F.S. 349.13 on Google Scholar

F.S. 349.13 on Casetext

Amendments to 349.13

The 2022 Florida Statutes

Title XXVI
Chapter 349
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 349.13 Florida Statutes and Case Law
349.13 Exemption from taxation.The effectuation of the authorized purposes of the authority created under this chapter is, shall and will be, in all respects for the benefit of the people of the state, for the increase of their commerce and prosperity, and for the improvement of their health and living conditions, and since such authority will be performing essential governmental functions in effectuating such purposes, such authority shall not be required to pay any taxes or assessments of any kind or nature whatsoever upon any property acquired or used by it for such purposes or upon any rates, fees, rentals, receipts, income, or charges at any time received by it, and the bonds and other obligations issued under this chapter, their transfer and the income therefrom (including any profits made on the sale thereof), shall at all times be free from taxation of any kind by the state or by any political subdivision or taxing agency or instrumentality thereof. The exemption granted by this section shall not be applicable to any tax imposed by chapter 220 on interest, income, or profits on debt obligations owned by corporations. When property of the authority is leased, it shall be exempt from ad valorem taxes only if the use by the lessee qualifies the property for exemption under s. 196.199.
History.s. 13, ch. 29996, 1955; s. 13, ch. 73-327; s. 13, ch. 2009-111.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: August 29, 2022
F.S. 349.13 on Google Scholar

F.S. 349.13 on Casetext

Amendments to 349.13

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 349.13
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 349.13.

Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S349.13
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 349.13.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. ¶13 Always Towing argues that this drop fee ordinance is preempted by Wis.Stat. § 349.13(3m) and Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 319.03 (Jan. 2016), which together create a comprehensive fee schedule for nonconsensual towing services and do not leave room for the City to enact the drop fee ordinance. In particular, Always Towing argues that § 349.13(3m) creates a right to "immediately" tow a vehicle, and the drop fee ordinance interferes with that right when it requires the towing company to discontinue the towing process if the vehicle owner or authorized operator arrives before the vehicle is fully hooked up. Always Towing further argues that § 349.13(3m)(e) authorizes the Department of Transportation (DOT) to promulgate rules providing a fee structure that may be charged for towing services, that the DOT set forth a fee structure for towing services in § Trans 319.03, and the drop fee ordinance is an "entirely new fee category" that is not authorized by either the statute or the regulation.
    PAGE 6
  2. Vill. of Chenequa v. Dahlquist

    Appeal No. 2019AP1145 (Wis. Ct. App. Sep. 16, 2020)
    ¶17 In short, the requirements of subd. 2. of WIS. STAT. § 349.13(1e)(c) were supported by the evidence, and Dahlquist introduced nothing to show otherwise. Again, an ordinance is presumed valid. See Town of Clearfield , 150 Wis. 2d at 20. Although that presumption can be overcome, Dahlquist fell far short of doing so, providing neither persuasive legal argument nor evidence. Therefore, the ordinance conforms to § 349.13 and does not violate state law. The Circuit Court Did Not Err in Denying Dahlquist's Summary Judgment Motion
    PAGE 9
  3. Sutton v. City of Milwaukee

    672 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1982)   Cited 111 times
    The State of Wisconsin has petitioned for rehearing with respect to the issue, not discussed in our opinion, whether the state statutes, Wis.Stat. §§ 342.20 and 349.13(3), that authorize towing are unconstitutional on their face because they do not require the city officers who do the actual towing to comply with any procedural safeguards, either pre-towing or post-towing, or whether they are merely enabling legislation. The district court's judgment contains a declaration that the statutes are unconstitutional. But the state was not a party in the district court. It intervened in the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) and filed a brief, but it did not participate in the oral argument, and we formed the impression, evidently erroneously, that the constitutionality of the state statutes was no longer an issue in the case.
    PAGE 649
  4. Under Iowa Code section 349.13, the appeal is "triable de novo as an equitable action without formal proceedings." As an appeal of an equitable proceeding, our review is de novo. State ex rel. Miller v. Vertrue, Inc. , 834 N.W.2d 12, 20 (Iowa 2013) ; Sille v. Shaffer , 297 N.W.2d 379, 381 (Iowa 1980).
    PAGE 710
  5. Stojsavljevic v. City of Milwaukee

    771 N.W.2d 928 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009)
    Were this court to address the merits of the argument posed by Stojsavljevic, it appears that the City would still prevail. Stojsavljevic's reliance on WIS. STAT. § 349.13(1e)(c)1. may be misplaced. Instead, as the City points out, night parking restrictions seem to be governed by § 349.13(1e)(c)2., which states, in relevant part:
  6. Sutton v. City of Milwaukee

    521 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Wis. 1981)   Cited 2 times
    Count I — Class: All owners whose vehicles have been, are being, or will be seized, towed and stored under § 349.13(3) Wis.Stats. (1979) or Milwaukee Code of Ordinances § 101-25(1);
    PAGE 736
  7. Milwaukee v. Hoffmann

    29 Wis. 2d 193 (Wis. 1965)   Cited 15 times
    Sec. 349.13 (1), Stats., provides in part that "no prohibition, limitation or restriction on parking imposed pursuant to this section is effective unless official traffic signs or markers or parking meters have been placed or erected indicating the particular prohibition, limitation or restriction."
    PAGE 196
  8. OPINION NO. OAG 92-77

    66 Op. Att'y Gen. 308 (Ops.Wis.Atty.Gen. 1977)
    It would serve no useful purpose to try to distinguish which of the stopping or standing violations might conceivably be considered moving violations. The penalties for nonmoving violations are usually small. Also, parking citations do not have to be processed through the court clerk's office. See sec. 345.28 (1), Stats. It is likely that the Legislature felt that attempting to collect the ten percent assessment against such violations would not be practical. You are therefore advised that the only violations exempt from the ten percent penalty assessment are violations of ordinances adopted under secs. 349.13 and 349.14, Stats., and violations of secs. 346.50 through 346.55, Stats.
    PAGE 309
  9. Dunham v. Clayton

    470 N.W.2d 362 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 4 times
    Iowa Code § 349.13.
    PAGE 366
  10. OPINION NO. OAG 14-88

    77 Op. Att'y Gen. 73 (Ops.Wis.Atty.Gen. 1988)
    Villages may manage and control their highways to provide for the public health, safety and welfare except as provided elsewhere in the statutes. Sec. 61.34 (1), Stats. Further, they may regulate parking "beyond the prohibitions, limitations or restrictions imposed by ch. 346, except that they may not modify the exceptions set forth in s. 346.50." Sec. 349.13 (1), Stats. Section 61.34 (5), Stats., mandates a liberal construction of these rights and powers.
    PAGE 74