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F.S. 810.011 on Google Scholar

F.S. 810.011 on Casetext

Amendments to 810.011


The 2022 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 810
BURGLARY AND TRESPASS
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 810.011 Florida Statutes and Case Law
810.011 Definitions.As used in this chapter:
(1) “Structure” means a building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof. However, during the time of a state of emergency declared by executive order or proclamation of the Governor under chapter 252 and within the area covered by such executive order or proclamation and for purposes of ss. 810.02 and 810.08 only, the term means a building of any kind or such portions or remnants thereof as exist at the original site, regardless of absence of a wall or roof.
(2) “Dwelling” means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether such building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof. However, during the time of a state of emergency declared by executive order or proclamation of the Governor under chapter 252 and within the area covered by such executive order or proclamation and for purposes of ss. 810.02 and 810.08 only, the term includes such portions or remnants thereof as exist at the original site, regardless of absence of a wall or roof.
(3) “Conveyance” means any motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad vehicle or car, trailer, aircraft, or sleeping car; and “to enter a conveyance” includes taking apart any portion of the conveyance. However, during the time of a state of emergency declared by executive order or proclamation of the Governor under chapter 252 and within the area covered by such executive order or proclamation and for purposes of ss. 810.02 and 810.08 only, the term “conveyance” means a motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad vehicle or car, trailer, aircraft, or sleeping car or such portions thereof as exist.
(4) An act is committed “in the course of committing” if it occurs in an attempt to commit the offense or in flight after the attempt or commission.
(5)(a) “Posted land” is that land upon which:
1. Signs are placed not more than 500 feet apart along, and at each corner of, the boundaries of the land, upon which signs there appears prominently, in letters of not less than 2 inches in height, the words “no trespassing” and in addition thereto the name of the owner, lessee, or occupant of said land. Said signs shall be placed along the boundary line of posted land in a manner and in such position as to be clearly noticeable from outside the boundary line; or
2.a. Conspicuous no trespassing notice is painted on trees or posts on the property, provided that the notice is:
(I) Painted in an international orange color and displaying the stenciled words “No Trespassing” in letters no less than 2 inches high and 1 inch wide either vertically or horizontally;
(II) Placed so that the bottom of the painted notice is not less than 3 feet from the ground or more than 5 feet from the ground; and
(III) Placed at locations that are readily visible to any person approaching the property and no more than 500 feet apart on agricultural land.
b. When a landowner uses the painted no trespassing posting to identify a “no trespassing” area, those painted notices shall be accompanied by signs complying with subparagraph 1. and placed conspicuously at all places where entry to the property is normally expected or known to occur.
(b) It shall not be necessary to give notice by posting on any enclosed land or place not exceeding 5 acres in area on which there is a dwelling house in order to obtain the benefits of ss. 810.09 and 810.12 pertaining to trespass on enclosed lands.
(6) “Cultivated land” is that land which has been cleared of its natural vegetation and is presently planted with a crop, orchard, grove, pasture, or trees or is fallow land as part of a crop rotation.
(7) “Fenced land” is that land which has been enclosed by a fence of substantial construction, whether with rails, logs, post and railing, iron, steel, barbed wire, other wire, or other material, which stands at least 3 feet in height. For the purpose of this chapter, it shall not be necessary to fence any boundary or part of a boundary of any land which is formed by water.
(8) Where lands are posted, cultivated, or fenced as described herein, then said lands, for the purpose of this chapter, shall be considered as enclosed and posted.
(9) “Litter” means any garbage, rubbish, trash, refuse, debris, can, bottle, box, container, paper, tobacco product, tire, domestic or commercial appliance, mechanical equipment or part, building or construction material, tool, machinery, wood, motor vehicle or motor vehicle part, vessel, aircraft, or farm machinery or equipment; sludge from a waste treatment facility, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility; or substance in any form resulting from domestic, industrial, commercial, mining, agricultural, or governmental operations.
(10) “Dump” means to dump, throw, discard, place, deposit, or dispose of any litter.
(11) “Commercial horticulture property” means any property that is cleared of its natural vegetation and is planted in commercially cultivated horticulture products that are planted, grown, or harvested. The term also includes property that is used for the commercial sale, use, or distribution of horticulture products.
(12) “Agricultural chemicals manufacturing facility” means any facility, and any properties or structures associated with the facility, used for the manufacture, processing, or storage of agricultural chemicals classified in Industry Group 287 contained in the Standard Industrial Classification Manual, 1987, as published by the Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President.
(13) “Construction site” means any property upon which there is construction that is subject to building permit posting requirements.
History.s. 30, ch. 74-383; s. 1, ch. 76-46; s. 1, ch. 82-87; s. 1, ch. 92-351; s. 1, ch. 94-263; s. 1, ch. 94-307; s. 47, ch. 96-388; s. 13, ch. 99-188; s. 3, ch. 2001-182; s. 49, ch. 2001-279; s. 15, ch. 2006-289; s. 1, ch. 2007-123; s. 4, ch. 2007-244; s. 166, ch. 2020-2.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: August 29, 2022
F.S. 810.011 on Google Scholar

F.S. 810.011 on Casetext

Amendments to 810.011


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 810.011
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 810.011.


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S810.011
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 810.011.


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Perkins v. State

    682 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1996)   Cited 30 times
    The house Perkins burglarized served as the owner's residence for many years before becoming a residential rental property. Although no one occupied the house at the time of the burglary, it was "designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night," and the owner intended it be used for that purpose. Because the house falls within the plain meaning of the definition of "dwelling" under section 810.011(2), we conclude that Perkins was properly convicted and sentenced for the second-degree felony of burglary of a dwelling. See § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. (1995).
    PAGE 1085
  2. Jacobs v. State

    41 So. 3d 1004 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 10 times
    "Dwelling" means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch . . . which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof. Fla. Stat. § 810.011(2) (2009).
    PAGE 1006
  3. L.C. v. State

    579 So. 2d 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 5 times
    We agree with appellants' argument that, in amending section 810.011(2), the legislature did not intend to overrule the common-law definition of a dwelling for purposes of the burglary statute. Nevertheless, the appellants' adjudications on the count of burglary of a dwelling must be affirmed because, under the common-law definition, the house burglarized in this case would still meet the definition of a dwelling. See e.g. Herbert v. State, 439 So.2d 971 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (motel room is a "dwelling" within meaning of section 810.011(2), without regard for whether it has been rented out at the time of the offense). A house which otherwise is a dwelling under common law does not lose that character where the only significant change in circumstances is that the sole occupant has died.
    PAGE 784
  4. State v. Bennett

    565 So. 2d 803 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 9 times
    We find only two post-amendment cases debating what sort of structure may constitute a "dwelling." Herbert v. State, 439 So.2d 971 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), held that a motel room is a "dwelling" by virtue of section 810.011(2) as amended. On the other hand, in P.P.M. v. State, 447 So.2d 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), we held that a vacant house was not a dwelling for purposes of the arson statute. Nowhere in Chapter 806 is there a definition of "dwelling" except the phrase "whether occupied or not" contained in section 806.01(1)(a). Thus the common law definition of "dwelling" continues to apply to arson prosecutions, and P.P.M. is inappropriate for analogy to burglary cases.
    PAGE 805
  5. United States v. Stitt

    139 S. Ct. 399 (2018)   Cited 179 times
    Alaska Stat. §§ 11.46.300, 11.46.310, 11.81.900(b)(3) (1989) (effective 1978); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13–1501(7)–(8), 13–1507, 13–1508 (1978); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 41–2001(1), 41–2002 (Michie 1977); Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 459, 460 (West 1970) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18–4–101(1) – (2), 18–4–202, 18–4–203 (1978) ; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53a–100(a), 53a–101, 53a–103 (1985 Cum. Supp.); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §§ 222(1), 824, 825 (1979); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 810.011( 2), 810.02 (1976) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 16–7–1(a) (1984); Idaho Code Ann. § 18–1401 (1979); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 38, § 19–1 (West 1985) ; Iowa Code §§ 702.12, 713.1 (1985); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21–3715, 21–3716 (1988) (effective 1970); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:62 (West 1974 Cum. Supp.); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17–A, §§ 2(10), 2(24), 401 (1983) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 266, § 16A (West 1970) ; Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45–2–101(40), 45–6–204 (1983); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 205.060 (1986); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 635:1 (1974) ; N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:18–1, 2C:18–2 (West 1982) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 30–16–3, 30–16–4 (2018) (effective 1978); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2909.01, 2911.11, 2911.12 (Lexis 1982) ; Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, …
    PAGE 408
  6. Taylor v. State

    818 So. 2d 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 186 times
    Three sections in the act involve substantive criminal provisions. Section 7 creates the new offense of repeat sexual batterer, section 794.0115, Florida Statutes (1999), and section 8 amends section 794.011, Florida Statutes (1997), to conform to the new crime created in section 7. Section 13 amends the definition of a conveyance in the burglary statute, section 810.011, Florida Statutes (1997). Ch. 99-188, § 7, at 1052-53; § 8, at 1053-56; § 13, at 1081, Laws of Fla.
    PAGE 547
  7. United States v. Matchett

    802 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2015)   Cited 427 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Although the definition of a crime of violence specifically includes the crime of “burglary of a dwelling,” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), the Florida offense of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling, Fla. Stat. § 810.02(1)(b), (3)(b), does not fall under that definition. The Florida offense includes burglary of “the curtilage” of the dwelling. Fla. Stat. § 810.011( 2). “[T]he inclusion of curtilage takes Florida's underlying offense of burglary outside the [federal] definition of ‘generic burglary’ ..., which requires an unlawful entry into, or remaining in, ‘a building or other structure.’ ” James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 212, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 1599, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 2158, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) ), overruled in part by Johnson, 135 S.Ct. 2551. Here, the government presented no evidence that the “charging paper and jury instructions actually required the jury to find all the elements of generic burglary in order to convict the defendant.” United States v. Matthews, 466 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir.2006) (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. at 2160 ) (internal quotation marks…
    PAGE 1197
  8. United States v. Esprit

    841 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2016)   Cited 39 times
    Id. § 810.011(2); see also id. § 810.011(1) (defining “structure” as “a building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof”).
    PAGE 1237
  9. State v. Huggins

    802 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2001)   Cited 56 times
    810.011 Definitions.-As used in this chapter:
    PAGE 279