Amendments to 790.15

1. Valdes v. State

   970 So. 2d 414 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 5 times

   It is clear, and defense counsel concedes, that under the Blockburger test, as codified in section 775.021(4)(a), section 790.15( 2), discharging a firearm from a vehicle within 1,000 feet of any person, and section 790.19, shooting or throwing a deadly missile at, within, or into any building, vehicle, aircraft or vessel, each contain an element distinct from the other. Section 790.15( 2) requires the willful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle within 1,000 feet of a person. Section 790.19 requires not mere willfulness, but malice, and does not require that any person be within the structure or near the structure at the time. Therefore, separate convictions are authorized unless these offenses fall within one of the exceptions in subsection (4)(b). Subsection (4)(b)(1), which concerns offenses that "require identical elements of proof," does not apply here. As previously discussed, pursuant to section 790.15( 2), the State was required to prove that Valdes fired the weapon from a vehicle within 1,000 feet of another person. Pursuant to section 790.19, the State was required to prove that when Valdes discharged the firearm, he did so with malice, and…

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2. Valdes v. State

   3 So. 3d 1067 (Fla. 2009)   Cited 144 times

   Under the approach we adopt today, dual convictions for the two offenses at issue in this case, discharging a firearm from a vehicle within 1000 feet of a person in violation of section 790.15(2), Florida Statutes, and shooting into an occupied vehicle in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes, do not satisfy the second statutory exception because the two offenses are found in separate statutory provisions; neither offense is an aggravated form of the other; and they are clearly not degree variants of the same offense. This is in contrast to sections 790.15(1), 790.15(2), and 790.15(3), which are explicitly degree variants of the same offense. We thus approve the result reached by the Third District in Valdes in concluding that dual convictions for these two offenses do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.

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3. U.S. v. Alexander

   609 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2010)   Cited 117 times

   The bare elements of the offense, with the benefit of these statements by the Florida courts interpreting the crime in a different context, drive our assessment of how section 790.15( 2) is violated "in the ordinary case." However, we also compare the offense at issue with other provisions of section 790.15 to add context and to better understand the Florida courts' interpretations of the provision. See Harrison, 558 F.3d at 1293 (noting the court's categorization of fleeing offenses reflected the Florida legislature's decision to differentiate between different types of fleeing behavior). Section one of the statute proscribes knowingly discharging a firearm in a public place. Fla. Stat. § 790.15( 1). This crime is classified as a misdemeanor of the first degree and is punishable by up to one-year imprisonment. Fla. Stat. § 775.082(4)(a). Section two of the statute adds the elements of (1) firing from a vehicle; and (2) doing so within 1,000 feet of another person. This offense is a class-two felony and is punishable by up to fifteen-years imprisonment. Fla. Stat. § 775.082(3)(c). The categorization of these offenses — class-one misdemeanor as opposed…

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4. American Insurance Association v. Garamendi

   539 U.S. 396 (2003)   Cited 210 times   3 Legal Analyses

   • Motion to dismiss
   4 more...

   Challenges to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 354.5 (West Cum. Supp. 2003) and Cal. Ins. Code Ann. § 790.15 (West Cum. Supp. 2003) were dismissed by the District Court for lack of standing, a ruling that was not appealed. See Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of America v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 742-743 (CA9 2001).

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5. Alvarez v. IBP, Inc.

   339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003)   Cited 280 times   11 Legal Analyses

   • Motion for summary judgment
   1 more...

   To be insulated from liability under § 259's good faith exception, an employer must "show it acted in (1) good faith, (2) conformity with, and (3) reliance on the DOL's regulations or the Administrator's Opinion Letter." Frank v. McQuigg, 950 F.2d 590, 598 (9th Cir. 1991). This test has both objective and subjective components, asking how a "reasonably prudent [person] would have acted under the same or similar circumstances" and requiring "that the employer have honesty of intention and no knowledge of circumstances which ought to put him upon inquiry." Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 790.15( a) (1900)) (internal punctuation omitted). Section 259's test also places on employers "an affirmative duty to inquire about uncertain [FLSA] coverage issues," see Keeley v. Loomis Fargo Co., 183 F.3d 257, 271 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 790.15( b)), putting "the risk of a close [good faith] case on the employer." Reich, 38 F.3d at 1127; see also 29 C.F.R. § 790.15( d) n. 99 (1999) ("It is not intended that this [good faith] defense apply where an employer had knowledge of conflicting rules and chose to act in accordance with the one most favorable to him."…

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6. McKinney v. State

   66 So. 3d 852 (Fla. 2011)   Cited 25 times

   As this holding was applied to Valdes' convictions under sections 790.19 and 790.15, we found that the violations did "not satisfy the second statutory exception because the two offenses are found in separate statutory provisions; neither offense is an aggravated form of the other; and they are clearly not degree variants of the same offense." Valdes, 3 So.3d at 1077. In contrast, we noted that sections 790.15(1), 790.15(2), and 790.15(3) were explicitly degree variants of the same offense. Valdes, 3 So.3d at 1077-78. As we held in Valdes, here there is no question that the Legislature did not expressly provide that robbery and grand theft are degree variants of the same offense. Despite this bright-line rule, McKinney argues that we may wish to follow the Fourth District's decision in Shazer, which provides that grand theft is a degree variant of robbery. We decline to do so.

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7. Bankston v. Illinois

   60 F.3d 1249 (7th Cir. 1995)   Cited 219 times

   1 more...

   However, the defendants' subjective beliefs do not amount to proof of good faith unless they were reasonable. The defendants had been advised by their legal staff that employees who were docked pay could not be exempt managerial employees. We have already decided that this memorandum, combined with evidence that showed that the plaintiffs were subject to being docked for partial day absences, provided a sufficient basis for a jury to conclude that the defendants acted willfully for purposes of deciding which statute of limitations to apply. Similarly, but not congruently, see Walton, 786 F.2d at 308-12, that evidence provided a sufficient basis for the district court to find that the defendants did not act with good faith. The memo shows that the defendants were at least aware that the plaintiffs may have been covered by the FLSA. And Steven Schnorf, CMS's director, though he indicated that he spoke with CMS's attorneys about the FLSA's general applicability to CMS employees, refused to describe his conversations with CMS's attorneys on these matters. The defendants failed to show how they took steps to be more certain of plaintiffs' status. The lack of such an inquiry indicates…

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8. Standard Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases

   723 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1998)   Cited 28 times

   07 784.021 784.07 784.011 790.10 790.15 784.07 784.045 784.07 784.03 790.10 790.15 784.08 784.045 784.08 784.03 790.10 790.15 784.08 784.021 784.08 784.011 790.10 790.15 784.08 784.03 784.08 784.011 787

   784.021 784.03 784.011 784.05 784.05 782.071 316.192 784.05 784.05 784.011 784.021 784.011 790.10 790.15 784.021 784.011 784.03 784.045 784.03 784.045 784.03 790.10 784.045 784.03 784.048 784.048 784.048

9. Insignares v. Sec'y

   755 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2014)   Cited 165 times

   • Motion to dismiss
   1 more...

   The jury found Insignares guilty on all counts. He was convicted of (1) attempted first-degree murder with a firearm, Fla. Stat. §§ 775.087, 777.04(1), 777.011, 782.04(1), resulting in a sentence of 40 years of imprisonment, including a 20–year mandatory minimum; (2) criminal mischief, Fla. Stat. § 806.13(1)(b) 3, resulting in a sentence of 5 years of imprisonment; and (3) discharging a firearm in public, Fla. Stat. §§ 775.087, 790.15(1), resulting in a sentence of 1 year of imprisonment. These sentences ran concurrently. B. State Direct and Post–Conviction Review

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10. Houk v. State

    316 So. 3d 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 1 times

    Accordingly, the supreme court held that Valdes's dual convictions for discharging a firearm from a vehicle within 1,000 feet of a person, in violation of section 790.15(2), Florida Statutes, and shooting into an occupied vehicle, in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes, did not satisfy the section 775.021(4)(b) 2. exception "because the two offenses are found in separate statutory provisions; neither offense is an aggravated form of the other; and they are clearly not degree variants of the same offense." Id. at 1077. The Court added, "This is in contrast to sections 790.15(1), 790.15(2), and 790.15(3), which are explicitly degree variants of the same offense." Id. at 1077–78.

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