The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . Law § 440.30(1)(a). . . .
. . . . § 440.30(l)(a), Hy-man sought DNA testing on the intact 9mm Intratech pistol found in Whitmore’s car . . . devoid of character and weight because none of the alleged retractions are sworn as required by C.P.L. § 440.30 . . . record should be denied because he failed to comply with the “sworn allegation” requirement of C.P.L. § 440.30 . . . N.Y.C.P.L. § 440.30(4)(b). . . .
. . . Code R. 60-0-6.114(1) & (2); see also § 440.30, Fla. Stat. (2005).” In Pierre v. . . .
. . . Law § 440.30(l-a) (McKinney 1994). . . . Law § 440.30(l-a)(b). . . . Section 440.30(l-a)(a) was not enacted until 2004. . . . Law § 440.30(l-a)(a) (McKinney 2004), with N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 440.30(l-a) (McKinney 1994). . . . . Law § 440.30(1-a)(b); see 2004 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2794 (McKiiiney). . . .
. . . That claim was denied pursuant to CPL § 440.30(4)(b). . . . April 22, 2013) (finding denial of motion under § 440.30(4)(b) to be determination on the merits arid . . . Smith, 858 F.Supp.2d 229, 236 (N.D.N.Y.2012) (concluding that § 440.30(4)(b) constituted a decision on . . . July 27, 2007) (holding that because “section 440.30(4) applies, by its own terms, only when a trial . . . court denies a motion to vacate ‘[u]pon considering the merits,’ ... a denial pursuant to CPL § 440.30 . . .
. . . Law § 440.30(6), can be seen to be in tension with Strickland’s requirement that petitioners need only . . .
. . . . § 440.30(4)(c) which indicates that a court may deny a C.P.L. § 440 motion if ‘an allegation of fact . . .
. . . See § 440.30, Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .
. . . The E/C took Shannon’s deposition prior to the institution of any claim, as permitted by section 440.30 . . . Fees Due Under Section 440.30 Section 440.30, Florida Statutes (2010), is the specific provision within . . . See § 440.30, Fla. Stat. . . . is a “claim” as the term is used in section 440.30. . . . Ch. 79-40, § 23, Laws of Fla.; see also § 440.30, Fla. Stat. (1979). . . .
. . . . § 440.30(4)(a).) . . . (Id. at 10 (citing C.P.L. § 440.30(4)(d)).) . . .
. . . The County Court cited CPL § 440.30(4)(b) in support of its decision and noted that Petitioner’s claim . . . report had been intentionally altered to conceal the true arrest date of the witness .... ” Section 440.30 . . . Scully, 875 F.Supp. 182, 192-93 n. 9 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (all holding that denial under § 440.30(4)(b) due . . . Oct. 15, 2007) (finding that denial pursuant to § 440.30(4)(b) was a decision on the merits subject to . . . This Court previously adopted the view that a § 440.30(4)(b) denial is not a procedural bar. . . .
. . . The state court denied petitioner’s motion pursuant to CPL § 440.30(2), (4)(a), (4)(b) and (4)(d). . . . Section 440.30(4)(b) provides that, “[ujpon considering the merits” of a section 440 motion, the court . . . This court, however, has previously held that because section 440.30(4) opens with an explicit reference . . . to “considering the merits of the motion,” a denial based on section 440.30(4) is “a decision on the . . . The Second Circuit has reached a similar conclusion regarding section 440.30(4)(c). Garcia v. . . .
. . . The court relied on CPL section 440.30(4)(b), holding that the motion did not have the necessary sworn . . . The state court rejected these claims under section 440.30(4)(b), because defendant’s moving papers did . . . July 2008 Order; § 440.30(4)(b). . See id. . See id. . See id. . 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). . . . .
. . . . § 440.30 in Kings County Supreme Court seeking to vacate his conviction on two grounds: 1) the “prosecutor . . . Pursuant to CPL § 440.30, People v. Graves, Ind. No. 9064/95 (Kings Cnty. Sup.Ct. Jan. 10, 2006). . . .
. . . Procedure Law (“Section 440.30(1-a)”), which provides, in substance, that a post-conviction defendant . . . L. § 440.30(1-a)(a). The quoted language was originally the full extent of § 440.30(1-a). . . . Upon the enactment of § 440.30(1-a)(b), the original language was placed under the heading of § 440.30 . . . Id. § 440.30(1-a)(b). . Pl. Mem. at 4 (emphasis omitted). . McKithen, 626 F.3d at 145. . . . . See § 440.30(1-a)(b). . See Pl. Mem. At 6. . . . .
. . . claimant, the judge entered an amended final order, rejecting arguments that sections 440.13(5) and 440.30 . . . Claimant contends that sections 440.13(5) and 440.30, Florida Statutes (2004), control the disposition . . . Section 440.30 permits fees charged by court reporters and witnesses to “be taxed as costs and recovered . . . Claimant’s argument that the language of section 440.30 “expressly limits” the award of costs for depositions . . .
. . . Law § 440.30(l-a). . . . L. § 440.30(l~a)(a). . . . C.P.L. § 440.30(l-a). However, in District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. . . . Law § 440.30(l-a) with Brady v. . . . Accordingly, the County Court denied the claim pursuant to CPL § 440.30(4)(b). . . .
. . . motion [alleging ineffective assistance of counsel] is therefore denied (CPL 440.10(2)(a), (c); CPL 440.30 . . .
. . . See CPL § 440.30(4)(a). . . . The state court's decisions were based on, and in compliance with section 440.30(4)(a). . . .
. . . Criminal Procedure Law § 440.30(1-a) (“440 motion”), seeking DNA testing of evidence secured in connection . . .
. . . Law § 440.30(1-a)(a). . . . Law § 440.30(1-a)(a). B. . . . Law § 440.30(1-a)(a) in his case. . . . Law § 440.30(1-a)(a). . . . Law § 440.30(1-a)(a). C. . . .
. . . Law § 440.30(4)(b)). . . .
. . . New York's subdivision 1-a to New York Criminal Procedure Law section 440.30 ("section 440.30(l-a)(a) . . . L. § 440.30(l-a)(a). See, e.g., Fuentes v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. . . . court denied post-conviction defendant's request for access to evidence for DNA testing under section 440.30 . . . preservation of evidence, a fact which could unfortunately serve to circumvent the spirit of section 440.30 . . .
. . . Section 440.30[sic] to Set Aside Sentence and to Vacate Judgment.” . . . C.P.L. § 440.30 sets out the circumstances under which the motion court may deny, without a hearing, . . . The substance of Barney's pleading makes clear that the reference to § 440.30 was a simple error, and . . .
. . . . § 440.30(4)(b) (“Upon considering the merits of the motion, the court may deny it without conducting . . . Borcyk states that he fears that this holding based upon C.P.L. § 440.30(4)(b) is a procedural bar. . . . 440.10 motion ‘[u]pon considering the merits of the motion,’ ” and therefore “a denial pursuant to § 440.30 . . . failed to come forward the first time with sufficient proof, [he] will be barred by CPL 440.10(3)(c) and 440.30 . . . C.P.L. § 440.30(1) lists the grounds upon which a trial court may order vacatur of a judgment; it does . . .
. . . Law § 440.30(4)(b). . . . and the trial court denied them because they were not supported by sufficient facts, citing C.P.L. § 440.30 . . .
. . . Smith states that she “is raising the same grounds that she raised on direct appeal and her 440.30[sic . . .
. . . Criminal Procedure Law § 440.30(1-a). The motion was denied. See Decision and Order, People v. . . . Proc. § 440.30(1-a)(a); citing People v. . . .
. . . motion [alleging ineffective assistance of counsel] is therefore denied (CPL 440.10(2)(a), (c); CPL 440.30 . . .
. . . In 1994, New York enacted subdivision 1-a to New York Criminal Procedure Law section 440.30 (“section . . . 440.30(l-a)(a)”), permitting a postconviction defendant to “request the performance of a forensic DNA . . . After section 440.30(l-a)(a) was enacted, Newton made three additional requests to obtain a DNA test . . . L. § 440.30(l-a)(a). . See Deposition of ADA John Carroll, Ex. . . . L. § 440.30(l-a)(a). Accord Fuentes v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Coir. . . .
. . . Law 440.30(l-a) (McKinney 2004) (the “440 motion”), seeking access to the blood evidence found at the . . .
. . . Law § 440.30(l-a)(a) (emphases added in McKithen)). . . .
. . . R. 60Q-6.114(1) & (2); see also § 440.30, Fla. Stat. (2005). . . .
. . . . § 440.30(2) and (4)(a), (b). . . .
. . . . § 440.30(l-a) (West 2005)); Act of May 9, 1997, Pub. Act No. 90-141, 1997 Ill. . . . . §440.30(l-a) (West 2005); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §15A-269 (Lexis 2007); N. D. Cent. . . .
. . . coram nobis (the "Coram Nobis Motion”), and a second motion to vacate judgment pursuant to CPL Section 440.30 . . .
. . . . § 440.30, in which he alleged the following: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for: (a) his failure . . .
. . . suggests that the basis for the New York Supreme Court’s decision was New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.30 . . .
. . . See CPL § 440.30(4)(a). . . .
. . . Law § 440.30(l-a), McKithen brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Queens County District . . . to the knife is precluded by the state court’s decision that he was not entitled to testing under § 440.30 . . . Law § 440.30(l-a), seeking court-ordered DNA testing of the knife to determine if Rose McKithen’s blood . . . Brown argues that if McKithen’s injury preexisted the § 440.30(l-a) motion, his claim must have accrued . . . Brown himself appears to agree that this is the correct interpretation of § 440.30(l-a). . . .
. . . . § 440.30(4)(b) and (d). . . .
. . . hearing, to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence, every fact essential to support the motion” (CPL § 440.30 . . .
. . . objection for the record, such that the claim is now proeedurally barred pursuant to § 440.10(3)(e) and § 440.30 . . .
. . . Law § 440.30(4)(b), which authorizes denial of a motion to vacate judgment without a hearing if the defendant . . . (See discussion infra at 313-14, 318-19). .Specifically, Section 440.30(4)(b) provides that "[u]pon considering . . . Law § 440.30(4)(b). . . . . Law § 440.30(4)(b) (see discussion supra at 306-07, n. 6), constitutes an independent and adequate state . . . .2005) (gathering cases detailing the Circuit split on the issue, and concluding that because “Section 440.30 . . .
. . . Law § 440.30(4). . . . Law § 440.30(4). . . . Law § 440.30(4) is procedural in nature, or on the merits. Compare Williams v. . . . Herbert, 369 F.Supp.2d 376, 389 (W.D.N.Y.2005) (holding that a determination under Section 440.30 is . . . If Judge Gulotta’s rejection of the petitioner’s argument based on Section 440.30(4) is procedural in . . .
. . . Law § 440.30, and because his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed to satisfy the requirements . . .
. . . N.Y.C.P.L. 440.30(4)(a). . . .
. . . November 7, 2002, more than ten years after the denial of his appeal and eight years after NYCPL § 440.30 . . . (l-a) (“§ 440.30”) had taken effect, Diaz moved, pro se, pursuant to that statute to vacate his judgment . . . corpus alleging the following grounds: (1) new evidence exists in the form of DNA testing pursuant to § 440.30 . . . Although Diaz had the right to pursue his § 440.30 motion at any time after his conviction, the “factual . . . . could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence” as early as the date on which § 440.30 . . .
. . . Law § 440.30(4)(b), but consented to petitioner’s request for a hearing pursuant to N.Y.Crim. Proc. . . . Law § 440.30(5). . . .
. . . Law § 440.30(l-a)(a), to compel, inter alia, DNA testing of the knife admitted into evidence at trial . . . Subsection l-a(a) of § 440.30 provides: Where the defendant’s motion requests the performance of a forensic . . . Law § 440.30(l-a)(a) (emphases added). . . . “naked assertion” that McKithen could have brought a federal constitutional claim as part of his § 440.30 . . . The state court, in denying McKithen’s § 440.30 motion to have the knife tested, reached the conclusion . . .
. . . Petitioner filed a motion to vacate pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.30 and an application . . .
. . . .”) § 440.30. . . . Because C.P.L. § 440.30 does not provide a basis for a motion to vacate; it only specifies the procedural . . .
. . . . § 440.30. . . .
. . . . §§ 440.10, 440.20, and 440.30. He claimed that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective. . . .
. . . . § 440.30(4)(b) and (d). Id. at 7-8. . . .
. . . Citing New York Criminal Procedure Law section 440.30, which states that motion papers must contain sworn . . . Citing New York Criminal Procedure Law section 440.30(4)(b), the court explained that “the Supreme Court . . . Wells presented his case as “an excellent opportunity to clarify the CPL 440.30[4][b] requirement that . . . Law § 440.30(1). . . . . Law § 440.30(4)(b). . . . .
. . . We need not reach the question of whether New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.30(l-a) creates a liberty . . . Law §§ 440.30(1-a), 450.10(5), 450.90 (McKinney Supp.2005); People v. . . . Law § 440.30(l-a) motion for forensic DNA testing tolled the statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § . . .
. . . state court was properly pointed out by the state Supreme Court Justice ruling on it as follows: CPL § 440.30 . . . CPL § 440.30(4)(b) states that a Court may deny a CPL § 440.10 motion, without a hearing, when an allegation . . .
. . . Law § 440.30(4)(b) and Romero v. . . . Law § 440.30(4)(b) ] would create a procedural bar”); Roberts v. . . . Law § 440.30(4)(b) is a decision on the merits. E.g., Lou v. . . . Law §§ 440.30(4)(b) and 440.30(4)(d) were not procedurally barred; state’s argument that the § 440 court . . . Because Section 440.30 refers to the procedures for deciding Section § 440.10 motions, and Section 440.30 . . .
. . . Discovery by deposition is permitted under section 440.30, Florida Statutes (2000), and its scope is . . .
. . . Law § 440.30(4)(c), was based on an “independent and adequate state procedural ground,” which prevents . . . Under § 440.30(4)(c), a court presented with a motion to vacate a judgment pursuant to N.Y. Crim. . . . We agree with the District Court that, based upon the plain language of § 440.30(4)(c), the state court . . . conclusively refuted” Garcia’s constitutional claims seems to be a most unreasonable application of § 440.30 . . .
. . . Law §§ 440.10 and 440.30, challenging the trial judge’s exclusion of one of his witnesses, alleging prosecutorial . . .
. . . Id. § 440.30(l)-(5). . . . Proc. § 440.30(1). . . . Undoubtedly, section 440.30 reflects important state policy. . . . Law § 440.30(l)-(5). . . . Law § 440.30(4)(d). . . .
. . . petitioner moved in New York Supreme Court, Kings County, under New York Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”) § 440.30 . . . Under CPL § 440.30(l-a), defendants convicted prior to January 1, 1996 may request a DNA test on certain . . .
. . . appeal but the defendant unjustifiably failed to do so), and New York Criminal Procedure Law section 440.30 . . . trial court’s invocation of New York Criminal Procedure Law sections 440.10(2)(a), 440.10(2)(c) and 440.30 . . . Feb. 17, 2000) (adequacy of section 440.30(1)). . . .
. . . Montalvo’s claim was based on facts that were unsupported by sworn allegations as required by CPL § 440.30 . . .
. . . same manner and for the same purpose as provided in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure or section 440.30 . . .
. . . Dep’t 2002) (affirming County Court’s denial of a motion made pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 440.30 . . .
. . . past the procedural barrier of CPL 440.10(2)(c), his motion would be summarily denied, pursuant to CPL 440.30 . . .
. . . (“CPL”) § 440.10 and 440.30, asserting that (1) Speringo was denied effective assistance of trial counsel . . .
. . . Law § 440.30 (McKinney Supp. 2001); Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . Court for an order pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law (“NYCPL”) §§ 440.10(l)(b), (d), (f), and 440.30 . . .
. . . See CPL § 330.40(2)(a) & (e)-(f) (governing CPL § 330.30(3) motions); CPL § 440.30(4)(b) (governing CPL . . .
. . . See CPL § 440.30. . . .
. . . . § 440.30. . . .
. . . . § 440.30 and follow the dictates of the [New York] Court of Appeals.” (Pet. at 35.) A. . . .
. . . .); CPL §§ 440.10, subd. 2, ¶ (b), 440.30, subds. 2, 4; see also People v. . . .
. . . . § 440.30. . . . See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(xi)(3); 42 C.F.R. § 440.30; see also Granato v. . . . (c) Furnished by a laboratory that meets the requirements of part 493 of this chapter. 42 C.F.R. § 440.30 . . . See 42 C.F.R. § 440.30; 42 C.F.R. § 494.1; 42 C.F.R. § 493.2. . . .
. . . same manner and for the same purpose as provided in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure or section 440.30 . . .
. . . requisite jurisdictional authority can be implied from several statutory provisions as follows: sections 440.30 . . . Section 440.30 specifically authorizes the JCC to order the taking of depositions before a claim is filed . . . Unlike section 440.30, dealing with the taking of depositions, and unlike section 440.33(1), as implemented . . .
. . . below, challenges a workers’ compensation order denying his claim for attorney’s fees under section 440.30 . . . Counsel for claimant subsequently filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees pursuant to section 440.30, Florida . . . the motion on the ground that the Request for Assistance was a “claim” within the meaning of section 440.30 . . . the claimant’s deposition was taken prior to the filing of a “claim” as the term is used in section 440.30 . . . We find that the reference to a filing of a “claim” in section 440.30, Florida Statutes (1993) should . . .
. . . generally outside the scope of discovery allowed in workers’ compensation cases pursuant to section 440.30 . . .
. . . . § 440.30(4)(d), denied the appeal on May 10, 1994. . . .
. . . Alternatively, she argued that the motion should be denied on procedural grounds under N.Y.Crim.Proc.L. 440.30 . . . (See N.Y.Crim.Proc.L. § 440.30(4)(b).) . . . .
. . . raising this claim because it was not raised properly in state court, and was denied pursuant to CPL § 440.30 . . .
. . . . § 440.30 & 440.33, Fla.Stat.; Fla.R.Work.Comp. 4.090(a) (discovery); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.380(d). Fla. . . .
. . . . § 440.30, Fla.Stat. (1991); Suburban Propane v. . . .
. . . find no impermissible conflict between section 440.13(2)(k), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), and section 440.30 . . . upon the occurrence of these circumstances, without regard to the more general provisions in section 440.30 . . .
. . . petitioner refiled his motion to vacate, this time conforming his pleadings to the requirements of CPL § 440.30 . . .
. . . New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.30(7) specifically instructs that a court, in denying a motion . . . Proc.Law § 440.30(7) (McKinney 1987). . . . Petitioner’s complaint about the trial court’s noncompliance with § 440.30(7), a state law, is not a . . .
. . . It is derived substantially from ^section 440.30, Florida» Statutes {1979). 1984 RevisiomAmendment. . . .
. . . Proc.Law §§ 440.30(1) and (4)(b). . . .
. . . Statutes (1989), and that the ordered depositions exceed the scope of discovery as set forth in Section 440.30 . . . Section 440.30, Florida Statutes (1989), provides: Depositions of witnesses or parties ... may be taken . . . Third, the taking of depositions is, pursuant to Section 440.30, Florida Statutes (1989), governed by . . . and ... used in connection with proceedings under Chapter 440, Florida Statutes[,]” and with section 440.30 . . . Thus, after considering rule 4.090(a) and section 440.30 in pari materia with the provisions of section . . .
. . . . § 440.30, Fla.Stat. (1989); Rule 4.090(e), Fla.W.C.R.P. . . .
. . . The court explained that Section 440.30, Florida Statutes, addressed the taking of depositions in workers . . . Section 440.30, Florida Statutes (1987), still reads as quoted by the Harbin court. . . .
. . . Performance Motor owes one-third of the costs and expenses accrued as of March 16, 1989, which is $440.30 . . . Leader Buick’s share includes one-third until March 16, 1989 ($440.30), and one-half until their settlement . . . Defendant Dileo owes one-third until March 16, 1989 ($440.30), one-half until Leader Buick’s settlement . . .
. . . It is derived substantially from § 440.30, Fla.Stat.1979. 1984 Committee Note: Subsections (b) through . . .
. . . These services include: inpatient hospital services (440.10), other laboratory and x-ray services (440.30 . . .
. . . appeals from the denial by the deputy commissioner of his claim for attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 440.30 . . . Based on this attendance, the claim for the fee pursuant to § 440.30 was filed (if no claim has been . . . pleading, both claims remained pending at the tíme of the deposition, barring the award of fees under § 440.30 . . . claims were pending at the time of these depositions so as to bar the fee sought pursuant to Section 440.30 . . .
. . . [b], 440.30, subds. 2, 4; see also People v. . . .