Cases from cite.case.law:

SILVER SHELLS CORPORATION, v. ST. MAARTEN AT SILVER SHELLS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., 169 So. 3d 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . See § 718.124, Fla. Stat. . . . Accordingly, we express no view on that issue or the related issue of whether, based on section 718.124 . . .

GROVE ISLE ASSOCIATION, INC. v. GROVE ISLE ASSOCIATES, LLLP,, 137 So. 3d 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Thus, while we recognize that section 718.124, Fla. . . .

SALTPONDS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. v. WALBRIDGE ALDINGER COMPANY,, 979 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . In examining an association’s rights with respect to claims, we must also consider section 718.124 of . . . run until the unit owners have elected a majority of the members of the board of administration. § 718.124 . . . As further noted by the Florida Supreme Court: [T]he obvious purpose of [section] 718.124 was to lengthen . . . Section 718.124 was intended to prevent a developer from retaining control over an association long enough . . .

SALTPONDS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. v. McCOY,, 972 So. 2d 230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . See § 718.124, Fla. Stat. (1995); Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc. v. Seawatch at Marathon Condo. . . .

SABAL CHASE HOMEOWNERS ASS N INC. I n, II n, f u b o Co. v. WALT DISNEY WORLD CO. d b a ARDC f k a Co. JMB B. Y. BKM Co. Co. J., 726 So. 2d 796 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . That being so, the plaintiff condominium associations enjoy the benefit of section 718.124, Florida Statutes . . . The associations reply, among other things, that the repose period was tolled by section 718.124, Florida . . . Enacted in 1977, section 718.124, Florida Statutes, provides: 718.124 Limitation on actions by association . . . The intent of section 718.124 is to suspend limitations periods until the condominium association has . . . The developers say that “statute of limitations” in section 718.124 is used in a technical sense, and . . . that the turnover provision of the statute of limitations contained in the Condominium Act, Section 718.124 . . . Section 718.124 provides that the statute of limitations for actions by a condominium association does . . . The clearly stated purpose of Section 718.124 is to lengthen the statute of “limitations” period, see . . . decline the appellants’ invitation to abrogate legislative power and therefore conclude that section 718.124 . . . Section 718.124, Florida Statutes (1997) states: "The statute of limitations for any actions in law or . . .

CHARLEY TOPPINO SONS, INC. v. SEAWATCH AT MARATHON CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. EPIC METALS CORP. v. SEAWATCH AT MARATHON CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., 658 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1994)

. . . breach of warranty claim separate from the unit owners’ action and that the broad language of section 718.124 . . . Further, section 718.124, which tolls the statute of limitations for “actions in law or equity which . . . if a unit owner allows the statute of limitations to run out on his or her warranty claim, section 718.124 . . . Further, there is nothing in section 718.124 that would preclude a unit owner from bringing a claim for . . . The court stated “[sjection 718.124 was intended to prevent a developer from retaining control over an . . . review a decision presenting the following certified question of great public importance: Does section 718.124 . . . 95.11(3)(c) provides a four-year limitations period for bringing implied warranty actions; and section 718.124 . . . run until the unit owners have elected a majority of the members of the board of administration. § 718.124 . . . Bessent, Hammock & Ruckman, Inc., 405 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981): [T]he obvious purpose of § 718.124 . . . Section 718.124 was intended to prevent a developer from retaining control over an association long enough . . .

SEAWATCH AT MARATHON CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. a v. CHARLEY TOPPINO AND SONS, INC., 610 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . throughout the state, we certify the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida: Does section 718.124 . . . The court’s ruling, according to Seawatch, disregarded section 718.124 of the Florida Condominium Act . . . Section 718.124 was enacted, obviously, in response to that realization. . . . In those cases, on the appellee’s interpretation, section 718.124 is a nullity. . . . We agree with the first district’s different view: [T]he obvious purpose of § 718.124 was to lengthen . . .

REGENCY WOOD CONDOMINIUM, INC. a v. BESSENT, HAMMACK AND RUCKMAN, INC. a a a a Co. a a, 405 So. 2d 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . In January 1977, the legislature adopted § 718.124, Florida Statutes, entitled “Limitation on Actions . . . If § 718.124 applies, the four year period of § 95.11(3) would not begin to run until January 8, 1976 . . . Weiss, 353 So.2d 141 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), they contend that § 718.124 applies only to a cause of action . . . In response, Regency Wood points out that at the time § 718.124 became law, the association’s cause of . . . As of the effective date of § 718.124, Regency Wood had a viable cause of action against the developer . . .

BUCKLEY TOWERS CONDOMINIUM, v. HERBERT BUCHWALD,, 48 Fla. Supp. 14 (Dade Cty. Cir. Ct. 1978)

. . . Assuming, without deciding, the retroactive applicability of §718.124, Fla. . . . Under the provisions of §718.124, that amendatory statute of limitations began to run on April 8, 1971 . . . this action and that the defendants go hence without day, as to the claims alleged in the complaint. . 718.124 . . .