F.S. 806.01 on Google Scholar

F.S. 806.01 on Casetext

Amendments to 806.01

The 2022 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
Chapter 806
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 806.01 Florida Statutes and Case Law
806.01 Arson.
(1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, or while in the commission of any felony, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged:
(a) Any dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its contents;
(b) Any structure, or contents thereof, where persons are normally present, such as: jails, prisons, or detention centers; hospitals, nursing homes, or other health care facilities; department stores, office buildings, business establishments, churches, or educational institutions during normal hours of occupancy; or other similar structures; or
(c) Any other structure that he or she knew or had reasonable grounds to believe was occupied by a human being,

is guilty of arson in the first degree, which constitutes a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(2) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, or while in the commission of any felony, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged any structure, whether the property of himself or herself or another, under any circumstances not referred to in subsection (1), is guilty of arson in the second degree, which constitutes a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) As used in this chapter, “structure” means any building of any kind, any enclosed area with a roof over it, any real property and appurtenances thereto, any tent or other portable building, and any vehicle, vessel, watercraft, or aircraft.
History.ss. 1, 2, ch. 15603, 1931; CGL 1936 Supp. 7208(8), (9); ss. 786, 787, ch. 71-136; s. 26, ch. 74-383; s. 18, ch. 75-298; s. 1, ch. 79-108; s. 1, ch. 90-225; s. 1228, ch. 97-102.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: August 29, 2022
F.S. 806.01 on Google Scholar

F.S. 806.01 on Casetext

Amendments to 806.01

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 806.01
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

806.01 2 - ARSON - 2ND DEGREE - F: S

Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S806.01
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 806.01.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Vuksanovic v. U.S. Attorney General

    439 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2006)   Cited 24 times
    § 806.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). The statutory definition of "structure" includes vehicles. See id. § 806.01(3).
    PAGE 1311
  2. State v. Mayle

    406 So. 2d 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 10 times
    § 806.01(2), Fla. Stat. (1979). A vehicle is expressly included in the statutory definition of "structure." § 806.01(3), Fla. Stat. (1979). The legislature eliminated the requirement that the burning be done "maliciously," but the new arson statute requires that the act be done "willfully and unlawfully." (Emphasis supplied).
    PAGE 109
  3. P.P.M. v. State

    447 So. 2d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 5 times
    Applying these legal principles to the facts of this case, we hold that the trial court erred in concluding that the subject house was a dwelling inside the meaning of section 806.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1981). However, because we find that the evidence supports appellant's delinquency adjudication for second degree arson, a lesser included offense of first degree arson, we reverse and remand with instructions that the trial court enter judgment on the lesser included offense [section 806.01(2), Florida Statutes (1981)] and to pass sentence accordingly. See Tukes v. State, 346 So.2d 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Johnson v. State.
    PAGE 448
  4. Linehan v. State

    476 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1985)   Cited 87 times
    We reiterate that the intoxication defense applies only to specific intent crimes. In the instant case, petitioner was charged with arson under section 806.01 and felony murder, with arson being the underlying felony. Section 806.01 reads, in part: "Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged . . . [a] dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its contents . . . is guilty of arson in the first degree which constitutes a felony of the first degree. . . ." Petitioner argues that the words "willfully and unlawfully" are words of specific intent and, therefore, that voluntary intoxication should be a valid defense to arson. We disagree. Arson was a general intent crime under the common law. See W. Burdick, The Law of Crime § 692 (1946). At common law, arson was defined as "the wilfull and malicious burning of a dwelling house, or outhouse within the curtilage of a dwelling of another." Duke v. State, 132 Fla. 865, 870, 185 So. 422, 425 (1938). See also Sawyer v. State, 100 Fla. 1603, 132 So. 188 (1931); Williams v. State, 100 Fla. 1054, 132 So. 186 (1930). Under this definition, a specific intent to burn is not…
    PAGE 1265
  5. Stevens v. State

    195 So. 3d 403 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 3 times
    The information under which Mr. Stevens was charged alleged that during the commission of the robbery of Mr. Beltran, Mr. Stevens, “by fire or explosion,” damaged “a structure, to wit: a dwelling ... or its contents,” thereby committing first-degree arson of a dwelling under section 806.01(1)(a). Mr. Stevens did not dispute that the trailer home was a dwelling within the meaning of the statute; in fact, he conceded that it was the Beltrans' home. At trial, however, he requested that the jury be instructed on second-degree arson of a structure under section 806.01(2). His reason was that a dwelling under section 806.01(1)(a) is also a structure under sections 806.01(2) and that the jury should have the opportunity to consider both the charged and the lesser included arson offenses. The trial court denied the request, finding that the evidence did not support an instruction on second-degree arson. We agree.
    PAGE 405
  6. Smith v. Singletary

    170 F.3d 1051 (11th Cir. 1999)   Cited 241 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Also, section 775.084(1)(b) designates specific offenses that will trigger an enhancement. Each of these offenses is defined by Florida law. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 806.01 (defining arson); Fla. Stat. § 794.011 (defining sexual battery); Fla. Stat. § 812.13 (defining robbery). It was not unreasonable for Smith's counsel to think, in the context of Florida's criminal law, that section 775.084(1)(b) referred to those offenses as they are designated by Florida law, in other words, that the Florida statute contemplated convictions under Florida law for the listed offenses. At the pertinent time, Smith's counsel (or more accurately, every reasonable lawyer) did not have to conclude that Florida intended to give some kind of extraterritorial effect to the criminal law of other jurisdictions.
    PAGE 1055
  7. Stevens v. State

    226 So. 3d 787 (Fla. 2017)   Cited 3 times
    Moore presented a "crabbed reading" of section 806.01( 2) that read the definitional limitation of second-degree arson out of the statute. Stevens, 195 So.3d at 409. By holding that a dwelling is necessarily a structure within the meaning of section 806.01( 2), Moore ignored the plain language of the statute that removed certain structures—such as dwellings—from that provision's protection. § 806.01( 1) - (2), Fla. Stat.; see Moore, 932 So.2d at 528. Indeed, the broad statutory definition of structure encompasses dwellings, see § 806.01( 3), Fla. Stat.; thus, Moore was correct that "a structure is not always a dwelling, [but] a dwelling is always a structure." 932 So.2d at 528. However, this fact is not dispositive because it fails to consider that section 806.01( 2) defines second-degree arson as beyond and outside the scope of section 806.01( 1). Although a dwelling is a structure, it is flatly not a type of structure protected by the second-degree arson statute. § 806.01( 2), Fla. Stat. "It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word [and] phrase…
    PAGE 793
  8. Standard Jury Instructions — Crim. Cases

    603 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 1992)   Cited 43 times

    [a dwelling.] 806.01 b. [an institution in which the damage occurred during normal hours of occupancy.] 806.01 [an institution where persons are normally present.] c. [a structure.] 806.01 4. The defendant

    child — 800.04 Battery — 784.03 Unnatural and lascivious act — 800.02 Arson — 806.01(1) None Arson 806.01(2) Arson — 806.01(2) Criminal mischief — Attempt 806.13(1)(b)1 Criminal mischief — 806.13(1)(b)2

  9. Linehan v. State

    442 So. 2d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 48 times
    Admittedly, our foregoing conclusion that arson under section 806.01(1) is a general intent crime cannot be drawn readily and easily from the bare wording of section 806.01. Candor compels the conclusion that whatever particular tests or distinctions are devised relative to "specific" and "general" intent, a perception of which type of intent the legislature meant in a particular statute is by no means always easy. Especially in states like Florida where the voluntary intoxication defense is not statutory, it is the province of the judiciary to establish guidelines or criteria, as we have endeavored to do here, for perceiving the type of intent meant by the legislature to be an element of a crime.
    PAGE 248
  10. U.S. v. Rainey

    362 F.3d 733 (11th Cir. 2004)   Cited 33 times
    Fla. Stat. Ann. § 806.01(1) (1987). Section 806.01(2) provided that
    PAGE 735