Amendments to 784.03

1. Johnson v. U.S.

   559 U.S. 133 (2010)   Cited 2,627 times   14 Legal Analyses

   Johnson's indictment specified five prior felony convictions. The Government contended that three of those convictions—for aggravated battery and for burglary of a dwelling in October 1986, and for battery in May 2003—rendered Johnson eligible for sentencing under § 924(e)(1). At the sentencing hearing, Johnson did not dispute that the two 1986 convictions were for “violent felon[ies],” but he objected to counting his 2003 battery conviction. That conviction was for simple battery under Florida law, which ordinarily is a first-degree misdemeanor, Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1)(b), but is a third-degree felony for a defendant who (like Johnson) has been convicted of battery (even simple battery) before, § 784.03(2).

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2. State v. Hearns

   961 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2007)   Cited 164 times

   The State has not shown with any certainty (has not shown at all, in fact) whether the battery on a law enforcement officer was a mere unwanted touching, see section 784.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), or caused bodily harm, see section 784.03(1)(b). . . . Following Perkins, with no record evidence that Hearn's conduct against a law enforcement officer was a forcible felony, it cannot be used as a qualifying prior for purposes of VCC sentencing.

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3. United States v. Vereen

   920 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2019)   Cited 34 times

   1 more...

   Fla. Stat. § 784.03. Because Vereen was convicted under § 784.03(2), we analyze that subsection, which requires that Vereen committed a battery subsequently to a conviction for battery, aggravated battery, or felony battery. Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 136, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010). Battery, in turn, is defined in § 784.03(1), which is divisible into at least two elements: (1) to intentionally cause bodily harm; or (2) actually and intentionally touch or strike the victim. Id. at 136–37, 130 S.Ct. 1265. Florida courts interpreting § 784.03(1)(a) have treated these two divisible subsections ((1) and (2)) as alternative elements of the crime of battery. See, e.g., Jaimes v. State, 51 So.3d 445, 449–51 (Fla. 2010) ; State v. Weaver, 957 So.2d 586, 587–89 (Fla. 2007) ; Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 8.3.

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4. United States v. Gandy

   917 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2019)   Cited 15 times

   Here, the categorical approach does not reveal whether Gandy was "necessarily" convicted of a crime that includes as an element the "use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." As the panel accurately points out, Gandy’s judgment reveals only that he was convicted of violating Fla. Stat. § 784.03, which is not categorically a crime of violence. Rather, § 784.03 has two subsections possibly applicable here—one that is not categorically a crime of violence ( § 784.03(1)(a)(1), which makes it a crime to "[a]ctually and intentionally touch[ ] or strike[ ] another person against the will of the other"), Curtis Johnson v. United States , 559 U.S. 133, 139, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010), and one that is ( § 784.03(1)(a)(2), which makes it a crime to "[i]ntentionally cause[ ] bodily harm to another person"). Because § 784.03 is divisible into one crime that qualifies as a crime of violence and another that does not, the categorical approach cannot help us deduce whether Gandy’s conviction under § 784.03 was necessarily for a crime of violence.

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5. United States v. Green

   842 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2016)   Cited 11 times

   In sum, Shepard documents show that Defendant was convicted under the "striking" element, and not the "actually and intentionally" touching element, of § 784.03. Applying the modified categorical approach, Defendant's felony battery conviction under § 784.03 was a "violent felony" under the elements clause. As a result, Defendant had at least three ACCA qualifying convictions, thus, we need not decide whether Defendant's felony battery conviction in violation of § 784.041 was also a "violent felony." We therefore affirm Defendant's sentence under the ACCA.

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6. Soverino v. State

   356 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1978)   Cited 53 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   With regard to his second point on appeal, appellant notes that prior to the enactment of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976), battery on a police officer constituted an offense under Section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1975), the misdemeanor statute. Since Section 784.03 was not repealed or modified by the enactment of Section 784.07, appellant suggests that the prosecutor may file under the felony or the misdemeanor statute. Appellant concludes this unbridled discretion in the prosecutor must invalidate the statute at issue. While we agree that the prosecutor has the discretion to charge under either Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976), or Section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1975), when a police officer has been the victim of a battery, we cannot endorse appellant's conclusion that such discretion creates a constitutional infirmity. The prosecutor is often free to charge the accused under one of a number of statutes which overlap or duplicate one another. See Newman v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 263, 382 F.2d 479 (1967). As this Court stated in Fayerweather v. State, 332 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1976):

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7. State v. Warren

   796 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2001)   Cited 8 times

   Johann Warren (Warren) was charged by information with one count of felony battery pursuant to section 784.03(2), Florida Statutes (1997). Section 784.03 provides:
8. Spradlin v. State

   967 So. 2d 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 8 times

   Simple battery is defined as "actually and intentionally touch[ing] or strik[ing] another person against the will of the other; or intentionally caus[ing] bodily harm to another person." § 784.03(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006). Although this offense is ordinarily punishable as a misdemeanor, a second violation is punished as a felony. § 784.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). That is what happened here. The question is whether even a second offense of simple battery — a felony battery — is a qualifying crime for PRR sentencing.
9. W.J.H. v. State

   922 So. 2d 458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 3 times

   Section 784.03(2), Florida Statutes (2004), makes the commission of a battery, which is ordinarily a first degree misdemeanor, see section 784.03(1)(b), a third degree felony if the defendant "has one prior conviction for battery, aggravated battery, or felony battery." The battery statute defines the term "conviction" as "a determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or a trial, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld or a plea of nolo contendere is entered." § 784.03(2), Fla. Stat. To elevate W.J.H.'s offense to the crime of felony battery, the State relied upon a prior delinquency proceeding, wherein W.J.H. pled guilty to the crime of battery and adjudication was withheld.
10. U.S. v. Glover

    431 F.3d 744 (11th Cir. 2005)   Cited 71 times

    Guidelines section 4B1.2 defines "crime of violence" as "any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that — (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. . . ." U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). Under Florida law, "battery occurs when a person: (1) Actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person . . . or (2) Intentionally causes bodily harm to another person." Fla. Stat. §§ 784.03, 784.07. Because battery on a law enforcement officer is a crime of violence under Guidelines section 4B1.2, the district court did not err when it enhanced Glover's sentence.

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