The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
|
||||||
|
. . . Rogers claims the trial court violated his rights under section 394.916, Florida Statutes (2017), when . . . to trial within the thirty days of the trial court's probable cause finding, as required by section 394.916 . . .
. . . . §§ 394.914, 394.915(1), 394.916(1). . . . within thirty days to determine the question by clear and convincing evidence. §§ .394.9135(3), 394.915, 394.916 . . .
. . . appointed counsel, Defendant agreed in both open court and in writing to waive his right under section 394.916 . . .
. . . . § 394.916. . . .
. . . . § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). In State v. . . .
. . . See § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. . . . Section 394.916(2), Florida Statutes, provides that a “trial may be continued once upon the request of . . . continuances may be granted unless the court finds that a manifest injustice would otherwise occur.” § 394.916 . . . trial court found probable cause that Appellant met the criteria for commitment, triggering section 394.916 . . . Specifically, section 394.916 provides: (1) Within 30 days after the determination of probable cause, . . . Instead, the invited error doctrine overcomes the mandatory time requirements set forth in section 394.916 . . . Section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (2009), states, “Within 30 days after the determination of probable . . . notably where a continuance, for good cause or in the interest of justice, has been granted under section 394.916 . . .
. . . After consultation with counsel, Morel agreed in open court to waive his right under section 394.916( . . . At the time of Morel’s initial confinement in April 2002, section 394.916(2) provided that “[t]he trial . . . See § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. . . . Before its revision in 2006, section 394.916(2) of the Act provided that “[t]he trial may be continued . . . When interpreting the interplay between section 394.916, subsections (1) and (2), the Second District . . . See generally §§ 394.913(2)-(3), 394.9135(3), 394.914, 394.916(5), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .
. . . Section 394.916(1) provides the court shall conduct a trial within 30 days after the determination of . . . Section 394.916(2) states the court may grant one continuance for “not more than 120 days.” . . .
. . . . § 394.916(l)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . . trial take place within thirty days after the determination of probable cause, unless continued. § 394.916 . . . continuances may be granted unless the court finds that a manifest injustice would otherwise occur. § 394.916 . . . See § 394.916(l)-(2), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . to trial within thirty days from the date of the probable cause determination as required by section 394.916 . . . bring Richards to trial within thirty days from the probable cause determination as required by section 394.916 . . . to trial within thirty days from the date of the probable cause determination as required by section 394.916 . . . State, 907 So.2d 505 (Fla.2005), noted that the requirement under section 394.916(1) that trial commence . . . The motion to dismiss for violation of section 394.916(1) was filed on March 31, 2010, which was a little . . .
. . . We presume that the “statutory guidelines” to which court was referring was section 394.916(1), Florida . . . However, section 394.916(1) no longer sets the date by which trial is to commence. . . . Because rule 4.240 conflicts with section 394.916(1) as to the date by which trial is to commence, the . . . its own motion in the interests of justice, when the person will not be substantially prejudiced.” § 394.916 . . .
. . . . § 394.916(2), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . Section 394.916(1) states that “[wjithin 30 days after the determination of probable cause, the court . . .
. . . Section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (1999-2010), states that the court shall conduct a trial on the . . .
. . . demonstrated good cause and that the defense did not establish substantial prejudice as required by section 394.916 . . . Section 394.916, Florida Statutes (2008), provides in pertinent part: (1) Within 30 days after the determination . . .
. . . dismissed due to the State’s failure to bring Goode to trial within thirty days as required by section 394.916 . . . the State failed to bring a detainee to trial within the thirty-day time period set forth in section 394.916 . . . Section 394.916(1) provides that "[w]ithin 30 days after the determination of probable cause, the court . . . allows for the trial to be continued upon a request of either party and a showing of good cause, see § 394.916 . . .
. . . As adopted, rule 4.260, Continuance of Trial, tracks the language of section 394.916(2), Florida Statutes . . .
. . . . § 394.916(1). . . . .
. . . by clear and convincing evidence that the person requires commitment. 831 So.2d at 105; see also §§ 394.916 . . .
. . . . § 394.916(3). . . .
. . . . § 394.916, Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . . § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . .
. . . for the first time, raised the thirty-day deadline in a “Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Section 394.916 . . . Further, section 394.916(2) of the Act provides for waiver of the deadline upon the trial court’s granting . . . open court that expressly and unequivocally demands a trial within thirty days pursuant to section 394.916 . . .
. . . probable cause under s. 394.915 or pursuant to a commitment as a sexually violent predator under s. 394.916 . . .
. . . Section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that “[wjithin thirty days after the determination . . . could not ensure that the appellee will not be held beyond the thirty-day time limit set by section 394.916 . . . So.2d 817, 823 (Fla.2002), the Florida Supreme Court held that the thirty-day time limit in section 394.916 . . . For example, section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (2000), provides that “[wjithin thirty days after the . . . In addition to the provision for an adversarial probable cause determination, section 394.916(2) provides . . .
. . . . § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). . Dr. Benoit and Dr. Pritchard. . § 394.911, Fla. Stat. (2000). . . .
. . . to trial within the thirty days of the trial court’s probable cause finding, as required by section 394.916 . . . We further interpreted the thirty-day time provision in section 394.916, Florida Statutes (1999), as . . . we have already concluded that dismissal is appropriate if the mandatory time standards of section 394.916 . . . As noted above, section 394.916(2), allows for a continuance, upon a showing of good cause by one of . . . See Kinder, 830 So.2d at 833 (“[A]fter the time period in section 394.916(1) has run, trial is no longer . . . See § 394.916(2), Fla. . . . there should be “scrupulous compliance” with the statutory thirty-day time limit set forth in section 394.916 . . .
. . . . § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. (2004). . § 394.915, Fla. Stal. (2004). . . .
. . . Id. at 514 (emphasis added) (quoting § 394.916(2), Fla. Stat. (1999)).. . . . Id. at 824 (“As noted above, section 394.916(2) allows for a continuance, upon a showing of good cause . . .
. . . Pursuant to section 394.916(3), the trial court also appointed counsel for Branch to represent him in . . .
. . . . § 394.916(4), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . .
. . . Curry who stipulates to either a waiver of his right to a trial within thirty days under section 394.916 . . . (1), Florida Statutes (2002), or to a continuance of his trial pursuant to section 394.916(2), Florida . . . See § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). Mr. . . . This notice did not refer to the thirty-day time limit set forth in section 394.916(1). . . . for a continuance under section 394.916(2) are essentially equivalent. . . . .
. . . trial court’s finding of probable cause that he is a sexually violent predator, pursuant to section 394.916 . . .
. . . However, Ennis also asserts that he was not brought to trial within thirty days as required by section 394.916 . . .
. . . probable cause under s. 394.915 or pursuant to a commitment as a sexually violent predator under s. 394.916 . . .
. . . See 830 So.2d at 828 The particular section under review in Goode, section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes . . .
. . . Section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that “[wjithin thirty days after the determination . . . could not ensure that the appellee will not be held beyond the thirty-day time limit set by section 394.916 . . . So.2d 817, 823 (Fla.2002), the Florida Supreme Court held that the thirty-day time limit in section 394.916 . . .
. . . We note that section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (2000), provides that a sexually violent predator detainee . . .
. . . See §§ 394.915, 394.916, Fla. Stat. (2001). . . .
. . . Section 394.916 states, in pertinent part: (1) Within SO days after the determination of probable cause . . . See § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat (1999). . . . See § 394.916(2). . . . As noted above, section 394.916(2), allows for a continuance, upon a showing of good cause by one of . . . In the instant case, no continuance was granted pursuant to section 394.916(2), which allows a party . . . I would find the thirty-day time period in section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (Jimmy Ryce Act) to be . . . the thirty-day time period, although it provided no consequences for the State’s failure to comply. § 394.916 . . .
. . . importance: WHETHER THE FAILURE TO COMMENCE A COMMITMENT TRIAL WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD OF SECTION 394.916 . . . Fla. 2002), and we approve the Second District’s holding herein that the time provisions of section 394.916 . . . Thus, after the time period in section 394.916(1) has run, trial is no longer pending and section 394.915 . . . See § 394.916(2). . . . See § 394.916(3), Fla. Stat. (2001). . . .
. . . See § 394.916(3), (4), Fla. Stat. (2001). . See id. § 394.916(5). . See id. § 394.917(1), (3). . . . .
. . . . § 394.916(1). . . . Id. § 394.916(5). . . . Id. § 394.916(3). . . .
. . . Pursuant to section 394.916(3), Florida Statutes (2000), Burton is entitled to the assistance of counsel . . .
. . . See § 394.916, Fla. Stat. (2000). . . .
. . . probable cause under the new standard, the matter shall proceed to trial in accordance with section 394.916 . . .
. . . The motion cited to section 394.916 of the Act which provides, in relevant part: 394.916 Trial; counsel . . . its own motion in the interests of justice, when the person will not be substantially prejudiced. § 394.916 . . . the thirty-day time period, although it provided no consequences for the State’s failure to comply. § 394.916 . . .
. . . respondent to trial within thirty days of the initial probable cause determination, pursuant to section 394.916 . . . importance: WHETHER THE FAILURE TO COMMENCE A COMMITMENT TRIAL WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD OF SECTION 394.916 . . .
. . . probable cause after an adversarial hearing, the 30 day clock for commencement of trial in section 394.916 . . . Moreover, as section 394.916(2) provides that the time for commencement of trial may be extended upon . . .
. . . . § 394.916, Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . Moreover, although section 394.916, Florida Statutes (1999), allows for the thirty-day period to be continued . . . See § 394.916(2). . . . that the legislature unconstitutionally usurped the court’s rule making authority in enacting section 394.916 . . . importance: WHETHER THE FAILURE TO COMMENCE A COMMITMENT TRIAL WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD OF SECTION 394.916 . . .
. . . See § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . See §§ 394.916(3), 394.920, Fla. Stat. (1999). B. . . . procedural and substantive rights include the following: (1) the right to counsel, see §§ 394.915(3), 394.916 . . . Stat. (1999); (4) trial by jury, see § 394.916, Fla. . . .
. . . See § 394.916(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . See also § 394.916(3), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . Section 394.916 provides: (1) Within 30 days after the determination of probable cause, the court shall . . . See § 394.916(3), (5). . . . . See § 394.916(1). . . .