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F.S. 798.02 on Google Scholar

F.S. 798.02 on Casetext

Amendments to 798.02


The 2022 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 798
ADULTERY; LEWD AND LASCIVIOUS BEHAVIOR
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 798.02 Florida Statutes and Case Law
798.02 Lewd and lascivious behavior.If any man or woman, married or unmarried, engages in open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior, they shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
History.s. 6, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2596; GS 3519; RGS 5407; CGL 7550; s. 773, ch. 71-136; s. 1, ch. 2016-188.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: August 29, 2022
F.S. 798.02 on Google Scholar

F.S. 798.02 on Casetext

Amendments to 798.02


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 798.02
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

798.02 - LEWD LASCV BEHAVIOR - COHABITATION - M: S


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S798.02
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 798.02.


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Campbell v. State

    331 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1976)   Cited 5 times
    There have been only three reported appellate opinions construing the second clause of Section 798.02, Florida Statutes, (proscribing "open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior"), which provides the basis for the charges against this appellant. In Coile v. State, 212 So.2d 94 (Fla.App. 3rd 1968), defendant was charged with the violation of Section 800.04, Florida Statutes, (lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in the presence of a child), and the trial court reduced the charge to a violation of the second clause of Section 798.02, supra. Coile involved offensive touching of a member of a Girl Scout troop on a holiday outing. A conviction under this clause was reversed in Kittleson v. State, 152 Fla. 242, 9 So.2d 807 (1942), for failure of the State to charge an offense under the statute. There, the State attempted to supply allegations necessary to the information through a bill of particulars which was neither sworn to nor verified. In Pitchford v. State, 65 Fla. 146, 61 So. 243 (1931), a white married man and a single black woman were observed by a deputy sheriff to be sitting on the edge of a bed, both in a state of semidress. In…
    PAGE 290
  2. Coile v. State

    212 So. 2d 94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968)   Cited 3 times
    The record contains testimony that the appellant, having consumed some alcohol, conducted himself in a manner which alarmed the adult supervisors of a troop of girl scouts. The girl scouts were having a holiday outing at one of the county beaches. In addition, there is evidence that the appellant approached and touched one of the children. The appellant on this appeal described this contact as a pat or push. The court found from the testimony of the witnesses present that the touching of the child was insufficient to constitute an assault under § 800.04, which prohibits "handl[ing], fondl[ing] or mak[ing] an assault upon any male or female child under the age of fourteen years * * *," but sufficient to constitute a lewd and lascivious act under § 798.02, which prohibits "open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior * * *." We think that this was a question of fact for the trial court to determine. Dickinson v. Geraci, Fla.App. 1966, 190 So.2d 368, 388. We are unable to say as a matter of law that the appellant's conduct was not open and gross lewd and lascivious behavior prohibited by § 798.02.
    PAGE 95
  3. McLaughlin v. Florida

    379 U.S. 184 (1964)   Cited 734 times   2 Legal Analyses
    "Section 798.05, Florida Statutes, under which the defendants were charged, simply prohibits habitual cohabiting of the same room by members of opposite races who are also members of opposite sexes. The terms of Section 798.05, supra, explicitly seek to avoid circumstances wherein there are high potentials of sexual engagement. . . . Section 798.02, Florida Statutes, which prohibits intraracial lewd cohabitation, has generally been interpreted as requiring the additional element of sexual occurrence as distinguished from the provisions of Section 798.05, supra, which only require a high potential of such occurrence. The legislative purpose in enacting both Sections 798.02 and 798.05, supra, is to prevent illegal sexual occurrences. . . . The purpose of the legislature in enacting both Sections 798.02 and 798.05, Florida Statutes, was to prevent such breaches of basic concepts of sexual decency whether committed by interracial or interracial parties." Brief for Appellee, 55-56.
    PAGE 193
  4. State v. Coyle

    718 So. 2d 218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 3 times
    Chapter 798, Florida Statutes, is entitled "Adultery; Cohabitation." There are only two sections in this chapter. Section 798.02 reads:
  5. Gotthardt v. State

    475 So. 2d 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 7 times
    One problem in this case is that the defendant's one specific act fits the description of the acts prohibited in these penal statutes because the statutes describe the prohibited conduct by vague words, such as, "behavior", "expose", and "act." All qualifying or limiting words, such as, "lewd" and "lascivious" (§§ 798.02 and 800.04), "vulgar" and "indecent" (§§ 800.03 and 800.04), and "open" and "gross" (§ 798.02), are too indefinite to describe, limit or restrict the conduct prohibited by each statute to some exclusive identifiable type or area of activity or conduct that does not overlap and does not include acts or conduct also prohibited by one or more of the other statutes. The concern with vagueness relates not to the constitutional due process notice problem but with the double jeopardy problem that results from concealing one substantive offense behind three vague statutes. Such vague penal statutes cannot be effectively differentiated by their essential constituent elements in the usual manner nor can they be factually distinguished in this case because each charge is based on one and the same elemental factual event.
    PAGE 282
  6. State v. Arrington

    741 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
    On appeal, the State challenges the county court's dismissal of misdemeanor charges against Christy Arrington and Gidget Karlik brought pursuant to section 798.02, Florida Statutes (1997). We have jurisdiction because the county court declared the statute unconstitutional. See State v. Freund, 561 So.2d 305 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). We have already decided this issue in the State's favor. See State v. Coyle, 718 So.2d 218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998),review denied, 729 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1999). Accordingly, we reverse. Because the court declared section 798.02 facially unconstitutional, it did not reach the merits of whether Arrington's and Karlik's conduct violated the statute. We remand for further proceedings on that issue.
  7. G B OF JACKSONVILLE v. STATE, ETC

    371 So. 2d 139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 7 times
    Section 798.02 provides that a person who engages in open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree.
  8. Cabrera v. State

    884 So. 2d 482 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 22 times
    While Cabrera and his mentally challenged victim were together in a swimming pool, Cabrera committed the two alleged acts of lewd and lascivious behavior. Specifically, count four of the information alleged that Cabrera touched the breasts of the victim and count five alleged that he touched the buttocks of the victim. The State charged that each act was committed in violation of section 798.02, Florida Statutes (2002), which provides:
  9. G B OF JACKSONVILLE v. STATE, ETC

    371 So. 2d 137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 4 times
    Section 798.02 provides that a person who engages in open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree.
  10. Lowe v. Broward County

    766 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 37 times
    (2) THE ACT IS INCONSISTENT WITH SECTIONS 741.212, 112.08(2)(a), 741.211, OR 798.02, FLORIDA STATUTES (1999)?
    PAGE 1211