Cases from cite.case.law:

OKPOSIO, v. BARRY UNIVERSITY MAIN CAMPUS, 252 So. 3d 1290 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . ." § 760.02(11), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . . covered establishment, and which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment . § 760.02 . . . In support of his argument on appeal, Appellant relies upon the fact that section 760.02(11) does not . . . While Appellant argues that a library could be considered a "place of entertainment" under section 760.02 . . . Museums and galleries are far more similar to libraries than the places listed in section 760.02(11)( . . .

CIMINO, s v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. a, 183 So. 3d 1242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . We reverse, as section 760.02, Florida Statutes (2014) provides that a “legal representative” is entitled . . . An “ ‘[a]g-grieved person’ means any person -who files a complaint with the [FCHR].” § -760.02(10). . . . organization; any other legal or commercial entity; the state; or any governmental entity or agency.” § 760.02 . . . complaint and that a “person” includes an “individual” as well as a “legal representative.” §§ 760.11(1), 760.02 . . .

ASHKENAZI, v. SOUTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT d. b. a., 607 F. App'x 958 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 760.02(6) (defining a “person” under the FCRA as including “individuals]”), with 29 U.S.C. § 623( . . .

In LEHMAN BROTHERS INC. L. P. L. P. v. W. SIPA, 533 B.R. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)

. . . Collier on Bankr-¶ 760.02 . Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.L. . . .

MARCHMAN, v. ST. ANTHONY S HOSPITAL, INC., 152 So. 3d 830 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . She relied on section 760.02(11), Florida Statutes, which defines as a public accommodation “any establishment . . . covered establishment, and which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment. § 760.02 . . . Marchman argues that based on section 760.02, particularly as discussed by Mena I, we should hold that . . . But to read section 760.02 in the way that Marchman beseeches requires that we turn a blind eye to the . . . True, section 760.02 is written to cast a wide net, as is its federal counterpart. . . .

CRANE, v. LIFEMARK HOSP. OF FLA. INC., 149 So. 3d 718 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . . ■ § 760.02(11), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). . . . Stat. § 760.02(ll)(d) (emphasis added).... . . . Civil Rights Act, they do not turn the Hospital into a “place of public accommodation” under section 760.02 . . . (“Sections 760.01-760.11 and 509.092 shall be cited as the 'Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992' ”); § 760.02 . . .

BIALEK, v. DELVISTA TOWERS CONDOMINIUM ASS N, INC. AKAM On-, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (S.D. Fla. 2014)

. . . . § 760.02(7). The term “employee” is not individually defined in the Florida Civil Rights Act. . . .

SING, v. NETTLES ISLAND MARINA,, 70 So. 3d 632 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . The Commission denied the charge, finding the marina was not a “public accommodation” under Section 760.02 . . . Section 760.02(ll)(a, d), Florida Statutes, defines a “public accommodation” as: Any [ ] restaurant, . . . the marina serves their patrons, the marina would qualify as a “public accommodation” under Section 760.02 . . .

MENA, v. LIFEMARK HOSPITALS OF FLORIDA, INC. d b a, 50 So. 3d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . In this case of first impression, we are called upon to determine whether, pursuant to section 760.02 . . . Section 760.02(11) defines “public accommodations” as “places of public accommodation, lodgings, facilities . . . Appellant contends, however, that pursuant to section 760.02(ll)(d), where a hospital has a cafeteria . . . Section 760.02(11) defines as a public accommodation: (d) Any establishment which is physically located . . .

A. BOLANOS, v. WORKFORCE ALLIANCE Am-, 23 So. 3d 171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . .” §§ 112.044(2)(b), 760.02(8), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . .

S. PATTERSON, v. CONSUMER DEBT MANAGEMENT AND EDUCATION, INC., 975 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . .” § 760.02(7), Fla. Stat. (1992) (emphasis added). . . .

SHEELY, v. MRI RADIOLOGY NETWORK, P. A. d. b. a. MRI- JFK,, 505 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 2007)

. . . Section 760.02(11) provides that “[fjor the purposes of §§ 760.01-760.11 and 509.092” — i.e., for purposes . . . Thus, § 760.02(ll)’s definition of “public accommodations” does not include medical facilities like MRN . . . action for “any Florida statute” making discrimination in places of public accommodation unlawful, § 760.02 . . . that “[b]ased on the information you provided, we are unable to pursue this matter further” because § 760.02 . . .

D. DUFFY, v. LOWE S HOME CENTERS, INC., 414 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (M.D. Fla. 2006)

. . . sufficient number of employees to meet the definition of an "employer' found in Florida Statutes section 760.02 . . . F.S. §§ 760.02; 760.10. .Duffy began working for Lowe's on May 12, 1999 in Alpharetta, Georgia. . . .

MAGGIO, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,, 899 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 2005)

. . . .” § 760.02(7), Fla. Stat. (2003) (emphasis added). . . . .” § 760.02(6), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . .

SANTINI, M. D. v. CLEVELAND CLINIC FLORIDA, a, 843 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . The definition section of the statute, specifically section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes, provides “ ‘ . . .

MOUSA, v. LAUDA AIR LUFTFAHRT, A. G., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2003)

. . . . § 760.02(7). “Person” is defined to include a corporation. Id. § 760.02(6). . . .

SYSTEM MANAGEMENT, INC. Me R. v. LOISELLE,, 138 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D. Mass. 2001)

. . . Thus Cruz’s total damages are $253.34, which are tripled to $760.02. b. . . . ORDER Judgment shall enter for Jose Cruz in the sum of $760.02 and for Lucio Ardon in the sum of $258.54 . . .

CONNOR, K. v. HALIFAX HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, J. MA, MD, FCAP, s s, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (M.D. Fla. 2001)

. . . . § 760.10 applies on its face to governmental entities or agencies, see § 760.02(6)—(7); § 760.10, § . . .

BELL, v. BOARD OF REGENTS, STATE OF FLORIDA,, 768 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . We conclude that, when read in pari materia, sections 760.02(6), 760.02(7), 760.11(4), and 760.11(5), . . .

WILLIAMS, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY,, 770 So. 2d 706 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . As the third district pointed out, section 760.02(6) includes “the state; or any governmental entity . . .

V. KLONIS, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,, 766 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . . § 760.02(7), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . . 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person. § 760.02 . . . statutory definition of “person” expressly includes “the state” or “any governmental entity or agency.” § 760.02 . . .

JONES, v. H. BRUMMER,, 766 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . Jones relies on section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes, which includes “the state; or any governmental entity . . . each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year....” § 760.02 . . .

SINCLAIR, v. DE JAY CORPORATION,, 170 F.3d 1045 (11th Cir. 1999)

. . . Section 760.02(7) defines an “employer” for purposes of the Florida Civil Rights Act as “any person employing . . . Ann. § 760.02(7). . . . We are obliged to give effect to the plain language of § 760.02(7). . . . The district court offered three reasons for its conclusion, notwithstanding the plain language of § 760.02 . . . introduce any evidence that his employer met the statutory definition of “employer” set forth in § 760.02 . . .

L. LYES, v. CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH, FLORIDA,, 166 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1999)

. . . . § 760.02(6) (West 1997) (defining “person” under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 to include “any . . .

STEVENS, v. STEAK N SHAKE, INC., 35 F. Supp. 2d 882 (M.D. Fla. 1998)

. . . . § 760.02 et. seq. and Fla.Stat. § 509.092. See Docket No. 2. . . .

DeSHIRO v. BRANCH, a d b a PPI a, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (M.D. Fla. 1998)

. . . Florida Statutes § 760.02(7). . . .

SANDERS, v. MAYOR S JEWELERS, INC., 942 F. Supp. 571 (S.D. Fla. 1996)

. . . . § 760.02(7). Title VIPs definition of “employer” is identical. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). . . .

BLOUNT, v. STERLING HEALTHCARE GROUP, INC. a J., 934 F. Supp. 1365 (S.D. Fla. 1996)

. . . . § 760.02(7) defines “employer” in substantially the same language as is used in the federal definition . . .

G. SUSSMAN, f k a M. v. SALEM, SAXON NIELSEN, P. A. A., 818 F. Supp. 1510 (M.D. Fla. 1993)

. . . . § 1002(5), and § 760.02(6), Fla.Stat. . . . Section 701(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), Section 3(5) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5), and § 760.02 . . .

BYRD, v. RICHARDSON- GREENSHIELDS SECURITIES, INC., 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1989)

. . . . § 760.02(6), Fla.Stat. (1987). . . .

LABORERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, LOCAL v. BURROUGHS,, 541 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1989)

. . . Because section 760.02(6) limits the scope of the Human Rights Act to employers with fifteen or more . . .

ANDREWS v ALBERTSON S, INC., 32 Fla. Supp. 2d 204 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings 1988)

. . . each working day in each 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year,” Section 760.02 . . .

LABORERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, LOCAL v. BURROUGHS,, 522 So. 2d 852 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . Specifically, section 760.02(6) of the Human Rights Act defines “employer” as “any person employing 15 . . .

FOSTER v. HANDLING SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, 29 Fla. Supp. 2d 187 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings 1987)

. . . The Petitioner is a black female, She is a person within the meaning of Sections 760.02(5) and 760.10 . . . The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. 7. . . .

F. SHUTTLEWORTH, v. BROWARD COUNTY, T. J. Jr., 639 F. Supp. 654 (S.D. Fla. 1986)

. . . In support of this contention, the defendants cite to § 760.02(5), Florida Statutes (1983), which provides . . .

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF SANFORD, v. L. BILLINGSLEA,, 464 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . Under section 760.02 the term “employer” is defined to include the state or any governmental entity or . . .

GARNER, v. WARD,, 251 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1971)

. . . . § 760.02, F.S.A., specifies the persons who may bring such action; Fla.Stat., § 768.03, F.S.A., also . . .

SCOFIELD, v. VALLEY PIPE LINE CO., 138 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1943)

. . . Of the indebtedness covered by the contract, $156,697.33 was incurred prior, and $5,-760.02 subsequent . . .