The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . required to pay quarterly assessments to the Special Disability Trust Fund (SDTF) pursuant to section 440.49 . . . for the purposes of calculating the annual assessments for the Special Disability Trust Fund under s. 440.49 . . . addition the cash refunds Amerisure requested “would be inconsistent with the provisions” of Sections 440.49 . . . See §§ 440.49(9)(b)1., Fla. . . .
. . . See § 440.49(2)(g), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1990). . . .
. . . .”§ 440.49(1), Fla. Stat. . . . . § 440.49(9)(b)l., Fla. Stat. . . . . § 440.49(7), Fla. Stat. . . . In 1997, the Legislature amended section 440.49 by limiting the claims eligible for reimbursement. . . . .” § 440.49(11), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . See § 440.49(7)(f), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .
. . . Section 440.49(7)(a), Florida Statutes, provides that employer/carriers may seek reimbursement from the . . .
. . . contained in section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes, to ap-pellees’ claim for reimbursement pursuant to section 440.49 . . . at issue was timely filed within the two-year limitations period specifically set forth in section 440.49 . . . The court determined that section 440.49(2)(g), Florida Statutes (1985), the same provision at issue . . . Section 440.49(2)(g) places no time limitation on the filing of reimbursement requests. Id. . . .
. . . Applicable statutes provided simply that assessments be based on “net premiums written,” § 440.49(9)( . . . In 1993, the Legislature amended section 440.49, changing “net premiums collected” to “net premiums written . . . its policyholders” from “net premiums written” and “net premiums collected,” as contained in sections 440.49 . . . See § 440.49(9)(b)(l.), Fla. Stat. (2005); § 440.5l(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . .” § 440.49(9)(b)(2.)-(3.), Fla. Stat. (2005); § 440.51(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . .
. . . issues, and to protect employers from excess liability for compensation and medical expense ....”§ 440.49 . . . Pursuant to section 440.49(9)(b)3., Florida Statutes (1999), “The net premiums written by the companies . . . among the insurance companies writing compensation insurance in the state and the self-insurers.” § 440.49 . . . HISTORY OF THE STATUTES In 1975, the Legislature amended sections 440.49 and 440.51, which had both used . . . Such an outcome would be contrary to the intent of sections 440.49 and 440.51. . . . I do, however, agree that (1) the interpretation of sections 440.49(9)(b)3 and 440.51(l)(b) urged by . . . position they have in this litigation and, therefore, have no bearing on the outcome; and (3) sections 440.49 . . .
. . . contends that the JCC erred in finding that the employer/servicing agent’s claim was timely under section 440.49 . . . Section 440.49(7)(c), Florida Statutes (1997) states: A proof of claim must be filed on each notice of . . . The employer/servicing agent’s actions failed to comply with the time limitations in section 440.49(7 . . .
. . . A claim for reimbursement from the Special Disability Trust Fund filed under section 440.49(7), Florida . . .
. . . pertinent statutory section relating to the employer’s entitlement to reimbursement in this case is section 440.49 . . . previous injury, but must also specifically have known that the injury constituted a 20% impairment: 440.49 . . . The amended section 440.49(6)(a) was construed in Staff Leasing v. . . . In Staff Leasing, the employee had a preexisting back injury and the subsection at issue was 440.49(6 . . . that it constituted a “preexisting permanent impairment,” as defined by subparagraph 21 of section 440.49 . . .
. . . Both the Fund and the appellant agreed that the employee’s injuries merged as defined in sections 440.49 . . . The JCC cited section 440.49(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), in its order denying reimbursement. . . . The appellant argues on appeal that section 440.49(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), is the appropriate . . . Section 440.49(4)(b) provides for reimbursement of all compensation for permanent total disability. . . . Therefore, the JCC should have relied on section 440.49(4)(b), rather than section 440.49(4)(a), in making . . .
. . . the Special Disability Trust Fund for temporary disability and medical benefits pursuant to section 440.49 . . .
. . . self insurer appeal a workers’ compensation order denying their claim for reimbursement under section 440.49 . . . Nothing in the language of section 9, chapter 87-330, Laws of Florida, amending section 440.49(2)(g), . . . We therefore find that the applicable version of section 440.49(2)(g) is the one which was in effect . . . The 1985 version of section 440.49(2)(g) in effect at the date of injury requires the claim be filed . . . Section 440.49(2)(c)3. provides that the employer is entitled to reimbursement "for all compensation . . .
. . . employer had failed to file a proof of claim within one year after July 1, 1997, as required by section 440.49 . . . The pertinent statute in effect at the time of the employee’s injury in 1996 was section 440.49(7), Florida . . . against the Special Disability Trust Fund, in regard to the above captioned case in accordance with 440.49 . . . In 1997, the legislature amended section 440.49(7) by adding paragraph (c), among other provisions, to . . . it as untimely, because it was filed more than one year after July 1, 1997, as required by section 440.49 . . .
. . . (codified at § 440.49(7)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997)). . . . See § 440.49(7)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997); Ch. 97-262, § 31, at 4742, Laws of Fla. . . . rule prescribe definitions that are necessary for the effective administration of this section.” § 440.49 . . .
. . . and carrier, appeal a final order of the Judge of Compensation Claims denying, pursuant to section 440.49 . . . In section 440.49, Florida Statutes (1994), the legislature has provided for reimbursement of an employer . . . See § 440.49(1), Fla. Stat. (1994). . . . Under section 440.49(6)(a), to be entitled to reimbursement from the Fund, the employer must show that . . . In section 440.49(6)(a)23, the legislature provided that mental retardation constituted a preexisting . . .
. . . Section 440.49(7), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994) provides in pertinent part: (7) Reimbursement of employer . . . The employer/servicing agent argue that the unambiguous language of section 440.49(7) does not mention . . . The Fund argues that, notwithstanding that the language of section 440.49(7) does not expressly provide . . . Non-claim statutes, such as section 440.49(7), are strictly construed, see, e.g., Special Disability . . . The omission of impairment benefits from section 440.49(7) evidences a legislative intent to exclude . . .
. . . ) which denied appellants’ reimbursement from the Special Disability Trust Fund pursuant to section 440.49 . . .
. . . A claim for reimbursement from the Special Disability Trust Fund filed under section 440.49(7), Florida . . .
. . . Section 440.49(2)©, Florida Statutes (1985), bars an employer from Fund reimbursement unless it is shown . . .
. . . Section 440.49(2)(g), Florida Statutes (1979), required a notice of claim reimbursement to be filed within . . . See § 440.49(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . . employer or carrier is otherwise entitled to reimbursement from the Special Disability Trust Fund.” § 440.49 . . . See § 440.49(2)(b)2 b, Fla. Stat. (1979). . See § 440.49(2)(b)2 a, Fla. Stat. (1979). . . .
. . . .” § 440.49(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1990). . . . For purposes of this appeal, the pertinent provision is section 440.49(2)(f)1, Florida Statutes (Supp . . . Division of Workers’ Compensation is obliged to interpret eligibility for reimbursement liberally. § 440.49 . . . See also § 440.49(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1990). . . . Though this laminectomy does not fit into one of the listed ‘presumed conditions’ of § 440.49(2)(f)(l . . .
. . . December 23, 1992, and that the claim filed on December 6, 1993, was therefore timely under section 440.49 . . . The JCC relied on the wording of section 440.49(2)(g), which provides that a claim for reimbursement . . . However, we agree with the Fund that our previous interpretations of section 440.49 clearly indicate . . . We explained the reasoning behind our ruling: Section 440.49(2)(g) is a non-claim statute and clearly . . . the later expressed date of MMI was not the operative date for determining timeliness under section 440.49 . . .
. . . The present proceeding began with the second carrier’s claim against the Fund under section 440.49(2) . . . Smith’s permanent total disability was a result of a merger of the kind contemplated by section 440.49 . . . Statutes (1987), and ordered the Fund to reimburse the second carrier — to the extent permitted by section 440.49 . . . But no statutory basis for such a prohibition exists, and section 440.49(2)(f)3., Florida Statutes (1987 . . . directive that the Division “shall interpret eligibility [for reimbursement] requirements liberally,” § 440.49 . . .
. . . The Special Disability Trust Fund (SDTF) appeals an order requiring it, pursuant to section 440.49(2) . . . knee injury, and that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove “merger” as defined in section 440.49 . . . However, the JCC’s findings regarding “merger” as defined by section 440.49(2)(b)2.b., discussed below . . .
. . . . § 440.49(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993). . . . jurisdiction to decide whether an injured worker was entitled to training and education and for how long. § 440.49 . . . program it may propose if such program is to be funded out of the fund established by s. 440.50. § 440.49 . . . Section 440.49(l)(d), Florida Statutes (1993), provided: Refusal to accept training and education as . . .
. . . quotient in the 70-79, “borderline” range) constituted a permanent physical impairment under section 440.49 . . . (b)l., Florida Statutes (1985), and that the requirement of employer knowledge contained in section 440.49 . . . The JCC rejected the Fund’s argument that section 440.49(2)(f)l.v. . . .
. . . Section 440.49(2), Florida Statutes (1991), authorizes reimbursement of certain benefits to the employer . . . The definition of “permanent physical impairment” in section 440.49(2)(b)(l) is central to this case: . . .
. . . this appeal brought by the Special Disability Trust Fund (Fund), we have occasion to construe section 440.49 . . . As pertinent to this case, section 440.49 provides: (1) LEGISLATIVE INTENT. . . . The emphasized part of section 440.49(4)(c) refers to “s. 440.49(1)(b)2”, a subsection that does not . . . ); the 1993 “merger” provision was section 440.49(2)(b)2, Florida Statutes (1993). . . . Section 440.49(2)(b)2, Florida Statutes (1993) provided: 2. “Merger” describes or means that: a. . . .
. . . claim because the E/SA filed its claim more than two years after the MMI date, contrary to section 440.49 . . . we do not believe that it was within the contemplation of the legislature, when it enacted section 440.49 . . . conclusion, we are strongly influenced by case law that interpreted the pre-1987 version of section 440.49 . . . is different in that the former links reimbursement to payment of permanent benefits, while section 440.49 . . . Section 440.49(2)(g) provides as follows: The right to reimbursement as provided in this subsection shall . . .
. . . The JCC correctly determined that the claim was timely filed under section 440.49(2), Florida Statutes . . .
. . . controlling statute pertaining to merger and reimbursement from the Fund for the period at issue is section 440.49 . . . Section 440.49(2)(c)3 provides: 3.Permanent total disability. — If an employee who has a preexisting . . . permanent total disability which is in excess of the first 175 weeks of permanent total disability.... § 440.49 . . . In calculating the excess compensation paid, the JCC recognized that section 440.49(2)(e)3, Florida Statutes . . . The language in section 440.49(2)(c)3, Florida Statutes (1991) is clear and unambiguous. . . .
. . . the Fund argues that a cause of action for reimbursement accrues every six months pursuant to section 440.49 . . . In Associated Coca Cola, this court decided that reimbursement requests made pursuant to section 440.49 . . . request accrues at the end of each six-month interval of periodic reimbursement provided for in section 440.49 . . .
. . . This court held that section 440.49(l)(c)(1979), under which, prior to adjudicating a claimant PTD, the . . . See § 440.49(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987). . . . The legislature altered that obligation in the 1989 statutes, see section 440.49(l)(a), Florida Statutes . . .
. . . establish that claimant’s obesity was a permanent physical impairment within the meaning of section 440.49 . . . Section 440.49(2) clearly requires the employer to prove the following elements before reimbursement . . . Thus, the evidence failed to establish a preexisting permanent impairment, as defined in section 440.49 . . . In 1990, however, section 440.49(2)(f) was amended to add obesity to the list of medical conditions an . . . (6)(a). § 440.49(2)(a), Fla.Stat. . . .
. . . Section 440.49(2)(g), Florida Statutes (1987), states in part: The right to reimbursement as provided . . . Our court’s decisional law has consistently interpreted section 440.49(2)(g) as requiring that once the . . .
. . . Disability Trust Fund appeals an order directing that it reimburse the employer pursuant to section 440.49 . . . August 13, 1991, Commercial Carrier filed a claim for reimbursement from the Fund pursuant to section 440.49 . . . Claimant suffered a preexisting, permanent physical impairment, “not due to the natural aging process,” § 440.49 . . .
. . . Benson, the extended filing period in section 440.49(2)(g), Florida Statutes (1987), applies to the employer . . . The shorter filing period in section 440.49(2)(g), Florida Statutes (1985), which was in effect on the . . . not pertain in this case except as it confirms the viability of the reimbursement claim when section 440.49 . . . Benson is not undermined by the later enactment of section 440.49(12), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), . . . We do not construe section 440.49(12), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), as addressing the filing period . . .
. . . A claim for reimbursement from the Special Disability Trust Fund filed under section 440.49(7), Florida . . .
. . . Section 440.49(2)(g), Florida Statutes (1987), provides in part: The right to reimbursement as provided . . . Section 440.49(2)(g) is a non-claim statute and clearly bars any right to reimbursement unless the claim . . .
. . . See § 440.49(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1981) (“this subsection shall not be construed to create or provide any . . . The Fund was designed to reimburse employer/carriers who meet the requirements of section 440.49. . . . See § 440.49(2)(g), Fla.Stat. (1981) (the Fund shall not be joined or made a party to any controversy . . .
. . . such period as the employee may be receiving training and education under a program pursuant to s. 440.49 . . . is no dispute that the claimant is “receiving training and education under a program pursuant to s. 440.49 . . . 440.15(2)(e) to provide that one who enrolls in vocational rehabilitation training pursuant to section 440.49 . . .
. . . temporary total disability (TTD) benefits during a period of training and education pursuant to section 440.49 . . . ), as prohibiting settlement of TTD benefits during periods of training and education under section 440.49 . . . Until 1989, when chapter 440 was extensively amended, section 440.49(l)(a), Florida Statutes, entitled . . . Section 440.49(l)(e) provided (in pertinent part): ... . . . The above-quoted pre-amendment language in section 440.49(l)(e) was stricken and section 440.49(l)(d) . . . 29, 1994, order awarding TTD benefits during a period of training and education pursuant to section 440.49 . . .
. . . Carrier’s argument on appeal, is “fundamentally at odds” with the concept of “rehabilitation” in section 440.49 . . . “specialized job placement” rather than on “suitable gainful employment” contemplated by subsection 440.49 . . . See § 440.49(l)(d). . . . compensable injuries precluded her from “earning wages equal to wages earned prior to the injury,” subsection 440.49 . . . Subsection 440.49(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1987), provides that the claimant shall receive "temporary . . .
. . . Rueh from applying for and receiving rehabilitation and retraining under section 440.49, Florida Statutes . . .
. . . Section 440.49(2)(g), Florida Statutes (1981), provides, in pertinent part: The right to reimbursement . . . “Excess permanent compensation” is then defined in 440.49(2)(b)3 as “that compensation for permanent . . . The claim should not have been revived “as the clear intent and effect of section 440.49(2)(g) is that . . .
. . . Section 440.49(1), Florida Statutes (1991), which requires that “[t]he division shall be a party to all . . . Under section 440.49(l)(d), Florida Statutes (1991), implementation of the plan would have rendered her . . . Section 440.49(l)(d), Florida Statutes (1991), provides: (d) When it appears that training and education . . .
. . . As amended, section 440.49(l)(c) provides: Prior to entering an order adjudicating an injured employee . . . The E/C argues that under the amended version of section 440.49(l)(c), if the JCC finds that a period . . . Grace, has squarely held that the absence of findings by the JCC under section 440.49(l)(c), Florida . . . We do not agree that a two-stage hearing process is mandated by section 440.49(l)(c). . . . Grace, the same does not hold true for all of section 440.49. . . .
. . . employment; and (2) personality traits could not constitute a “permanent physical impairment” under section 440.49 . . .
. . . The Fund asserts that E/C did not timely file their notice of claim for reimbursement based on § 440.49 . . . Section 440.49(2)(g), Florida Statutes (1987), provides in part: (g) Reimbursement of employer. — The . . . Section 440.49(2)(a), Florida Statutes, mandates that eligibility requirements be interpreted liberally . . .
. . . "Merger,” under Section 440.49(2)(b)(2), Florida Statutes (1989), means that the subsequent accident . . .
. . . claimant could be rehabilitated to suitable gainful employment, in accordance with the dictates of Section 440.49 . . .
. . . Brown, 409 So.2d 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), that Section 440.49(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1987), provides . . .
. . . appeal a workers’ compensation order requiring the Special Disability Trust Fund, pursuant to section 440.49 . . . Special Disability Trust Fund, 615 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); § 440.49, Fla.Stat. (1987). . . .
. . . In light of our holding, it is unnecessary for us to address the application of section 440.49(l)(a), . . .
. . . Petitioner is in doubt as to whether the provisions of Section 440.49(2)(f)2, Florida Statutes prohibit . . . STATE OF FLORIDA, to issue its Declaratory Statement regarding the following question: Under Chapter 440.49 . . . physical impairment to cause a greater disability than would have resulted from the injury alone. § 440.49 . . . See § 440.49(2)(c)2, Fla.Stat. (1991). . . . .
. . . . § 440.49(2), Fla.Stat. (1987). . As the supreme court observed in Tintera v. . . .
. . . Section 440.49(l)(a), Fla.Stat., (1989), places the burden of providing rehabilitation benefits on the . . . Section 440.49(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), states in pertinent part: When an employee has suffered . . . [emphasis added] Section 440.49(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), became effective on October 1, 1989. . . .
. . . Statutes, and petitions for reimbursement from the Special Disability Trust Fund pursuant to Ssection 440.49 . . .
. . . the award of wage loss benefits is not an additional award of rehabilitation benefits under section 440.49 . . . circumstances,” and claimant was awarded the maximum rehabilitation benefits allowable under section 440.49 . . .
. . . payment of excess permanent compensation (in the form of wage loss benefits), is barred by section 440.49 . . .
. . . question as one of great public importance: Is the Special Disability Trust Fund, pursuant to section 440.49 . . .
. . . /carriers made a claim for reimbursement from the Special Disability Trust Fund pursuant to section 440.49 . . . the employer/carriers’ entitlement to reimbursement for permanent total benefits pursuant to section 440.49 . . . Section 440.49(2), Florida Statutes (1983), provides in pertinent part: (2) LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR . . . The decision recognized that “simply because the legislature amended section 440.49(1) to require the . . . Section 440.49(2)(c)3 provides that the employer of an employee who has a preexisting permanent physical . . .
. . . E/SI had satisfied the requirements of proving the existence of medical merger pursuant to Section 440.49 . . . Section 440.49(2)(b), Fla.Stat., states in pertinent part: 2. “Merger” describes or means that: b. . . .
. . . Section 440.49(2)(g) provides in relevant part: The right to reimbursement as provided in this subsection . . . In turn, section 440.49(2)(b)3. defines “excess permanent compensation” as that compensation for permanent . . . Fund argued the claim was barred except for PTD benefits in excess of 175 weeks pursuant to section 440.49 . . . The JCC entered his order finding that section 440.49(2)(g) did not bar the claim for reimbursement. . . . Since “excess permanent compensation” is defined in section 440.49 as the compensation for PTD and other . . .
. . . Co., 414 So.2d 245 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), aff'd, 441 So.2d 1070 (Fla.1983); §§ 440.39(3)(a), 440.49, Fla.Stat . . .
. . . The E/C sought reimbursement from the Fund pursuant to section 440.49(2)(b)3., Florida Statutes (1989 . . . It is not an enumerated situation under Section 440.49(2)(c), (d) and (e) where Fund reimbursement is . . . Section 440.49(2)(a). . . . The Fund argues that the wording in section 440.49(2)(c)3., “the employer shall, in the first instance . . . Finally, the Fund argues that section 440.49(2)(c), (d), and (e), Florida Statutes, specifically states . . . The legislature expressed its intent in section 440.49(2)(a) that the disability trust fund protect employers . . .
. . . prescribed curriculum, the judge concluded that the two-year program was suitable, but under section 440.49 . . . The statute applicable in this case is section 440.49(1), Florida Statutes (1983), which provides in . . . Petersburg Junior College constituted the “rehabilitation services” contemplated by section 440.49, Florida . . . opportunity to restore the individual ... to his average weekly earnings at the time of injury.” § 440.49 . . . of employer/carrier fall within the purview of the rehabilitation services contemplated by section 440.49 . . .
. . . JCC erroneously granted the E/C’s motion, we do not decide whether an amended provision of Section 440.49 . . . proof that Strawter’s injury is preventing him from earning pre-injury wages, as is required by Section 440.49 . . . placement service is not equivalent to nor subsumed under the concept of rehabilitation pursuant to section 440.49 . . . Section 440.49(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), begins by providing, "[w]hen an employee has suffered . . .
. . . for an undisputed compensable condition, they might be deemed to have been “furnished” under section 440.49 . . . entitled to conclude that employer/carrier had not “furnished” such care within the meaning of section 440.49 . . .
. . . See § 440.49(1)(a), Fla.Stat. (1987); A.D. Builders, Inc. v. . . .
. . . carrier’s argument that they should not be responsible for claimant’s rehabilitation since section 440.49 . . . The enactment which was effective on the date of claimant’s injury, section 440.49, Florida Statutes . . .
. . . F.S. 440.49(2)(e). . . . Subsection 440.49(2)(c)l authorizes reimbursement, subject to the limitations in 440.49(2)(f), for 60 . . . Subsection 440.49(2)(e), referred to in subsection 440.49(2)(e)3, defines the right to reimbursement . . . See § 440.49(2)(f)l.v. . . . This finding satisfies the criteria in subsection 440.49(2)(b)2.b. . . . .
. . . Further, in paragraph 7, the judge properly considered section 440.49(l)(c) and determined that, since . . .
. . . [T]he apportionment provision of Section 440.15(5)(c) and the reimbursement provision of Section 440.49 . . .
. . . Section 440.49(l)(a), Fla.Stat., in pertinent part, requires employers or carriers to provide rehabilitation . . .
. . . ’ order finding employer/carrier entitled to reimbursement from the Fund in accordance with Section 440.49 . . . Section 440.49(2)(g) (1981) provides that an employer/carrier’s right to reimbursement from the Fund . . . So.2d 392 (Fla.1975): The clear intent, and effect [of the 60-day limitation in the pre-1987 Section 440.49 . . .
. . . will be entitled to vocational assistance only if she is able to satisfy the requirements of Section 440.49 . . .
. . . Section 440.49(1), Florida Statutes (1987) includes the following: the employee shall be entitled to . . . rehabilitation was not authorized and that the procedures for obtaining rehabilitation set up by Section 440.49 . . . When an e/c refuse or ignore a request for rehabilitation, claimant’s recourse is in Section 440.49(1 . . .
. . . for payment of capital expenditures designed to establish claimant in his own business.... ” Section 440.49 . . . However, it has also been emphasized that the legislative intent expressed in section 440.49(1) is to . . . Section 440.49(1)(a) directly addresses these concerns, providing in certain circumstances for evaluation . . . The rule is in accord with the recognized intent of section 440.49(1) for the provision of counseling . . . the establishment of a business enterprise is not an authorized rehabilitation benefit under section 440.49 . . .
. . . Citing Section 440.49(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1985), providing that a JCC cannot find an employee PTD . . .
. . . Section 440.49(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), places the duty upon the employer/carrier to provide prompt . . .
. . . .-20(13)(d), Florida Statutes (1987) or rehabilitation benefits under Section 440.49. . . .
. . . barred by reason of the employer’s failure to timely file the requisite notice of claim under Section 440.49 . . . Prior to the 1987 amendment of Section 440.49(2)(g), that Section provided that the employer/carrier’ . . .
. . . Section 440.49(2)(b)2.b. provides: Merger describes or means that: The permanent disability, permanent . . .
. . . Considering that under Section 440.49(l)(c), Florida Statutes, a deputy is required to determine whether . . .
. . . the employer/carrier did not file their claim for reimbursement within 60 days as required by section 440.49 . . .
. . . Statutes, and petitions for reimbursement from the Special Disability Trust Fund pursuant to Section 440.49 . . .
. . . Section 440.49(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1986) states as follows: When an employee has suffered an injury . . .
. . . Under section 440.49(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1980), the E/C was reimbursed by the Special Disability . . . Finding that funeral expenses were not “compensation paid for ... death” under section 440.49(2)(e) and . . . Section 440.49(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1980) states that the E/C shall be reimbursed by the Fund for . . . Section 440.49(2)(d) states that if the E/C are statutorily required to pay funeral expenses and death . . . However, the E/C fail to consider that section 440.49(2)(d) distinguishes between funeral expenses and . . .
. . . The deputy ordered the Fund to reimburse the E/SA under section 440.49(2) for benefits paid subsequent . . . Section 440.49(2) provides for reimbursement to an employer/carrier by the Special Disability Trust Fund . . . Merger is defined under section 440.49(2)(b)2.b. to mean: “The permanent disability, permanent impairment . . . The employer/carrier bears the burden of establishing entitlement to reimbursement under section 440.49 . . . Thus, there was no merger under section 440.49(2)(b)2.b. . . .
. . . The only significant issue raised on appeal is whether section 440.49(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), . . . statutorily expressed goal of rehabilitation — to return the individual to ‘suitable gainful employment.’ § 440.49 . . . Such a result is not consistent with the purpose of section 440.49. . . . We hold, therefore, that section 440.49(l)(a) requires employers and carriers to provide rehabilitation . . .
. . . the Special Disability Trust Fund upon compliance with the statutory requisites provided in section 440.49 . . .
. . . Consequently, the employer was entitled to the conclusive presumption in section 440.49(2)(f)l, Florida . . .
. . . deputy commissioner (deputy) directing it to reimburse the employer/carrier (e/c) pursuant to Section 440.49 . . . It contends that section 440.49(2), requires a finding that the claimant had a preexisting permanent . . . substantial evidence which establishes a preexisting permanent physical impairment, as required by section 440.49 . . . Finding nothing in section 440.49(2)(a) requiring that a permanent impairment rating be given an employee . . . Laws of Florida (1955), creating Section 440.15(5)(d)l, Florida Statutes (1955) (currently Section 440.49 . . .
. . . necessary, and has completed training or rehabilitation under a rehabilitative program pursuant to section 440.49 . . . in the use of an artificial member or device, and/or a rehabilitation program set up under section 440.49 . . .
. . . As to the kind of merger defined in section 440.49(2)(b)2.a., commonly known as “but for” merger, the . . . “accident” in section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes, does not apply to the use of the term in section 440.49 . . . question of whether the deputy erred in finding no merger under the second alternative definition, section 440.49 . . .
. . . appeal is whether proceedings to contest denial of reimbursement requests made pursuant to section 440.49 . . . that the only time limitation pertaining to reimbursement from the Fund is the limitation in section 440.49 . . . notice of claim must be filed within one of the 60-day periods specifically provided for in section 440.49 . . . Section 440.49(2)(g) places no time limitation on the filing of reimbursement requests. . . . Second, the e/c’s accrual theory ignores the fact that section 440.49(2)(g) requires the Fund to reimburse . . .
. . . The term “merger” is defined in subsection 440.49(2)(b)2 b to mean: The permanent disability, permanent . . . Subsection 440.49(2)(b)3 similarly provides: “Excess permanent compensation” means that compensation . . . Subsection 440.49(2)(c)l provides that in the event an employee with a preexisting permanent physical . . . Subsection 440.49(2)(c)2 makes similar provision for reimbursement of “wage loss benefits” paid pursuant . . . Subsection 440.49(2)(c)3 states: If any employee who has a preexisting permanent physical impairment . . .