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Florida Statute 768.19 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 768.19 Case Law from Google Scholar
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Link to State of Florida Official Statute Google Search for Amendments to 768.19

The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLV
TORTS
Chapter 768
NEGLIGENCE
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 768.19
768.19 Right of action.When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, negligence, default, or breach of contract or warranty of any person, including those occurring on navigable waters, and the event would have entitled the person injured to maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued, the person or watercraft that would have been liable in damages if death had not ensued shall be liable for damages as specified in this act notwithstanding the death of the person injured, although death was caused under circumstances constituting a felony.
History.s. 1, ch. 72-35.

F.S. 768.19 on Google Scholar

F.S. 768.19 on Casetext

Amendments to 768.19


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 768.19
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 768.19.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

HARRIS, v. R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY,, 383 F. Supp. 3d 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2019)

. . . . § 768.19, Fla. Stat. . . . Section 768.19 does state that a person shall be liable for damages "[w]hen the death of a person is . . . have entitled the person injured to maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued." § 768.19 . . .

WALDRON, R. Jr. a v. SPICHER,, 349 F. Supp. 3d 1202 (M.D. Fla. 2018)

. . . See § 768.19, Fla. Stat. (2017). . . .

SCHULTZ, FOR SCHULTZ, v. GGNSC ST. PAUL LAKE RIDGE LLC,, 310 F. Supp. 3d 985 (D. Minn. 2018)

. . . . § 768.19. . . .

K. SHARBAUGH, v. C. BEAUDRY,, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1326 (N.D. Fla. 2017)

. . . . § 768.19, which incltide economic losses of the estate (both pre-death and prospective net earnings . . .

GREER, v. IVEY,, 242 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (M.D. Fla. 2017)

. . . . § 768.19. . . .

KELLY, K. v. GEORGIA- PACIFIC, LLC, Co., 211 So. 3d 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See also Perkins, 445 So.2d at 1012 (basing its decision “upon the language contained in section 768.19 . . .

N. CLEMONS, v. M. KNIGHT,, 662 F. App'x 725 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 768.19. . . .

ESTATE OF OSORIO v. MIAMI- DADE COUNTY,, 191 F. Supp. 3d 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2016)

. . . . § 768.19. . . .

LAND F. v. GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC PDQ It LLC, 140 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D.S.C. 2015)

. . . St. 768.19 (stating that wrongful death is a death caused by a "wrongful act, negligence,, default, or . . .

E. GRAHAM, PR v. R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, USA,, 782 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 768.19. . . .

COSMAN, v. RODRIGUEZ,, 153 So. 3d 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . .” § 768.19. . . . The wrongdoer is liable for “damages as specified in this act.” § 768.19. . . .

In ENGLE CASES, 45 F. Supp. 3d 1351 (M.D. Fla. 2014)

. . . . § 768.19. . . . Stat. § 768.19 (stating that wrongful death and personal injury both require that the injury or death . . . Stat. § 768.19. . . .

RANDALL, v. WALT DISNEY WORLD CO., 140 So. 3d 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . The supreme court held that Florida’s Wrongful Death Act, section 768.19, Florida Statutes (2008), did . . .

HOMADAY, f k a Jr. v. SMITH AND NEPHEW, INC., 994 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (M.D. Fla. 2014)

. . . . § 768.19 (“When a personal injury to the decedent results in death, no action for the personal injury . . .

STATE SECURITY SERVICE, INC. v. GIANGRANDI,, 132 So. 3d 1128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . . § 768.19, Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .

CAPONE, v. PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., 116 So. 3d 363 (Fla. 2013)

. . . Section 768.19 of the Florida Wrongful Death Act provides: When the death of a person is caused by the . . . death of the person injured, although death was caused under circumstances constituting a felony. § 768.19 . . .

LAIZURE, v. AVANTE AT LEESBURG, INC., 109 So. 3d 752 (Fla. 2013)

. . . See § 768.19, Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . death of the person injured, although death was caused under circumstances constituting a felony. § 768.19 . . . Section 768.19, Florida Statutes (2008), provides for a cause of action “[w]hen the death of a person . . . See § 768.19, Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . See § 768.19, Fla. . . .

SMITH, Jr. v. R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO. U. S. A. Co. LLC f k a f k a Co. f k a, 103 So. 3d 955 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . filing a separate suit is “required” under the Wrongful Death Act, but it cited for support only section 768.19 . . . Section 768.19 creates a right of action; it says nothing about pleading requirements: When the death . . . death of the person injured, although death was caused under circumstances constituting a felony. § 768.19 . . .

YELTON, K. D. L. Y. L. R. L. Y. v. PHI, INCORPORATED III, v. PHI PHI,, 669 F.3d 577 (5th Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 768.19 (1993). . . .

SKYRME, v. R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY USA, LLC f k a f k a, 75 So. 3d 769 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . (quoting § 768.19, Fla. Stat. (1995)); Celotex Corp. v. . . . of the decedent’s death, transformed a personal injury claim into one for wrongful death” (quoting § 768.19 . . .

STARLING, v. R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY,, 845 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (M.D. Fla. 2011)

. . . . § 768.19. B. . . . Stat. §§ 768.19-768.21. . . .

CAPONE, v. PHILIP MORRIS U. S. A. INC., 56 So. 3d 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . wrongful death rather than filing a separate suit as required under the Wrongful Death Act, section 768.19 . . . survivor or personal representative must assert a separate, statutory cause of action under section 768.19 . . .

LAIZURE, v. AVANTE AT LEESBURG, INC. a k a, 44 So. 3d 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 768.19, Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .

BURKS, v. BEARY,, 713 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (M.D. Fla. 2010)

. . . . § 768.19. . . . would have entitled the person to maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued.” § 768.19 . . .

J. GRIFFIS, E. v. E. WHEELER, Jr. A., 18 So. 3d 2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . . § 768.19, Fla. Stat. (2005). . . .

T. STANLEY, v. DELTA CONNECTION ACADEMY, INC. f k a,, 12 So. 3d 781 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See § 768.19, Fla. Stat. (2002); Jenkins v. W.L. Roberts, Inc., 851 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). . . .

WALLACE, v. Ed DEAN,, 3 So. 3d 1035 (Fla. 2009)

. . . See § 768.19, Fla. . . .

ESTATE HEISER, v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, D. v., 466 F. Supp. 2d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

. . . . §§ 768.19 (2005). . . . .

FORRY, v. SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY, d b a Su a, 899 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . The complaint alleged a claim for wrongful death, see § 768.19, Fla. . . .

KNOWLES, v. BEVERLY ENTERPRISES- FLORIDA, INC., 898 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2004)

. . . .” § 768.19, Fla. Stat. (1997). . . . . § 768.19, Florida Statutes (1983). . . .

In GUARDIANSHIP OF J. D. S. v., 864 So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . . § 768.19, Fla. Stat. (1993). . § 827.04(1), Fla. Stat. (1987). . § 744.3215(4)(e), Fla. . . .

C. WALKER, Jr. v. VIRGINIA INSURANCE RECIPROCAL,, 842 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 2003)

. . . This shall include: (a) Rights of action under s. 768.19 and defenses thereto. . . .

FLORIDA CONVALESCENT CENTERS, v. SOMBERG,, 840 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 2003)

. . . Section 768.19, Florida Statutes (1997), explains when an action for wrongful death may be brought, while . . .

TOOMBS, v. ALAMO RENT- A- CAR, INC., 833 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 2002)

. . . ANALYSIS Section 768.19, Florida Statutes (1995), which defines the right of action under the Wrongful . . . death of the person injured, although death was caused under circumstances constituting a felony. § 768.19 . . . Section 768.19 has remained unchanged since its enactment in 1972. . . .

TOOMBS, v. ALAMO RENT- A- CAR,, 762 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . To answer this question, we must consider Shiver and section 768.19, Florida Statutes. . . . Section 768.19 defines a “right of action” in the context of the Wrongful Death Act. . . . behalf of the two surviving minor children under Florida’s Wrongful Death , Act pursuant to section 768.19 . . .

LEWIS, v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG,, 98 F. Supp. 2d 1344 (M.D. Fla. 2000)

. . . Florida Statute § 768.19, in pertinent part, states: When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful . . .

ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY, a v. C. ALLEY,, 728 So. 2d 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . The Wrongful Death Act, section 768.19, Florida Statutes (1995), provides in part: [W]hen the death of . . . The district court reasoned that since this action was a wrongful death action pursuant to section 768.19 . . .

FRANZEN, M. D. M. D. P. A. v. E. MOGLER, 744 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . liable for damages as specified in this act notwithstanding the death of the person injured.... ” § 768.19 . . . WDA also states that the cause of action created by WDA section 768.19 is reposed in a designated person . . .

R. TANNER, v. M. HARTOG,, 696 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1997)

. . . wrongful death of whom a tortfeasor is liable to its survivors for damages under the Wrongful Death Act (§ 768.19 . . .

R. TANNER, v. M. HARTOG, M. D. M. D. P. A., 678 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . wrongful death of whom a tortfeasor is liable to its survivors for damages under the Wrongful Death Act (§ 768.19 . . .

YOUNG, v. ST. VINCENT S MEDICAL CENTER, INC., 673 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1996)

. . . district court certifying the question of whether a fetus is a person within the meaning of section 768.19 . . .

M. HUGHES, v. UNITECH AIRCRAFT SERVICE, INC. a P. a, 662 So. 2d 999 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . This portion of the statute was amended in 1972 so that it now begins, in section 768.19, Fla.Stat. ( . . .

YOUNG, v. ST. VINCENT S MEDICAL CENTER, INC. d b a St. s d b a, 653 So. 2d 499 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . While we feel that the question of whether a fetus is a person within the meaning of section 768.19, . . . in this ease is whether there is a right of recovery under the Florida Wrongful Death Act, sections 768.19 . . . Section 768.19, Florida Statutes (1989). (Emphasis supplied.) . . . certified question “[is] a full term, viable, but stillborn fetus a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 768.19 . . . would have added the term "unborn children” to the definitions of “person" and "minor children” in § 768.19 . . .

AUTO- OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, v. DeJOHN, 640 So. 2d 158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . DeJohn brought suit under the Wrongful Death Act, section 768.19-768.21, Florida Statutes (1991). . . . Section 768.19, Florida Statutes (1991) provides that: When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful . . .

HILSMAN v. WINN DIXIE STORES, INC., 639 So. 2d 115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . wrongful death of whom a tortfeasor is liable to its survivors for damages under the Wrongful Death Act (§ 768.19 . . .

LINDER, v. CALERO PORTOCARRERO,, 747 F. Supp. 1452 (S.D. Fla. 1990)

. . . . § 768.19, and the Florida Survivor Statute, Fla.Stat. § 46.021, as well as the Florida common law tort . . . Fla.Stat. § 768.19 (emphasis added). . . . .

S. TAYLOR, v. ORLANDO CLINIC,, 555 So. 2d 876 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . negligence is based on the common law; the cause of action for wrongful death is provided by statute (§ 768.19 . . .

SINGLETON, v. O. RANZ, M. D., 534 So. 2d 847 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . wrongful death of whom a tortfeasor is liable to its survivors for damages under the Wrongful Death Act (§ 768.19 . . .

BROWN, v. UNITED STATES, 838 F.2d 1157 (11th Cir. 1988)

. . . . § 768.19 (1985). . . . Furthermore, as in the federal court suit, the wrongful death claims were brought under Fla.Stat. § 768.19 . . . See Fla.Stat. §§ 768.19-20 (1985). . . . See Fla.Stat. § 768.19 (1985). . . .

INNOCENT La Co- s v. CENTRAL TRUCK LINES, INC. a, 680 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D. Fla. 1988)

. . . . § 768.19 (West 1986). . . .

HAMPTON, v. A. DUDA SONS, INC., 511 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . action at his death as a condition precedent to his survivor bringing a cause of action under section 768.19 . . . death of the person injured, although death was caused under circumstances constituting a felony. § 768.19 . . .

NISSAN MOTOR CO. LTD. v. PHLIEGER,, 508 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1987)

. . . representative (respondent herein), filed a wrongful death action against Nissan, pursuant to section 768.19 . . . The district court reasoned that since this action was a wrongful death action pursuant to section 768.19 . . . GRIMES, J., concurs specially in result only with an opinion. . § 768.19, Fla.Stat. (1983), provides: . . .

ENGLAND, C. v. UNITED STATES, 632 F. Supp. 1340 (M.D. Fla. 1986)

. . . Florida Statutes, Section 768.19 provides: When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, . . . The language of section 768.19 suggests that defenses that would bar a decedent’s recovery if he had . . .

PHLIEGER, v. NISSAN MOTOR CO. LTD., 487 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . Phlieger brought this wrongful death action pursuant to section 768.19, Florida Statutes (1983) which . . . negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty, was a wrongful death action pursuant to section 768.19 . . .

H. WILLIAMS, J. H. v. BAY HOSPITAL, INC. d b a, 471 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . . § 768.19, Florida Statutes (1983). . . .

M. ANDERSON, v. K. ANDERSON,, 468 So. 2d 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . . §§ 768.19, 768.20, Fla.Stat. (1983). . . .

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. D. McCARSON, Sr., 467 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1985)

. . . Florida’s Wrongful Death Act, in section 768.19, Florida Statutes (1981), requires, as a condition precedent . . .

F. HUDSON, v. KEENE CORPORATION H. K., 445 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . boils down to whether, based on the language found in the wrongful death statute, specifically Section 768.19 . . . Section 768.19 provides: When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, negligence, default . . .

VARIETY CHILDREN S HOSPITAL, v. PERKINS,, 445 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1983)

. . . Our holding is based upon the language contained in section 768.19, Florida Statutes (1981), which provides . . . Section 768.19, Florida Statutes, requires that the initial injury be one that “would have entitled the . . .

R. DRESSLER, F. a v. A. TUBBS, A., 435 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1983)

. . . .” § 768.19, Fla.Stat. (1979). . . . Raisen and the language of section 768.19 would compel this result. . . . The relevant part of the Florida Wrongful Death Act, Section 768.19, Florida Statutes (1977), provided . . . Section 768.01, Fla.Stat. (1953), the counterpart to § 768.19, Fla.Stat. (1977), provided: Whenever the . . .

A. TUBBS, A. v. F. DRESSLER, F. a, 419 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . Section 768.19, Florida Statutes (1977) says: When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act . . .

PERKINS, a v. VARIETY CHILDREN S HOSPITAL,, 413 So. 2d 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . Section 768.19 thereof provides: When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, negligence . . . action by the personal representative of the deceased where death is a result of the same injuries. . § 768.19 . . . pivots on the interpretation to be given certain language in the Florida Wrongful Death Act, Section 768.19 . . . The Florida Supreme Court has consistently found that Section 768.19, Florida Statutes (1979), Wrongful . . . Cohen, 363 So.2d 129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), the Third District Court of Appeal agreed that Section 768.19 . . .

JOHNSON, M. v. G. MULLEE, M. D., 385 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . Under the provisions of section 768.19 and Florida decisionary law, a bar to the decedent’s right to . . . personal representative; and that since decedent would not have been entitled within the intendment of § 768.19 . . .

WESTERMAN, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK AND COMPANY,, 577 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1978)

. . . . § 768.19. . Hopkins v. . . .

R. SMITH C. O. v. L. LUSK a, 356 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)

. . . Section 768.19, Florida Statutes (1975), reads in part: “When the death of a person is caused by the . . .

HORTON, B. v. UNIGARD INS. CO. Co. A., 355 So. 2d 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)

. . . Section 768.19, Florida Statutes (1975), provides, among other things, that when a death is caused by . . .

STERN v. MILLER,, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977)

. . . This is an action for wrongful death brought under Florida’s Wrongful Death Act [Section 768.19, Florida . . . The Millers brought an action for wrongful death pursuant to Section 768.19, Florida Statutes (1973), . . . The trial court ruled that a viable fetus is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 768.19 and . . . as a direct and'proximate result of another’s negligence, is a “person” within the intent of Section 768.19 . . .

C. DUNCAN, v. D. FLYNN, M. D., 342 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)

. . . viable children and concluded that a viable unborn child is a “person” within the meaning of Section 768.19 . . .

MILLER v. HIGHLANDS INSURANCE COMPANY, 336 So. 2d 636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

. . . killed as a direct and proximate result of another’s negligence, is a “person” within the intent of § 768.19 . . . A condition of recovery under § 768.19 is that “ . . . the event would have entitled the person injured . . . In our opinion a viable unborn child is a “person” within the meaning of § 768.19. . . . Having determined that under § 768.19 there is a cause of action for the wrongful death of a viable, . . . In summary we hold that a viable, unborn child is a “person” within the meaning of § 768.19, and that . . .

M. JOLLY, A. v. INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, a, 331 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

. . . individually, and as relatives dependent on the decedent for support under the wrongful death statute, §§ 768.19 . . .

HANLEY, a v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a, 323 So. 2d 301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)

. . . . §§ 768.19 and .21) and that it specifically defines the phrase “minor children” to mean “unmarried . . .

In AIR CRASH DISASTER AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS ON JULY, 399 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Mass. 1975)

. . . . § 768.19. . . .

A. GABOURY M. v. FLAGLER HOSPITAL, INC. a M. D., 316 So. 2d 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)

. . . . § 768.19, reads as follows: “When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, negligence, . . .

DAVIS v. Dr. SIMPSON, 313 So. 2d 796 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)

. . . question presented is: Is a full term, viable, but stillborn fetus a “person” within the meaning of § 768.19 . . . , viable, but stillborn fetus is not a “person” within the meaning of the wrongful death statute, § 768.19 . . . Petitioners contend that the word “person” in § 768.19, Florida Statutes, 1973, should be construed to . . .

C. MARTIN, c. t. a. v. UNITED SECURITY SERVICES, INC. a MOBLEY, v. AMERICAN BANKERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF FLORIDA, a, 314 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1975)

. . . Section 768.19 of the new Act provides for a cause of action in wording similar to that of now repealed . . . Revision Commission, Recommendations and Report on Florida Wrongful Death Statutes (December 1969). .§ 768.19 . . .