Amendments to 796.05

1. Brown v. State

   506 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 30 times

   We have considered each of the issues presented by the appellant including his attack on the constitutionality of section 796.05, Florida Statutes (1983). His constitutional challenge is without merit. See Eaton v. State, 481 So.2d 1254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). We affirm his conviction.
2. McSweeney v. State

   286 So. 3d 369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)

   McSweeney was convicted of attempted deriving support from proceeds of prostitution. The completed crime is defined as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person with reasonable belief or knowing another person is engaged in prostitution to live or derive support or maintenance in whole or in part from what is believed to be the earnings or proceeds of such person's prostitution." § 796.05(1), Fla. Stat. (2017). The element at issue is whether McSweeney had a reasonable belief or knew that Herron was engaging in prostitution.

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3. In re Ortega

   Case No. 11-38104-BKC-AJC (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2013)

   9. Section 796.05 of the Florida Statutes falls within the "Hazardous Occupations Act", and applies to awards for personal injury arising out of hazardous occupations. The statute provides that:

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4. Eaton v. State

   481 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 3 times

   Section 796.05 reads in relevant part:
5. Helms v. State

   38 So. 3d 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 2 times

   This is an appeal from defendant's convictions for deriving support from the proceeds of prostitution, in violation of section 796.05(1), Florida Statutes (2009), and transporting another individual for the purposes of prostitution, in violation of section 796.07(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2009). Of the several arguments that defendant raises on appeal, only two merit discussion: first, that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal as the evidence did not demonstrate he knew or had reason to believe prostitution would occur; and, second, that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by admitting an audiotape containing incriminating statements into evidence. We find these claims unpersuasive and affirm defendant's convictions.
6. State v. Rivers

   660 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1995)   Cited 12 times

   § 796.05, Fla. Stat. (1991).

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7. City of Fort Lauderdale v. Byrd

   242 So. 2d 494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970)   Cited 4 times

   Therefore, when the City charged the appellee with violations of sections 796.07, 796.01, and 796.05, it in effect was charging him with ordinance violations. Under the charter of the City, section 128, the municipal court has ample power to try a person charged with violation of the City's ordinances. See Ch. 63-1335, Section 32, Laws of Florida, Special Acts, 1963. We, therefore, conclude that the Municipal Court of the City of Fort Lauderdale has jurisdiction to try the appellee for the offenses defined by Florida Statutes, sections 796.05, 796.07, and 796.01, F.S.A.

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8. State v. Tyrrell

   807 So. 2d 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 26 times

   § 796.05, Fla. Stat. (1999).

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9. Pronesti v. State

   847 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 3 times

   Michele Gerardo Pronesti appeals his conviction for deriving support from the proceeds of prostitution, in violation of section 796.05(1), Florida Statutes. We affirm.
10. Hubard v. State

    17 So. 3d 1274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 1 times

    The four prostitution counts were classified as misdemeanors on the scoresheet. Whether listed in the "Additional Offense(s)" section or the "Prior Record" section, misdemeanor counts are each assigned a point value of 0.2. § 921.0024(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001). Deriving support from the proceeds of prostitution is a third-degree felony, § 796.05(2), Fla. Stat. (2001), and is a level 3 offense for scoresheet purposes, § 921.0022(3)(c). When listed in the "Additional Offense(s)" section, level 3 offenses are assigned a point value of 2.4; when listed in the "Prior Record" section, they are assigned a point value of 1.6. § 921.0024(1)(a).

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