F.S. 812.019 on Google Scholar

F.S. 812.019 on Casetext

Amendments to 812.019

The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)

Title XLVI
Chapter 812
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 812.019 Florida Statutes and Case Law
812.019 Dealing in stolen property.
(1) Any person who traffics in, or endeavors to traffic in, property that he or she knows or should know was stolen shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in ss. 775.082, 775.083, and 775.084.
(2) Any person who initiates, organizes, plans, finances, directs, manages, or supervises the theft of property and traffics in such stolen property shall be guilty of a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in ss. 775.082, 775.083, and 775.084.
History.s. 7, ch. 77-342; s. 1237, ch. 97-102.

Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: March 07, 2023
F.S. 812.019 on Google Scholar

F.S. 812.019 on Casetext

Amendments to 812.019

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 812.019
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

812.019 1 - STOLEN PROP-DEAL IN - - F: S

Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S812.019
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

Current data shows no reason a civil citation or a suspension or revocation of license should have been issued under Florida Statute 812.019.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

  1. Goddard v. State

    458 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1984)   Cited 20 times
    Instead of being charged with theft under section 812.014 and trafficking in stolen property under section 812.019(1), Goddard was charged with a violation of section 812.019(2), which provides that "[a]ny person who initiates, organizes, plans, finances, directs, manages, or supervises the theft of property and traffics in such stolen property shall be guilty of a felony of the first degree. . . ." At the charge conference the prosecutor advised the trial judge that there were no lesser included offenses to the charge under section 812.019(2). Defense counsel raised no objection. In its final argument, the state asserted that because Goddard stole and then sold the stainless steel parts, he had violated section 812.019(2).
    PAGE 232
  2. State v. Camp

    596 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1992)   Cited 19 times
    Section 812.019(1) provides:
  3. Capaldo v. State

    679 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1996)   Cited 4 times
    On appeal, the district court affirmed the conviction on the basis of its previous decision in Lamar v. Keesee, 512 So.2d 1066 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), which held that there need not be stolen property to sustain a conviction under section 812.019 (1). Capaldo, 654 So.2d at 1208. However, the district court also noted that in reaching this conclusion in Lamar it had "distinguish[ed] between trafficking in stolen property and endeavoring to traffic in stolen property as though these [were] two separate offenses under the same statute." Id. at 1209. The court recognized that this ruling could be inconsistent with this Court's holdings in State v. Sykes, 434 So.2d 325 (Fla. 1983) (finding that the theft statute containing similar statutory language revealed a legislative intent to define theft as including attempt to commit theft), and State v. Tomas, 370 So.2d 1142 (Fla. 1979) (upholding constitutionality of section 812.019 (1)). Id. Thus, the district court certified the question to this Court. Id.
    PAGE 719
  4. Neals v. State

    962 So. 2d 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 3 times
    Section 812.019(1), Florida Statutes, provides:
    PAGE 927
  5. Lancaster v. State

    369 So. 2d 687 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 7 times
    Lancaster appeals his conviction under Section 812.019, Florida Statutes (1977), pursuant to a plea of nolo contendere reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss the information on the ground that there were no material disputed facts and that the undisputed facts did not establish a prima facie case. Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4). Lancaster urges that he could not properly be convicted under Section 812.019 because the undisputed evidence, established by affidavit, lacked a prima facie showing that Lancaster, who was in possession of property he knew or should have known was stolen, intended to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense, or otherwise dispose of that property. Sections 812.012(7)(b), .019, Florida Statutes (1977). The state, on appeal, agrees with Lancaster's interpretation of the statute. We also agree.
  6. Townsley v. State

    443 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 9 times
    Appellant appeals his conviction, after trial by jury, of dealing in stolen property in violation of section 812.019, Florida Statutes. The evidence does not support a finding that appellant was trafficking in or endeavoring to traffic in stolen property, as charged under that statute. We reverse.
  7. Like civil theft, a civil claim for dealing in stolen property requires an injury resulting from a violation of the criminal statute prohibiting dealing in stolen property, Fla. Stat. § 812.019. Accordingly, to state a claim for dealing in stolen property, UTC must allege that West-Hem, with felonious intent, (1) trafficked in, or endeavored to traffic in, property that it knew or should have known was stolen, or (2) initiated, organized, planned, financed, directed, managed, or supervised the theft of property and trafficked in such stolen property. Fla. Stat. §§ 772.11 (providing civil remedy for theft or exploitation), 812.019 (criminal dealing in stolen property statute); cf. In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases — Report No. 2006-2, 962 So.2d 310, 327 (Fla. 2007).
    PAGE 1271
  8. Jackson v. State

    926 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 2006)   Cited 1,638 times
    More specifically, Braxton claims that the trial court invalidated section 775.087, Florida Statutes (1993), by not convicting him under it. On March 23, 1995, a jury found Braxton guilty of one count of burglary with assault, a violation of section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1993), and one count of dealing in stolen property, a violation of section 812.019, Florida Statutes (1993). On April 7, 1995, the trial court held a sentencing hearing, which included a separate proceeding in which Braxton was sentenced as a habitual felony offender. The trial court recognized that Braxton's adult criminal history (i.e., nine arrests, twelve charges, seven felony convictions, two misdemeanor convictions, and multiple violations of community control) reflected a "total inability to comply with any law or authority" and that Braxton's crimes are "escalating in that more and more violence is becoming part of his method." Therefore, the court sentenced Braxton to concurrent sentences of forty years for burglary with assault and fifteen years for dealing in stolen property. Braxton appealed this sentence on the grounds that the facts at trial clearly established that he should have been…
    PAGE 1265
  9. Hall v. State

    826 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 2002)   Cited 44 times
    Under the dealing in stolen property statute, [t]he penalties are higher for a person who organizes or directs the fencing operation [under section 812.019(2)] than for the person who merely "traffics in" stolen property [under section 812.019(1)]. . . . The penalties are graded according to the offender's role, but not according to the value of the property involved.
    PAGE 271
  10. Blackmon v. State

    121 So. 3d 535 (Fla. 2013)   Cited 24 times
    “It thus appears that the ‘remedial goal’ of section 812.019(2) is to discourage organized theft by imposing a harsher penalty on the individual who actually organizes thefts and traffics in stolen goods than on the common thief who simply steals and then sells those goods.” Goddard, 458 So.2d at 234.
    PAGE 542