F.S. 806.10 on Google Scholar

F.S. 806.10 on Casetext

Amendments to 806.10

The 2022 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
Chapter 806
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 806.10 Florida Statutes and Case Law
806.10 Preventing or obstructing extinguishment of fire.
(1) Any person who willfully and maliciously injures, destroys, removes, or in any manner interferes with the use of, any vehicles, tools, equipment, water supplies, hydrants, towers, buildings, communication facilities, or other instruments or facilities used in the detection, reporting, suppression, or extinguishment of fire shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) Any person who willfully or unreasonably interferes with, hinders, or assaults, or attempts to interfere with or hinder, any firefighter in the performance of his or her duty shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
History.s. 9, sub-ch. 4, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2433; GS 3280; RGS 5113; CGL 7214; s. 1, ch. 69-232; s. 795, ch. 71-136; s. 28, ch. 74-383; s. 19, ch. 75-298; s. 1229, ch. 97-102.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: August 29, 2022
F.S. 806.10 on Google Scholar

F.S. 806.10 on Casetext

Amendments to 806.10

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 806.10
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S806.10
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 806.10.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Robinson v. State

    673 So. 2d 114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 2 times
    Reading section 633.30 in para materia with section 806.10, it is clear that an individual violates section 806.10 by interfering with a firefighter who, in the course of his or her employment, is attempting to save a human life. At bar, the firemen were responding to a seizure victim, a situation involving the preservation of human life. Mr. Sexsmith was clearly hindered and interfered with by Robinson's actions as he was forced to leave the scene of the emergency to obtain the assistance of Officer Branford. Moreover the firemen in the EMS truck were also hindered and interfered with by Robinson, as their path to the victim was obstructed by Robinson's vehicle. Contrary to Mr. Robinson's assertions, subsection (2) of the statute makes no distinction between a firefighter who is extinguishing a fire and one who is providing medical services.
    PAGE 116
  2. Pelfresne v. Village of Williams Bay

    917 F.2d 1017 (7th Cir. 1990)   Cited 193 times
    On June 25, 1986, judgment was entered for the Village in the refiled suit. The judgment ordered the buildings razed and also awarded the Village damages and costs totaling $629.42. The clerk of the circuit court, pursuant to statute, prepared the judgment docket card that appears at the end of this opinion. Wis.Stat. § 806.10(1). The card notes the damages and costs but not the raze order.
    PAGE 1019
  3. The plaintiff argues that there was no probable cause for her arrest under § 806.10 because that section only applies to firefighters who are extinguishing a fire or attempting to save someone's life. In Robinson v. State of Florida, 673 So.2d 114, 115 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), the court found that the defendant violated § 806.10 by refusing to move his vehicle when told by a firefighter that it was blocking the path of an emergency medical vehicle. See id. The court in Robinson read § 633.30 in pari materia with § 806.10 to find that § 806.10 is violated by interfering with a firefighter performing a duty delineated in § 633.30. See id. Enforcing fire prevention codes is one of the primary responsibilities of a firefighter under § 633.30 and it was reasonable for Eggert and Watson to believe that Stachel was interfering with the performance of that duty when she tore up the fire inspection form. Therefore, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they had arguable probable cause to arrest Stachel for violating § 806.10(2).
    PAGE 1330
  4. Huml v. Vlazny

    2006 WI 87 (Wis. 2006)   Cited 80 times   2 Legal Analyses
    The statute appears to provide that upon completion of a defendant's probation, the circuit court shall enter a "civil judgment" "for the unpaid restitution," "unless it finds that the victim has already recovered a judgment against the probationer for the damages covered by the restitution order." This judgment has the same force and effect as other judgments for money under Wis. Stat. § 806.10. Accordingly, the statute implies that a separate settlement agreement could encompass the judgment derived from the restitution order and could preclude the victim from enforcing the judgment.
    PAGE 181
  5. ¶ 28. First, our reading of Wis. Stat. § 806.10(3) fits with the language of § 806.10(1). Subsection (1) of Wis. Stat. § 806.10 provides in pertinent part that "[a]t the time of entry of a judgment . . . the clerk of circuit court shall enter the judgment in the judgment and lien docket . . . ." Wisconsin Stat. § 806.10(1) thus contemplates that the docketing of a judgment is contemporaneous with the entry of the judgment:
    PAGE 744
  6. South Milwaukee Savings Bank v. Barczak

    229 Wis. 2d 521 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 7 times
    The plain language of § 806.10(3) as applied to the statutes of limitations found in § 893.93, creates a legitimate debate over which is the proper statute of limitations. Section 893.93(1)(a) imposes a six-year statute of limitations on actions upon liabilities "created by statute when a different limitation is not prescribed by law." Section 806.10(3) plainly creates and imposes liability upon any clerk who fails to docket a judgment at the proper time. By contrast, § 893.93(2)(a) imposes a two-year statute of limitations upon an action by a private party upon a statute penalty. Since South Milwaukee is a private party and § 806.10(3) imposes treble damages, these facts make § 806.10(3) a statute penalty. Therefore, the plain language of § 806.10(3) is of little help in deciding which statute of limitations must be applied. Because the statutory language does not indicate which statute of limitations to apply, we next consider the statute's intended purpose, and determine whether it redresses a public wrong or remedies an individual harm.
    PAGE 532
  7. Stengel v. Medtronic Inc.

    704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013)   Cited 216 times   12 Legal Analyses
    When it received FDA approval of its SynchroMed EL Pump and Catheter, Medtronic was not aware of certain risks associated with the device. Before Stengel was paralyzed, however, Medtronic had become well aware of those risks but had failed to inform the FDA, even though the MDA required Medtronic to do so. The FDA discovered the risks, and discovered that Medtronic already knew about them, when it inspected a Medtronic facility in late 2006 and early 2007. The FDA sent a Warning Letter to Medtronic in July 2007, stating that Medtronic had “misbranded” its Class III device by concealing known risks, in violation of 21 C.F.R. §§ 803.50(a)(1), 806.10(a)(1). In response to the FDA's Warning Letter, Medtronic sent a Medical Device Correction letter to doctors in January 2008. Medtronic recalled the device in March 2008. This advice and recall came too late to help Richard Stengel, who had been paralyzed in 2005.
    PAGE 1227
  8. ¶ 19. Commercial also argues that the clerk of circuit court further violated WIS. STAT. § 806.10(1) by failing to docket the foreclosure judgment, which preceded the deficiency judgment. We summarily reject this argument. Section 806.10(1) expressly applies to "a judgment directing in whole or in part the payment of money." While the judgment of foreclosure indicates an amount due to Commercial from Frykholm, it does not direct or order the payment of any money. To the contrary, the judgment only orders the foreclosure or redemption of the property. Moreover, the foreclosure judgment anticipates the future entry of a deficiency judgment ordering the payment of money in the event the proceeds of the sheriff's sale did not satisfy the amount due to Commercial. Thus, the ensuing deficiency judgment, not the foreclosure judgment, constituted the only judgment eligible for docketing under § 806.10(1).
    PAGE 860
  9. Associated Bank N.A. v. Collier

    2013 WI App. 1 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 1 times
    ¶ 18 The circuit court noted that Decade could have checked whether its judgment had been properly docketed and that it has a remedy against the clerk. SeeWis. Stat. § 806.10(3). Further, while the court did not expressly say so, the record suggests that Collier evaded service from SB1 for months and that Decade's six lawsuits were filed as a dilatory tactic. We may search the record for reasons to sustain the circuit court's exercise of discretion. Randall v. Randall, 2000 WI App 98, ¶ 7, 235 Wis.2d 1, 612 N.W.2d 737. We are satisfied that the court's exercise of discretion was proper.
  10. U.S. v. Frykholm

    Case No. 00 CR 50001-4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2002)
    CMF tries to argue its way around Builder's Lumber but the court finds its attempts unconvincing. First it claims that the Wisconsin legislature "specifically corrected" Builder's Lumber by amending § 806.10 in 1984. Besides taking out the requirement that the debtor's vocation be listed, the 1984 amendment also added the "the validity of the judgment is not affected thereby" language to § 806.10(1)(a). But the court does not at all see how the latter amendment is a reaction againstBuilder's Lumber. If anything, this amendment seems to have directly incorporated the holding of Builder's Lumber, as the court in that case held the judgment creditor had a valid judgment despite the absence of the address and occupation information from the docket — even though § 806.10 at the time did not specifically say that.