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F.S. 787.03 on Google Scholar

F.S. 787.03 on Casetext

Amendments to 787.03


The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 787
KIDNAPPING; CUSTODY OFFENSES; HUMAN TRAFFICKING; AND RELATED OFFENSES
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 787.03 Florida Statutes and Case Law
787.03 Interference with custody.—
(1) Whoever, without lawful authority, knowingly or recklessly takes or entices, or aids, abets, hires, or otherwise procures another to take or entice, any minor or any incompetent person from the custody of the minor’s or incompetent person’s parent, his or her guardian, a public agency having the lawful charge of the minor or incompetent person, or any other lawful custodian commits the offense of interference with custody and commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) In the absence of a court order determining rights to custody or visitation with any minor or with any incompetent person, any parent of the minor or incompetent person, whether natural or adoptive, stepparent, legal guardian, or relative of the minor or incompetent person who has custody thereof and who takes, detains, conceals, or entices away that minor or incompetent person within or without the state with malicious intent to deprive another person of his or her right to custody of the minor or incompetent person commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) A subsequently obtained court order for custody or visitation does not affect application of this section.
(4) It is a defense that:
(a) The defendant had reasonable cause to believe that his or her action was necessary to preserve the minor or the incompetent person from danger to his or her welfare.
(b) The defendant was the victim of an act of domestic violence or had reasonable cause to believe that he or she was about to become the victim of an act of domestic violence as defined in s. 741.28, and the defendant had reasonable cause to believe that the action was necessary in order for the defendant to escape from, or protect himself or herself from, the domestic violence or to preserve the minor or incompetent person from exposure to the domestic violence.
(c) The minor or incompetent person was taken away at his or her own instigation without enticement and without purpose to commit a criminal offense with or against the minor or incompetent person, and the defendant establishes that it was reasonable to rely on the instigating acts of the minor or incompetent person.
(5) Proof that a person has not attained the age of 18 years creates the presumption that the defendant knew the minor’s age or acted in reckless disregard thereof.
(6)(a) The offenses prescribed in subsections (1) and (2) do not apply in cases in which a person having a legal right to custody of a minor or incompetent person is the victim of any act of domestic violence, has reasonable cause to believe he or she is about to become the victim of any act of domestic violence, as defined in s. 741.28, or believes that his or her action was necessary to preserve the minor or the incompetent person from danger to his or her welfare and seeks shelter from such acts or possible acts and takes with him or her the minor or incompetent person.
(b) In order to gain the exception conferred by paragraph (a), a person who takes a minor or incompetent person under this subsection must:
1. Within 10 days after taking the minor or incompetent person, make a report to the sheriff’s office or state attorney’s office for the county in which the minor or incompetent person resided at the time he or she was taken, which report must include the name of the person taking the minor or incompetent person, the current address and telephone number of the person and minor or incompetent person, and the reasons the minor or incompetent person was taken.
2. Within a reasonable time after taking a minor, commence a custody proceeding that is consistent with the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. s. 1738A, or the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, ss. 61.501-61.542.
3. Inform the sheriff’s office or state attorney’s office for the county in which the minor or incompetent person resided at the time he or she was taken of any change of address or telephone number of the person and the minor or incompetent person.
(c)1. The current address and telephone number of the person and the minor or incompetent person which are contained in the report made to a sheriff or state attorney under paragraph (b) are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution.
2. A sheriff or state attorney may allow an agency, as defined in s. 119.011, to inspect and copy records made confidential and exempt under this paragraph in the furtherance of that agency’s duties and responsibilities.
History.—s. 24, ch. 74-383; s. 14, ch. 75-298; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 1, ch. 88-244; s. 25, ch. 94-134; s. 25, ch. 94-135; s. 1201, ch. 97-102; s. 1, ch. 2000-231; s. 1, ch. 2000-357; s. 157, ch. 2004-5; s. 1, ch. 2005-89; s. 1, ch. 2006-114; s. 1, ch. 2006-115; s. 1, ch. 2011-99.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: March 07, 2023
F.S. 787.03 on Google Scholar

F.S. 787.03 on Casetext

Amendments to 787.03


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 787.03
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

787.03 - FAMILY OFFENSE - INTERFERE W CUSTODY OF MINOR INCOMP PERSON - F: T
787.03 - FAMILY OFFENSE - DEPRIVE CUSTODY OF MINOR INCOMPETENT PERSON - F: T

Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S787.03
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 787.03.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Lindemuth v. State

    247 So. 3d 635 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 1 times
    In addition, the trial court used the definition of "entice" that the Fourth District Court of Appeal used, in part, in Leding . In Leding, the defendant was charged with "enticing two children" under section 787.03(1), Florida Statutes (1995). As in the case before us, the defendant in Leding never said anything sexual, and there was no evidence to suggest Leding had a sexual intent. Because there was no standard jury instruction to define entice, and it was not defined in section 787.03(1), the Fourth District Court of Appeal used the definition in Black's Law Dictionary. There, the trial court instructed the jury with Black's Law Dictionary's definition of "entice," which stated:
    PAGE 639

  2. United States v. Rocco

    18-CR-00420-23 (ALC) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2023)
    Specification 4 alleges that on or about August 18, 2022, the defendant unlawfully interfered with the custody of a minor in violation of Florida Statute 787.03. The relevant elements of that Statute are as follows:
    PAGE 11

  3. Moseley v. State

    7 So. 3d 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 2 times
    Inexplicably, the State's amended information in the case charged Moseley with violating subsection (2), and no one appears to have caught the error. Instead, all parties and the court simply assumed that Moseley was being prosecuted under subsection (1). Moseley never objected to the defect in the information, and the information was never amended. The jury was instructed on the elements of the crime outlined in subsection (1), and Moseley was convicted of that charge. In essence, Moseley was charged with violating section 787.03(2), but was convicted of violating section 787.03(1). Citing to the general rule that due process is violated when an individual is convicted of an un-charged crime, Moseley claims that he is entitled to postconviction relief.
    PAGE 552

  4. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn.

    564 U.S. 786 (2011)   Cited 430 times   9 Legal Analyses
    This, however, is not such a case. Although much has changed in this country since the Revolution, the notion that parents have authority over their children and that the law can support that authority persists today. For example, at least some States make it a crime to lure or entice a minor away from the minor's parent. See, e.g., Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 272(b)(1) (West 2008); Fla. Stat. § 787.03 (2010). Every State in the Union still establishes a minimum age for marriage without parental or judicial consent. Cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 558, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (Appendix D to opinion of Court) (2005). Individuals less than 18 years old cannot enlist in the military without parental consent. 10 U.S.C. § 505(a). And minors remain subject to curfew laws across the country, see Brief for Louisiana et al. as Amici Curiae 16, and cannot unilaterally consent to most medical procedures, id., at 15.
    PAGE 2760

  5. Khan v. State

    704 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 4 times
    Accordingly, we affirm appellant's conviction and sentence pursuant to section 787.04(1). We reverse appellant's conviction for the violation of section 787.03(1) and remand to vacate his conviction and sentence on this charge.
    PAGE 1131

  6. State v. Earl

    649 So. 2d 297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 3 times
    There are several reasons for our decision. First, resolution of this case does not require a declaration that section 744.301 is unconstitutional. Section 787.03, Florida Statutes, under which Earl was charged, relates to interference with custody. Since the lower court ruled, and it is no longer disputed, that Earl had a right of custody by virtue of the prior order, the constitutional issue did not need to be reached.
    PAGE 298

  7. Edgar v. Firuta

    100 So. 3d 255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 2 times
    The Mother's argument on this point is well taken. The final judgment modifying the prior order on parental responsibility, visitation, and timesharing is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. C., D. Contempt and Section 787.03, Florida Statutes
    PAGE 260

  8. State v. Lindemuth

    193 So. 3d 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)
    The defendant, Ryan Charles Lindemuth, was charged by information with one count of interference with the custody of a minor in violation of section 787.03( 1), Florida Statutes (2014). The defendant filed a sworn motion to dismiss the information pursuant to rule 3.190(c)(4), asserting that there were no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts did not establish a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant. An hour prior to the scheduled hearing on the defendant's motion to dismiss the information, the State filed an unsworn “Traverse/Demurrer,” setting forth facts not provided by the defendant in his sworn motion to dismiss and asserting that these facts, along with the facts alleged in the defendant's motion to dismiss, established a prima facie case of interference with the custody of a minor in violation of section 787.03( 1). At the hearing, defense counsel moved to strike the State's traverse/demurrer because it was unsworn and untimely filed. Although the Assistant State Attorney was prepared to swear to his traverse/demurrer in open court and had moved for a continuance to allow defense counsel to review the State's responsive pleading, the…
    PAGE 56

  9. State v. Badalich

    479 So. 2d 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 4 times
    Section 787.03, Florida Statutes reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
    PAGE 199

  10. Graham v. State

    169 So. 3d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 2 times
    We are mindful of the dissent's concern (expressed in its footnote 9) that our opinion could result in prosecution for kidnapping whenever a person interferes with a state agency's custody of a child or removes a child from the state contrary to an order of a state agency or court. The kidnapping statute under which Geralyn Graham was charged, section 787.01(1)(a) 4., more appropriately encompasses the totality and gravity of Geralyn Graham's felonious conduct than the crimes defined in sections 787.02 (false imprisonment), 787.03 (interference with custody), and 787.04 (removal of child from state). A false imprisonment under section 787.02 does not necessarily interfere with the performance of a governmental function. Interference with custody (section 787.03) or removal from the state (section 787.04) are not necessarily forcible, secret, by threat, or against the will of the child. Geralyn Graham's violent acts toward Rilya, combined with her deliberate, orchestrated effort to mislead DCF officials and interfere with DCF's duties, implicated section 787.01 foremost. The circumstances of this case are extraordinary. Our opinion should not be construed to…
    PAGE 130