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F.S. 349.03 on Google Scholar

F.S. 349.03 on Casetext

Amendments to 349.03


The 2022 Florida Statutes

Title XXVI
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
Chapter 349
JACKSONVILLE TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 349.03 Florida Statutes and Case Law
349.03 Jacksonville Transportation Authority.
(1) There is hereby created and established a body politic and corporate and an agency of the state to be known as the Jacksonville Expressway Authority, redesignated as the Jacksonville Transportation Authority, and hereinafter referred to as the “authority.”
(2) The governing body of the authority shall consist of seven members. Three members shall be appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate. Three members shall be appointed by the mayor of the City of Jacksonville subject to confirmation by the council of the City of Jacksonville. The seventh member shall be the district secretary of the Department of Transportation serving in the district that contains the City of Jacksonville. Except for the seventh member, members shall be residents and qualified electors of Duval County.
(3)(a) The terms of appointed members shall be for 4 years deemed to have commenced on June 1 of the year in which they are appointed. Each member shall hold office until a successor has been appointed and has qualified. A vacancy during a term shall be filled by the respective appointing authority only for the balance of the unexpired term. Any member appointed to the authority for two consecutive full terms shall not be eligible for appointment to the next succeeding term. One of the members so appointed shall be designated annually by the members as chair of the authority, one member shall be designated annually as the vice chair of the authority, one member shall be designated annually as the secretary of the authority, and one member shall be designated annually as the treasurer of the authority. The members of the authority shall not be entitled to compensation, but shall be reimbursed for travel expenses or other expenses actually incurred in their duties as provided by law. Four voting members of the authority shall constitute a quorum, and no resolution adopted by the authority shall become effective unless with the affirmative vote of at least four members. Members of the authority shall file as their mandatory financial disclosure a statement of financial interest with the Commission on Ethics as provided in s. 112.3145.
(b) The authority shall employ an executive director, and the executive director may hire such staff, permanent or temporary, as he or she may determine and may organize the staff of the authority into such departments and units as he or she may determine. The executive director may appoint department directors, deputy directors, division chiefs, and staff assistants to the executive director, as he or she may determine. In so appointing the executive director, the authority may fix the compensation of such appointee, who shall serve at the pleasure of the authority. All employees of the authority shall be exempt from the provisions of part II of chapter 110. The authority may employ such financial advisers and consultants, technical experts, engineers, and agents and employees, permanent or temporary, as it may require and may fix the compensation and qualifications of such persons, firms, or corporations. The authority may delegate to one or more of its agents or employees such of its powers as it shall deem necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter, subject always to the supervision and control of the governing body of the authority.
History.s. 3, ch. 29996, 1955; s. 19, ch. 63-400; s. 1, ch. 67-542; ss. 23, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 1, ch. 70-381; s. 2, ch. 71-101; s. 1, ch. 79-409; s. 209, ch. 81-259; s. 1, ch. 85-263; s. 11, ch. 88-215; s. 525, ch. 95-148; s. 50, ch. 2002-1; s. 4, ch. 2007-196; s. 2, ch. 2009-111; s. 71, ch. 2012-174.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: August 29, 2022
F.S. 349.03 on Google Scholar

F.S. 349.03 on Casetext

Amendments to 349.03


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 349.03
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 349.03.


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S349.03
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 349.03.


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Janesville v. Walker

    50 Wis. 2d 35 (Wis. 1971)   Cited 14 times
    The state of Wisconsin has preempted the field of traffic regulations by the enactment of chapters 341 to 348 and by sec. 349.03, Stats., which provides that these chapters shall be uniform in operation throughout the state and no local authority may enact any traffic regulation unless such regulation is not contrary to or inconsistent with these sections or such regulation is expressly authorized by secs. 349.06 to 349.25 or some other provision of the statutes. By sec. 349.06 the legislature affirmatively delegated to municipalities the power to enact traffic regulations which are in strict conformity with chapters 341 to 348. The city of Janesville argues there is a difference in these two references to municipal power. We think not. Sec. 349.03, in prohibitory language, is the same concept of municipal power which is expressed affirmatively in sec. 349.06. Both refer to the same chapters 341 to 348. These two sections dealing with the power of municipalities to enact traffic regulations must be read together and establish one test.
    PAGE 37
  2. Scheunemann v. City of West Bend

    179 Wis. 2d 469 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 85 times
    Section 349.03.
    PAGE 482
  3. State v. Burt

    658 N.W.2d 87 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003)
    ¶ 7. We note that Wis. Stat. § 349.03(4) was enacted as part of 1983 Wis. Act 535. Before this, except in cases of fresh pursuit, an officer was restricted to his or her own jurisdiction. See Wis. Stat. § 349.03 (1981-82). Section 349.03(4) now gives an officer authority to go beyond the jurisdiction, indeed anywhere in the state, to enforce a violation of OWI or implied consent. The officer need only establish that the violation occurred within his or her jurisdiction to have the authority to investigate and arrest outside the jurisdiction. Here, Ekholm observed Hunt's car make several lane deviations and cross the yellow line twice within his jurisdiction. Ekholm therefore had the authority to stop and arrest Burt even after Burt had left the village limits.
  4. Keck v. Eminisor

    104 So. 3d 359 (Fla. 2012)   Cited 65 times
    Under this structure, all parties agree that JTA falls within the definition of a state agency. In fact, section 349.03(1), Florida Statutes, expressly designates JTA as “a body politic and corporate and an agency of the state.” § 349.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). The question, however, is whether JTM fits under the third category, which expressly includes “corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities ... of the state.” § 768.28(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). Keck argues that JTM is included because it is a corporation primarily acting as an instrumentality of JTA, a state agency. However, the trial court ruled that while JTA is an independent establishment of the State and thus is entitled to sovereign immunity, the same cannot be said as to JTM because the statutory definition in section 768.28(2) does not expressly include corporations that are acting primarily as instrumentalities or agencies of independent establishments of the State. Eminisor asserts that the trial court's construction of the statute was correct. We disagree.
    PAGE 367
  5. City of Madison v. Crossfield

    671 N.W.2d 717 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 3 times
    ¶ 8. The supreme court concluded in Henkel v. Phillips , 82 Wis.2d 27, 260 N.W.2d 653 (1978), that a University of Wisconsin Board of Regents regulation permitting the towing and impounding of vehicles illegally parked on the Madison campus did not contravene Wis. Stat. § 349.03(1) in part because regulating the towing and impounding of vehicles was not "promulgating `traffic regulations' as the term is used in sec. 349.03." Id . at 30. The court noted that "[t]raffic is defined in sec. 340.01(68) . . . to mean, `. . . vehicles and other conveyances, either singly or together, while using any highway for the purpose of travel.'" Id . Here, as in Henkel , Crossfield challenges a local regulation that has nothing to do with "vehicles . . . while using any highway for the purpose of travel." In short, the City's regulation of the types of vehicles that may be parked in a residential district does not contravene Wis. Stat. § 349.03(1).
  6. Suspension of Operating Privilege of Bardwell

    83 Wis. 2d 891 (Wis. 1978)   Cited 38 times
    Sec. 349.03, Stats., is entitled "Regulation by local authorities forbidden; exceptions." This title, as well as a reading of sec. 349.03 as a whole, shows that sec. 349.03 is intended to restrict the enactment and enforcement of local traffic regulations and that it does not purport to deal with the enforcement of state traffic regulations. We hold that sec. 349.03 has no bearing on the question of whether the City is authorized to prosecute a refusal to take a designated chemical test.
    PAGE 902
  7. Town of East Troy v. A-1 Service Co., Inc.

    537 N.W.2d 126 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 3 times
    In City of Janesville v. Walker, 50 Wis.2d 35, 36-37, 183 N.W.2d 158, 159-60 (1971), our supreme court addressed an argument similar to that set forth by the Town here. The City of Janesville contended that subsecs. (a) and (b) of § 349.03(1), STATS., presented two separate powers to enact traffic ordinances, with subsec. (a) permitting the enactment of rules which, while not in strict conformity with the traffic statutes, are not inconsistent with the traffic statutes. Our supreme court rejected that argument, holding that §§ 349.03 and 349.06, STATS., must be read together to establish one test that municipal traffic ordinances must be in strict conformity with chs. 341 to 348 and 350, STATS. See Walker, 50 Wis.2d at 36-37, 183 N.W.2d at 159-60 (construing § 349.03, STATS., 1969, which provides that local traffic regulation may not be inconsistent with chs. 341 to 348, STATS.).
    PAGE 131
  8. State v. Nelis

    791 N.W.2d 405 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010)
    ¶ 8 The trial court acknowledged, "I have my internal doubts that [Ovaska's] testimony is particularly accurate as to what happened out there only because the time line doesn't add up . . . the log times and pull over times don't quite add up." Nonetheless, the trial court denied Nelis's motion to suppress. The court found that WIS. STAT. § 349.03(4) authorized Ovaska's extrajurisdictional stop of Nelis's vehicle. Specifically, the court determined that § 349.03(4) allows an officer to make an extrajurisdictional stop when the officer has reasonable suspicion to make the stop based on events occurring in the officer's jurisdiction. The court found that, even if Ovaska did not observe Nelis driving erratically within the city limits, Ovaska had reasonable suspicion to stop him based on events that occurred in the city of Ashland.
    PAGE 4
  9. Madison v. Reynolds

    48 Wis. 2d 156 (Wis. 1970)   Cited 7 times
    The city argues the phrase "free use of all highways" cannot include unlimited access to highways because there are many limitations upon the use of highways which are not contained in sec. 349.03(2), Stats. As we view these limitations, those in ch. 349 are expressly authorized as express regulatory powers and those in ch. 66 are special powers granted under the general municipal law. These statutes relating to specific power are to be construed in derogation of sec. 349.03(2). Whether these sections are considered to be an implied limitation on sec. 349.03(2) or a specific delegation of power recognized by sec. 349.03(1) is not relevant. If the city's argument is correct that the police power in sec. 62.11 is all inclusive subject only to the reasonable exercise thereof, there would be no need for these separate sections specifically delegating authority. Furthermore, sec. 62.11(5) is not an implied exception to sec. 349.03(2) by analogy to these specific statutes. We see no logical analogy between a general police power which can be limited and a special power in derogation of a general prohibition.
    PAGE 160