Amendments to 790.19

1. Paul v. State

   129 So. 3d 1058 (Fla. 2013)   Cited 23 times

   In State v. Reddick, 568 So.2d 902, 903, n. 2 (Fla.1990), this Court cited the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases in stating that, pursuant to section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1985), the offense of “[s]hooting into a dwelling ... has three elements: (1) the defendant shot a firearm, (2) into a public or private building, (3) wantonly or maliciously.” This Court subsequently interpreted section 790.19 as one which includes multiple offenses, each containing distinct elements, in the case of Valdes v. State, 3 So.3d 1067 (Fla.2009). In Valdes, the defendant was convicted of shooting into an occupied vehicle, in violation of section 790.19. Id. at 1068. In upholding the defendant's conviction, we noted that pursuant to section 790.19 a conviction for shooting into an occupied vehicle “requires proof of the following three elements: (1) the defendant shot a firearm; (2) he or she did so at, within, or into a vehicle of any kind that was being used or occupied by any person; and (3) he or she did so wantonly or maliciously.” Id. at 1071. Therefore, we have previously concluded that section 790.19 is comprised of distinct…

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2. State v. Kettell

   980 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 2008)   Cited 14 times

   The district court opinions essentially conflict over whether proof of the first two elements of section 790.19 (shooting a firearm at, within, or into a building) is sufficient to establish the third (doing so wantonly or maliciously). Understanding why Holtsclaw is incorrect first requires us to (1) review the history of the district courts' interpretations of section 790.19 and then (2) explain how Holtsclaw misinterpreted these decisions to remove the statute's intent requirement.

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3. Hudson v. State

   800 So. 2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 12 times

   790.19 Shooting into or throwing deadly missiles into dwellings, public or private buildings, occupied or not occupied; vessels, aircraft, buses, railroad cars, streetcars, or other vehicles. Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into, or throws any missile or hurls or projects a stone or other hard substance which would produce death or great bodily harm, at, within, or in any public or private building, occupied or unoccupied . . . shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

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4. Johnson v. State

   436 So. 2d 248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 5 times

   With pistol in hand, appellant circled a vehicle, containing two passengers in the rear seat area, while trying to get a clear shot at an intended victim, Ricky Joiner, who was trying to keep the vehicle between appellant and himself. Bullets aimed by appellant at his victim hit the top of the vehicle trunk, the bottom of the vehicle trunk and a panel near the rear window. One bullet was also fired through the open window on the driver's side and passed through the vehicle and broke the window at the front passenger's side. Appellant was charged, tried and convicted of an aggravated assault on Ricky Joiner and also a violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1981), which makes it a felony crime to wantonly or maliciously shoot any firearm at, within or in any vehicle which is being used or occupied by any person.
5. D.B.C. v. State

   341 So. 2d 230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)   Cited 4 times

   "that . . . is a delinquent child because: On the 6th day of February, 1976, the said child did then and there wantonly and maliciously throw a missile, to-wit: rocks, at railroad cars of the SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD CO., contrary to Section 790.19, Florida Statutes."
6. J.W.B. v. State

   419 So. 2d 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 3 times

   Appellant challenges the order which found him to be delinquent for throwing an orange at a school bus. He was charged with "throwing a deadly missile" in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1979), which reads as follows:
7. Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI (Medium)

   709 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2013)   Cited 324 times

   Turner's conviction for shooting into an occupied building also qualifies as a violent felony. Florida Statute section 790.19 provides that “[w]hoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into, or throws any [deadly] missile ... at, within, or in any public or private building, occupied or unoccupied ... shall be guilty of a felony.” For purposes of section 790.19, “ ‘wantonly’ means ... with the knowledge that damage is likely to be done to some person,” and “ ‘[m]aliciously’ means wrongfully, intentionally, ... and with the knowledge that injury or damage will or may be caused to another person or the property of another person.” State v. Kettell, 980 So.2d 1061, 1067 (Fla.2008).

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8. Valdes v. State

   3 So. 3d 1067 (Fla. 2009)   Cited 144 times

   It is undisputed that sections 790.15(2) and 790.19 each contain an element that the other does not. Shooting from a vehicle in violation of section 790.15(2) requires proof of two elements: (1) the defendant knowingly and willfully discharged a firearm from a vehicle; and (2) the discharge occurred within 1000 feet of any person. § 790.15(2), Fla. Stat. (2003). In contrast, section 790.19 requires proof of the following three elements: (1) the defendant shot a firearm; (2) he or she did so at, within, or into a vehicle of any kind that was being used or occupied by any person; and (3) he or she did so wantonly or maliciously. § 790.19, Fla. Stat. (2003). Thus, separate convictions for these two offenses are authorized unless the offenses fit within one of the three exceptions in section 775.021(4)(b).

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9. United States v. Estrella

   758 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2014)   Cited 46 times

   The fact of Mr. Estrella's conviction under Fla. Stat. § 790.19, as well as a description of his alleged conduct, was included in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) prepared to assist the District Court with Mr. Estrella's sentencing for his illegal reentry conviction. The PSR concluded that the § 790.19 conviction qualified as a crime of violence under USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), and recommended that the District Court impose the corresponding 16–level enhancement.

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10. United States v. Estrada

    777 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2015)   Cited 23 times

    Summarizing, Estrella held that a conviction under Florida Statute § 790.19 is not categorically a crime of violence for purposes of application of the 16–level crime-of-violence enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). But that is not the end of the analysis because Estrella also concluded that § 790.19 is a divisible statute and hence use of the modified categorical test is appropriate. To apply that test here, we must next examine any Shepard -approved documents to see whether those documents identify the particular mens rea element upon which the prior conviction of the defendant in this case rested. But the government has conceded that the only Shepard -approved document here is the information charging Defendant with § 790.19, which information charges that Defendant “wantonly or maliciously” threw a deadly missile at an occupied vehicle. As Defendant's nolo contendere plea was to an information charging him in the disjunctive with wantonly or maliciously committing a particular act in violation of § 790.19 (not with “wantonly and maliciously” doing so), we are likewise unable to determine on which mens rea element Defendant's conviction…

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