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F.S. 806 on Google Scholar

F.S. 806 on Casetext

Amendments to 806


The 2022 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 806
ARSON AND CRIMINAL MISCHIEF
View Entire Chapter
CHAPTER 806 Florida Statutes and Case Law
CHAPTER 806
ARSON AND CRIMINAL MISCHIEF
806.01 Arson.
806.031 Arson resulting in injury to another; penalty.
806.10 Preventing or obstructing extinguishment of fire.
806.101 False alarms of fires.
806.111 Fire bombs.
806.13 Criminal mischief; penalties; penalty for minor.
806.135 Destroying or demolishing a memorial or historic property.
806.14 Art works in public buildings; willful damage; unauthorized removal; penalties.
806.01 Arson.
(1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, or while in the commission of any felony, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged:
(a) Any dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its contents;
(b) Any structure, or contents thereof, where persons are normally present, such as: jails, prisons, or detention centers; hospitals, nursing homes, or other health care facilities; department stores, office buildings, business establishments, churches, or educational institutions during normal hours of occupancy; or other similar structures; or
(c) Any other structure that he or she knew or had reasonable grounds to believe was occupied by a human being,

is guilty of arson in the first degree, which constitutes a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(2) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, or while in the commission of any felony, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged any structure, whether the property of himself or herself or another, under any circumstances not referred to in subsection (1), is guilty of arson in the second degree, which constitutes a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) As used in this chapter, “structure” means any building of any kind, any enclosed area with a roof over it, any real property and appurtenances thereto, any tent or other portable building, and any vehicle, vessel, watercraft, or aircraft.
History.ss. 1, 2, ch. 15603, 1931; CGL 1936 Supp. 7208(8), (9); ss. 786, 787, ch. 71-136; s. 26, ch. 74-383; s. 18, ch. 75-298; s. 1, ch. 79-108; s. 1, ch. 90-225; s. 1228, ch. 97-102.
806.031 Arson resulting in injury to another; penalty.
(1) A person who perpetrates any arson that results in any bodily harm to a firefighter or any other person, regardless of intent or lack of intent to cause such harm, is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(2) A person who perpetrates any arson that results in great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to a firefighter or any other person, regardless of intent or lack of intent to cause such harm, is guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) Upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, a person may be sentenced separately, pursuant to s. 775.021(4), for any violation of this section and for any arson committed during the same criminal episode. A conviction for any arson, however, is not necessary for a conviction under this section.
History.s. 1, ch. 84-23; s. 182, ch. 91-224.
806.10 Preventing or obstructing extinguishment of fire.
(1) Any person who willfully and maliciously injures, destroys, removes, or in any manner interferes with the use of, any vehicles, tools, equipment, water supplies, hydrants, towers, buildings, communication facilities, or other instruments or facilities used in the detection, reporting, suppression, or extinguishment of fire shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) Any person who willfully or unreasonably interferes with, hinders, or assaults, or attempts to interfere with or hinder, any firefighter in the performance of his or her duty shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
History.s. 9, sub-ch. 4, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2433; GS 3280; RGS 5113; CGL 7214; s. 1, ch. 69-232; s. 795, ch. 71-136; s. 28, ch. 74-383; s. 19, ch. 75-298; s. 1229, ch. 97-102.
806.101 False alarms of fires.Whoever, without reasonable cause, by outcry or the ringing of bells, or otherwise, makes or circulates, or causes to be made or circulated, a false alarm of fire, shall for the first conviction be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. A second or subsequent conviction under this section shall constitute a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
History.s. 13, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2706; GS 3682; RGS 5626; CGL 7819; s. 934, ch. 71-136; s. 1A, ch. 71-306; s. 65, ch. 74-383.
Note.Former s. 823.03.
806.111 Fire bombs.
(1) Any person who possesses, manufactures, transports, or disposes of a fire bomb with intent that such fire bomb be willfully and unlawfully used to damage by fire or explosion any structure or property is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) For the purposes of this section:
(a) “Disposes of” means to give, give away, loan, offer, offer for sale, sell, or transfer.
(b) “Fire bomb” means a container containing flammable or combustible liquid, or any incendiary chemical mixture or compound having a wick or similar device capable of being ignited or other means capable of causing ignition; but no device commercially manufactured primarily for the purpose of illumination, heating, or cooking shall be deemed to be such a fire bomb.
(3) Subsection (1) shall not prohibit the authorized use or possession of any material, substance, or device described therein by a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or by firefighters, police officers, peace officers, or law enforcement officers so authorized by duly constituted authorities.
History.s. 3, ch. 67-211; s. 797, ch. 71-136; s. 29, ch. 74-383; s. 19, ch. 75-298; s. 238, ch. 77-104; s. 2, ch. 79-108; s. 46, ch. 88-381; s. 1230, ch. 97-102.
806.13 Criminal mischief; penalties; penalty for minor.
(1)(a) A person commits the offense of criminal mischief if he or she willfully and maliciously injures or damages by any means any real or personal property belonging to another, including, but not limited to, the placement of graffiti thereon or other acts of vandalism thereto.
(b)1. If the damage to such property is $200 or less, it is a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
2. If the damage to such property is greater than $200 but less than $1,000, it is a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
3. If the damage is $1,000 or greater, or if there is interruption or impairment of a business operation or public communication, transportation, supply of water, gas or power, or other public service which costs $1,000 or more in labor and supplies to restore, it is a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
4. If the person has one or more previous convictions for violating this subsection, the offense under subparagraph 1. or subparagraph 2. for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) Any person who willfully and maliciously defaces, injures, or damages by any means any church, synagogue, mosque, or other place of worship, or any religious article contained therein, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if the damage to the property is greater than $200.
(3) Any person who, without the consent of the owner thereof, willfully and maliciously defaces, injures, or otherwise damages by any means a memorial or historic property, as defined in s. 806.135(1), and the value of the damage to the memorial or historic property is greater than $200, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. A court shall order any person convicted of violating this subsection to pay restitution, which shall include the full cost of repair or replacement of such memorial or historic property.
(4) Whoever, without the consent of the owner thereof, willfully destroys or substantially damages any public telephone, or telephone cables, wires, fixtures, antennas, amplifiers, or any other apparatus, equipment, or appliances, which destruction or damage renders a public telephone inoperative or which opens the body of a public telephone, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084; provided, however, that a conspicuous notice of the provisions of this subsection and the penalties provided is posted on or near the destroyed or damaged instrument and visible to the public at the time of the commission of the offense.
(5) Any person who willfully and maliciously defaces, injures, or damages by any means a sexually violent predator detention or commitment facility, as defined in part V of chapter 394, or any property contained therein, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if the damage to property is greater than $200.
(6)(a) The amounts of value of damage to property owned by separate persons, if the property was damaged during one scheme or course of conduct, may be aggregated in determining the grade of the offense under this section.
(b) Any person who violates this section may, in addition to any other criminal penalty, be required to pay for the damages caused by such offense.
(7)(a) Any person who violates this section when the violation is related to the placement of graffiti shall, in addition to any other criminal penalty, be required to pay a fine of:
1. Not less than $250 for a first conviction.
2. Not less than $500 for a second conviction.
3. Not less than $1,000 for a third or subsequent conviction.
(b) Any person convicted under this section when the offense is related to the placement of graffiti shall, in addition to any other criminal penalty, be required to perform at least 40 hours of community service and, if possible, perform at least 100 hours of community service that involves the removal of graffiti.
(c) If a minor commits a delinquent act prohibited under paragraph (a), the parent or legal guardian of the minor is liable along with the minor for payment of the fine. The court may decline to order a person to pay a fine under paragraph (a) if the court finds that the person is indigent and does not have the ability to pay the fine or if the court finds that the person does not have the ability to pay the fine whether or not the person is indigent.
(8) In addition to any other penalty provided by law, if a minor is found to have committed a delinquent act under this section for placing graffiti on any public property or private property, and:
(a) The minor is eligible by reason of age for a driver license or driving privilege, the court may direct the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to revoke or withhold issuance of the minor’s driver license or driving privilege for not more than 1 year.
(b) The minor’s driver license or driving privilege is under suspension or revocation for any reason, the court may direct the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to extend the period of suspension or revocation by an additional period of not more than 1 year.
(c) The minor is ineligible by reason of age for a driver license or driving privilege, the court may direct the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to withhold issuance of the minor’s driver license or driving privilege for not more than 1 year after the date on which he or she would otherwise have become eligible.
(9) A minor whose driver license or driving privilege is revoked, suspended, or withheld under subsection (8) may elect to reduce the period of revocation, suspension, or withholding by performing community service at the rate of 1 day for each hour of community service performed. In addition, if the court determines that due to a family hardship, the minor’s driver license or driving privilege is necessary for employment or medical purposes of the minor or a member of the minor’s family, the court shall order the minor to perform community service and reduce the period of revocation, suspension, or withholding at the rate of 1 day for each hour of community service performed. As used in this subsection, the term “community service” means cleaning graffiti from public property.
(10) Because of the difficulty of confronting the blight of graffiti, it is the intent of the Legislature that municipalities and counties not be preempted by state law from establishing ordinances that prohibit the marking of graffiti or other graffiti-related offenses. Furthermore, as related to graffiti, such municipalities and counties are not preempted by state law from establishing higher penalties than those provided by state law and mandatory penalties when state law provides discretionary penalties. Such higher and mandatory penalties include fines that do not exceed the amount specified in ss. 125.69 and 162.21, community service, restitution, and forfeiture. Upon a finding that a juvenile has violated a graffiti-related ordinance, a court acting under chapter 985 may not provide a disposition of the case which is less severe than any mandatory penalty prescribed by municipal or county ordinance for such violation.
History.s. 27, ch. 74-383; s. 20, ch. 75-298; s. 1, ch. 82-21; s. 1, ch. 86-281; s. 1, ch. 88-273; s. 183, ch. 91-224; s. 1, ch. 95-164; s. 1231, ch. 97-102; s. 1, ch. 98-93; s. 1, ch. 98-415; s. 5, ch. 2001-244; s. 117, ch. 2002-1; s. 1, ch. 2002-163; s. 35, ch. 2019-167; s. 10, ch. 2021-6.
806.135 Destroying or demolishing a memorial or historic property.
(1) As used in this section, the term:
(a) “Historic property” means any building, structure, site, or object that has been officially designated as a historic building, historic structure, historic site, or historic object through a federal, state, or local designation program.
(b) “Memorial” means a plaque, statue, marker, flag, banner, cenotaph, religious symbol, painting, seal, tombstone, structure name, or display that is constructed and located with the intent of being permanently displayed or perpetually maintained; is dedicated to a historical person, an entity, an event, or a series of events; and honors or recounts the military service of any past or present United States Armed Forces military personnel, or the past or present public service of a resident of the geographical area comprising the state or the United States. The term includes, but is not limited to, the following memorials established under chapter 265:
1. Florida Women’s Hall of Fame.
2. Florida Medal of Honor Wall.
3. Florida Veterans’ Hall of Fame.
4. POW-MIA Chair of Honor Memorial.
5. Florida Veterans’ Walk of Honor and Florida Veterans’ Memorial Garden.
6. Florida Law Enforcement Officers’ Hall of Fame.
7. Florida Holocaust Memorial.
8. Florida Slavery Memorial.
9. Any other memorial located within the Capitol Complex, including, but not limited to, Waller Park.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to willfully and maliciously destroy or demolish any memorial or historic property, or willfully and maliciously pull down a memorial or historic property, unless authorized by the owner of the memorial or historic property. A person who violates this section commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) A court shall order any person convicted of violating this section to pay restitution, which shall include the full cost of repair or replacement of such memorial or historic property.
History.s. 11, ch. 2021-6.
806.14 Art works in public buildings; willful damage; unauthorized removal; penalties.
(1) Whoever willfully destroys, mutilates, defaces, injures, or, without authority, removes any work of art displayed in a public building is guilty of a criminal offense.
(2)(a) If the damage to the work of art is such that the cost of restoration, in labor and supplies, or if the replacement value, is $200 or less, the offense is a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(b) If the damage to the work of art is such that the cost of restoration, in labor and supplies, or if the replacement value, is greater than $200 but less than $1,000, the offense is a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(c) If the damage to the work of art is such that the cost of restoration, in labor and supplies, or if the replacement value, is $1,000 or more, the offense is a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
History.s. 2, ch. 80-55; s. 485, ch. 81-259; s. 184, ch. 91-224.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: August 29, 2022
F.S. 806 on Google Scholar

F.S. 806 on Casetext

Amendments to 806


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 806
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

806.01 1 - ARSON - 1ST DEGREE DWELLING BUILDING PEOPLE PRESENT - F: F
806.01 2 - ARSON - 2ND DEGREE - F: S
806.031 1 - ARSON - CAUSE BODILY HARM - M: F
806.031 2 - ARSON - CAUSE GREAT BODILY HARM PERMANENT DISABILITY - F: S
806.10 - HEALTH-SAFETY - PREVENT HINDER FIREFIGHTER OR EQUIPMENT - F: T
806.101 - FALSE FIRE ALARM - FALSE FIRE ALARM 2ND OR SUBSQ OFF - F: T
806.101 - FALSE FIRE ALARM - FALSE FIRE ALARM 1ST OFF - M: F
806.111 - INCENDIARY DEVICE-USING - POSSESS MANUFACTURE ETC WIT FIREBOMB - F: T
806.13 1b1 - DAMAGE PROP-CRIM MISCH - 200 DOLS AND UNDER - M: S
806.13 1b1 - DAMAGE PROP-CRIM MISCH - 200 DOLS OR LESS SUBSQ OFF - F: T
806.13 1b2 - DAMAGE PROP-CRIM MISCH - OVER 200 DOLS UNDER 1000 DOLS - M: F
806.13 1b2 - DAMAGE PROP-CRIM MISCH - OVER 200 UNDER 1000 DOLS SUBSQ OFF - F: T
806.13 1b3 - DAMAGE PROP-CRIM MISCH - 1000 DOLS OR MORE - F: T
806.13 2 - DAMAGE PROP-CRIM MISCH - CHURCH SYNAGOGUE MOSQUE OR RELIGIOUS ARTICLE - F: T
806.13 3 - DAMAGE PROP-CRIM MISCH - PUBLIC PHONE CABLES FIXTURES EQUIPMENT ETC - F: T
806.13 4 - DAMAGE PROP-CRIM MISCH - SEX VIOL PRED FACILITY - F: T
806.14 2a - DAMAGE PROP-PUBLIC - ART WORKS IN PUBLIC BUILDINGS 200 DOLS OR LESS - M: S
806.14 2b - DAMAGE PROP-PUBLIC - ART WORKS IN PUB BLDG OVER 200 UND 1000 DOLS - M: F
806.14 2c - DAMAGE PROP-PUBLIC - ART WORKS IN PUBLIC BUILDING 1000 DOLS OR MORE - F: T
817.806 2 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - VIOLATE CREDIT COUNSELOR LAW - F: T


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S806
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

S806.13 Criminal Mischief (under 18 years of age) [See 806.13(5)] - Points on Drivers License: 0 S
S806.13 Criminal Mischief (under 18 years of age) [See 806.13(5)] NOTE: Criminal Mischief (Under 18 years of age) (If court does not direct to suspend) (When UTC is written) Does not go on driver record as a conviction) Do not send Court Orders unless Court directs Revocation/Suspension. - Points on Drivers License: 0


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd

    563 U.S. 731 (2011)   Cited 7,710 times   8 Legal Analyses
    Fourth Amendment reasonableness "is predominantly an objective inquiry." Edmond, supra, at 47, 121 S.Ct. 447. We ask whether "the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the challenged] action." Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). If so, that action was reasonable "whatever the subjective intent" motivating the relevant officials. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). This approach recognizes that the Fourth Amendment regulates conduct rather than thoughts, Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338, n. 2, 120 S.Ct. 1462, 146 L.Ed.2d 365 (2000) ; and it promotes evenhanded, uniform enforcement of the law, Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153–154, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004).
    PAGE 736
  2. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth App. Dist

    528 U.S. 152 (2000)   Cited 893 times   1 Legal Analyses
    To resolve this case it is unnecessary to cast doubt upon the rationale of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Faretta can be accepted as quite sound, yet it does not follow that a convicted person has a similar right of self-representation on appeal. Different considerations apply in the appellate system, and the Court explains why this is so. With these observations, I join the opinion of the Court.
    PAGE 164
  3. United States v. Knights

    534 U.S. 112 (2001)   Cited 1,689 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Because our holding rests on ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis that considers all the circumstances of a search, there is no basis for examining official purpose. With the limited exception of some special needs and administrative search cases, see Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45 (2000), "we have been unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individual officers." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
    PAGE 122
  4. Ohio v. Robinette

    519 U.S. 33 (1996)   Cited 1,760 times   18 Legal Analyses
    Notwithstanding that the subjective motivation for the officer's decision to stop respondent related to drug interdiction, the legality of the stop depended entirely on the fact that respondent was speeding. Of course, "[a]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). As noted above, however, by the time Robinette was asked for consent to search his automobile, the lawful traffic stop had come to an end; Robinette had been given his warning, and the speeding violation provided no further justification for detention. The continued detention was therefore only justifiable, if at all, on some other grounds.
    PAGE 50
  5. State v. Ray

    364 N.C. 272 (N.C. 2010)   Cited 53 times
    Generally speaking, the appellate courts of this state will not review a trial court's decision to admit evidence unless there has been a timely objection. State v. Thibodeaux, 352 N.C. 570, 581-82, 532 S.E.2d 797, 806 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1155, 121 S.Ct. 1106, 148 L.Ed.2d 976 (2001). To be timely, an objection to the admission of evidence must be made " at the time it is actually introduced at trial." Id. at 581, 532 S.E.2d at 806 (emphasis omitted). It is insufficient to object only to the presenting party's forecast of the evidence. Id. As such, in order to preserve for appellate review a trial court's decision to admit testimony, " objections to [that] testimony must be contemporaneous with the time such testimony is offered into evidence" and not made only during a hearing out of the jury's presence prior to the actual introduction of the testimony. Thibodeaux, 352 N.C. at 581-82, 532 S.E.2d at 806 (citations omitted).
    PAGE 322
  6. Holeman v. City of New London

    425 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2005)   Cited 96 times
    It does not matter whether the stop was on account of the traffic violation, because reasonableness is evaluated from an objective standard. United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 725 (2d Cir. 1998) ("an observed traffic violation legitimates a stop even if the detectives do not rely on the traffic violation"); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).
    PAGE 190
  7. Durocher v. Singletary

    623 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1993)   Cited 64 times
    Competent defendants have the constitutional right to refuse professional counsel and to represent themselves, or not, if they so choose. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Hamblen v. State, 527 So.2d 800 (Fla. 1988). If the right to representation can be waived at trial, we see no reason why the statutory right to collateral counsel cannot also be waived. On May 26, 1993 Durocher had the following affidavit placed on file with prison officials:
    PAGE 484
  8. Jimmy Day Plumbing v. Smith

    964 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 2007)   Cited 102 times
    Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P., requires that arguments in an appellant's brief contain "citations to the cases, statutes, other authorities, and parts of the record relied on." Further, "it is well settled that a failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 28(a)(10) requiring citation of authority in support of the arguments presented provides this Court with a basis for disregarding those arguments." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Motley, 909 So.2d 806, 822 (Ala. 2005) (citing Ex parte Showers, 812 So.2d 277, 281 (Ala. 2001)). This is so, because "`it is not the function of this Court to do a party's legal research or to make and address legal arguments for a party based on undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient authority or argument.'" Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So.2d 1, 20 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So.2d 248, 251 (Ala. 1994)).
    PAGE 9
  9. U.S. v. Morales

    902 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1990)   Cited 118 times
    A jury verdict in a criminal case is not to be overturned lightly, and therefore a Rule 33 motion is not to be granted lightly. United States v. Reed, supra, 875 F.2d at 113; United States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 1985). But if the judge believes there is a serious danger that a miscarriage of justice has occurred — that is, that an innocent person has been convicted — he has the power to set the verdict aside, United States v. Rothrock, 806 F.2d 318, 321-22 (1st Cir. 1986), even if he does not think that he made any erroneous rulings at the trial. The existence of the power implies, in extreme cases anyway, a duty enforceable by an appellate court. Rule 33's conferral of discretion on the district court ("the court . . . may grant") is not a license to abuse it. Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552, 70 S.Ct. 317, 94 L.Ed. 335 (1950); United States v. Wiley, 517 F.2d 1212, 1219-20 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Parks, 460 F.2d 736, 745-46 (5th Cir. 1972).
    PAGE 606
  10. Litchfield Asset Management Corp. v. Howell

    70 Conn. App. 133 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002)   Cited 199 times
    "A corporation is a separate legal entity, separate and apart from its stockholders. . . . It is an elementary principle of corporate law that a corporation and its stockholders are separate entities and that . . . corporate property is vested in the corporation and not in the owner of the corporate stock." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Radzvilowicz, 47 Conn. App. 1, 18-19, 703 A.2d 767, cert. denied, 243 Conn. 955, 704 A.2d 806 (1997). That principle also is applicable to limited liability companies and their members. General Statutes § 34-133. The assets of a corporation or limited liability company, therefore, typically are not available to creditors seeking to recover amounts owed by a stockholder or member of that corporation or limited liability company. Nonetheless, "[c]ourts will . . . disregard the fiction of a separate legal entity to pierce the shield of immunity afforded by the corporate structure in a situation in which the corporate entity has been so controlled and dominated that justice requires liability to be imposed. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Angelo Tomasso, Inc. v. Armor…
    PAGE 148