Amendments to 787.01

1. Harkins v. State

   380 So. 2d 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 39 times

   The Florida statute is broader and less restrictive in one important respect. The intent listed in subsection (2) of section 787.01(a) is: "Commit or facilitate commission of any felony." (Emphasis added.) Nevertheless, we do not believe that the Florida Legislature intended to convert every first degree robbery and every forcible rape into two life felonies. Therefore, we construe section 787.01, Florida Statutes, to mean that "confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person . . . with intent to commit or facilitate commission of any felony" does not include movement or confinement that is inconsequential or inherent in the nature of the felony. The examples cited in Buggs, supra at 731, are apposite and quoted here with approval:

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2. Faison v. State

   426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983)   Cited 219 times

   Subsequent to the district court decision in the instant case, this Court interpreted section 787.01 in Mobley v. State, 409 So.2d 1031 (Fla. 1982). In Mobley we observed that a literal construction of subsection 787.01(1)(a)2 "would apply to any criminal transaction which inherently involves the unlawful confinement of another person, such as robbery or sexual battery." Id. at 1034. We then adopted the view that subsection 787.01(1)(a)2 did not apply to unlawful confinements or movements that were merely incidental to other felonies, but recognized an exception in the case of hostages.

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3. Perry v. State

   57 So. 3d 910 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 3 times

   We need not address the merits of the Second District's analysis of section 787.01(1)(a)3 in Conner because the case is distinguishable on its facts. In Conner, the defendant jumped out of a vehicle and attacked a student waiting at a bus stop, holding her down and choking her. See Conner, 19 So.3d at 1119. The entire attack lasted less than a minute and the restraint "did not involve any element of movement." Id. at 1124; see also id. at 1125 (characterizing the defendant's "brief act" of holding the victim down during the attack as "a mere momentary restraint"). Here, the beating administered by Appellant lasted at least seven minutes and involved the victim being beaten in one room, dragged by her hair into another room where the beating continued, and then dragged by her neck or hair outside where the beating concluded. These facts are sufficient to establish confinement under any reading of section 787.01(1)(a)3.

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4. Kopsho v. State

   No. SC09-1383 (Fla. Mar. 1, 2012)   Cited 16 times

   Kopsho was charged under both sections 787.01(1)(a)(2) and 787.01(1)(a)(3), Florida Statutes (2000). Section 787.01(1)(a) defines kidnapping as:

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5. Waddell v. State

   696 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 10 times

   As to the cross-appeal, we agree with the state that the trial court erred when it granted Waddell's motion for judgment of acquittal on his false imprisonment conviction. In Count IV of the amended information, the state charged Waddell alternatively with kidnapping with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony pursuant to section 787.01( 1)(a)(2), Fla. Stat. (1991) and/or kidnapping with the intent to inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim pursuant to section 787.01( 1)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (1991). There was evidence at trial to establish, and the trial court so found, that Waddell had confined the victim with an intent to terrorize the victim. Relying upon the analysis set forth in Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 963, 966 (Fla. 1983), the trial court, however, concluded that the victim's confinement was merely incidental to the robbery and granted the judgment of acquittal. The trial court's reliance upon Faison, however, was misplaced in this case because Faison adopted a test only for a determination of whether a kidnapping had taken place with the intent to commit a felony pursuant to section 787.01( 1)(a)(2). Where, as…

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6. Mobley v. State

   409 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1982)   Cited 64 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   As their third point appellants claim that their kidnapping convictions should be reversed since their conduct in confining the guards and the attorney was merely incidental to their attempted escape. Appellants were convicted under Florida's new kidnapping statute, section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1979), which has not yet been construed by this Court. Specifically, appellants were convicted under subsection 787.01(1)(a)2., which prohibits the unlawful confining of another person with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of any felony. If construed literally this subsection would apply to any criminal transaction which inherently involves the unlawful confinement of another person, such as robbery or sexual battery. Appellants cite three district court of appeal cases which have resolved this dilemma by construing this subsection not to include confinement that is inconsequential or inherent in the nature of the related felony. See Ayendes v. State, 385 So.2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Friend v. State, 385 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Harkins v. State, 380 So.2d 524 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); See also Bass v. State, 380 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).

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7. Chaeld v. State

   599 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 12 times

   Section 787.01(1)(a) defines kidnapping as follows:

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8. Bedford v. State

   589 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 1991)   Cited 41 times

   We also find no merit to Bedford's contention that a conviction for kidnapping cannot be sustained because any confinement was "merely incidental" to the homicide. Bedford was charged with confining, abducting, or imprisoning Herdmann with the intent to "[i]nflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize" Herdmann, under section 787.01(1)(a), (3), rather than with the intent to "[c]ommit or facilitate commission of any felony," under subsection 787.01(1)(a), (2). Our decision in Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 963 (Fla. 1983), which held that the latter subsection does not apply to unlawful confinements or movements that were merely incidental to or inherent in the nature of the underlying felony, has no application here.

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9. Lee v. State

   770 So. 2d 231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 8 times

   We reject the appellant's only claim of trial error on the holding that the evidence was sufficient to justify his conviction for kidnapping under the "terrorizing" provision of the statute, section 787.01(1)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1999). See Biggs v. State, 745 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Waddell v. State, 696 So.2d 1229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), review denied, 707 So.2d 1128 (Fla. 1998). Specifically, and contrary to Lee's principal contention on this point, we conclude that the fact that the victim was dragged by her throat for almost ten feet from one room to another in the course of the defendant's vicious attack upon her is sufficient to demonstrate the confinement, abduction or imprisonment required to establish any form of kidnapping. § 787.01(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999). See Faison v. State, 399 So.2d 19, 20-21 n. 2 3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), approved, 426 So.2d 963 (Fla. 1983); State v. Davis, 668 So.2d 323 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); cf. Simpkins v. State, 395 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Accordingly, the convictions under review are affirmed.

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10. Matissek v. Waller

    51 So. 3d 624 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 3 times

    Angel Maldonado Melendez appeals his conviction for kidnapping with a firearm, arguing the facts were insufficient to establish confinement. Melendez recognizes the three-part test in Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 963 (Fla. 1983), is inapplicable because he was charged under section 787.01(1)(a)3., Florida Statutes, not under section 787.01(1)(a)2., kidnapping with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of any felony. See Sutton v. State, 834 So.2d 332 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). Instead, the issue is the sufficiency of the evidence relating to the confinement element.

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