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F.S. 349.02 on Google Scholar

F.S. 349.02 on Casetext

Amendments to 349.02


The 2022 Florida Statutes

Title XXVI
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
Chapter 349
JACKSONVILLE TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 349.02 Florida Statutes and Case Law
349.02 Definitions.
(1) Except in those instances where the context clearly indicates otherwise, whenever used or referred to in this chapter, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
(a) “Authority” means the body politic and corporate, an agency of the state created by this chapter.
(b) “Members” means the governing body of the authority, and the term “member” means one of the individuals constituting such governing body.
(c) “Bonds” means and includes the notes, bonds, refunding bonds, or other evidences of indebtedness or obligations, in either temporary or definitive form, that the authority is authorized to issue pursuant to this chapter.
(d) “Department” means the Department of Transportation existing under chapters 334-339.
(e) “Florida State Improvement Commission” or “commission” means the state agency created, organized, and existing under and by virtue of the provisions of former chapter 420, or the successor thereto, chapter 29788, Acts of 1955, now chapter 288.
(f) “County” means the County of Duval.
(g) “City” means the City of Jacksonville.
(h) “State Board of Administration” means the body corporate existing under the provisions of s. 4, Art. IV of the State Constitution or any successor thereto.
(i) “Agency of the state” means and includes the state and any department of the state, the authority, or any corporation, agency, or instrumentality heretofore or hereafter created, designated, or established by the state.
(j) “Federal agency” means and includes the United States, the President of the United States, and any department of the United States or any corporation, agency, or instrumentality heretofore or hereafter created, designated, or established by the United States.
(k) “Duval County gasoline tax funds” means all the 80-percent surplus gasoline tax funds accruing in each year to the Department of Transportation for use in Duval County under the provisions of s. 9, Art. XII of the State Constitution, after deduction only of any amounts of said gasoline tax funds heretofore pledged by the department or the county for outstanding obligations.
(l) “Transportation facilities” means and includes all mobile and fixed assets (real or personal property or rights therein) used in the transportation of persons or property by any means of conveyance whatsoever, and all appurtenances thereto, such as, but not limited to, highways; limited or controlled access lanes and facilities; docks, vessels, vehicles, fixed guideway facilities, and any means of conveyance of persons or property of all types; park-and-ride facilities; transit-related improvements adjacent to transit facilities or stations; bus, train, vessel, or other vehicle storage, cleaning, fueling, control, and maintenance facilities; and administrative and other office space for the exercise by the authority of the powers and obligations herein granted.
(2) Words importing singular number shall include the plural number in each case and vice versa, and words importing persons shall include firms and corporations.
History.s. 2, ch. 29996, 1955; s. 18, ch. 69-216; ss. 23, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 1, ch. 2009-111; s. 24, ch. 2011-64; s. 57, ch. 2013-15.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: August 29, 2022
F.S. 349.02 on Google Scholar

F.S. 349.02 on Casetext

Amendments to 349.02


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 349.02
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 349.02.


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S349.02
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 349.02.


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 349.02[2], at 349-9 (15th ed. 1997) (emphasis in original).
    PAGE 942
  2. State v. Bailey

    2009 WI App. 140 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 8 times   3 Legal Analyses
    ¶ 17. WISCONSIN STAT. § 349.02(2)(a) and (b) expressly allow a police officer to stop a vehicle for violation of a statute or ordinance enacted under this chapter. Section 349.02(2) provides:
    PAGE 361
  3. Duran v. Gudino (In re Duran)

    630 B.R. 797 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2021)   Cited 2 times
    The severity of a Strong-Form § 349(a) dismissal "with prejudice" dictates that bankruptcy courts proceed in such matters with the caution reserved for egregious circumstances and a full opportunity for hearing consistent with consideration associated with a complaint to deny discharge under § 727. Leavitt , 209 B.R. at 941-42, citing 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 349.02[2]; Ellsworth , 455 B.R. at 920, 922-23.
    PAGE 811
  4. In re Tomlin

    105 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1997)   Cited 187 times
    As Colonial points out, generally "[d]ismissal of an action with prejudice is a complete adjudication of the issues presented by the pleadings and is a bar to a further action between the parties." Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc., 924 F.2d 530, 534 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting Schwarz v. Felloder, 767 F.2d 125, 129 (5th Cir. 1985)). Moreover, principles of res judicata certainly apply to decisions of bankruptcy courts. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 334 (1966). Indeed, although the Bankruptcy Code establishes a general rule that dismissal of a case is without prejudice, it also expressly grants a bankruptcy court the authority to "bar the discharge, in a later case . . . of debts that were dischargeable in the case dismissed. . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 349(a) (1994); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy Section(s) 349.02[2] (15th ed. rev. 1994).
    PAGE 937
  5. In re Jimenez

    CASE NO. 18-04070 (ESL) (Bankr. D.P.R. Jun. 3, 2019)
    A motion requesting voluntary dismissal that does not relate to a request for relief of stay does not activate the filing restrictions of §109(g)(2). As stated by Collier on Bankruptcy, the restriction included in §109 is inapplicable "...if the Debtor successfully defended against or resolved the motion for relief from the stay or paid in full the creditor who moved for relief. Further, when the dismissal of the first case is remote in time from the motion for stay relief - perhaps years after it was filed- section 109(g) should not be automatically applied." Collier on Bankruptcy at 349.02. (foot notes omitted). "...[T]he purpose of preventing abusive refiling is not served when the motion for relief and the dismissal are totally unrelated". Id.
    PAGE 4
  6. In re Henderson

    472 B.R. 579 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2012)   Cited 1 times
    Subsection (a) specifies that unless the court for cause orders otherwise, the dismissal of a case is without prejudice. The debtor is not barred from receiving a discharge in a later case of debts that were dischargeable in the case dismissed. Of course, this subsection refers only to pre-discharge dismissals. If the debtor has already received a discharge and it is not revoked, then the debtor would be barred under § 727(a) from receiving a discharge in a subsequent liquidation case for six years.... S.Rep. No. 95–989, at 48; reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5834 (emphasis added). Other courts and commentators that have addressed this issue have similarly limited the effect of § 349(a) to pre-discharge dismissals. In re Baylies, 114 B.R. 324, 325 (Bankr.D.D.C.1990); First State Bank & Trust Co. v. Bishop (In re Bishop), 74 B.R. 677, 681 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1987); Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 349.02[ 2] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.). Applying this reasoning, if a debtor's case is dismissed prior to discharge, § 349(a) allows that debtor another opportunity to get the same debts discharged in a later case, absent certain extenuating circumstances. See…
    PAGE 581
  7. In re Duran

    No. CC-20-1045-KTG (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jul. 27, 2021)
    Appellate courts have had to discern from facts what was intended when a bankruptcy court dismisses a case "with prejudice" without explanation. E.g., Tomlin, 105 F.3d at 940-41; Casse v. Key Bank Nat'l Ass'n (In re Casse), 198 F.3d 327, 333-34 (2d Cir. 1999); Leavitt, 209 B.R. at 941 n.10; see also 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 349.02[3] (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2021).
    PAGE 13
  8. In re Merayo

    319 B.R. 883 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005)   Cited 2 times
    There is no disagreement with the case law interpreting section 349 that a bankruptcy court may for just cause dismiss a case with prejudice that would bar the debtor any relief under any chapter in any subsequent case. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 349.02[2] (Alan N. Resnick Henry J. Sommer, et al., eds., 15th ed. rev. 1993). A dismissal with prejudice may bar further bankruptcy proceedings between the parties and may be a complete adjudication of the issues. Leavitt v. Soto (In re Leavitt), 171 F.3d 1219, 1233-24 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing In re Tomlin, 105 F.3d 933, 936-37 (4th Cir. 1997); In re Penny, 243 B.R. 720, 727 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2000) (citing In re Leavitt, 171 F.3d at 1223-24; In re Tomlin, 105 F.3d 933; In re Frieouf, 938 F.2d 1099 (10th Cir. 1991)).
    PAGE 3
  9. State v. Teasdale

    868 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015)
    ¶ 15 Before concluding, I note that Teasdale cites to Wis. Stat. § 349.02(2)(c), which provides that “a law enforcement officer may not stop a vehicle solely because the vehicle's color differs from the color stated in the application for registration of that vehicle.” (Emphasis added.) However, as noted above, the deputy testified that he stopped the car based on the color discrepancy and his reasonable mistaken belief as to the make and model. Thus, to the extent that Teasdale may be making an argument based on § 349.02(2)(c), it is not dispositive here. Rather, the dispositive issue is whether the totality of the facts and circumstances give rise to reasonable suspicion that Teasdale violated Wis. Stat. § 341.61(2), the statute pertaining to the display of registration plates.
  10. In re Bradley

    38 B.R. 425 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984)   Cited 26 times
    2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 349.02 (15th ed.).
    PAGE 432