Amendments to 790.23

1. United States v. Clarke

   822 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2016)   Cited 24 times

   And, as the Eleventh Circuit noted in the instant case, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal and Third District Court of Appeal have held that for prosecution under section 790.23, Florida Statutes, an adjudication is required. The Third District in Castillo v. State, 590 So.2d 458 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), which predated McFadden, held that for prosecution under section 790.23 “we construe ‘conviction’ to mean an adjudication of guilt.... Where adjudication has been withheld, the offender is not a convicted felon.” Id. at 461 (citations omitted). And, in State v. Menuto, 912 So.2d 603 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), the Second District relied on Castillo to hold that for purposes of section 790.23(1)(a), “ ‘conviction’ means ‘adjudication of guilt’—a mere withhold of adjudication of guilt of the prior offense will not suffice.” Menuto, 912 So.2d at 605–06 (citing Malcolm v. State, 605 So.2d 945, 948 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (holding that defendant was never convicted of a felony for purposes of section 790.23 because he pled guilty and adjudication was withheld)).

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2. Weeks v. State

   146 So. 3d 81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 6 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   Christopher Douglas Weeks was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a violation of section 790.23, Florida Statutes (2012). He challenges his conviction arguing section 790.23 is unconstitutionally vague. Because we conclude that section 790.23 is unconstitutional with respect to the possession of a replica of an antique firearm by a convicted felon, we reverse the conviction, vacate the corresponding sentence, and certify conflict with Bostic v. State, 902 So.2d 225 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

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3. Williams v. State

   492 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1986)   Cited 40 times

   Williams would have us construe the antique "or replica" exceptions of section 790.23 in such a way as to condone the concealment, by a convicted felon, of a firearm which may possibly be a replica of an antique, but is obviously operable and loaded with live ammunition. We do not believe that the legislature, when enacting section 790.23, intended that a convicted felon could be acquitted when possessing a concealed, loaded weapon by using the excuse that the weapon is an antique or a replica thereof. This literal requirement of the statute exhalts form over substance to the detriment of public policy, and such a result is clearly absurd. It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that statutes will not be interpreted so as to yield an absurd result. Woollard v. Lloyd's Companies of Lloyds, 439 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1983); McKibben v. Mallory, 293 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1974).

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4. State v. Snyder

   673 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1996)   Cited 16 times

   This case involves whether a defendant is "convicted" for purposes of section 790.23, Florida Statutes (1991), when adjudicated guilty in the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant has the right to contest the validity of the conviction by appeal or by other procedures. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that an individual is "convicted" for purposes of section 790.23 from the point of being adjudicated guilty.

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5. Hill v. State

   711 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 28 times

   To the extent relevant, section 790.23, Florida Statutes (1995), reads:

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6. Walker v. State

   137 So. 3d 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 12 times

   Unconstitutional as Applied West's F.S.A. § 790.23(1)Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Richard J. Sanders, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Ricardo E. Walker, pro se. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and C. Suzanne Bechard, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. LaROSE, Judge.

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7. Malone v. State

   652 So. 2d 902 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 48 times

   The appellant challenges probation condition four which states: "You will not possess, carry or own any firearms. You will not possess, carry, or own any weapons without first procuring the consent of your officer." The first sentence of this condition is a valid general condition under section 790.23, Florida Statutes (1991). Fitts v. State, 649 So.2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). The portion of the condition that prohibits the carrying of weapons other than those enumerated in section 790.23, was not orally pronounced at sentencing and is stricken. 20 Fla. L. Weekly D238. Further, because the remainder of the condition implies that a felon can possess weapons otherwise prohibited with the consent of his probation officer, that portion is stricken.
8. State v. Brown

   745 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 3 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   In this case, Brown argues that once the State certified him as an adult the juvenile court's jurisdiction over him was relinquished under chapter 985, and pursuant to section 790.23(2), he could no longer be prosecuted under section 790.23. However, we believe Brown misinterprets the statute. The only question raised by section 790.23(2) is whether the court's jurisdiction over Brown's prior delinquent act had expired prior to Brown's possession of a firearm.

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9. State v. Maxwell

   682 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1996)   Cited 35 times

   § 790.23, Fla. Stat. (1991).

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10. Bell v. State

    122 So. 3d 958 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 10 times

    Both of Bell's convictions are for violations of section 790.23(1), Florida Statutes (2011), which provides, in pertinent part:

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