Amendments to 787.02

1. Davis v. State

   20 So. 3d 1024 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 8 times

   We reverse the trial court's September 3, 2008 denial of the first rule 3.800(a) motion. The State's response to this court's order to show cause does not dispute that false imprisonment is not an enumerated felony under section 775.082(9)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2004). State v. Hearns, 961 So.2d 211, 213 (Fla. 2007) (explaining that the only consideration in determining whether an offense is a forcible felony is the statutory elements of the offense); Sinclair v. State, 973 So.2d 665, 665 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (reversing sentence and remanding for resentencing because false imprisonment is not enumerated in subsection 775.082(9)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2004)); see also § 787.02(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004) (defining false imprisonment as "forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against her or his will," which may be accomplished by physical force, but also in other ways).

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2. United States v. Rosales-Bruno

   676 F.3d 1017 (11th Cir. 2012)   Cited 32 times

   Against this backdrop, we look to Florida case law to determine whether a conviction under § 787.02 necessarily involves the employment of “physical force” as that term is defined by federal law. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1(B)(iii). Section 787.02 requires that “some amount of force” be used. Proko v. State, 566 So.2d 918, 920 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990); see also id. (noting that the state must prove, among other things, that a “defendant forcibly restrained the victim against her will”). However, the force need not be “substantial.” Id. And, though that appears to be a fine distinction, case law since Proko makes clear that a § 787.02 offense can be committed without employing the type of “physical force” contemplated in the Guidelines.
3. United States v. Watson

   423 U.S. 411 (1976)   Cited 2,104 times   9 Legal Analyses

   1 more...

   For example, under federal law these are some of the commonlaw misdemeanors, or their modern equivalents, now considered felonies: assault, 18 U.S.C. § 111-112; assault with intent to commit murder, rape or any other felony, § 113; forging securities of the United States, § 471; bribing voters, § 597; escape, § 751; kidnaping, § 1201; obstruction of congressional or executive investigations, § 1505; obstruction of criminal investigations, § 1510; perjury, § 1621; riots, § 2101; interception of wire or oral communications, § 2511. See also, e. g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-606 (1964) (assault with intent to kill); § 41-607 (assault with intent to rape); § 41-1805 (forgery); § 41-3005 (perjury); § 41-2308 (Supp. 1973) (kidnaping). Fla. Stat. Ann. § 787.02 (Supp. 1975) (false imprisonment); § 831.01 (Supp. 1975) (forgery); § 837.012 (Supp. 1975) (perjury); § 843.14 (Supp. 1975) (compounding felonies); § 870.03 (Supp. 1975) (riots and routs). Ill. Ann. Stat. § 10-1 (Supp. 1975) (kidnaping); § 14-4 (eavesdropping); § 33-1 (Supp. 1975) (bribery); § 32-2 (Supp. 1975) (perjury). Ky. Rev. Stat. § 520.020 (1975) (escape); § 516.020 (1975) (forgery); § 509.020 (1975) (kidnaping); …

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4. U.S. v. Gonzalez-Perez

   472 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2007)   Cited 22 times

   The Florida statute defines false imprisonment as "forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against her or his will." Fla. Stat. § 787.02(1)(a). The government argues that a conviction under § 787.02(a) "implicitly contain[s] as an element the use . . . of . . . force." We disagree.

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5. State v. Robinson

   873 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 2004)   Cited 40 times

   1 more...

   c. Any second-degree or greater felony violation of s. 787.01 [kidnapping] or s. 787.02 [false imprisonment], where the victim is a minor and the defendant is not the victim's parent; chapter 794 [sexual battery]; s. 796.03; s. 800.04 [lewdness]; s. 825.1025(2)(b); s. 827.071 [sexual performance of a child]; or s. 847.0145; or a violation of a similar law of another jurisdiction, and the offender has previously been convicted of or found to have committed, or has pled nolo contendere or guilty to, regardless of adjudication, any violation of s. 787.01 or s. 787.02, where the victim is a minor and the defendant is not the victim's parent; s. 794.011(2), (3), (4), (5), or (8); s. 794.023; s. 796.03; s. 800.04; s. 825.1025; s. 827.071; s. 847.0133; s. 847.0135; or s. 847.0145, or a violation of a similar law of another jurisdiction[.]

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6. United States v. Driver

   663 F. App'x 915 (11th Cir. 2017)   Cited 1 times

   First applying the categorical approach, we agree with the parties that a conviction for false imprisonment under Florida Statute § 787.02 does not categorically satisfy the ACCA's elements clause. The statute defines "false imprisonment" to mean "forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against her or his will." Fla. Stat. § 787.02( 1)(a). In United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 676 F.3d 1017 (11th Cir. 2012), we held that this language does not necessarily require the "use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force" to support a conviction. Rosales-Bruno, 676 F.3d at 1020-22. As we explained in Rosales-Bruno, the statute's "secretly confining" language and the interpreting Florida case law make it clear that § 787.02 can be violated "without employing the type of 'physical force' contemplated" by the elements clause. Id. at 1022. Rosales-Bruno analyzed the Florida false imprisonment statute in the context of the elements clause of the Sentencing Guidelines, but the same rationale applies to the identically-worded elements clause of the ACCA. See United States v…

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7. State v. Smith

   840 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 2003)   Cited 17 times

   The respondent was convicted of false imprisonment under section 787.02(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), and robbery under section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1997). Section 787.02(1)(a) defines false imprisonment as

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8. Raines v. State

   805 So. 2d 999 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 15 times

   Without question, the state has an interest in protecting the public from sexual offenders. Ch. 2000-246, § 3 Laws of Fla. And the designation of a person as a sexual offender is rationally related to that goal where an accused has been convicted of false imprisonment under section 787.02 (3)(a) 2., 3., or 4., which proscribes false imprisonment of a child under 13 when committed along with an enumerated sexual offense. However, where an accused is convicted of false imprisonment under sections 787.02 (1)(a) and/or (b) and it is clear that the predicate crime is totally devoid of a sexual component, such rational basis is lost.

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9. In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—Instructions 9.1

   167 So. 3d 443 (Fla. 2015)   Cited 1 times

   If a violation of § 787.02(3), Fla. Stat. , is charged, instruct as follows:

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10. United States v. Schneider

    681 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2012)   Cited 10 times

    .Fla. Stat. § 787.02(1)(a).

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