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F.S. 782.071 on Google Scholar

F.S. 782.071 on Casetext

Amendments to 782.071


The 2022 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 782
HOMICIDE
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 782.071 Florida Statutes and Case Law
782.071 Vehicular homicide.“Vehicular homicide” is the killing of a human being, or the killing of an unborn child by any injury to the mother, caused by the operation of a motor vehicle by another in a reckless manner likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another.
(1) Vehicular homicide is:
(a) A felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(b) A felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if:
1. At the time of the accident, the person knew, or should have known, that the accident occurred; and
2. The person failed to give information and render aid as required by s. 316.062.

This paragraph does not require that the person knew that the accident resulted in injury or death.

(2) For purposes of this section, the term “unborn child” has the same meaning as provided in s. 775.021(5).
(3) A right of action for civil damages shall exist under s. 768.19, under all circumstances, for all deaths described in this section.
(4) In addition to any other punishment, the court may order the person to serve 120 community service hours in a trauma center or hospital that regularly receives victims of vehicle accidents, under the supervision of a registered nurse, an emergency room physician, or an emergency medical technician pursuant to a voluntary community service program operated by the trauma center or hospital.
History.s. 16, ch. 74-383; s. 6, ch. 75-298; s. 12, ch. 86-296; s. 14, ch. 96-330; s. 9, ch. 98-417; s. 1, ch. 99-153; s. 2, ch. 2001-147; s. 5, ch. 2014-194.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: August 29, 2022
F.S. 782.071 on Google Scholar

F.S. 782.071 on Casetext

Amendments to 782.071


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 782.071
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

782.071 1a - HOMICIDE-NEGLIG MANSL-VEH - KILLING OF PERSON OR VIABLE FETUS W VEH - F: S
782.071 1b - HOMICIDE-NEGLIG MANSL-VEH - FAIL TO GIVE INFORMATION AND RENDER AID - F: F


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S782.071
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

S782.071 VEHICULAR HOMICIDE [See 322.28(4)] - Points on Drivers License: 0 R


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. McCreary v. State

    371 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1979)   Cited 56 times   1 Legal Analyses
    The issues before us are whether section 782.071, Florida Statutes (1975), is unconstitutionally vague; whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal; and whether the information failed to charge an offense. The response to these questions depends upon whether the legislature, by enacting section 782.071, intended only to reduce the crime of manslaughter by culpable negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle to a third-degree felony or whether the legislature intended and did create a lesser included offense with a lesser standard of proof required for conviction. We find that the legislature intended to accomplish the latter, and we, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal and defendant's motion to dismiss the information. We also hold that section 782.071 as construed is not unconstitutionally vague.
  2. McKnight v. State

    906 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 16 times
    Based on our examination of the statutory language of section 782.071(1)(b) and its interrelated statutory provisions, its pertinent legislative history, the purpose for its enactment, the relevant case law, and the uniform statutory treatment of manslaughter offenses, see Bautista, we believe that the legislative intent is clear and leads to only one conclusion. The aspect of criminal conduct to be punished in a prosecution for vehicular homicide under section 782.071(1)(b) is the failure to render aid to the victims and, therefore, the allowable unit of prosecution is each victim. Because the legislative intent is clear, the rule of lenity is inapplicable. Accordingly, multiple first-degree felony convictions under section 782.071(1)(b), based on the number of victims killed in a single accident who did not receive aid from the defendant, are appropriate without violating double jeopardy principles regardless of the fact that the defendant fled only one accident scene.
    PAGE 374
  3. State v. Maisonet-Maldonado

    308 So. 3d 63 (Fla. 2020)   Cited 15 times
    § 782.071(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010).
    PAGE 70
  4. Hunt v. State

    769 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 12 times
    Both the First and Fourth Districts have held that double jeopardy bars prosecution under section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes (1991), because that section is subsumed by section 782.071(2), Florida Statutes (1991). See Pierce v. State, 744 So.2d 1193, 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Wright v. State, 573 So.2d 998, 1001 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). This analysis applies to the 1997 version of the vehicular homicide statute as well. Section 782.071 subsumes the requirement found in section 316.027 that the motorist stop and comply with the requirements of section 316.062, Florida Statutes (1997). See generally Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985) (holding the test of double jeopardy is statutory elements, not evidence produced at trial). On that basis, we reverse Hunt's conviction for leaving the scene of an accident involving injury.
    PAGE 1111
  5. McCullough v. State

    230 So. 3d 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 12 times
    It is clear that vehicular homicide and leaving the scene of a crash with death do not share the same elements. Vehicular homicide requires reckless operation of a vehicle, but leaving the scene of a crash with death does not require that the vehicle be operated in any particular manner. Compare § 782.071(1)(a) (vehicular homicide), with § 316.027(2)(c) (leaving the scene of a crash with death). Moreover, leaving the scene of a crash with death also requires that a defendant willfully leave the scene of a crash, whereas vehicular homicide has no such element. Compare § 782.071(1)(a), with § 316.027(2)(c). Accordingly, these two offenses satisfy the statutory Blockburger test set forth in section 775.021(4). Lastly, the two offenses are not degrees of the same offense, nor is one a lesser offense subsumed by the greater offense. § 775.021(4)(b)(2) – (3). Accordingly, McCullough's convictions for vehicular homicide and leaving the scene of a crash with death satisfy the double jeopardy statute.
    PAGE 592
  6. Houser v. State

    474 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1985)   Cited 105 times
    Relevant to this discussion is the Brown court's analysis of the relationship between the statutes under discussion here: "Causing the death of a person by the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated is a specific category of manslaughter. § 860.01(2), Fla. Stat. (1977) [subsequently recodified at § 316.1931(2)]. Vehicular homicide otherwise than from intoxication has been removed by the legislature from the manslaughter statute and made an offense subject to a lesser penalty than that imposed for manslaughter. §§ 782.07 and 782.071, Fla. Stat. (1977)." 371 So.2d at 162, n. 1.
    PAGE 1197
  7. Huckaba v. State

    260 So. 3d 377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 5 times
    The "viable fetus" language is consistent with the 2013 version of Florida's vehicular homicide statute, whereas the "unborn child" language in the amended information tracks the 2014 version. Compare § 782.071, Fla. Stat. (2013) (amended 2014), with § 782.071, Fla. Stat. (2014). Significantly, both charging instruments alleged that Appellant's conduct was "contrary to Florida Statute 782.071(1)."
    PAGE 380
  8. Raik v. Dep't of Legal Affairs

    344 So. 3d 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022)
    The Act's definition of "crime" in subsection 960.03(3)(b) includes only the first-degree violation of the vehicular homicide statute. It does not include the specific charge in this case, i.e., a second-degree felony under subsection 782.071(1)(a ). Subsection 960.03(3)(b) of the Act defines "crime" to include a "violation of s. 316.027(2), s. 316.193, s. 316.1935, s. 327.35(1), s. 782.071(1)(b ) , or s. 860.13(1)(a) which results in physical injury or death." Id. § 960.03(3)(b) (emphases added). Subsection 782.071(1)(b)—as highlighted—is specifically included as a "crime" for purposes of victim compensation; but subsection 782.071(1)(a)—involving second degree felonies—is not. For this reason, a violation of section 782.071(1)(a) —the specific criminal charge in this case—is not a "crime" under subsection 960.03(3)(b) of the Act for purposes of compensability; perhaps it should be included in this subsection, but the Legislature chose not to do so, including only the more serious first-degree felony that includes leaving the scene of an accident.
    PAGE 552
  9. In re Jury Instructions Case

    946 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 2006)   Cited 11 times
    MANSLAUGHTER — 782.07 CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA STAT. INS. NO. 782.071 782.072
    PAGE 1065
  10. Smith v. U.S. Attorney Gen.

    983 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2020)   Cited 4 times
    Fla. Stat. § 782.071. The question before us is whether the level of intent needed to commit the crime of vehicular homicide in Florida is "sufficiently base, vile, or depraved" to constitute a crime involving moral turpitude. Gelin, 837 F.3d at 1243.
    PAGE 1211