Amendments to 775.0845

1. Cabal v. State

   678 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1996)   Cited 20 times

   We recognize that the legislature amended section 775.0845, effective October 1, 1995, but the amended statute is not at issue in this proceeding. Section 775.0845 was amended effective October 1, 1995, with the addition of the following language to the statute: "For purposes of sentencing under chapter 921 . . . a felony offense which is reclassified under this subsection is ranked one level above the ranking under s. 921.0012 or s. 921.0013 of the offense committed." § 775.0845, Fla.Stat. (1995) (emphasis added). Although this provision speaks to reclassification, Cabal was sentenced under the 1993 version of the statute, which does not contain that language. Moreover, this boilerplate provision was added to numerous other statutes. See e.g., § 775.0875, Fla.Stat. (1995); § 775.087, Fla. Stat. (1995). We do not address whether this language acts to require reclassification of an offense to the next higher degree for offenses committed after 1993. We note, however, that the definitive, substantive language of the statute has not been altered.

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2. Wright v. State

   810 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2002)   Cited 5 times

   Wright contends that since he remained unmasked in his vehicle, his offenses cannot be reclassified under the provisions of section 775.0845, Florida Statutes (1997) ("Wearing mask while committing offense; reclassification"). Section 775.0845 provides:
3. Spicer v. State

   615 So. 2d 725 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 16 times

   In this case, the trial court interpreted section 775.0845(4) as requiring robbery with a mask to be reclassified as a first-degree felony. The court then used the first-degree conviction to sentence Spicer to life imprisonment under the habitual offender statute, section 775.084(4)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (1989). Spicer argues that although section 775.0845 is an enhanced penalty statute, it does not reclassify the degree of felony. Thus, he argues that he can be sentenced as a habitual offender only for a second-degree felony. We agree and reverse.

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4. Jennings v. State

   498 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 6 times

   Appellant argues that the lower court erred by reclassifying the degree of aggravated assault and battery upward based on the fact that appellant wore a mask while committing these felonies. Appellant contends that the mask statute, like the habitual offender statute, does not require reclassification of the degree of crimes, but only increases the penalty. We disagree. Appellant is only correct in stating that the habitual offender status pursuant to § 775.084, Florida Statutes (1985) does not permit the reclassifying of crimes upward for scoresheet purposes. The statute's language clearly reveals that only the penalty is enhanced, i.e., in terms of years. The degree of offense remains the same. See Cuthbert v. State, 459 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), pet. for rev. denied 467 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 1985); Hall v. State, 483 So.2d 549 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). However on its face, § 775.0845, Florida Statutes (1985), the mask statute, reveals language that distinguishes it from the habitual offender statute. The language of the mask statute requires that each offense, i.e., misdemeanor or felony, shall be punishable as if it were reclassified upward as an offense of the next…

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5. Johnson v. State

   311 So. 3d 203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 1 times

   In March 2019, Appellant filed a motion under rule 3.800(a), in which he again claimed that his sentence on count I was illegal. Appellant claimed that 1995 version of section 775.0845 applied and that under this statute his sentence for count I was improperly reclassified rather than enhanced. Appellant pointed to the title to section 775.0845, Florida Statutes (1995), which states, "[w]earing mask while committing offense; enhanced penalties." Appellant also claimed that the 1995 amendments to section 775.0845, contained in chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida, was unconstitutional as a violation of the single-subject rule in article III, section 6 of the Florida Constitution. See Heggs v. State , 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000). Appellant sought to be resentenced under an earlier version of the statute that he claimed provided for enhancement rather than reclassification of sentence. See § 775.0845, Fla. Stat. (1994). The trial court denied relief, and Appellant brought this appeal.

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6. Cooper v. State

   800 So. 2d 243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 24 times

   Because it is not properly before us, we do not address whether the conviction for felon in possession of a firearm can be reclassified to a first-degree felony pursuant to section 775.0845, Florida Statutes (1995), and then be subjected to the habitual sentence for a first-degree felony. We note, however, that the cases relied upon by Cooper interpreted a prior version of the statute and do not control here. See Solone v. State, 686 So.2d 719, 720 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (noting that the amended version of section 775.0845 is not an issue in that appeal);Adams v. State, 775 So.2d 385, 385 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (noting that the amended version of section 775.084 is not an issue in that appeal).

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7. Fletcher v. State

   472 So. 2d 537 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 28 times

   To-date, no Florida case has discussed section 775.0845, Florida Statutes (1983) except to characterize it as an enhancement statute. Dominguez v. State, 461 So.2d 277 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Walcott v. State, 460 So.2d 915 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Cuthbert v. State, 459 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Cooper v. State, 455 So.2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), review denied, 464 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1985). Nor is the legislative history of section 775.0845 particularly enlightening. However, it appears the statute is aimed at criminals who employ devices either to make witnesses' identifications of them difficult or to otherwise facilitate the commission of a crime. This may include covering up one's face; or altering one's appearance by disguise or costume. The officer's testimony in this case does not preclude the reasonable inference that Fletcher's disguise under the circumstances was a device used to facilitate his criminal behavior. Accordingly, under the facts presented at trial, we conclude that the court did not err by allowing the special verdict pertaining to section 775.0845.

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8. L.D.H. v. State

   212 So. 3d 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 2 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   We agree with the state's argument. Section 775.0845, Florida Statutes (2015), provides in pertinent part:

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9. Wright v. State

   767 So. 2d 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 3 times

   The earlier version of section 775.0845 was clearly a sentence enhancer. It was initially entitled "wearing masks while committing offense; enhanced penalties." This was pointed out in Cabal v. State, 678 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1996), in which the supreme court implicitly invited the legislature to amend the statute in order to reclassify "the conduct as a distinct, substantive offense." The legislature did so in 1997. See section 775.0845, Fla. Stat. (1997).

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10. Newman v. State

    738 So. 2d 981 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 4 times

    The State reminds us that in Cabal the supreme court did not interpret the language added to the end of this and several other statutes in October 1995, which speaks to reclassification. The State also points out that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.703(d)(11) states that an "increase in offense severity level may result from areclassification of felony degrees pursuant to 775.0845, 775.087, 775.0875, or 794.023[,]" and that rule 3.703(c)(2) provides that "[a]n offense does not become unlisted and subject to the provisions of section 921.0013, because of a reclassification of the degree of felony pursuant to section 775.0845, section 775.087, section 775.0875 or section 794.023 ." (Emphases supplied.) We note that language corresponding to the latter rule provision has been included in section 921.0022(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998).

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