The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . . § 810.07 , Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . . § 810.07(2) (2016) ; Irvin v. State, 590 So.2d 9 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). . . .
. . . See § 810.07(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) ; Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 13.1. . . .
. . . . § 810.07 Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the stealthy-entry inference set forth in section 810.07 . . . In accordance with section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes, evidence in a burglary trial that the defendant . . . Before the trial judge may instruct the jury on the section 810.07 inference, the State “must present . . .
. . . .” § 810.07(1), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . the early hours of the morning are sufficient to impair the statutory presumption created by section 810.07 . . .
. . . The trial court was referring to the statutory presumption in section 810.07(1). . . . .” § 810.07(1); see also J.J.D., 973 So.2d at 1255 (stating that there was no evidence that the juvenile . . . “entered in a stealthy manner and thus triggered the presumption of intent under section 810.07(1)”) . . .
. . . In L.S., we said that the state may rely on section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1983), the burglary presumption . . . This principle is also evident from the very existence of section 810.07 of the Florida Statutes, which . . . owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense.” § 810.07 . . . See § 810.07(1), Fla. . . . straightforward requirement of the statute itself and the establishment of a prima facie case under section 810.07 . . .
. . . Furthermore, to prove intent, the State could rely on the statutory presumption of section 810.07(1); . . .
. . . . § 810.07 Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . was shown by his prior violent interactions with Woodard; rather, she argued consistent with section 810.07 . . . owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of entering with the intent to commit an offense.” § 810.07 . . .
. . . See § 810.07(1); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 13.1. . . .
. . . . § 810.07 Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . See § 810.07(1). . . .
. . . See § 810.07(2), Fla. Stat. (2010); L.S. v. State, 464 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 1985). . . .
. . . Section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes (2007), provides, “In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of . . . owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense.” § 810.07 . . .
. . . , the State requested that the jury be instructed on the statutory presumption set forth in section 810.07 . . . To utilize the presumption set forth in section 810.07, the State must present evidence of the owner . . . ’s argument that intent could be inferred based upon the statutory presumption set forth in section 810.07 . . . similarly insufficient evidence to support the employment of the statutory presumption set forth in section 810.07 . . .
. . . See § 810.07(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .
. . . .§ 810.02(l)(b), § 810.02(2)09, § 810.07, Fla. Stat. (2005). . . .
. . . . § 810.07. . . . One definition for the term “stealthily,” as used in § 810.07, is “ ‘[a]ny secret, sly or clandestine . . . Stat. § 810.07. See Rodnguez-Lopez, 363 F.3d at 1137. . . .
. . . . § 810.07 Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . that J.J.D. entered in a stealthy manner and thus triggered the presumption of intent under section 810.07 . . .
. . . occupant thereof shall be prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense”) (quoting § 810.07 . . . In that case, absent section 810.07, the state could not take the case to a jury in the face of the Standard . . .
. . . . § 810.07 Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . Section 810.07(2) provides: “In a trial on the charge of attempted burglary, proof of the attempt to . . .
. . . . §§ 810.02(1) and (3); 810.07, Fla. Stat. (2001). .See Washington v. . . .
. . . . §§ 810.02(1),(3); 810.07, Fla. Stat. (2002). . § 812.014(1),(2)(c), Fla. . . .
. . . Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (2002), establishes that proof of stealthy entry is prima facie evidence . . .
. . . Dawson, 681 So.2d 1206, 1207 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); see also § 810.07(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . .
. . . . §§ 810.02(1), (2)(b); 810.07, Fla. Stat. . § 812.014(1), (2)(c)5, Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . .
. . . . §§ 810.02(1) and (3), and 810.07, Fla. Slat. (1997). . § 812.014(1) and (3)(a), Fla. . . .
. . . See § 810.07, Fla. . . . structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof’); § 810.07 . . .
. . . . § 810.07, FlaStat. . . .
. . . The state’s case, however, is aided by the statutory presumption contained in section 810.07(1) which . . .
. . . Under section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes (2001), in burglary cases, “proof of the entering of such structure . . .
. . . . §§ 810.02(1), 810.02(2)(a), 810.07, 775.087(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . . .
. . . common sense and Florida law, such an entry is done with the purpose of committing a crime inside: 810.07 . . . the owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense. 810.07 . . .
. . . . §§ 810.02(1) & (2), 810.07, Fla. Stat. (1996). . § 812.014(1) & (2)(c), Fla. . . .
. . . Pursuant to section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes (1999), this was prima facie evidence of his entering . . .
. . . On July 27, 1999, the government issued a Treasury draft to Adcock-Ladd in the sum of $320,-810.07, which . . .
. . . See § 810.07(2), Fla. Stat. (1999) ANTOON, C.J., THOMPSON and SAWAYA, JJ., concur. . . .
. . . See § 810.07(2), Fla.Stat. (1997); L.S. v. State, 464 So.2d 1196 (Fla.1985). . . .
. . . See § 810.07(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .
. . . . §§ 810.02(1) and (4); 810.07, Fla. Stat. (1997). . § 775.084, Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .
. . . (See section 810.07, Florida Statutes, which is a part of the jury instructions on burglary) and the . . .
. . . According to section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes (1993) , this evidence was sufficient prima facie evidence . . .
. . . . §§ 810.02 and 810.07 (convicted). . . .
. . . the early hours of the morning are sufficient to impair the statutory presumption created by section 810.07 . . . Pui’suant to section 810.07, proof of entering stealthily and without consent is prima facie evidence . . .
. . . Instead, "it is an evidentiary tool [under section 810.07] with which to establish prima facie proof . . .
. . . State, 464 So.2d 1195 (Fla.1985); § 810.07, Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .
. . . 777.04(1), 777.04(4), and 794.011(4)(a); and (4) Burglary with an assault contrary to §§ 810.02 and 810.07 . . .
. . . Thus, section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes (1989), provides that “proof of the entering of such structure . . . 1991) (in prosecution for attempted burglary of a conveyance, stealth instruction was proper under § 810.07 . . .
. . . A subsequent section, 810.07(1), provides that: In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering . . . Furthermore, in a prosecution for burglary the state may rely on section 810.07 as prima facie evidence . . . That pronouncement is no longer effective since the legislature amended section 810.07 by adding subsection . . . required in the charging document and that the proof of intent may be facilitated by resort to section 810.07 . . . In that case, absent section 810.07, the state could not take the case to a jury in the face of the Standard . . .
. . . At trial the State relied on section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1989), which provides in part, “In a trial . . . Id. § 810.07(2). . . .
. . . Waters, 436 So.2d 66 (Fla.1983); Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1989). . . .
. . . Further, section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1989), provides that proof of stealthy entry is prima facie . . .
. . . Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1985) states: In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering . . .
. . . Appellant was charged with one count of armed burglary of a structure, in violation of section 810.07 . . .
. . . burglary of a structure with presumption of intent, a third degree felony according to sections 810.02 and 810.07 . . .
. . . 466 (it was error for the court to instruct the jury on the burglary presumption of intent statute, § 810.07 . . . Waters, 436 So.2d at 70 (section 810.07 does not apply to attempted burglary), the error was corrected . . .
. . . A prima facie case of burglary was made out under Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1983), which provides . . .
. . . the element of intent in a burglary prosecution by use of the presumption of intent statute section 810.07 . . .
. . . In L.S., we said that the state may rely on section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1983), the burglary presumption . . . As indicated earlier, section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), is fully consistent with this approach . . .
. . . the establishment of a prima facie case of burglary under the presumption of intent statute, section 810.07 . . . As a part of our answer to the certified question, we stated: In this case, however, section 810.07 is . . . We therefore decline to expand the scope of section 810.07 beyond the clearly expressed legislative intent . . . Proof of the elements set out in section 810.07 is sufficient to establish prima facie evidence of such . . . In a prosecution for burglary, the state may rely on section 810.07 as prima facie evidence of intent . . .
. . . on stealthy entry because the state is prohibited from relying on the presumption created by section 810.07 . . .
. . . the element of intent in a burglary prosecution by use of the presumption of intent statute, section 810.07 . . . Section 810.07 provides: In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure . . . defendant did intend to commit the specified offense and must do so without the benefit of section 810.07 . . . intend to commit a specific offense after the breaking and entering, it may avail itself of section 810.07 . . .
. . . . §§ 810.02(1); 810.02(3) & 810.07, Fla.Stat. (1983). . § 812.014(l)(a)(b), Fla.Stat. (1983). . . . .
. . . Schraader’s home; and (b) the court erred in deriving that intent from section 810.07, Florida Statutes . . .
. . . decision merely permitted the state to allege a violation of the burglary statute in the language of § 810.07 . . .
. . . jury to find proof of intent to commit theft, based on the statutory presumption set forth in section 810.07 . . . Appeal in the negative, holding that it was improper to rely on the statutory presumption of section 810.07 . . . statutory presumption may be used where there is proof of an entry: In this case, however, section 810.07 . . . INVOLVED, IS IT PROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO RELY UPON THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION SET FORTH IN SECTION 810.07 . . .
. . . this case is whether or not the state can rely on the burglary presumptive intent statute, section 810.07 . . . intend to commit a specific offense after the breaking and entering, it may avail itself of section 810.07 . . . Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1981), provides: Prima facie evidence of intent. — In a trial on the . . .
. . . with intending to commit a specific offense, it may not rely upon the presumption afforded by section 810.07 . . . intend to commit a specific offense after the breaking and entering, it may avail itself of section 810.07 . . . further appears that by seeking a bill of particulars, a defendant may be able to circumvent section 810.07 . . .
. . . prove intent at all, erroneously relying on proof of the presumption of intent as provided in section 810.07 . . . It then addressed the issue of whether proof of the factual elements set out in section 810.07 would . . . intend to commit a specific offense after the breaking and entering, it may avail itself of section 810.07 . . . Section 810.07 provides: Prima facie evidence of intent. — In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof . . .
. . . stealthily without the occupant’s consent with intent to commit some offense, contrary to Sections 810.07 . . . by the conventional method first and then as an alternative charge set out the elements of section 810.07 . . . State, 402 So.2d 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), which held that section 810.07 does not establish a substantive . . . Waters, 436 So.2d 66 (Fla.1983), we held that the elements in section 810.07 do not constitute the crime . . . However, we held in Waters and Rozier that section 810.07 should not be used as an allegational alternative . . .
. . . need to plead intent to commit a specific offense and that whether it did or did not so plead, section 810.07 . . . The court also held that the statutory language of section 810.07 allows the state, during the course . . . Second, if the state does not allege that the accused intended to commit a specific offense, section 810.07 . . . Furthermore, when the state does so charge, the proof must be established without the benefit of section 810.07 . . . Since section 810.07 only applies when no specific offense is alleged in an information charging burglary . . .
. . . Stat. 810.02(3) and Fla.Stat. 810.07.” . . . Gonzalez filed a motion to declare Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), unconstitutional. . . .
. . . theft and/or did enter stealthily and without the owner’s consent pursuant to Florida Statutes Section 810.07 . . . a prima facie case of burglary by relying exclusively on the evidentiary presumption set forth in § 810.07 . . . So.2d 1131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), the State contends that the eviden-tiary presumption set forth in § 810.07 . . . Nor can we extend the words and meaning of section 810.07 to make it applicable to allegations in the . . . Is the statutory rebuttable presumption contained in section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979) sufficient . . .
. . . The state also argued that section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), could be relied upon to establish . . . Is the statutory rebuttable presumption contained in section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), sufficient . . . The second certified question pertains to the operation and effect of section 810.07, Florida Statutes . . . The predecessor of section 810.07 was first enacted in 1895. Ch. 4405, § 5, Laws of Fla. (1895). . . . Section 810.07 only comes into operation as an alternative means of proving the element of intent. . . .
. . . These cases have to do with the construction and application of sections 810.02 and 810.07, Florida Statutes . . . The main question on appeal was whether allegations of the elements of section 810.07 were a sufficient . . . Proof of the elements of section 810.07 does not, however, prove the crime but only constitutes prima . . . Thus proof of the section 810.07 elements is a sufficient evidentiary basis for a finding of the intent . . . Section 810.07 provides: In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure . . .
. . . This latter allegation was obviously suggested by section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1981). . . .
. . . We note that section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), which existed prior to the 1975 revision, provides . . .
. . . He argues that a jury instruction based on section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979) should not have been . . . it asked for and received, over the defendant’s objection, the standard instruction based on section 810.07 . . . COBB and COWART, JJ., concur. . § 810.02, Fla.Stat. (1979). . § 810.07, Fla.Stat. (1979) provides: In . . .
. . . Since § 810.07, Fla.Stat., relied upon by the state in drafting the instant information, creates only . . .
. . . stealthily without the occupant’s consent with intent to commit some offense, contrary to Sections 810.07 . . . State, 402 So.2d 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), defendant argued that § 810.07, Fla.Stat. is not a substantive . . . to comply with the “general to particular” rule of pleading and yet give force and effect to Section 810.07 . . .
. . . we determine whether an allegation of stealth and lack of consent of the owner pursuant to Section 810.07 . . .
. . . This case is unaffected by the “presumption statute,” Section 810.07, which creates a prima facie inference . . .
. . . Section 810.07, Florida Statutes, enacted in 1975, provides: Prima facie evidence of intent In a trial . . . a dwelling “with intent to commit an offense therein contrary to Florida Statutes 810.-02(1)(3) and 810.07 . . . Fourth District Court of Appeal did not agree with the contention of the State, saying that section 810.07 . . . Section 810.07, Florida Statutes, was apparently an attempt by the legislature to help the State with . . . Nor can we extend the words and meaning of section 810.07 to make it applicable to allegations in the . . .
. . . Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979). See Kersey v. State, 73 Fla. 832, 74 So. 983 (1917); M. . . .
. . . the state has the choice of alleging the specific offense or of alleging its reliance upon Section 810.07 . . . to commit a specific offense and as to the effect of the evidentiary presumption created by Section 810.07 . . . Is the statutory rebuttable presumption contained in Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979) sufficient . . . state not alleged an intent to commit a specific offense and instead alleged reliance upon Section 810.07 . . .
. . . Fields, 390 So.2d 128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); § 810.07, Fla.Stat. (1977). . . .
. . . However, it does not address Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), wherein the Legislature said that . . . to comply with the “general to particular” rule of pleading and yet give force and effect to Section 810.07 . . . As indicated earlier, Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), is fully consistent with this approach . . .
. . . GERTRUDE WATERS, with intent to commit an offense therein, contrary to Florida Statutes 810.02(1)(3) and 810.07 . . . foregoing requirements because of the reference therein to several statutory sections, 810.02(1), (3) and 810.07 . . . Section 810.07 has to do with proof of intent: “In a trial of the charge of burglary, proof of the entering . . .
. . . The State relies upon Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), which provides: In a trial on the charge . . .
. . . financed items had been sold out of trust and submitted an inventory worksheet to Boudreau showing $810.07 . . .
. . . See Section 810.07, Florida Statutes. McNULTY, Acting C. J., and BOARD-MAN and GRIMES, JJ., concur. . . .