Amendments to 790.162

1. Perez v. Florida

   137 S. Ct. 853 (2017)   Cited 13 times

   The State prosecuted Perez for violating a Florida statute that makes it a felony "to threaten to throw, project, place, or discharge any destructive device with intent to do bodily harm to any person or with intent to do damage to any property of any person." Fla. Stat. § 790.162 (2007). The trial court instructed the jury that they could return a guilty verdict if the State proved two elements. First, the State had to prove the actus reus ; that is, the threat itself. The instruction defined a threat as "a communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on another when viewed and/or heard by an ordinary reasonable person." App. F to Brief in Opposition 350. Second, the State had to prove that Perez possessed the necessary mens rea ; that is, that he intended to make the threat. Circularly, the instruction defined intent as "the stated intent to do bodily harm to any person or damage to the property of any person." Ibid . This instruction permitted the jury to convict Perez based on what he "stated" alone—irrespective of whether his words represented a joke, the ramblings of an intoxicated individual, or a credible threat. The jury found Perez guilty, and because he…

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2. United States v. Pendleton

   665 F. App'x 836 (11th Cir. 2016)   Cited 7 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   Pendleton concedes that § 790.162 is divisible and that some violations of the statute would qualify as violent felonies.

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3. In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—Report 2017-04

   231 So. 3d 384 (Fla. 2017)

   § 790.162, Fla._Stat.

   PAGE 386
4. Valdes v. State

   443 So. 2d 221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 9 times

   Valdes was convicted for attempted unarmed robbery and for threatening to throw, place, or discharge a destructive device in violation of Section 790.162, Florida Statutes (1981). He contends on appeal that the State failed to prove an essential element of Section 790.162 and that the trial court should have suppressed an eyewitness identification of him. We do not agree and affirm.
5. L.C. v. State

   283 So. 3d 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 2 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   If L.C. had threatened to plant a bomb in the school, he would have run afoul of the law—but not the statute with which he was charged for his shooting statements. Section 790.162 makes it unlawful to threaten to place a bomb, but that statute does not mention threats concerning the use of firearms in a violent manner. In other words, chapter 790 criminalizes a threat to place a bomb as well as a false report that a bomb has been placed but only criminalizes a false report of the use of firearms in a violent manner. Compare § 790.162 with § 790.163. When the legislature has included a provision in one statute but omitted it in a related statute, courts should not read it into the statute from which it has been excluded. See Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911, 914 (Fla. 1995) (declining to "imply [a term] where it has been excluded" when the term was used in one section governing the implied warranty for developers but not another implied-warranty section governing contractors); see also Cason v. Fla. Dep't of Mgmt. Servs., 944 So. 2d 306, 315 (Fla. 2006) ("[W]e have pointed to language in other statutes to show that the Legislature…

   PAGE 444
6. Reid v. State

   405 So. 2d 500 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 8 times

   Section 790.161 provides that it is unlawful for any person to throw, place or discharge a destructive device with intent to do bodily harm or damage to property. Section 790.162, which essentially tracks the same language, was obviously intended to cover a threat to carry out the conduct proscribed by section 790.161. Viewed in this context, we think that section 790.162 requires only that the threat must convey an intent to do bodily harm or damage to property. Here, appellant's threat obviously conveyed this intent. Therefore, under our construction of the statute, whether appellant intended to follow through with his threat was irrelevant.

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7. Valdes v. State

   443 So. 2d 223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 7 times

   Valdes was convicted for unarmed robbery and for threatening to throw, place, or discharge a destructive device in violation of Section 790.162, Florida Statutes (1981). Two of the points which he raises on appeal were raised and found to be without merit in Valdes v. State, 443 So.2d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Likewise, we find no merit in the additional points raised here and we affirm.
8. Lanier v. State

   983 So. 2d 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 8 times

   In lower tribunal case number 02-27820, Lanier was charged with four counts of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, in violation of section 784.021, Florida Statutes (2002), and with resisting an officer without violence, in violation of section 843.02, Florida Statutes (2002). In lower tribunal case number 05-9631, Lanier was charged with battery on a law enforcement officer, in violation of section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2002), battery on a facility employee, in violation of section 784.078, Florida Statutes (2002), and threatening a public servant, in violation of section 838.021, Florida Statutes (2002). In lower tribunal case number 07-18004, Lanier was charged with threatening to throw a destructive device — a bomb — in violation of section 790.162, Florida Statutes (2007), possession of cocaine, in violation of section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2007), and possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of section 893.147(1), Florida Statutes (2007).

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9. Dragani v. State

   759 So. 2d 745 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 7 times

   § 790.162, Fla. Stat. (1997).
10. Keene v. State

    689 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

    The state filed an information charging Keene with threatening to place or discharge a destructive device at the newspaper office of the Bradenton Herald, in violation of section 790.162, Florida Statutes (1993). Before trial, Keene filed a motion in limine requesting the exclusion of any testimony concerning any threats or threatening letters other than the threat to the Bradenton Herald contained in the information. The trial court granted the motion.