F.S. 798 on Google Scholar

F.S. 798 on Casetext

Amendments to 798

The 2022 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
Chapter 798
View Entire Chapter
CHAPTER 798 Florida Statutes and Case Law
798.01 Living in open adultery.
798.02 Lewd and lascivious behavior.
798.01 Living in open adultery.Whoever lives in an open state of adultery shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. Where either of the parties living in an open state of adultery is married, both parties so living shall be deemed to be guilty of the offense provided for in this section.
History.s. 1, ch. 1986, 1874; RS 2595; GS 3518; RGS 5406; CGL 7549; s. 772, ch. 71-136.
798.02 Lewd and lascivious behavior.If any man or woman, married or unmarried, engages in open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior, they shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
History.s. 6, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2596; GS 3519; RGS 5407; CGL 7550; s. 773, ch. 71-136; s. 1, ch. 2016-188.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: August 29, 2022
F.S. 798 on Google Scholar

F.S. 798 on Casetext

Amendments to 798

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 798
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S798
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 798.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Ross v. Estelle

    694 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1983)   Cited 1,264 times
    Second, Ross claims that his trial lawyer rendered ineffective assistance because he failed to investigate and interview key witnesses. One such key witness was Ross' wife who he alleges would have placed him at another place when the aggravated robbery attempt occurred. We would be more than slightly perplexed by counsel's failure to check out this alibi if it were shown that this was probative. This testimony, of course, would not have been merely cumulative and its absence clearly prejudicial to the defendant. See Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975). We point out, however, that there is no basis existing anywhere in the record — save Ross' statement in his pro se brief — which supports his assertion as to what his wife would have testified to. Absent evidence in the record, a court cannot consider a habeas petitioner's bald assertions on a critical issue in his pro se petition (in state and federal court), unsupported and unsupportable by anything else contained in the record, to be of probative evidentiary value. Woodard v. Beto, 447 F.2d 103 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 957, 92 S.Ct. 325, 30 L.Ed.2d 275 (1971). We are thus bound to re-emphasize that mere…
    PAGE 1012
  2. United States v. Strevig

    663 F. App'x 908 (11th Cir. 2016)   Cited 18 times
    Strevig's contention we may not apply the residual clause, because Amendment 798 has removed that clause from § 4B1.2(a)(2), also fails. The Sentencing Commission has not decided to make Amendment 798 retroactive. Consequently, it may be applied retroactively only if it is a clarifying amendment rather than a substantive change to the career-offender guideline. Jerchower, 631 F.3d at 1184; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(2); U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 798 (Supp. Aug. 1, 2016). Considering the relevant factors, the removal of the residual clause in Amendment 798 is a substantive change. First, Amendment 798 alters the text of § 4B1.2(a)(2), not only the corresponding commentary. See U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 798 (Supp. Aug. 1, 2016); Jerchower, 631 F.3d at 1185. Second, in explaining its reason for removing the residual clause from § 4B1.2(a)(2), the Sentencing Commission explicitly cited Johnson, a significant litigation had ensued over the continuing viability of the residual clause of the guideline following Johnson and stated the residual clause of § 4B1.2 implicated many of the same concerns identified in Johnson. See U.S.S.G. App. C…
    PAGE 14
  3. Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

    350 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003)   Cited 198 times   1 Legal Analyses
    We are mindful of judicial economy considerations, especially because an important procedural issue in this proposed class action has already been briefed, namely, whether insureds seeking to "stack" one coverage policy with another can properly proceed as a "class" of plaintiffs in light of, among other considerations, any case-by-case analysis required to compute each claimant's necessary medical bills that are the subject of coverage. However, because this is not a mootness case, in which substitution or intervention might have been possible, we remand this case to the district court with instructions to dismiss. We are persuaded by the Seventh Circuit's approach in an analogous case, Foster v. Center Township of LaPorte County, 798 F.2d 237, 244-45 (7th Cir. 1986), which held that where the sole named plaintiff "never had standing" to challenge a township's poor-relief eligibility guidelines, and where "she never was a member of the class she was named to represent," the case must be remanded with instructions to dismiss.
    PAGE 1023
  4. Stringer v. Eleventh Court of Appeals

    720 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1987)   Cited 42 times
    In Robinson v. Harkins Company, 711 S.W.2d 619 (1986), we held the investigation privilege embodied in TEX.R.CIV.P. 166b(3)(d) is still governed by the rule established in Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1977). Only information obtained by a party after there is good cause to believe a suit will be filed or after the institution of a lawsuit is privileged.
    PAGE 802
  5. Ross v. Blake

    578 U.S. 632 (2016)   Cited 4,975 times   2 Legal Analyses
    We note that our adherence to the PLRA's text runs both ways: The same principle applies regardless of whether it benefits the inmate or the prison. We have thus overturned judicial rulings that imposed extra-statutory limitations on a prisoner's capacity to sue—reversing, for example, decisions that required an inmate to demonstrate exhaustion in his complaint, permitted suit against only defendants named in the administrative grievance, and dismissed an entire action because of a single unexhausted claim. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007). "[T]hese rules," we explained, "are not required by the PLRA," and "crafting and imposing them exceeds the proper limits on the judicial role." Ibid.
    PAGE 640
  6. Parnell v. Adventist Health System/West

    35 Cal.4th 595 (Cal. 2005)   Cited 48 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Because our holding relies solely on the absence of a debt underlying the lien, we do not reach, and express no opinion on, the following issues: (1) whether Olszewski v. Scripps Health (2003) 30 Cal.4th 798 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 69 P.3d 927] and Hanif v. Housing Authority (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 635 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 192] apply outside the Medicaid context and limit a patient's tort recovery for medical expenses to the amount actually paid by the patient notwithstanding the collateral source rule; (2) whether the HLA violates due process; and (3) whether hospitals may waive their rights under the HLA.
    PAGE 612
  7. Graham v. John Deere Co.

    383 U.S. 1 (1966)   Cited 3,107 times   42 Legal Analyses
    We find no nonobvious facets in the '798 arrangement. The wear and repair claims were sufficient to overcome the patent examiner's original conclusions as to the validity of the patent. However, some of the prior art, notably Glencoe, was not before him. There the hinge plate is below the shank but, as the courts below found, all of the elements in the '798 patent are present in the Glencoe structure. Furthermore, even though the position of the shank and hinge plate appears reversed in Glencoe, the mechanical operation is identical. The shank there pivots about the underside of the stirrup, which in Glencoe is above the shank. In other words, the stirrup in Glencoe serves exactly the same function as the heel of the hinge plate in '798. The mere shifting of the wear point to the heel of the '798 hinge plate from the stirrup of Glencoe — itself a part of the hinge plate — presents no operative mechanical distinctions, much less nonobvious differences.
    PAGE 26
  8. California v. Acevedo

    500 U.S. 565 (1991)   Cited 1,443 times   9 Legal Analyses
    "If the officer has probable cause to believe there is contraband somewhere in the car, but he does not know exactly where, he may search the entire car, as well as any containers found therein. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 . . . (1982); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, . . . (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 . . . (1925). If, on the other hand, the officer only has probable cause to believe there is contraband in a specific container in the car, he must detain the container and delay his search until a search warrant is obtained. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 . . . (1982); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 . . . (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 . . . (1977)." Castleberry v. State, 678 P.2d 720, 724 (Okla. 1984).
    PAGE 595
  9. Wyoming v. Houghton

    526 U.S. 295 (1999)   Cited 919 times   14 Legal Analyses
    See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985); United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.2(c), pp. 487-488, and n. 113 (3d ed. 1996); id., § 7.2(d), at 506, n. 167.
    PAGE 310
  10. Arizona v. Gant

    556 U.S. 332 (2009)   Cited 3,649 times   41 Legal Analyses
    (c) This Court is unpersuaded by the State's argument that its expansive reading of Belton correctly balances law enforcement interests with an arrestee's limited privacy interest in his vehicle. The State seriously undervalues the privacy interests at stake, and it exaggerates both the clarity provided by a broad reading of Belton and its importance to law enforcement interests. A narrow reading of Belton and Thornton, together with this Court's other Fourth Amendment decisions, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201, and United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, permit an officer to search a vehicle when safety or evidentiary concerns demand. Pp. 1719 – 1721.
    PAGE 333