d 342, 346 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (citation omitted). . . .

EHRMAN, v. COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. COXCOM, LLC LLC,, 932 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dep't. of the Interior , 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[D]iscovery should be granted when ... . . .

PILLAR DYNASTY LLC, v. NEW YORK COMPANY, INC., 933 F.3d 202 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Co. , 342 F.2d 796, 797 (2d Cir. 1965) ("When an advisory jury is used, the review on appeal is from . . .

L. ROMANSKY, v. SUPERINTENDENT GREENE SCI, 933 F.3d 293 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . effect reset the clock for any claims pertaining to the 1987 trial, and invokes Magwood , 561 U.S. at 342 . . . Id . at 342, 130 S.Ct. 2788 (emphases in original). . . .

VALBRUNA SLATER STEEL CORPORATION, v. JOSLYN MANUFACTURING COMPANY,, 934 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Koches , 94 N.E.3d 339, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). . . . E.g. , Freels , 94 N.E.3d at 342. . . .

O. CAMPOS, v. COOK COUNTY,, 932 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Fagan , 342 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by Spiegla v. . . .

C. CORDARO, v. UNITED STATES, 933 F.3d 232 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . United States, 568 U.S. 342, 347, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013) (quoting Lambrix v. . . .

BENAVIDEZ v. HOWARD,, 931 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 342, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). . . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 342, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (emphasis added). . . .

JET MIDWEST INTERNATIONAL CO. LTD, v. JET MIDWEST GROUP, LLC, F. F. M., 932 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Borchert , 486 F.3d 342, 346 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) ). . . .

JONES, v. A. BERRYHILL,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 831 (M.D. Tenn. 2019)

. . . Sec. , 342 F. App's 149, 155-56 (6th Cir. 2009). . . .

K. W. P. By v. KANSAS CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS In In, 931 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 342-43, 105 S.Ct. 733. . . .

PENNSYLVANIA NATIONAL MUTUAL CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, v. BEACH MART, INC. L L, 932 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Motorola, Inc. , 245 F.3d 335, 342 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Although in the proper context ... a slogan[ ] can . . .

UNITED STATES v. BOSYK,, 933 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . See Dissenting Op. at 342 (Figure A) (showing more than 64% probability that link was clicked after being . . . See Dissenting Op. at 342-49. . . . link containing child pornography in a variety (though probably not "millions," see Dissenting Op. at 342 . . .

D. LEISER, v. KLOTH,, 933 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Smith , 342 F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 2003) (defendant is not generally permitted to appeal denial of a . . . City of Milwaukee , 850 F.3d 335, 342 (7th Cir. 2017) (failure-to-intervene claims failed where plaintiff's . . .

K. HASSEN, v. RUSTON LOUISIANA HOSPITAL COMPANY, L. L. C., 932 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Principi , 289 F.3d 342, 348 (5th Cir. 2002) ) (finding employee raised a genuine issue of fact regarding . . . Co. , 917 F.3d 335, 342 (5th Cir. 2019). EEOC v. . . .

IN RE WASHINGTON, v. N. A., 602 B.R. 710 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 342. . . . In re Rosa , 521 B.R. at 339, 342-43. . . .

IN RE RIZZO, s, 603 B.R. 550 (Bankr. S.C. 2019)

. . . Robbins, 964 F.2d 342, 345 (4th Cir. 1992). . . .

NOVAK, v. CITY OF PARMA, 932 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. 1945, 1952-53, 201 L.Ed.2d 342 (2018) ). The burden to answer that lies on the officers. Id. . . . Ohio Elections Comm'n , 514 U.S. 334, 342, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995) ; id. at 371, 115 S.Ct . . .

DAVIS, v. GUAM M. C. F. P. F. I. M., 932 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Lightfoot , 364 U.S. 339, 342, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960) (quoting Lane v. . . .

MIRKIN, v. XOOM ENERGY, LLC XOOM LLC,, 931 F.3d 173 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . XOOM Energy, LLC , 342 F. Supp. 3d 320, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). . . . XOOM , 342 F. Supp. 3d at 328. . . . XOOM , 342 F. Supp. 3d at 329. We see no support for this assertion in the Complaint or the PAC. . . .

UNITED STATES v. D. WISEMAN, Jr., 932 F.3d 411 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 342 (Page ID #664). . . .

MARAMBO v. P. BARR,, 932 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dec. at 342. . . .

FOROUZAN v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 1184 (C.D. Cal. 2019)

. . . Ruby Robinson Co., Inc. , 342 F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003). . . .

ANDERSON, v. CITY OF ROCKFORD,, 932 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Agurs , 427 U.S. 97, 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) ; see also Kyles , 514 U.S. at 460, 115 . . .

UNITED STATES v. COONCE, Jr., 932 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Wells , 371 F.3d 342, 349 n.5 (6th Cir. 2004), Congress could redefine the term when it wanted as a matter . . .

UNITED STATES v. MUSCHETTE, 392 F. Supp. 3d 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Id. at 342. . . . Agurs , 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), I need not resolve the prosecution's . . .

UNITED STATES v. RODRIGUEZ- SORIANO, a k a a k a, 931 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 312 U.S. 342, 347, 61 S.Ct. 603, 85 L.Ed. 876 (1941) ). . . .

F. EDMISTON, v. LOUISIANA SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CENTER,, 931 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Louisville Ladder Co ., 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1999). . . .

KOALA, v. KHOSLA,, 931 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ritchie , 342 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2003). . . .

BRINDLEY, v. CITY OF MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, 934 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. , 508 S.W.2d 342, 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973) ; see also Wolfe v. . . .

WEEKS, a. k. a. v. UNITED STATES, 930 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Jones, 235 F.3d 342, 347 (7th Cir. 2000) ("As the government points out, the phrase 'did assault and . . .

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, v. R. LOUDERMILK, Sr. C. B. J. III, W. P. L., 930 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 298 U.S. 342, 347-48, 56 S. . . .

PRESQUE ISLE COLON AND RECTAL SURGERY, v. HIGHMARK HEALTH, f k a f k a, 391 F. Supp. 3d 485 (W.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . USA Petroleum Co. , 495 U.S. 328, 342, 110 S.Ct. 1884, 109 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990) ; West Penn , 627 F.3d . . . Inc. , 902 F.3d at 342 (quoting City of Pittsburgh v. W. . . .

IN RE LICKING RIVER MINING, LLC, v. LLC,, 603 B.R. 336 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2019)

. . . Id. at 342 (citations omitted). . . . Id. at 342 (citations omitted). B. Application of Law. . . . App'x at 342 (evaluating a § 548(a)(1)(B) claim and holding that "[t]he date for determining reasonable . . . App'x at 342, and Montalvo , 333 B.R. at 150, to support its argument that an indirect benefit can constitute . . .

K. NARKIEWICZ- LAINE, v. C. DOYLE,, 930 F.3d 897 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Novelty, Inc. , 509 F.3d 339, 342 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gorenstein Enterprises, Inc. v. . . .

E. APONTE- RAMOS, v. UNITED STATES, 391 F. Supp. 3d 183 (D. P.R. 2019)

. . . Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6, 18 (1st Cir. 2003). . . .

F. WORTHY, D. Co. v. CITY OF PHENIX CITY, ALABAMA,, 930 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Minard , 342 U.S. 117, 120, 72 S.Ct. 118, 96 L.Ed. 138 (1951) )). . . .

K. GRIGGS, v. CHICKASAW COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI,, 930 F.3d 696 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Comm'n , 342 F.3d 242, 257 (3d Cir. 2003) ("The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that the Rooker-Feldman . . . Ct. 1945, 1954, 201 L.Ed.2d 342 (2018) (explaining a retaliation claim against a municipality requires . . .

UNITED STATES v. T. HERMAN,, 930 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 342. Doubet was convicted of the bank robbery. . . .

L. C. v. ALTA LOMA SCHOOL DISTRICT,, 389 F. Supp. 3d 845 (C.D. Cal. 2019)

. . . See AR 342-43. . . .

HEJRAN HEJRAT CO. LTD, v. UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,, 930 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Brownlee , 342 F.3d 1335, 1337-38 (Fed. . . .

M. CROCE, v. NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY Jr., 930 F.3d 787 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ford Motor Co. , 342 F.3d 593, 598 (6th Cir. 2003). . . .

SUNG HEE JOO, v. UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI,, 389 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (S.D. Fla. 2019)

. . . Fla. , 342 F.3d 1281, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Brewer-Giorgio v. . . .

GIBSON, Ca v. SCE GROUP, INC. d b a d b a s,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Supp. 3d 342, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). . . . Supp. 3d 342, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding that the musician had a strong mark because he "sold over . . .

MANNING v. CALDWELL, s FOR CITY OF ROANOKE s, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Johnson , 491 U.S. 397, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989) ; Brandenburg v. . . .

GRAVES, I. Y. M. Y. A. Y. v. A. LIOI L. Jr. I. Y. M. Y. A. Y. v. A. L. Jr., 930 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Infra at 342. . . .

HENRY, a v. HULETT,, 930 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Estate of Shabazz , 482 U.S. 342, 348-49, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987) ; Hudson , 468 U.S. at . . .

VUGO, INC. v. CITY OF NEW YORK,, 931 F.3d 42 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . App'x 342, 365 (6th Cir. 2015) ("[A]lthough Sorrell stated that 'heightened judicial scrutiny' applied . . .

GREEN, v. KENNEWAY,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 275 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Agurs , 427 U.S. 97, 106-07, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). Mr. . . .

UNITED STATES v. RANKIN,, 929 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Miner , 774 F.3d at 342-43. . . .

NKOMO, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF UNITED STATES, 930 F.3d 129 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Dec. 336, 342 (BIA 2007) )). . . . Dec. at 342-43. This approach necessarily gives no weight to the sentence imposed. . . .

FUSARO, v. R. COGAN, C. J. A. J. Jr., 930 F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Rivendell Woods, Inc. , 415 F.3d 342, 345 (4th Cir. 2005). . . .

STARR INDEMNITY LIABILITY COMPANY, v. BRIGHTSTAR CORP., 388 F. Supp. 3d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Whether the German Warehouse Was Added to the Policy Under Endorsement No. 40...342 c. . . . Supp. 2d 342, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Finest Investments v. Sec. . . .

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, v. S. NADKARNI,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 917 (N.D. Cal. 2019)

. . . Ritchie , 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) ; In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. . . .

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, v. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION,, 928 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Cuno , 547 U.S. 332, 342, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006). . . .

BAATZ, v. COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC,, 929 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Burch , 781 F.3d 342, 344 (6th Cir. 2015). . . .

KIRK, v. A. BERRYHILL,, 388 F. Supp. 3d 652 (D.S.C. 2019)

. . . Mathews , 424 U.S. at 342, 96 S.Ct. 893. . . .

REID v. DONELAN,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 201 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Sessions, 342 F. Supp. 3d 429, 435-36 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). . . . Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 544-46, 72 S.Ct. 525, 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952) (assuming that the Excessive Bail Clause . . . See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752, 107 S.Ct. 2095 ; Carlson, 342 U.S. at 545, 72 S.Ct. 525. . . . See id. at 752, 107 S.Ct. 2095 ; Carlson, 342 U.S. at 545, 72 S.Ct. 525 ; see also Bolante v. . . . Carlson, 342 U.S. at 545, 72 S.Ct. 525. . . .

MUNICIPALITY OF CABO ROJO, v. POWERSECURE, INC. v., 390 F. Supp. 3d 327 (D. P.R. 2019)

. . . Times , May 6, 2018 ("Puerto Rico has 2,400 often mountainous miles of high-voltage transmission lines, 342 . . .

CITY OF HEARNE, TEXAS, v. JOHNSON, v. F. Jr., 929 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Cuno , 547 U.S. 332, 339, 342 n.3, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006). . . .

ROSARIO, v. UNITED STATES,, 389 F. Supp. 3d 122 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Supp. 2d 339, 342 (D. . . . Supp. 2d at 342 (holding that mandatory registration as a sex offender does not constitute "custody" . . . Agurs , 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (same); Kyles v. . . .

BETANSOS, v. P. BARR,, 928 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 342. . . .

UNITED STATES v. FLUTE,, 929 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 342 U.S. 246, 263, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). . . .