Home
Menu
904-383-7448
F.S. 776.08 on Google Scholar

F.S. 776.08 on Casetext

Amendments to 776.08


The 2022 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 776
JUSTIFIABLE USE OF FORCE
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 776.08 Florida Statutes and Case Law
776.08 Forcible felony.“Forcible felony” means treason; murder; manslaughter; sexual battery; carjacking; home-invasion robbery; robbery; burglary; arson; kidnapping; aggravated assault; aggravated battery; aggravated stalking; aircraft piracy; unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.
History.s. 13, ch. 74-383; s. 4, ch. 75-298; s. 289, ch. 79-400; s. 5, ch. 93-212; s. 10, ch. 95-195.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: August 29, 2022
F.S. 776.08 on Google Scholar

F.S. 776.08 on Casetext

Amendments to 776.08


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 776.08
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 776.08.


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S776.08
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 776.08.


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Rodriguez v. State

    826 So. 2d 464 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 19 times
    Section 776.08, Florida Statutes (1997), provides:
    PAGE 465
  2. Hudson v. State

    800 So. 2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 12 times
    a. Any forcible felony, as described in s. 776.08. . . .
    PAGE 629
  3. Johnson v. State

    858 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 11 times
    Johnson's current (battery) offense, spitting on a law enforcement officer, is not one of the forcible felonies enumerated in section 776.08 and does not amount to "the use or threat of use of physical force or violence" as provided by that section. Battery is a qualifying offense where the defendant struck or intentionally caused bodily harm to another person. § 784.03(1)(a)1, 2, Fla. Stat. (2001). While spitting on a law enforcement officer amounts to an unwanted touching, it does not amount to the use or threat of use of physical force or violence. Johnson's spitting offense is not a qualifying one for sentencing as a violent career criminal.
  4. Perkins v. State

    576 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1991)   Cited 144 times
    Thus, in the strict and literal sense required by Florida law, this language can only mean that the statutory elements of the crime itself must include or encompass conduct of the type described. If such conduct is not a necessary element of the crime, then the crime is not a forcible felony within the meaning of the final clause of section 776.08. See § 776.08, Fla. Stat. (1987); accord Bowes v. State, 500 So.2d 290 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (marijuana trafficking not a forcible felony), review denied, 506 So.2d 1043 (Fla. 1987).
    PAGE 1313
  5. Johnson v. U.S.

    559 U.S. 133 (2010)   Cited 2,610 times   14 Legal Analyses
    Florida has a statute similar to the Armed Career Criminal Act that imposes mandatory-minimum sentences upon “violent career criminal[s],” Fla. Stat. § 775.084(4)(d) (2007), defined to mean persons who have three convictions for certain felonies, including any “forcible felony,” § 775.084(1)(d)(1)(a). “[F]orcible felony” is defined to include a list of enumerated felonies—including murder, manslaughter, sexual battery, carjacking, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery—and also “any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.” § 776.08. In Hearns, the Florida Supreme Court held that the felony offense of battery on a law enforcement officer, § 784.07(2)(b)—which requires the same conduct (directed against a law enforcement officer) as misdemeanor battery under § 784.03(1)(a)—was not a forcible felony. See 961 So.2d, at 219. It said that since § 784.03(1)(a) requires proof of only the slightest unwanted physical touch, “the use ... of physical force” was not an element of the offense. Id., at 219.
    PAGE 138
  6. State v. Hackley

    95 So. 3d 92 (Fla. 2012)   Cited 49 times
    Our decision in Hearns does not require a different result. In Hearns, we held that a conviction for BOLEO did not qualify a defendant for sentencing as a violent career criminal (VCC). 961 So.2d at 219. The VCC statute contains a list of enumerated qualifying offenses, as well as a provision incorporating “[a]ny forcible felony, as described in s. 776.08.” § 775.084(1)(d)1.a, Fla. Stat. (2000). Section 776.08 enumerates several forcible felonies and also includes a catch-all provision covering “any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.” § 776.08, Fla. Stat. (2000). Applying the “statutory elements” test set forth in Perkins v. State, 576 So.2d 1310 (Fla.1991), we reasoned that
    PAGE 95
  7. Walker v. State

    965 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 36 times
    When the postconviction court summarily denied Walker's rule 3.800(a) motion, it did not have the benefit of State v. Hearns, 961 So.2d 211 (Fla. 2007). In Hearns, the Supreme Court of Florida considered whether battery on a law enforcement officer is a "`forcible felony, as described in' section 776.08, Florida Statutes (2000)," for purposes of the violent career criminal (VCC) statute. Id. at 214; see § 775.084(1)(d). Because battery on a law enforcement officer is not specifically enumerated as a "forcible felony" in section 776.08, the Hearns court analyzed the catchall provision that defines a "forcible felony" as including "any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual." § 776.08, Fla. Stat. (2005). Relying on its prior decision in Perkins v. State, 576 So.2d 1310 (Fla. 1991), the Hearns court held that "in determining whether a crime constitutes a forcible felony, courts must consider only the statutory elements of the offense, regardless of the particular circumstances involved." 961 So.2d at 212. Quoting from Perkins, the Hearns court said:
    PAGE 1283
  8. Ubilla v. State

    8 So. 3d 1200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 25 times
    The violent career criminal statute provides, in pertinent part, that qualifying offenses include "[a]ny forcible felony, as described in s. 776.08." § 775.084(1)(c)1.a., Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998).
    PAGE 1202
  9. Cala v. State

    854 So. 2d 840 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 30 times
    Juan Cala challenges his sentence as a violent career criminal arguing that the non-violent burglaries on which his sentence was based are not qualifying offenses as "described" in section 776.08 of the Florida Statutes. See § 775.084(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2003) (defining a violent career criminal as a defendant who has previously been convicted as an adult three or more times for an offense that is a "forcible felony, as described in s. 776.08"). According to Cala, section 776.08 enumerates those crimes that may qualify as predicate forcible felonies if and only if they involve the use or threat of physical force or violence. We disagree.